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Social Structure and Party Support in the East Asian Democracies

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Abstract

Political parties are indispensable for democratic consolidation. In turn, a stable and effective party system depends on consistent and enduring support from social groups. Using the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm as a point of departure, this article tests the relationship between social structure and party support in six Asian democracies—Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan—using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset. The results show that, outside of the two Australasian countries, the four Lipset-Rokkan social cleavages are only loosely related to party support, mainly through center-periphery and urban-rural divisions. The absence of an owner-worker cleavage is explained by the suppression of labor-based parties in several of the countries. More generally, the results suggest the importance of the socializing experiences associated with the democratic transitions in the each of the four newer democracies.

Social Structure and Party Support in the East Asian Democracies

As the world continues with its greatest-ever experiment in democracy, the past half century has seen democratic consolidations occur across the globe, from former military dictatorships in Latin America and the postcommunist states of central and eastern Europe, to the ‘tiger’ economies of East Asia. While scholars disagree about many aspects of the nature and direction of these transitions, one element that few disagree on is the central role that political parties play in the process. And the key to the successful institutionalization of a party system is the creation of an enduring link between the social structure and the main party and policy alternatives that exist in the country. Once such a link has been embedded over successive elections, the coalescence of voters’ loyalties around the main party groupings should ensure long-term continuity in the choice sets open to voters.

Using the paradigm developed by Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipsetⁱ to explain how and why parties come to represent social cleavages, this article examines the relationship between social structure and party support in six East Asian. We examine Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Taiwan; the nations included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset. Broadly comparable measures of social structure are available for these nations. The six countries represent a diverse range of Asian democratic experience. Australia and New Zealand represent the established Westminster democracies, while Japan is the only other long-term democracy in the region. Korea and Taiwan appear to have consolidated following lengthy periods of military rule and political repression that stunted the formation of their party systems.ⁱⁱ The Philippines is representative of the group of emerging democracies, the other major cases being Indonesia and Thailand.

The article is organized as follows. The first section examines the normative relationship between social structure and party support and how we might expect this to evolve in the East Asian countries, using the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm as a starting point. The second section outlines the data for the study and the measurement of social structure and the vote across the six countries. The fifth section outlines the results that emerge from the analyses, presented separately for the six countries. The final section discusses the implications of the results.

Social Cleavages and Party Systems

The theory behind the development of social cleavages and party support comes from Lipset and Rokkan's influential 1967 essay.ⁱⁱⁱ They identified four social cleavages—center-periphery (region), state-church (religion), land-industry (urban-rural), and owner-worker (class)—which they argued were the basis for the emergence of European party systems at the turn of the twentieth century. For a cleavage to become politically salient, three conditions have to be met. First, the cleavage has to distinguish people on at least one potentially important characteristic. Second, individuals have to know which group to identify with on any characteristic. Third, political parties have to compete for electoral support around the cleavage, providing it with institutional expression. Lipset and Rokkan argued that once these conditions had been met, the 'freezing' of these party systems in the 1920s took place, resulting in an enduring relationship between the cleavages and the parties that has persisted ever since.

Numerous studies have re-evaluated the Lipset and Rokkan paradigm and expanded its application beyond Europe. Theoretical studies have examined whether or not the 'freezing hypothesis' relates to party systems, or to the cleavage structures that underpin them^{iv}—the former leading to a focus on the nature and direction of party competition, the latter to the

persistence of social cleavages. Empirical studies have evaluated the strength of the various cleavages, cross-nationally and over time. Early studies concluded that parties were most cohesive on religion, followed by class,^v while other studies have confirmed the remarkable stability of parties and their social bases since the 1920s.^{vi} More recently, studies have found a decline in the correlation between social cleavages and party support.^{vii} The collapse of communism provided a further opportunity to evaluate the Lipset and Rokkan model in newly emerging democracies, with the model appearing to be most effective in explaining social cleavages in the oldest postcommunist societies, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.^{viii}

While the postcommunist democratic consolidations in Eastern Europe largely support the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm, how the theory might explain the dynamic relationship between social structure and party support in East Asia is more problematic. East Asia represents a more challenging case study for theories of social structure and voting. In the first place, many of the societies are highly pluralistic, combining Confucian values with economic liberalism with complex consequences for popular views of democracy.^{ix} Many of the countries have colonial histories, as well as experience of extended periods of martial rule, which have influenced party system formation. And not least, several of the countries are democratic in name only, since competition is not free and fair; even when elections are open and competitive, long periods of one party rule often ensue.

Data and Measurement

To examine social cleavages and voting we use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems module 2. The analyses are restricted to voters in national elections in each of the six countries.^x To measure the effect of social structure on vote, multinomial logistic regression (MNL) is used. MNL is appropriate where a dependent variable has more than two categories, and enables a more complex statistical model to be estimated; it is especially valuable when analysing voting in a multiparty system.^{xi} In the analyses of the Philippines survey, logistic regression rather than MNL is used to measure the presidential vote, since the dependent variable is dichotomous.

