

**Synergy and Trade-offs between Political Representation and
Accountability in Stable and New Democracies**

(preliminary draft, not for quotation)

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Paper to be presented at IPSAS, SINICA Conference, Taipei 10-11 April, 2005

INTRODUCTION

The two concepts mentioned in the paper title denote real existing political phenomena and have a rather different ontological status: political representation is an old concept, deliberated by the classics and pretty well clarified, while political accountability is both fairly new and still a vague one.

Moreover, many scholars consider them to be so closely related as to claim each a *sine qua non* condition for understanding the other. Most of them assume the two are equally desirable qualities of a functioning liberal democracy, albeit contend that in practice there is a trade-off between the two, and there is little agreement as to the superiority of one over the other. This alleged contradiction derives from institutional factors – political infrastructure of a polity. It is widely believed that presidential systems and two party systems, an effect of SMD plurality electoral rules enhance accountability, whereas parliamentary, multiparty systems, consequence of PR electoral rules boost representation. Both political representation and accountability are possible only in the context of democracy, democratic elections in particular. It is consequently believed either that voters are better integrated into democracy they live in and value its merits if elections allow them to replace incumbent government with oppositional alternative, if they negatively evaluate the performance of the former, or when they feel their views are adequately represented in the parliament. The first conjecture reflects option for accountability as the major merit of democratic elections, whereas the second presumption – representation.

Although there are many ways of conceptualizing representation and accountability, this paper deals with their strictly electoral subtype, and focuses on elections as the sole mechanism where representation and accountability are visible. Many other manifestations of representation and of accountability exist and might be more relevant (see the discussion below). I submit however - contrary to other scholars (e.g. Mainwaring & Welna 2003) - that in contemporary democracies, the new ones in particular, it is rather other than electoral institutions "providing" representation and accountability, checks and balances, justice and equity and the like are the real problem. In definite majority of stable or recently consolidated democracies electoral fraud is either nonexistent or is a very rare phenomenon. In a nutshell, I assume that – in fragile or newly consolidated democracies in particular – compared to the deeds of courts, trade unions, bureaucracy and the rule of law in general, elections are, in most instances, fairly reliable mechanism of warranting representation and accountability.

In the next section I will discuss the theoretical and operationalization problems concerning the two concepts, before I move to it, let me emphasize yet another phenomenon pertinent to the accountability concept alone. It is about almost exclusive concentration of the scholarly effort on macro-institutional factors as the sole determinants of accountability mechanism. Institutional design (presidentialism, parliamentarism), electoral rules and their consequences (multi- vs two-partyism,

coalition bargaining and cabinet formation) influence many aspects of democracies we live in. Many believe it has profound impact on the degree of "clarity of responsibility", "decisiveness of elections", "political representation", (real) "opportunity for political choice" (i.e. system alternativeness) and other features of contemporary democracies, i.e. its effectiveness, efficacy, political support, and the like (Strom 1984; Powell 1982; 1989; Dalton 1989). Scholarly tradition, old and new, most of the time follows this approach: by analyzing the institutional design and depicting its alleged consequences, the new body of knowledge grows deductively, usually exemplified by qualitative case-studies. What is almost entirely missing as an *explanans* of the accountability mechanism is the sovereign – the People. Since the accountability phenomenon is a relational one, i.e. two entities – Principal and the Agent - are needed and the interaction between them, the omission seems indeed inexplicable. To be sure, most analysts assume the sovereign – the People - to be an important, really existing and consequential entity, which moreover "holds the incumbents accountable". Yet, I know of no empirically grounded work that focuses on the average citizens' dispositions: their mental, social, cultural and purely political attitudes and preferences pertinent to the accountability phenomenon. The remark applies not only to new democracies, but to stable ones as well. Simply put: we know almost nothing about structural, cultural or micro-political variation in - lets tentatively call it - *accountability credentials* of citizens of contemporary democracies. That is, of citizen's individual preferences, perceptions and attitudes that are conducive to exercising the accountability opportunity structure mechanism. Elsewhere (Markowski 2001) I have presented an attempt at scrutinizing this phenomenon in new democracies of ECE. In this paper I present an alternative approach to depict and explain the individual level manifestations of political representation and accountability. Before I move to discuss its details, few words on the theoretical accomplishments in the field.

THEORETICAL HERITAGE

The concept of political representation is pretty clear, although it has several "traditions" and discipline-specific approaches. The contemporary philosophico-ontological tradition starts with Hannah Pitkin's (1967) book, in which among other things, she clearly distinguishes the concepts of "standing-for" and "acting-for" representation. It is this very oft-quoted book that extensively utilizes the more-than-two-centuries old distinction of trustee and delegate "mode" of representation, proposed by Edmund Burke, and the related concepts of different foci of representation – local and national. Another, empirically oriented tradition, starts with the famous Miller/Stokes (1963) "diamond of representation", and is fruitfully continued by numerous scholars, among them Converse and Pierce (1986) on political representation in France, Holmberg and Esaisson (1989; 1996) on Sweden, Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, Toka (1999) on East Central Europe and many others. In both traditions a strong assumptions are present as to the ontological status of re-representation, meaning – in a nutshell – to be present by means of some other entity and that what representation is about can be summarized as follows: (a) there are always two entities, one that represents and the other that is

represented, (b) the essence of the relationship between them is that it should reveal some *congruence*, *concurrence*, *mirroring* or some other notion of similarity or resemblance; (c) ideal-model styles of representation can follow either the *will* of the people (delegate mode of representation) or their *interests* (trustee mode); (d) representatives can focus either on representing *local (or sectoral)* interest or *all-national* ones; (e) the representatives can focus on different "role-segments" (Wahlke, Eulau 1978) *party role*, *pressure group role* or *representational role per se*; (f) in "Responsible Party Model" characteristic of multiparty systems and PR electoral rules, political behavior of representatives is to a high degree constrained by preferences of the party they belong to. In other words, *party member role* is one of the most influential features of what is going on in the representation process; (g) one of the fundamental challenges in the empirically oriented studies of political representation is that the two entities differ very much in their ontological status across countries: briefly, as far as the "represented" are always a collective entity, though differentiated because of different aggregation (geographical, functional, ethnic or political) the "representative(s)" might either be individuals (MPs in SMD) or collective entities – parties (see Brooks 1985; 1990)