Lipset and Rokkan identified center-periphery as the first basis for the political divisions that emerged in European party systems at the beginning of the twentieth century. This reflects the antagonism of those living in peripheral regions towards the political authority of the center. Center-periphery antagonisms have periodically played a major role in twentieth century East Asia.^{xii} We measure center-periphery by the distance between the capital city in each country and the region or province that the voter lives in. Because the absolute distances vary widely, they have been standardized on a zero to 10 scale, 10 representing the region or province most distant from the national capital, zero the national capital itself. Center-periphery differences are greatest in the Philippines, reflecting the large proportion of voters living in Visayas and Mindanao, the two island groups most remote from the National Capital Region. The differences are smallest in Australia and New Zealand, and in Korea, in the latter case partly because of the state's strong policy of decentralization that began in the early 1980s.^{xiii}

State-church divisions based on religion are a main arena of political conflict in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. The analyses presented here rely on church attendance and religious denomination. Church attendance is measured by a six point scale, ranging from

never attends to attends once a week or more; not surprisingly given the predominance of Catholicism, the Philippines has the highest incidence of church attendance across the six countries.

Measuring religious denomination is more complex because of the diversity of religions across the six countries. The most straightforward is Australia and New Zealand, where denomination is represented by Catholics and Protestants contrasted with those in other religions or who have no religion. In Japan, where Buddhism has predominated, denomination is measured by Buddhists and other religions contrasted with those with no religion.^{xiv} The other three countries have more complex religious compositions. Korea has a diverse set of religious denominations, and traditional religions have remained important as Christianity has gained in popularity since the 1960s.^{xv} In Korea, denomination is measured by Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and other religions contrasted with those with no religion. In Taiwan, the main religions have been Buddhism and Taoism, and they are included with other religions contrasted with those with no religion.^{xvi} Catholicism has dominated the Philippines since the sixteenth century, and since only two respondents reported not having a religion, the reference category is those who said they had a religious denomination other than Catholicism.

[Table 1 about here]

Social divisions over industrialization can also give rise to an urban-rural cleavage. Although it ceased to be politically important in many countries after industrialization (and in any event was often absorbed by religion), the urban-rural cleavage has remained electorally important in some countries through the presence of agrarian parties. Urban-rural differences are measured by a four-point scale derived from the area of residence measure included in the various surveys. The most rural country in Table 1 is the Philippines, where 66 percent reported

living in a rural area; the most urban is New Zealand, where 64 percent reported living in a city, followed by Australia (53 percent) and Japan (44 percent). Urbanization is also strongly associated with center-periphery relations in the Philippines, but only modestly so in Japan and Taiwan. There is no association in Australia, Korea or New Zealand.^{xvii}

The fourth cleavage is the division between owners and workers, reflected in occupation. Two direct measures of occupation are used here: non-manual workers and farmers, with manual workers and those not in the labor force forming the reference category. Since unemployment is often a major source of political conflict, that is also included. The countries vary considerably in their occupational structure, reflecting in part their differing levels of economic development. As we would expect, Australia has the highest number of white collar workers (56 percent), followed by New Zealand (46 percent) and Japan (44 percent); the much less industrialized Philippines has the lowest (9 percent) and has three in 10 of its voters are also employed in agriculture. Unemployment, at least at the time the surveys were conducted, was highest in Japan and lowest in Australia.

In Western democracies, parties of the left emerged from trade union roots, and union membership has been a major predictor of the vote ever since. However, the decline in union membership since the 1980s across most industrialized societies^{xviii} has diminished the political importance of unions, while the proliferation of professional and business associations has blurred its political salience. Union membership in Australia and New Zealand has been of major political importance; across the other four countries membership is modest—10 percent or less—with the exception of Taiwan, where 40 percent of voters reported that they or a partner were a trade union member, reflecting the influence of the state in trade unionism during the period of

military rule in the mid-1980s.^{xi} The final measure of the owner-worker cleavage reflects achievement, in the form of total household income, and is measured in quintiles.^x

These four social cleavages, deriving from the Lipset and Rokkan paradigm, form the theoretical basis for the measurement of social divisions and how they relate to political conflict. Three further measures are included. Gender and age are control variables, although age itself is a proxy for generation, which we hypothesize might be important in several of the countries, reflecting lifetime political experiences. The age distribution of the countries varies considerably; the mean age of voters in Japan is 54 years, more than twice the mean age for the other three countries, reflecting the aging of the Japanese population.^{xi} Finally, education is measured by the proportion with secondary and tertiary education, with the reference category being those with no education or primary education only. Korea voters have the highest levels of tertiary education, with one-third reporting having completed a university education, reflecting the huge expansion of higher education in Korea, giving it one of the highest levels of enrolment in the world.^{xii}

Measuring the Vote

In each of the four countries, vote is measured as the vote for the major parties in the lower house parliamentary elections, with the exception of Japan where the vote is for the upper house. The distribution of voters in the surveys is shown in Table 2. Since our interest is in voting for the major parties, a rough guide was to include only those parties that attracted the support of 10 percent or more of the voters in the survey.^{xiii} In Japan, this presents few problems; the Communist Party did better in the SMDs than in the proportional district vote, but still failed to meet the 10 percent threshold. In total, those voting for other than the three major parties made

up just 11 percent of the Japanese respondents. In Korea, the pattern is similar, and three major parties account for more than nine out of 10 respondents, with the centrist Our Party, the party of President Roh Moo-hyun, attracting 46 percent of the respondents who reported voting. In Taiwan, three parties meet the 10 percent threshold, making up 82 percent of the respondents' votes.