Undergraduate students eager to know what accountability really means are exposed to the following dictionary wisdom: (a) "Accountability... has two major meanings, which overlap. Firstly, there is the standard meaning, common in democracies, that those who exercise power (...) are in a sense stewards and must be able to show that they have exercised their powers and discharged their duties properly. Secondly, accountability may refer to the arrangements made for securing conformity between the values of a delegating body and the person or persons to whom powers and responsibilities are delegated. (...) Ultimately ... governments in democracies are accountable to the people through the mechanism of elections" (Robertson 1993: 3). (b) "A is accountable to B if B may sanction and forbid his actions. It does not follow that B is responsible for A: chains of responsibility run downwards by delegation, chains of accountability run upwards..." (Scruton 1982: 3).

The more recent debate conceives and defines accountability directly or indirectly, either by stating what it means to be accountable or by defining contemporary liberal democracies via accountability. Still others propose, kind of, functional definitions of the term. "...[P]olitical accountability limits the use and sanctions the abuse of political power. (...) Actors and institutions that promote accountability attempt to bind the exercise of power to specific benchmark standards" (Fox 2000: 2).

Another attempt goes like this: "...decision-making in large entities, such as democratic states, implies *delegation* of authority. In agency relationships, the right to make decisions is assigned by a "principal" to an "agent", but this assignment, i.e. delegation, is conditional. That is, it continues only at the pleasure of the principal. That it may be withdrawn is the very essence of *accountability*". And "...relations of delegation run in one direction – from principal to agent – while relations of accountability run in the opposite direction – from agent to principal. (Moreno, Crisp, Shugart 2003: 83)

Spectacular follow-up to the concept of "delegative democracy", has been presented by O'Donnell (1999) in his work on "horizontal accountability" (HA). In fact the 1999 article is much broader than on HA and covers phenomena denoted by a bunch of other closely related concepts: *delegation, governance or decisiveness, representation* and indeed about the crucial merits of liberalism, republicanism and representative democracy. The proposal has launched (and has been accompanied by others' scholarly efforts trying to elaborate on the consequential differences between parliamentary and presidential systems) vibrant discussion about the contradiction between *accountability* and *governance*. The former is needed to control the dangers of unrestricted power that might prove deplorably irrelevant to citizens' preferences. The latter - to enable those with delegated power to effectively introduce policies and decisions citizens expect to be implemented. Sounds clear: taken the historical experience, power somehow has to be constrained. On the other hand power centers in the complex contemporary societies ought to be able of solving collective action problems effectively and legitimately, i.e. reaching decisions that are socially binding. Contradictions of this sort look irresolvable and contribute to fluctuating equilibria – periods of tough governance (effective and decisive executive policy implementation) follow periods of deliberative evaluations of responsibility (accountability dominance) and erection of clauses aimed at policy assessment and grass-root preference protection. In a nutshell, even if - as many claim - divided government increases the effectiveness of horizontal accountability, it clearly increases legislative-executive conflict at the same time. The latter usually is associated with ineffective government, which might lead to instability of the democratic regime as a whole.

Accountability and its relationship to representation, governance, delegation and participation form a "terminological environment" conducive to grasping essential problems of democratic consolidation, models of democracies implemented and their performance.

First, I find it rather confusing to digest and conceive the "horizontalness" of the accountability; its ontological status seems to be extremely vague. Briefly, *horizontal accountability* seems to be a terminological contradiction, to say the least. To start with the noun – there are quite similar definitions of the term. "Governments are *accountable* if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately, so that those incumbents who act in the best interests of citizens win reelection and those who do not lose them" (Manin, Przeworski, Stokes 1999: 40); authors call it the accountability conception of representation, and in fact it covers two processes: first, one that relates to the deeds of incumbents to the vote and second, the mechanism that forces the incumbents to choose policies that boost their reelection chances. Laver and Shepsle (1999) claim "accountability is both a state (equilibrium) and a mechanism (e.g. confidence procedure)". What they mean is that the political agent (the representative) is accountable to the principal (The People, citizenry) even when the principal does not try to replace the agent with an alternative one, although he has the means to do so.

The crucial point however is that political accountability is always mediated, clearly in parliamentary democracies, less so in presidential systems. Ferejohn (1999: 131) links *accountability* to *responsiveness*: "accountability is... a property of institutional structures, whereas responsiveness is a consequence of interaction within such structures. Put another way, responsiveness is a measure of how much accountability an institutional structure permits".

For others accountability has to do with "answerability" and "enforcement" (Schedler 1999); both components being equally important. The latter means there exists sanctions - the essential tool of accountability - potentially to be used by the principal; without this ability to punish 'wrong' behavior or outcomes, no accountability can be claimed.