[Table 2 about here]

In Australia, the two major parties^{xxiv} attract 88 percent of the total vote, with the Greens attracting a further 8 percent. The Greens are included in the analyses although they fall just short of the 10 percent threshold because of their substantive importance in the political system. In New Zealand, the three parties that attracted 10 percent or more of the vote—the Labour, National and New Zealand First parties—still leave about a quarter of the voters supporting minor parties. The fragmentation of the New Zealand party system began in the 1990s, brought on by a change in the electoral system from first past the post to a mixed member proportional system.^{xxv}

The Philippines presents some difficulty in measuring the vote. The May 2004 elections were for the president, vice-president, the upper and lower houses of parliament, and local government. There were, then, a bewildering number of parties and groupings competing for positions at three levels of government. The survey asked just about the presidential and lower house vote; even so, there is still considerable scope for the survey respondents to confuse how they actually voted. In the lower house elections, three parties attracted the support of 10 percent or more of the respondents. However, all three of the parties—Lakas, Christian-Muslim Democrats, the Nationalist Peoples' Coalition, and the Liberal Party—formed the core of the Coalition of Truth and Experience for Tomorrow (or K-4). The main opposition, the Coalition of

United Filipinos (or KNP), made up of the Struggle of Democratic Filipinos (LDP) and the Party of the Filipino Masses (PMP) gained just 3 and 0.3 percent support from the respondents, respectively. A further problem is that no less than 41 percent of the respondent reported casting votes for candidates for whom party affiliation could not be ascertained. We also examine presidential vote for this reason.. More than eight out of 10 voters cast their ballot either for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who represented the K4 coalition, or Fernando Poe, representing the KNP coalition. However, the link between the two main presidential candidates and the parties was, on occasion, tenuous. In the case of Poe, the LDP split on his candidacy, and another party member, Panfilo Lacson, also ran. Thus, presidential vote is an imperfect proxy for party and is difficult to compare to the analyses of parliamentary vote in other nations.

Results

We begin our analyses by focusing on the two Western democracies of Australia and New Zealand that lie at the edge of East Asia, but which should represent the broad patterns of cleavage alignments that we might find in Western democracies. With this benchmark set, we then turn to the other nations in our study.

Australia. Since the federation of the colonies and for most of the twentieth century, Australia has represented almost a model European society in terms of its voting behavior. The class cleavage eclipsed an urban-rural divide in the 1920s, giving rise to a conservative party aligned with capital on the one hand, and a labour party aligned with the trade unions on the other. Through the twin mechanism of compulsory voting and frequent elections, these two groupings have dominated Australian politics to the present day, albeit with some weakening in

the class cleavage in recent years, although not to the extent of the other Western democracies.^{xxvi}

[Table 3 about here]

The predominance of the owner-worker cleavage in Australian voting is shown in Table 3 in the contrast between Liberal-National coalition and Labor voters in the 2004 federal election for the lower House of Representatives. The most predictor of Liberal-National versus Labor voting is trade union membership, which is more than three times more important than any other variable in the equation. Income is next in importance, followed by the two occupational measures, non-manual workers and farmers. By contrast, the differences between the two major party voters and Green voters ends to be dominated by religion or (in the case of Liberal-National versus Green) income. In general, the differences between Green voters and Labor voters are the smaller of the two sets of contrasts, mainly because the Greens have recruited most of their support from disaffected Labor supporters.

New Zealand. Like Australia, voting in New Zealand has historically been dominated by socio-economic concerns, reflected in an almost perfect model of a two party system. However, economic recessions in the 1970s, followed by unpopular free market policies championed by a Labour government, fostered splits within the major parties and the rise of protest parties. This trend was exacerbated by the adoption of proportional representation in 1996 and in the 2002 and 2005 elections between seven and eight parties had representation in the single chamber parliament. In line with changes in voting behavior in the other Westminster democracies, values and environmental issues have risen in importance to voters, eroding the traditional class cleavage.^{xxvii}

[Table 4 about here]

Whatever the importance of other cleavages, socio-economic differences between voters were the predominant influences underlying Labour and National party support in the 2002 election (Table 4). Like Australia, trade union membership was by far the most important predictor of the vote and was almost four times more important than the second most important predictor, income. Vestiges of the cleavages that dominated New Zealand politics early in the twentieth century, religion and urban-rural, are also evident in Table 4. Socioeconomic divisions are less important in distinguishing Labour or National voters from voters for the populist New Zealand First (NZF) party. Supporters of both major parties are more likely to have tertiary education compared to their NZF counterparts, and NZF voters are more likely to live in peripheral areas compared to National voters.

Japan. Studies of voting behavior in Japan have emphasized the absence of any major social cleavages in Japanese society to structure voting behavior.^{xxviii} As a largely homogeneous society, Japan has not seen the religious, regional or ethnic divisions that have been so important in other societies. As a result, candidate-centered politics and the personal vote are important in shaping the vote, one consequence of the long period of LDP rule with no credible opposition. Of the three parties included in Table 5, the LDP is the oldest and most conservative, occupying government for all but three years of the postwar period. Since 2003, the LDP has formed a coalition government with the Clean Government Party (NKP), a conservative party led by the leader of a prominent Buddhist organization opposed to armed conflict and the deployment of the Japanese military overseas. The Democratic Party was formed in 1998 through an amalgamation of four center-left parties and has grown to become the main opposition party.

Of the four main social cleavages around which party conflict has traditionally coalesced, religion is the most consistently important, in the form of church attendance. As we would

expect from its Buddhist origins, NKP voters differ from both their LDP and Democratic Party counterparts in exhibiting greater religiosity. The owner-worker cleavage is important in the form of farm workers, who are significantly more likely to vote for the LDP over both the NKP and the DJP. Urban-rural divisions are unimportant, and center-periphery is important only in identifying LDP from DJP voters, with the former being more likely to live farther away from Tokyo. The most consistently important predictors of the vote in Japan are outside of the four main social cleavages, in the form of gender, age, and education.^{xxix} Being older, male and better educated are the most important predictors of both the LDP and DJP vote, compared to the NKP. In turn, LDP voters are more likely to be female and older compared to their DJP coalition partners.

[Table 5 about here]

These results underline the importance of religion in Japanese voting, through support from more committed Buddhists for the NKP. The results also confirm those of earlier studies which show the importance of the farm sector in support for the LDP. However, there are also significant effects for gender, age and education; indeed, age is the most important factor in the overall model.

Korea. Historically, elections in Korea have been dominated by regional interests, with local candidates dominating voter preferences.^{xxx} This pattern re-emerged in the 1987 election which marked the transition from military rule, which had existed since 1961. While other social cleavages have been periodically important—particularly owner-worker cleavages, as one would expect in the world's 10th largest economy—their effects have generally been small. Moreover, sustained repression during military rule effectively stifled the growth of any significant labour or center left parties. The 2004 Korean parliamentary elections were fought on the issue of the

impeachment of President Roh on allegations of corruption. The newly formed liberal reformist Our Party, which opposed the president's impeachment, won the largest proportion of the vote, followed by the conservative Grand National Party, which supported his impeachment. The third party, the center-left trade union-backed Democratic Labour Party, gained 13.0 percent of the vote.

With the exception of center-periphery, voting patterns in Korea are notable for the weak influence of the four main social cleavages (Table 6). There is a modest impact for religion, with Buddhists being more likely to support the Grand National Party over the other two parties. Both the GNP and the DLP are more likely to find their supporters in the Korean periphery, compared to Our Party, whose support is more likely to be found in and around Seoul. This supports other research on regional voting, which shows that GNP support is linked to powerful regional leaders outside of Seoul.^{xxxii}

However, as in Japan, the strongest influences on Korean voting are associated with age, and to a lesser extent, gender. Older voters are more likely to support the GNP over the main alternatives; indeed, in both equations contrasting the GNP with the other two parties, age is as important as all the other independent variables combined. Women are also much more likely to support the GNP and Our Party, compared to the DLP.

[Table 6 about here]

The Philippines. Previous research claims that voting in the Philippines is dominated by local patronage and machine politics, in line with many other developing countries. Corruption is often a major issue in national elections, and an additional factor has been the communist insurgency in the south of the country. As noted earlier, the analysis of voting in the 2001 Philippines elections is first based on the legislative elections, which contrasts the three parties

forming the K-4 (*Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan* or Coalition of Truth and Experience for Tomorrow). In addition, we examine the presidential election, which was a straight contest between the K-4 coalition and the opposition *Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino* (Coalition of United Filipinos), or KNP.

The results for the legislative elections in Table 7 show that the only consistent predictor of legislative vote is center-periphery. Lakas and NPC supporters are more likely to come from the periphery, while Liberal Party supporters are more likely to be found in the National Capital Region, which includes Manila. There is a similar pattern in the presidential vote; Arroyo's supporters are in the outlying provinces, and Poe's in and around the capital. Indeed, in two of the four equations, center-periphery is by far the most important predictor of the vote. Urban-rural differences are important in distinguishing the K-4 parties, but have no effect on the presidential vote.

[Landscape Table 7 about here]

Focussing on patterns of voting in the 2001 presidential election, there are important patterns for education in Table 7. The vote for Arroyo in 2001 was more likely to come from better-educated voters, especially those with tertiary education, while Poe's supporters were disproportionately found among the less educated. Indeed, the combined effect for education is almost equivalent to center-periphery in its impact on the vote. These effects do not appear in the contrasts between the K-4 parties; the only analogy is income, with Lakas supporters have significantly lower incomes compared to their NPC counterparts. It would appear, then, that Arroyo support was associated with the traditional political elites, while Poe was a more populist candidate.

Taiwan. Voting behavior in Taiwan has been dominated by the issue of relations with China, and for that reason social cleavages have generally exercised influence only in so far as they are related through, for example, provincial origins to political and national identity.^{xxxii} The election analysed here is the 2001 Taiwanese legislative election, which resulted in the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) losing its majority for the first time, although along with its main partner in the ‘Pan-Blue Coalition’, the People First Party (PFP), it remained in office.^{xxxiii} The main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, gained the largest number of votes and seats, but its ‘Pan-Green Coalition’ with the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union did not produce sufficient votes to beat its conservative opponents.

[Table 8 about here]

Table 8 shows that the four potential social cleavages have relatively few effects on the vote. The center-periphery cleavage is significant in distinguishing KMT and DPP voters from PFP voters, with the latter being more likely to live in the areas in or around the capital, Taipei. However, center-periphery considerations are unimportant in distinguishing voters across the main political divide, between the KMT and the DPP. Here the most important factors are age, with KMT voters being older than DPP voters, followed by education, with KMT voters being generally better educated. These results are similar to those reported by Chu for the 1995-2005 time period.^{xxxiv} The stability of the effects suggests the continuing relevance of the independence issue, and the social factors to which it is related.