The concept of accountability is closely, though "reversely" related to the concept of delegation. Contemporary democracies are representative ones, their major feature being that the principal delegates authority to the agent, to use the neo-institutional slang. The delegation is provisional and contingent on agent's deeds. Depending on particular political system structures, the delegation can be more or less easily withdrawn, which is to be sure, a principal right. Thus, relations of delegation run from The People to the representatives, simultaneously with the accountability relations running oppositely. In this case, where the agent is subordinate to the principal, simple spatial imagination calls for using hierarchy or verticality metaphors.

Thus accountability can not, by its very nature, be horizontal, because horizontalness assumes equality of entities concerned. Horizontal can be a relationship, exchange or influence, and indeed in politics these often happen to be potent forces, as they effectively constrain the activities and outcomes of the agents involved in political decision-making. Though potent, such influences still can not be compared to accountability relationships, as defined above (Shugart, Moreno, and Crisp 2000: 3)

To be sure, horizontal influences and exchange differ with political systems; surely independently chosen executive and legislative branches in presidential systems open different interpretations of the discussed issue. On the other hand - what complicates even more the debate between the proponents of the two ideal models of contemporary democracies - recent scholarly work is more and more inclined to assume that in parliamentary democracies the relationship between the legislative and executive branches has undergone a substantial change. Put briefly: no longer is legislative branch supremacy over the executive taken for granted (Strom 2000; Mueller 2000). What remains in place is that parliamentary democracies are systems of mutual (i.e. executive and legislative) dependence while presidential ones – of mutual independence.

In reality however, the parliamentary systems rarely really elect the executive. Nonetheless, the symbolic ladder of accountability (mirroring, if one looks bottom-up, the ladder of delegation), is comprised of several rungs: (i) citizens - The People, (ii) the legislature, (iii) the executive, (iv) the bureaucracy. In more detail, there might be good empirical reasons to distinguish two sub-levels of the executive – prime minister and members of his cabinet, which depending on the constitutional provisions might to a different degree be in a clear accountable/delegative relationship.

Kaare Strom (2000: 6-8) treats accountability concept as a constitutive element in his definition of a parliamentary government: "(...) *parliamentary government* refer(s) to the institutional arrangement by which the executive is accountable, through confidence relationship, to any parliamentary majority". And adds that "(...) chain of delegation is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the reverse direction (...) [a]ll representative democracies entail delegation and accountability". The above review makes it clear that accountability, for the sake of its analytical and heuristic value, should remain conceived vertical alone. Horizontal mechanisms were always present in political systems contributing to and serving control, empowerment, exchange, and "fire alarm" functions. Why obscure clear concepts and add other conceptual extensions to the already numerous examples.

The willingness to broaden the scope of accountability is seen in yet another terminological attempt that - in my view - confuses the debate even more. The new invention, based on the "delegative democracies" concept is the *societal accountability*, which "involves actions carried out by actors with differing degrees of organization that recognize themselves as legitimate claimants of rights" and is defined as "...a non-electoral, yet vertical, mechanisms that enlarges the number of actors involved in the exercise of control. In contrast to electoral mechanisms, societal ones can be exercised between elections, do not depend on fixed calendars, and are activated 'on demand' (Smulovitz, Peruzzotti 2003: 310).

Actors allegedly employ - the proposal submits - institutional and non-institutional tools, on the one hand activating oversight agencies, institutions monitoring policy implementation, on the other - mobilize citizens, launch media denunciation, etc. It is believed not to entail mandatory legal sanctions but rather symbolic ones. They signal problems, change the saliency of particular issues, "frame" media events and the like. Sometimes these activities foster establishment of parallel societal organizations that monitor the deeds of public institutions.

The above description is deliberately longer; after its critical review one has little doubts we are talking about the functioning of public opinion, social control mechanisms, formal and informal, and about constructing social problems well described and theorized among scholars of sociology of social problems, many years ago (Becker 1966; Spector, Kitsuse 1981). So why dub it accountability? Moreover, the accompanying adjective - *societal* - contributes to further confusion; the phrase as crafted seems to hint that it is the society or its component parts that is accountable to something else. This idea comes close to another, conceived by Fox (1996; 1999), phenomenon – the "reverse accountability". It is reverse exactly because, so goes the submitted proposal, society's behavior is being evaluated by state or local politicians and rewards or punishments granted dependent on the outcome of the evaluation. In brief, it is about the relationship between those in power and the subordinated, in particular about an exchange of material rewards for compliance and obedience. The phenomenon usually presents to a greater extent in authoritarian setting. Fox himself speaks of "authoritarian clientelism" (1999: 7), one can not exclude a more moderate form of the phenomenon to

be present in every political system. In some cases it is clearly linked to a formally and institutionally established regime type - corporatism, which is organized from upper society and held accountable to the power center.

And again, my point is the same – why call it accountability? In this case at least 3 criteria of accountability (in its original meaning) seem to be flawed: (i) lack of precise awareness of a principal-agent relationship; (ii) no delegation mechanism seems to be in place; (iii) the ontology of punishment and rewards is vague for the majority of the alleged "agents", and (iv) even though the "reverse principal" might be a conceivable entity, conceptualizing "reverse agent(s)" and their exact role, the underlying signaling and transmission mechanisms etc. frankly exceeds my political imagination. To be sure, indeed political blackmailing, enforced clientelism and the like clearly exist and posit a real danger for stability, performance and transparency of the contemporary political systems. Moreover these phenomena directly influence the electoral process, political representation and ultimately, accountability. For this reason they should be analytically kept separate, as they are exogenous factors.

A final remark on the state of the art. The scholarly effort is usually concentrated on the theoretical and normative debate about the institutional and legal design of political systems and its effects on the working of the accountability mechanism. To be clear, the approach is of basic character and crucial importance and a good starting point for more detailed, empirically oriented endeavor, it does not suffice, however. The literature has used many empirical examples of "the working of accountability", usually though its negative version – with clear overrepresentation of political agents' punishment, neglecting the phenomenon of political reward. The stories submitted fall short of convincing explanation as to why a particular agent, president or a government, has been rejected during the delegation renewal. Instead the reader is exposed to a general evaluation, frequently rationalized post-factum, taking the form "since the agent has been punished, something must have gone wrong", accompanied by an inventive search for exemplifications. That's at least my understanding of the literature.

And last remark on the standard approach to accountability and its consequences: most authors implicitly assume the accountability mechanism applies only to the incumbents. On election day, The People, supposedly, delegate part of their authority to those who form a government and at the next election evaluate their performance, usually concentrating on their economic record. Cheibub and Przeworski (1999: 225), in addition to the previously quoted definition of accountability, note: "[r]ulers are accountable if the probability that they survive in office is sensitive to government performance; otherwise they are not accountable". (...) "Rulers are accountable, if their hazard rate increases, and the probability of surviving in office falls when economic performance declines". Authors then employ impressive data sets and analyses to test the extent to which economic performance of 135 countries, between 1950 to 1990, impact accountability, which is "enforced by

elections" (p.222). The result: "...economic performance does not affect the survival of heads of democratic governments even during the years when elections are held..." (p.237). Among the five, interesting and plausible, explanations why this is the case, none - even "between the lines" - refers to the deeds of the opposition. This is my major point here: I know of no scholarly effort to link electoral outcomes, and accountability mechanisms in particular, to the way the opposition behaves, performs, and co-creates policies, limited as it might be in particular instances. In a nutshell, I see no reason to refrain from applying the accountability mechanism to the opposition parties; irrespective of theoretical legacies and academic design, voters do hold accountable parties remaining in opposition, because there are prescribed roles and functions for such parties, in both parliamentary and presidential democracies. In parliamentary systems, opposition parties participate in drafting bills, chairing parliamentary committees, and in minority government settings, bargain their support for incumbents, etc. All these are by far too consequential political activities to neglect. Common sense and sheer participation in everyday democratic politics proves how incongruent to real life is the assumption that the sovereign evaluates only the deeds of incumbents. Looking from the electoral outcome angle, numerous examples of incumbents' good performance does not result in their reelection. When pitted against convincing issue stances and policy promises by politicians of the opposition, they look less able. And, on the other hand, an equally frequent configuration -- poorly acting incumbents remain in office because of even more disappointing outlooks of the opposition. In a nutshell thus: accountability has to be defined in interactive terms.

One of the immediate effects of accountability at work is that this mechanism boosts the probability that both incumbents and opposition are responsive and representative of the people. Since we are conceiving democratic accountability I refrain from pointing to revolutions, revolts, coup d'etats and other non-democratic means of punishing incumbents and giving way to the opposition. There exist also numerous intra-parliamentary and quasi-constitutional mechanisms pertinent to accountability. To name just a few: (i) elite bargaining and "horse trading", in multiparty systems contributing to numerous changes in governmental composition; (ii) parliamentary committees or MPs right to dismiss a particular minister; (iii) public opinion activity aimed at solving an issue or removing a given politician from office; (iv) votes of no-confidence; (v) specific provisions of presidential power, and the like. Finally, evaluation of political objects utilizes prospective imagination as well – their programs and manifestoes sooner or later are taken into account by the citizenry, just as their former record, in particular their "campaign loyalty", i.e. the extent to which parties winning the election stick to their promises when it comes to policy implementation.

To conclude: although the horizontal relationship between major political institutions exist, and proves at times of crucial importance, I opt for reserving the notion of accountability to the vertical one alone. In a nutshell, belief in existence of horizontal accountability in practice excludes the sovereign – The People – and thus by far departs from what I am inclined to consider democratic accountability to be.

Moreno, Crisp and Shugart (2003: 80) claim as well that the concept of HA is an oxymoron, and this is because: "(t)he term, 'horizontal' when applied to a political system implies two or more actors or institutions at the same level, but if one considers accountability to involve the possibility of sanctions, then the ability of one actor to sanction other implies that the one who may mete out sanctions has authority over the other. In other words, accountability implies that the actors in a political relationship are not at the same level".

Likewise, no doubt active "societal infrastructure", public opinion and the net of social initiatives aimed at combating social problems, all contribute to clarifying political responsibility and ultimately accountability; no doubt however can they be equalized with it. Furthermore the "reverse", *a rebour* mechanisms neglecting the obvious rights of the sovereign, are recorded in many polities; the claim that they constitute core accountability mechanisms is hardly plausible for me. Moreover, a word of caution about the usage of recently popular, but frequently confusing, Principal-Agent semantics is due. Accountability relationship between the Principal and the Agent becomes meaningful only when the two follow the Burkean "trustee" mode of representation. Can one realistically assume accountability to exist in the case of pure and full delegation relationships? The answer ought to be -- no; accountability is meaningful only if a trustee mode is in place, i.e. situations in which those entrusted with delegated authority have substantial freedom to represent our interests. And exactly what we hold our representatives accountable for is the extent to which they were able to properly represent us, despite the freedom they had to depart from our expectations. In case of the simple "transmission belt" relationship - accountability procedure seems less relevant.