Conclusion

There are clearly systematic linkages between social structure and voting across the six countries covered in the analyses presented above. What is their overall impact in predicting the vote? And

more importantly, what is the impact of the social cleavages identified in the Lipset and Rokkan paradigm in predicting the vote in these Asian democracies? The models in Tables 3 to 8 provide an overall measure of the fit of the social factors in predicting the vote, in the form of the percentage of the variance which is explained by each model; by calculating the weight of each group of independent variables in making up that overall R-squared value, we can estimate the contribution of each social cleavage.^{xxxv} These calculations are shown in Figure 1, which shows three sets of results: the overall model fit; the contribution from the four Lipset and Rokkan social cleavages; and the contribution of gender, age and education.

The results in Figure 1 show that the social structures of four countries—Australia, Japan, Korea and the Philippines—exhibit very similar impacts on voting, of around 19 to 20 percent. Of these four countries, Australia, Japan and Korea, the most economically developed, show a broadly similar distribution between the traditional social cleavages, and gender, age and education. In Australia, the Lipset and Rokkan cleavages constitute 14.1 percent of the 20.1 percent total; in Japan, 10.3 percent of the 18.4 percent total; and in Korea the figure is 7.9 percent of the 19 percent total. New Zealand, although having a smaller proportion of the overall variance explained, is almost an archetypal Lipset-Rokkan polity, with most of the 14.8 percent of the variance is explained by the four traditional social cleavages. The Philippines shows a separate pattern, with almost all of the total coming from the traditional social cleavages, in this case center-periphery and urbanization. Taiwan represents the exception; with just 8.7 percent of the variance explained by social cleavages, it shows the enduring importance of the independence issue on voting, which of course is not controlled for in the model estimated here.

[Figure 1 about here]

The analyses tested the hypothesis that the Lipset-Rokkan paradigm can be used to explain social structure and voting in East Asia. At best, there is only weak support for the hypothesis, outside of Australia and New Zealand. While center-periphery and urban-rural differences are important in three of the four newer democracies, the other cleavages are not, with the partial exception of religion. Nor can it be argued that the four democracies are so different as to obviate any meaningful comparisons. While they differ in economic development and democratic experience, they all display a strong element of localism and personal patronage in their politics,^{xxxvi} at least partly a function of their mixed-member systems electoral systems. They also have exhibited strong, sometimes authoritarian state intervention to achieve economic goals, which in turn has stifled the development of civil society.^{xxxvii} And their political elites have held a common belief that economic decline can lead to national disintegration, and as a consequence have been prepared to make short term compromises to achieve economic prosperity.^{xxxviii}

One perhaps surprising finding is the absence of any significant owner-worker cleavage in party support outside of Australia or New Zealand. This is explained by the underdevelopment of the political left in three of the countries, the exception being Japan. In Korea and Taiwan, military rule and authoritarian governments have stultified the growth of the left, and the consequence mobilization of voters around the owner-worker cleavage. To the extent that the political left has attracted support, it has been on a policy platform broadly supportive of the prevailing policies of economic liberalization, rather than on traditional union issues of workers' rights.^{xxxix} In many respects, the East Asian left is now similar in outlook to the new left in many of the established democracies.

The democratic experiences of the mass publics across the six countries has obviously had a major impact on their party support. Measuring that, of course, is extremely difficult, but we can see elements of it in the consistent importance of age in the four newer democracies, and in the absence of it in the older democracies of Australia and New Zealand. There are clear generational influences at work as voters exhibit the political outlooks and views that were moulded by their political socialization in early adulthood. While it is beyond the scope of this study to examine these effects in depth, it would appear that the timing of the democratic transition and experiences associated with it are one of the strongest influences on the institutionalization of the party systems of East Asia.

Footnotes

- ⁱ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 'Introduction'. In Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).
- ⁱⁱ See Uk Heo and Hans Stockton, 'The Impact of Democratic Transition on Elections and Parties in South Korea.' *Party Politics* 11 (2005): 674-688.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Lipset and Rokkan, 'Introduction.'
- ^{iv} Peter Mair, 'The Freezing Hypothesis: An Evaluation.' In Lauri Karvonen, Stein Kuhnle and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- ^v Richard Rose, and Derek Urwin, 'Social Cohesion, Political Parties, and Strains in Regimes.' *Comparative Political Studies* 2 (1969): 7-67.
- ^{vi} See, for example, Arend Lijphart, 'Religion vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting.' *American Political Science Review* 73 (1979): 442-58; Robert H. Dix, 'Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America.' *Comparative Politics* 22 (1989): 23-38; and Oddbjørn Knutsen, 'Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West European Countries: A Comparative Empirical Analysis.' *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1989): 495-533.
- ^{vii} See Mark Franklin *et al.*, *Electoral Change: Responses to Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russell J. 'The Decline of Party Identifications.' In Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties Without Partisans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- ^{viii} See, for example, Ian McAllister and Stephen White, 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Postcommunist Societies,' *Party Politics*, forthcoming; Herbert Kitschelt, 'Divergent Paths of Postcommunist Democracies.' In Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); and Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, 'Political Culture Versus Rational Choice: Explaining Responses to Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,' *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1999): 129-55.
- ^{ix} See Doh Chull Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, *Do Asian Values*

Deter Support for Democracy? The Case of South Korea (Taipei: Asian Barometer Working Paper Series No 26, 2005).