Finally, contrary to the major focus of accountability literature – on the institutional design and its interactive outcomes -- my proposal concentrates on the entity that allegedly is the ultimate one, the main actor holding politicians accountable - the citizens. Clearly so in presidential systems, less so in parliamentary ones. In the latter, however, one has to bear in mind that even if the withdrawal of support for the executive formally comes from the parliament (say, in the middle of the term between the elections) the most likely real causal factor is a very poor or rapid decline in voters' support for the governing party(ies). In the age of weekly polling and mass media, this is the major source of political decisions as to the composition of governments. Briefly: without people's cognitive, affective and behavioral dispositions, accountability mechanism hardly exist. The genetic underlying assumption is thus, that accountability hardly exists *per se*; it has to be created by human beings, which means basically two things: institution building - constitutional provisions and accompanying socialization process, meaning both, political educational training and experience.

THEORETICAL PROPOSAL: "Fine-Tuning" at the Micro Level

In a nutshell thus: all of the above mentioned processes and mechanisms depend on the "vehicle" they embark on -- individual citizens. It is them who are faced with institutions that serve the purpose of accountability better or worse. Accountability is likely to depend as well on many - categorically different - macro factors. For example, the type of culture and the political in particular, that shapes its social structure and the labor market that forces and places each individual and their aggregates in different positions vis a vis each other and towards political actors, etc. Similarly, personality traits of individuals might play a role in their readiness to utilize the accountability mechanism or refrain from it, lastly, considerable proportions of the electorate in each country refrain from voting and thus leave the accountability tool to others.

Needless to say, what is definitely underscrutinized in the accountability phenomenon is exactly its individual level manifestation. To be sure, I consider them crucial for the macro-mechanisms to work, although it is hard to distinguish their causal sequence, and thus claim causality. Individual traits, be they cultural, social or psychological, might equally be determined by exogenous factors as well as created by the accountability-driven socialization and idiosyncratic experiences. The issue of causality is especially important in new democracies, in which political design, creativity and social constructiveness are at work. The practical question might be worded as follows: should new polities' designers believe Cheibub and Przeworski's (1999: 222) contention that "democracy is a system that enforces accountability", (bearing in mind they treat it as an "empirical hypothesis"), and simply wait for the institutional mechanism to create accountability. Or should the educational programs concentrate on the issue and deliberately socialize its citizens to be capable of "providing accountability to the system", i.e. be willing to evaluate and "make justice" when election day comes. At this point let me clarify what is - in my view - crucial for both accountability to work and for fruitful empirical analysis of the phenomenon. What follows is aimed at analytical disentangling the accountability mechanism concept into its component parts.

Three important facets (levels) of the accountability phenomenon seem to be worth distinguishing:

1) Accountability as an opportunity structure; as mentioned in the previous section, different political systems allow for different levels of accountability depending on the institutional design implemented, the first *sine qua non* condition being the very existence of democratic elections, enabling citizens to choose. Non-democratic polities are basically 'non-accountable' (except for revolts and revolutions, their mechanisms however differ substantially and qualitatively from the common denotation of the term, we are not covering this phenomenon). Democracies are. It is widely believed that accountability of contemporary democracies depends however on the institutional shape of the political system (electoral rules, presidentialism vs parliamentarism etc.) and the existence of real political (party) alternatives. The latter is important if the opportunity structure is to exist: alternatives on the supply side of the political system are its crucial condition.

2) Accountability as a cognitive/affective/behavioral asset of an individual . The focal point here is whether and to what extent citizens are capable of effective usage of that opportunity structure. Accountability is inversely related to delegation. Delegation is provisional and contingent upon politicians' performance. The *sine qua non* condition for this process is the very existence among the broader public of a subjective perception - "mirroring" - of that opportunity structure; which depends, in turn, on many categorically different factors, i.e. political culture, institutional legacies from the past (particularly important in post-authoritarian settings), elite activities etc. The point is that citizens ought to believe accountability is a real opportunity ("a tool at hand") and thus consequently, should reveal behavioral dispositions concerning its potential use. High levels of political cynicism, distrust in political institutions and widespread conviction that the political system offers no real party alternatives can contribute to low 'accountability potential' among the masses.

Therefore, to know whether accountability is at work, three processes need be controlled for:

[a] citizens' perceptions of the opportunity structure and trust in the electoral process (procedural aspect);

[b] belief that the system offers real political alternatives; opinions, attitudes, preferences and beliefs enabling the analysis of citizens' evaluation of particular policies implemented, values protected or assessment of system's general performance (cognitive aspect);

[c] readiness to do something about the (unsatisfactory) state of affairs, and consequently - "adequate" - to the above evaluations - behavior at elections (behavioral aspect).

3) Accountability as an outcome

Most scholars assume that since elections are held, the principal – "The People" make use of this tool and equate it with accountability at work. To push it to the extremes: the claim is that whatever the turnout and whatever the support for incumbent and opposition parties – once elections are held, accountability has been achieved, in other words democratic "justice has been done". The People can not be wrong.

One can imagine however a more demanding task - evaluation whether at elections indeed the justice has been done, either by relying on expert judgements concerning the state of the economy or any other relevant policies-issues or on subjective evaluations of The People.

Political representation and accountability in patterns of electoral behavior and their relevance

In this section I will describe the assumptions underlying the analyses presented in the empirical part of the paper. To be sure what follows is restricted to *electoral accountability*.

First, the basic *sine qua non* condition of electoral accountability to exist is, first, the very existence of elections (as an “opportunity structure”) and, second, participation in elections by reasonably numerous part of the sovereign. Total abstention means no democratic accountability. There are many reasons why people participate in elections, some of them are almost completely irrelevant to accountability, like habitual behavior, sheer conformism, threat by powerful others and the like.