^x The elections were: 2004 Australia; 2004 Japan; 2004 Korea; 2002 New Zealand; 2004 Philippines; and 2001 Taiwan. In Japan, the vote in the proportional district vote was used as the dependent variable, rather than the vote in the single member districts. Hong Kong was excluded because it is not a sovereign state and, in any event, created estimation problems since the number of voters was small ($n = 357$) and dispersed among 13 parties. Thailand could in principle be used in the analyses, but voting intention rather than past vote was collected, and this question elicited responses from just 21 percent of the respondents, representing a total useable N of just 150 of which the largest party had just 57 respondents.

The dataset included a sample weight for Japan and a demographic weight for the Philippines; in each case, the weighted number of respondents has been adjusted to the true number to leave significance tests unaffected. There were no weights for the other four countries.

^{xi} See Guy D. Whitten and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Heightening Comparativists' Concern for Model Choice: Voting Behavior in Great Britain and the Netherlands,' *American Journal of Political Science* 40 (1996): 231-60. Strictly speaking, multinomial probit is a more appropriate method for analyzing voting behaviour, but it is less easy to interpret and to calculate and that reason, MNL is used here.

^{xii} John Halliday, 'Recession, Revolution and Metropolis-Periphery Relations in East-Asia with Special Reference to Japan,' *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 7 (1977): 347-363.

^{xiii} Hee-Yeon Lee, 'Growth Determinants in the Core-Periphery of Korea.' *International Regional Science Review* 12 (1989): 147-163.

^{xiv} Peter F. Kornichi and James McMullen, *Religion in Japan: Arrows to Heaven and Earth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

^{xv} Andrew Eungi Kim, 'Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: a Sociological Survey,' *Review of Religious Research* 43 (2002): 291-310.

^{xvi} Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones, eds., *Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003).

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- xvii The correlation between center-periphery and urban-rural is $-.70$ ($p < .000$) in the Philippines, $-.32$ ($p < .000$) in Taiwan, and $-.19$ in Japan ($p < .000$).
- xviii See M. Wallerstein and Bruce Western, 'Unions in Decline: What has Changed and Why,' *Annual Review of Political Science* 3 (2000): 355-377.
- xix Shyh-Jer Chen, Jyh-Jer Ko and John Lawler, 'Changing Patterns of Industrial Relations in Taiwan,' *Industrial Relations* 42 (2003): 315-340.
- xx Almost one-third of the Japanese respondents refused to report their income, and to obviate problems with missing values, they were coded to the mean value.
- xxi One factor affecting these estimates is the age at which individuals are eligible to vote, which is 20 in Japan and Taiwan, 19 in Korea, and 18 in the Philippines and Thailand.
- xxii Sunwoong Kim and Ju-Ho Lee, 'Changing Facets of Korea Higher Education: Market Competition and the Role of the State,' *Higher Education* 52 (2006): 557-587.
- xxiii In almost all cases, the survey estimate was within several percent of the actual election results
- xxiv Technically, the two conservative parties, the Liberal and National parties, are separate, independent parties. However, they have been in almost permanent coalition since the 1920s and for that reason are treated as a single party here.
- xxv See Jack Vowles *et al.*, eds., *Voters' Veto: The 2002 Election in New Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2004).
- xxvi See Ian McAllister, *Political Behaviour: Citizens, Parties and Elites in Australia* (Melbourne: Longmans, 1992) and Don Aitkin, *Stability and Change in Australian Politics* (Canberra: ANU Press, 1982).
- xxvii See Raymond Miller, 'New Zealand's Multi-Party System: Consolidation of the Cartel Model Under Proportional Representation.' In Ian Marsh, ed., *Political Parties in Transition?* (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006).
- xxviii See Scott C. Flanagan *et al.*, *The Japanese Voter* (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1991) and Steven R. Reed, 'Democracy and the Personal Vote: A Cautionary Tale from Japan,' *Electoral Studies* 13 (1994):17-28. The 2004 upper house election involved the election

of 121 members, 73 from the 47 prefectural districts and 48 from the nationwide list; the analyses conducted here use the nationwide list.

^{xxix} Flanagan et al, *The Japanese Voter*, analyzing results from the 1976 lower house elections, found no effect for age, but hypothesized that younger people would be more conservative. That prediction has not been borne out.

^{xxx} See Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* and Carl J. Saxer, *From Transition to Power Alternation: Democracy in South Korea, 1987-1997* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

^{xxxi} Woojin Moon, 'Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests,' *Party Politics* 11 (2005): 579-599.

^{xxxii} Yun-han Chu and Tse-min Lin, 'The Process of Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan: Social Cleavages, Electoral Competition and the Emerging Party System.' In Hung-Mao Tien, ed., *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition* (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1996) and Ching-hsin Yu, 'The Evolving Party System in Taiwan,' *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 40 (2005): 105-123.

^{xxxiii} The other coalition partner was the New Party. Together the three parties formed what is called the 'Pan Blue Coalition.' The 2001 election involved the election of 225 members to the lower house, of whom 168 were from single member districts and 41 from a nationwide list, with a further eight seats each elected by overseas voters and aboriginal populations.

^{xxxiv} Ching-hsin Chu, 'The Evolving Party System in Taiwan, 1995-2004' *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 40 (2005): 105-123.

^{xxxv} The weight of each variable is estimated by summing the Wald values in each equation, and then calculating their contribution to the overall variance explained.

^{xxxvi} Mikael Mattlin, 'Nested Pyramid Structures: Political Parties in Taiwanese Elections,' *China Quarterly* 180 (2004): 1031-1049.

^{xxxvii} Geoffrey McNicoll, 'Policy Lessons of the East Asian Demographic Transition,' *Population and Development Review* 32 (2006): 1-25.

^{xxxviii} Hilton L. Root, 'What Democracy can do for East Asia.' *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 113-126.

^{xxxix} Joseph Wong, 'Democratization and the Left: Comparing East Asia and Latin America,' *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (2004): 1213-1237.

Table 1: Variables, Definitions, and Means

Variables	Definitions	Means					
		Australia	Japan	Korea	NZ	Philip.	Taiwan
<i>Center-periphery</i>	Distance from national capital to region, from zero to 10.	2.61	3.92	3.51	1.77	5.17	3.47
<i>Religion</i>							
Buddhist	1=yes, 0=no	na	.61	.30	ns	na	.42
Taoist	1=yes, 0=no	na	na	na	ns	na	.18
Catholic	1=yes, 0=no	.25	na	.33	.35	.83	na
Protestant	1=yes, 0=no	.43	na	.19	.46	na	na
Other religion	1=yes, 0=no	na	.07	na	na	na	.07
Church attendance	From 1 (never attends) to 6 (attends weekly)	2.42	3.25	2.12	2.34	4.98	2.13
<i>Urban-rural</i>	From 1 (rural) to 4 (city)	3.00	2.79	2.71	3.11	1.57	2.52
<i>Owner-worker</i>							
Non-manual worker	1=non-manual worker, 0=other	.57	.44	.23	.46	.09	.29
Farmer	1=farmer, 0=other	.03	.08	.03	.03	.31	.04
Unemployed	1=unemployed, 0=other	.02	.12	.07	.04	.12	.04
Family income	Quintiles	1.90	2.01	1.75	1.94	1.83	1.78
Trade union member	1=member, 0=non-member	.31	.09	.10	.41	.07	.40
<i>Controls</i>							
Gender	1=male, 0=female	.48	.50	.51	.56	.50	.50
Age	Years	50.03	53.79	42.74	49.34	42.07	45.69
Secondary education	1=yes, 0=no	.33	.61	.49	.44	.31	.56
Tertiary education	1=yes, 0=no	.24	.18	.33	.19	.11	.13
(N)		(1,625)	(1,600)	(1,174)	(1,402)	(1,035)	(1,638)

Estimates are for voters only. Occupation and trade union member are for head of household.

Source CSES modules 2.

Table 2: The Distribution of the Vote

<i>Australia</i>		<i>Japan</i>		<i>Korea</i>	
Liberal-National party coalition (LNP)	51	Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	35	Grand National Party (GNP)	33
Australian Labor Party (ALP)	37	Democratic Party (DJP)	42	Our Party	46
Greens	8	Clean Government Party (NKP)	12	Democratic Labour Party (DLP)	13
Others	4	Others	11	Others	8
Total (N)	100 (1,625)	Total (N)	100 (1,464)	Total (N)	100 (1,114)
<i>New Zealand</i>		<i>Philippines</i>		<i>Taiwan</i>	
Labour	45	Lakas-Christian, Muslim Democrats (CMD)	17	Kuomintang (KMT)	29
National	18	Nationalist Peoples' Coalition (NPC)	14	Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	36
NZ First	10	Liberal Party (LP)	12	People First Party (PPF)	17
Others	27	Others	16	Others	18
		Candidate's party not known	41		
Total (N)	100 (1,402)	Total (N)	100 (826)	Total (N)	100 (1,311)

Estimates are for the 2004 upper house elections in Japan, the 2004 Korean parliamentary elections, the 2004 Philippines lower house parliamentary elections, and the 2001 Taiwan lower house parliamentary elections.

Source CSES, module 2.

Table 3: Social Structure and Voting in Australia, 2004
(Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates)

	LNP/ALP		LNP/Green		ALP/Green	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Religion</i>						
Catholic	ns	ns	1.04**	(.311)	.923**	(.311)
Protestant	ns	ns	1.06**	(.255)	ns	ns
Church attendance	.114**	(.040)	.224**	(.082)	ns	ns
<i>Urban-rural</i>	-.183**	(.053)	ns		ns	ns
<i>Owner-worker</i>						
Non-manual worker	.408**	(.138)	ns		ns	ns
Farmer	1.487**	(.513)	ns		-1.607*	(.773)
Unemployed	-.827*	(.421)	ns		ns	ns
Family income	.229**	(.053)	.310**	(.090)	ns	ns
Trade union member	-.971**	(.133)	-.761**	(.234)	ns	ns
<i>Controls</i>						
Gender	ns	ns	.519*	(.223)	ns	ns
Age	ns	ns	ns	ns	.015*	(.008)
Secondary education	ns	ns	ns		ns	ns
Tertiary education	-.541**	(.188)	-2.103**	(.335)	ns	ns
Constant	.099		.579		.480	
Nagelkerke R-sq			.201			
(N)			(1,325)			

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regression showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting three sets of contrasts between party voters. ns = not statistically significant.

Source CSES module 2.