Majority of citizens in contemporary democracies participate in elections however because they seem to pursue one of the two or both goals: they either (i) want to “throw the rascals out” and concentrate on the retrospective *evaluation* to hold politicians accountable or (ii) want to “*delegate* their authority” to deliberately chosen politicians – concentrating on the prospective expectations, or want (iii) to achieve both objectives. The distinction between the two is analytical, as one can hardly imagine citizens voting purely on retrospective/evaluative basis without thinking of the prospective delegation of authority and vice versa. Each individual, when decides what to do at the election, combines – in divergent proportions – the two considerations. Evaluation means – and this is where I depart from the orthodox classics of accountability – both punishment and reward.

To sum up: I posit that accountability mechanism can only exist between vertically located entities. It is a classical Principal- Agent relationship; it is of “trustee” mode. The agent must have enough independence to allow for his/her/its evaluation. If a perfect “delegate” mode is in place – the agent follows exactly the will of the principal, in other words – full responsiveness takes place, no accountability mechanisms can be applied. Moreover, the “delegation” act should be cognitively conscious one, that is, voting for a political entity should be rationally grounded. On the other hand, there must exist a will to evaluate on the side of the people. If people refrain from voting, i.e. from evaluating and delegating, no accountability and representation occurs. At least it is non-existent in the realm of electoral politics, it might be found elsewhere however, but this is what I am not interested in this paper.

For the clarity of further analysis in the empirical part, we need to depict all possible patterns of electoral behavior. For that we need to know what people do at elections. At a single election an individual can: (i) vote or refrain from voting and (ii) vote for a governmental party – the incumbents or for oppositional party. For judging about political accountability and representation we need to know the individuals' behavior in at least two consecutive elections. This allows us to distinguish nine types of electoral behavior, that are sort of “universe” of electoral choices (see Figure 1).

Does this mean that all non-voters should be considered as not involved in the accountability mechanism? I posit that those who have participated in the previous election (at time t_1) and had

decided not to vote in the last one (at t2) do exercise their accountability power in that they are unwilling to prolong the support for whomever they have supported at t1. In this sense these “new” non-voters are relatively punishing those they voted for previously by withdrawing their support, though only partly and moderately (as they don’t vote for their opponents). The stable non-voters are not considered to fall into the category of citizens exercising accountability.

Figure 1 shows detailed exhaustive categorizations of electoral behavior. Let me quickly go through them.

FIGURE 1 about here

Group 1 is comprised of “Stable Non-Voters”, those who have not participated in any of the last two elections. The group is interesting for comparative reasons – in one version of the the analysis it serves as the opposite pole of both accountability and representation. It is pure form of *exit* – no delegation and no evaluation. In a nutshell: this group – for many different reasons – does not take part nor responsibility for what is going on in the political system.

Group 2 ["Incumbent Demobilization"] and 3 ["Opposition Demobilization"] gathers the electorally demobilized citizens: those who had shifted their electoral behavior from voting for a particular party to electoral restraint - abstention. These two groups represent two mechanisms: evaluation, in both instances *punishment* and *exit*, in the first instance from supporting a governmental party and in the second – oppositional. Both groups present a moderate form of punishment – they only stop supporting party of their former preference, but they are not ready to support another one.

In many further analyses, groups 2 and 3 (as well as 8 and 9) were ultimately merged together for the sake of simplicity. In almost all instances the means of the socio-demographic and “political/attitudinal” variables was very similar.

Group 4 is a classical example of stable governmental support and is composed of citizens that have voted at both points in time for the governmental party(ies)¹. I call this pattern "Incumbent Delegation Renewal" Apart from stability of the voting preference the group is characterized by the combination of positive evaluation – *political reward* and *delegation*; renewal of support for another term.

Group 5 is a classical example of the orthodox treatment of accountability – its aggregates individuals who have evaluated governmental party(ies) they voted for at t1 election negatively and decided to

punish them, not only by refraining to renew their support, but to vote for an alternative – an opposition party. This is a group that attempts to "throw the rascals out". I call this pattern of discontinued voting preferences – "Direct Punishment". Two mechanisms underlie such a pattern *evaluation* of the former incumbents and willingness to *punish* them combined with the will to *delegate* their authority to another political actor.

Group 6 is comprised of people who decided to switch from voting for an opposition party to a governmental one. This group certainly does both, still *delegates* their authority, though to another actor and at the same time *evaluates*, by *punishing* opposition and *rewarding* the incumbents.

Group 7 – "Stable Opposition Support" consists of people who are stable supporters of the opposition. This is a specific type; by rigid standards of accountability that relates the phenomenon exclusively to the deeds of incumbents would have to be considered irrelevant. This group however, by the way the most numerous of all nine, certainly indicates high level of political representativeness, one might even say a pure – uncontaminated by incumbents' distributional "cookies" – type of political representation, probably based on values. One might however be more flexible and assume that *evaluation* and *delegation* of authority to opposition is part of the accountability mechanism story as well. If so, in terms of evaluation this group exhibits *reward* for opposition (or if one is concentrated only on incumbents – *relative punishment* of governmental parties, as by supporting/rewarding opposition these citizens decrease the chances of the incumbents to be reelected or their landslide victory, which for policy-legitimacy is important as well)

Groups 8 and 9 contain former non-voters mobilized at the last election – they are newcomers to the electoral market. I label the patterns of electoral behavior they are carriers of as "Incumbent Re-mobilization" and "Opposition Re-mobilization", respectively. The main underlying mechanism of their decision seems to be *delegation*. Just as any other citizens they might be motivated by evaluations of the past: by the wrongdoings of the incumbents and vote at t2 election for opposition (group 9) or they might have been attracted by the deeds of incumbents and vote for them; finally they might simply vote for opposition because they think it is prospectively a better choice. Nonetheless the main peculiarity of this group is that they – from their subjective (psychological) perspective - can not "hold accountable" be it governmental or opposition parties as they have *refrained from delegating* their authority at t1 election.