Table 4: Social Structure and Voting in New Zealand, 2002
(Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates)

	Labour/National		Labour/NZF		National/NZF	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	-.208*	(.103)	ns	ns	.372**	(.144)
<i>Religion</i>						
Catholic	-.672*	(.269)	-.722*	(.321)	ns	ns
Protestant	-.617**	(.202)	ns	ns	ns	ns
Church attendance	ns	ns	ns	ns	.151*	(.074)
<i>Urban-rural</i>	.155*	(.071)	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Owner-worker</i>						
Non-manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	.503*	(.243)
Farmer	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Unemployed	1.234*	(.638)	ns	ns	ns	ns
Family income	-.230**	(.075)	ns	ns	.322**	(.104)
Trade union member	1.563**	(.267)	.546*	(.273)	-1.017**	(.355)
<i>Controls</i>						
Gender	ns	ns	-.401*	(.208)	ns	ns
Age	.013*	(.006)	ns	ns	ns	ns
Secondary education	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Tertiary education	ns	ns	.766	(.381)	.873*	(.419)
Constant	1.153		.529			
Nagelkerke R-sq			.148			
(N)			(881)			

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regression showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting three sets of contrasts between party voters. ns = not statistically significant.

Source CSES module 2.

Table 5: Social Structure and Voting in Japan, 2004
(Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates)

	LDP/NKP		DJP/NKP		LDP/DJP	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	ns	ns	ns	ns	.056**	(.020)
<i>Religion</i>						
Buddhist	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Other religion	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Church attendance	-.222**	(.051)	-.200**	(.049)	ns	ns
<i>Urban-rural</i>	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Owner-worker</i>						
Non-manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Farmer	1.119**	(.398)	ns	ns	1.127**	(.290)
Unemployed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Family income	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Trade union member	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Controls</i>						
Gender	.528**	(.204)	.811**	(.199)	-.283*	(.138)
Age	.047**	(.008)	.022**	(.007)	.025**	(.005)
Secondary education	.612*	(.262)	.747**	(.264)	ns	ns
Tertiary education	1.398**	(.439)	1.615**	(.430)	ns	ns
Constant	-1.652		-.204		-1.448	
Nagelkerke R-sq			.184			
(N)			(1,219)			

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regression showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting three sets of contrasts between party voters. ns = not statistically significant.

Source CSES module 2.

Table 6: Social Structure and Voting in Korea, 2004
(Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates)

	GNP/DLP		Our Party/DLP		GNP/Our Party	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	-.085*	(.037)	-.070*	(.035)	ns	ns
<i>Religion</i>						
Buddhist	1.030*	(.411)	ns	ns	.836**	(.307)
Catholic	1.013*	(.492)	ns	ns	ns	ns
Protestant	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Church attendance	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Urban-rural</i>	ns	ns	ns	ns	.187*	(.082)
<i>Owner-worker</i>						
Non-manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Farmer	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Unemployed	ns	ns	2.173*	(1.036)		
Family income	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Trade union member	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Controls</i>						
Gender	-.724**	(.249)	-.704**	(.234)	ns	ns
Age	.057**	(.011)	ns	ns	.050**	(.008)
Secondary education	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Tertiary education	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Constant	-1.670		1.973		-3.643	
Nagelkerke R-sq			.190			
(N)			(774)			

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regression showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting three sets of contrasts between party voters. ns = not statistically significant.

Source CSES, module 2.

Table 8: Social Structure and Voting in Taiwan, 2001
(Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates)


	KMT/PFP		DPP/PFP		KMT/DPP	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	.100**	(.035)	.085**	(.034)	ns	ns
<i>Religion</i>						
Buddhist	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Taoist	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Other religion	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Church attendance	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Urban-rural</i>	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Owner-worker</i>						
Non-manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Farmer	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Unemployed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Family income	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Trade union member	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.281*	(.147)
<i>Controls</i>						
Gender	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Age	.020**	(.007)	ns	ns	.021**	(.006)
Secondary education	ns	ns	-.563*	(.260)	.649**	(.202)
Tertiary education	ns	ns	-.938**	(.342)	.798**	(.298)
Constant	-.557		.765		-1.322	
Nagelkerke R-sq			.087			
(N)			(1,042)			

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regression showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting three sets of contrasts between party voters. ns = not statistically significant.

Source CSES, module 2.

Figure 1: Social Cleavages and Voting in East Asia



Percent variance explained by different groups of social cleavages, derived from Tables 3 to 8. For estimation method, see text.

Source CSES, module 2.

**Table 7: Social Structure and Voting in Philippines, 2001
(Multinomial and Logistic Regression Estimates)**

	(Legislative election)				(Presidential election)			
	Lakas/LP		NPC/LP		Lakas/NPC		Arroyo-Poe	
	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)	Est	(SE)
<i>Center-periphery</i>	.228**	(.053)	.223**	(.053)	ns	ns	.118**	(.127)
<i>Religion</i>								
Catholic	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Church attendance	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Urban-rural</i>	.787**	(.178)	ns	ns	.602**	(.172)	ns	ns
<i>Owner-worker</i>								
Non-manual worker	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Farmer	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Unemployed	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Family income	ns	ns	ns	ns	-.434**	(.124)	ns	ns
Trade union member	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
<i>Controls</i>								
Gender	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Age	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	.042*	(.005)
Secondary education	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	.528**	(.185)
Tertiary education	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	1.217**	(.346)
Constant	-1.866		-.881		-.985		-1.077	
Nagelkerke R-sq			.188				.084	
(N)			(349)				(818)	

** p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed.

Multinomial logistic regressions (first two equations) and logistic regression (third equation) showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting vote. The first three equations predict three sets of contrasts between party voters; the dependent variable in the third equation is dichotomous, contrasting the presidential vote for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo with the vote for Fernando Poe.

Source: CSES, module 2.