¹ A short note on timing of elections and the in-between term seems to be due at this point: whenever in this paper I talk of governmental or opposition parties (support) I refer to parties' status of the between election t1 and t2 status.

Research questions and hypotheses

The aim of this paper is mostly descriptive and exploratory, although some hypothetical predictions can be laid out as well.

First and foremost, we want to know which of the types of electoral behavior come closest to what we consider mechanisms of electoral accountability and political representation. We can obviously proceed under the most general and generous assumption that all nine types indicate – to a different degree – the working of accountability and representation mechanisms at the micro-level. In what follows I will try to depict the determinants of each type of electoral behavior in terms of both, socio-demographic features of individuals as well as political correlates of each behavior by referring to individuals' preferences, evaluations and attitudes.

The main three "open-ended" research questions are:

First, what is the relationship between the particular types of electoral behavior (some of them suspected to be indicative more of an accountability, others of representation) with the subjective opinions and attitudes evaluating selected aspects of the polity functioning pertinent to these concepts? In a nutshell: is there a logical fit between citizens' behavior and their attitudes/evaluations? A very open-ended question and, in a way, a very crude test of the whole logic of the research design I offer here. Had the results proven my general expectations wrong I would have refrained from further analyses.

Second, what is the relationship between representation and accountability? Is it indeed a "reverse" one – the more accountability the less representation and the other way round? Do we see significant differences in this respect between the stable and new democracies? Are individuals that manifest the "logical fit" between their electoral behavior and attitudes/evaluations more indicative of the above depicted relationship?

Third, and final major question is whether people are more satisfied with the functioning of their democracy when accountability mechanisms dominate or when representational one do? Or maybe the two synergetically boost each others impact on satisfaction with democracy, both its performance and the ideal? We are interested whether these relationships and the set of independent factors that impacts them cluster differently in the stable and new democracies?

More systematic reasoning allows (four) initial hypotheses to be spelled out:

H1: Basic test: non-voters are expected to differ substantially from all other groups of electorally active citizens in their lower democratic qualities: representativeness and accountability credentials. This sounds fairly trivial as we know that non-voters differ from active voters, but this enterprise is important as we want to test and eventually manifest the extent to which and the substance of these differences. In other words, were we unable to manifest significant differences between how people

evaluate divergent aspects of political reality and their decision to participate in election or not – which is our simplest and most crude understanding of citizens' willingness to use accountability opportunity structure (the elections) - we would have to stop and refrain from further more detailed analyses.

H2: Among the nine types of electoral behavior, two seem to be more than other types closely related to what the collective wisdom of political science is recognizing as pure forms of representation and accountability – "Incumbent Delegation Renewal" [group 4] and "Direct Punishment" [group 5]. If indeed this is the case, we should be able to manifest logical relations with relevant attitudinal-evaluative factors, like higher: (i) levels of system responsiveness [REPRESENT, see table 1] (ii) levels of party representativeness [PARTREP] for group 4, and lower (iii) assessment of the performance of the government [SATGOV] and/or (iv) evaluation of the deeds of the party they voted for at the t1 election [PREVPART], for group 5.

Invoking the spirit of David Easton one may say that the two indicators for each of the concept-mechanism can be described as revealing its "diffuse" and "specific" aspects.

We also expect that citizens who are ephemeral, capricious voters (the ones that enter and exit the electoral arena) are likely to display less of the above traits, especially the two concerning representation. Why this should be the case is covered by the essence of H3

H3: The determinants of the more ephemeral voters (and consequently the transitory status of their electoral behavior) might derive either from their unstable, marginal social position (young, poorly educated, unaffiliated etc) or from their political experiences manifested in evaluations and attitudes (no party identification, perception of lack of party alternatives, alienation or external locus of political control, and the like.).

H4: The more stable the voters and the more active in using the clear mechanisms of evaluation and delegation the more likely they are to be influenced by the immediate, detailed evaluations of politics (i.e. satisfaction with government performance and evaluation of accomplishments of the supported at t1 election party).

Apart from these four hypotheses many other expectations worth testing are not disclosed for the sake of space. Instead let me simply emphasize that numerous tests of the relationships between particular types of electoral behavior and associated factors were undertaken. Moreover, logistic regression models aimed at tracing the direct effects of each variable were run for each of the nine types. In addition, the impact of "political" factors was tested after accounting for major socio-demographic controls. Finally, pairwise (most contrasted from the pure *accountability* and pure *delegation*) types of electoral behavior were tested against the sets of independent variables, aimed at showing the peculiarities of each of them.

The Results

Entries of table 1 allow us to maintain that H1 is fully confirmed: **non-voters are categorically different in all respects**, concerning indicators of representation, accountability, satisfaction with democracy, political efficacy and perceptions of political system format. In substantive and directional terms non-voters, those who do not delegate and do not (or do less) evaluate are: least satisfied with democracy, both its performance and the ideal, are least satisfied with the accomplishments of the government, are least likely to be attached to any particular party, see least differences on the “supply” side of the party system, and so on. Moreover, they also are the ones that uncover specific political attitudes – their “political efficacy” is poor and are alienated from the system: don’t believe that voting matters and ‘who is in power’ makes no difference for them. This trivial observations offer however fairly nontrivial consequences for our approach.

What follows is based on the subsequent logic: if we agree that (a) stable non-voters are almost pure, straight example of people avoiding both the usage of electoral accountability mechanism and are refrain from becoming represented in the system and that (b) those who participate and vote in both elections (especially those who either renew the delegation for the same party or punish those whom they voted for in the last election by withdrawing their delegation) are at the other end of representation and accountability, respectively, then (c) the types of electoral behavior labeled “ephemeral voters” (the ones that go in and out of electoral market) should fall somewhere in between.

In table 1 there are 99 cells, the entries confirm all our expectations, as most of them precisely support the logic of the argument unveiled above and answer precisely one of our reserach questions, namely that indeed there is a lot of commonalities between how people behave and how they evaluate polities’ crucial features. In a nutshell, that the relationship between behavioral and attitudinal dimensions of political phenomena is adequate, at least in our sample of cases. If we assume that there are more groups (than group 4 - “Incumbent Delegation Renewal”) of electoral behavior indicative of representation, such as: group 6 [“Pro-Incumbent Switch”], group 7 [“Stable Opposition Support”] and group 8 [“Incumbent Re-mobilization”], we can easily show that groups 6 and 8 are the ones where highest scores on the attitudinal/evaluative dimension are to be found. Namely, individuals’ subjective assessment that the electoral procedures contribute to effective representation [REPRESSEN] and that there are parties in the system that offer fair representation [PARTREP] prove to be constitutiue attitudinal elements of these groups. In both cases something fairly attractive on the side of the government must have been visible so that these two groups decided to support the incumbents. One, very serious possibility is that incumbent party(ies) has simply been representative and responsive. In case of group 7, “Stable Opposition Support”, its’ underlying mechanism stems, equally, from their

high party identification [PID] as well as from their conviction that “the party they voted for previously” has done a good job [PREVPART]. Individuals falling into this category are interesting yet for another reason. They are among those who see clear party alternatives [see high values of LRDIFFER and WIDELR] and, moreover, score very high on two variables indicative of political efficacy [POWERDIF] and [VOTEDIFF].

On the other hand, groups symptomatic of accountability-driven behavior (apart from the classical type of “Direct Punishment”, which aim at “throwing the rascals out”) like group number 2 [“Incumbent Demobilization”] and to a certain extent group number 9 [“Opposition Mobilization”] also unveil pretty high level of congruence with attitudinal/evaluative dimension. In both cases individuals falling into these two groups, de facto punish the incumbents, the former by refraining from renewing the delegation for the party they voted for in the previous election, and the latter by supporting opposition and delegating their authority to them. Especially group number 9 manifests very low satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government [SATGOV], whereas group 2 is dissatisfied with the performance of the party they voted for in the last election.

Final remark is to draw reader’s attention to the fact that stability of the electoral behavior over time is as well pretty well explained by the set of our attitudinal evaluative factors, among them PID, VOTEDIFF and PREVPART in particular. Simply put: stability of vote preferences among individuals in our sample is a phenomenon that is clearly related to the perception of the supply side of the party system. And this is not a tautology to say that those who have strong PID vote in a predictable stable way, it is more than that because they also see the system as more ‘stretched’ and consequently see more clearly programmatic differences between the parties (see LRDIFFER and WIDELR) as well as consequently unveil higher levels of ‘political efficacy’ (see VOTEDIFF and POWERDIF) than other groups.

On the other hand, groups indicative of accountability mechanisms application (apart from the classical type – “Direct Punishment, which aims at ‘throwing the rascals out’) that is group 2 [Incumbent Demobilization] and to a certain extent, group 9 [Opposition Mobilization], both in fact punish the incumbent party(ies), the former, by refraining to renew the delegation and, the latter, by supporting opposition and delegating their authority to them. Especially group 9 manifests very low satisfaction with governments’ performance [SATGOV], whereas group 2 is mainly dissatisfied with the performance of the party they voted for in the previous election [PREVPART].

The discussion presented above covers also the content of hypothesis H2. **Briefly: the hypothesis is partly confirmed**, in that the “*renewed delegation*” type displays the most pro-democratic and pro-representative effects, however the “*direct punishment*” type does not. Citizens belonging to the latter group unveil – on average – fairly low satisfaction with the democratic performance and democracy as

an ideal regime. Moreover, the group displays on average moderate feeling of representation, both via electoral process and MPs responsiveness as well as via party that represents their views.

The general results presented in table 1 show that apart from citizens that have embarked on the “*renewed delegation*” accountability mode, the second in the row group of citizens most satisfied with democracy and representation is to be found among those who at t2 election are mobilized and/or attracted by the incumbent party. The juxtaposition of the above configuration permits us to claim that it is not the very “integrity” of voters (their loyalty of support) that matters for satisfaction with democratic performance and its ideal, nor that *rewarding* the party of the former choice is the main factor in boosting satisfaction and representativeness of the system. The single similar factor for both groups of citizens is that they – in the second t2 election – were willing to *delegate* their authority to the incumbents.

The last part of H2 is confirmed: “ephemeral”, as I call them, voters expose poor feeling of representativeness and consequently these groups are by far the least happy with democracy as an ideal regime [DEMIDEAL], but they are not among the most dissatisfied with the democratic performance [SATDEM]. In other words, these ‘transitory’ voters don’t seem to be particularly strongly attached to the politics’ fundamentals, they seem however to be instrumentally oriented citizens – they enter and exit the electoral arena as they please, and for that reason they are less critical of the functioning (performance) of democracy; at least they are considerably less critical of its performance than two groups which are consistently supportive of opposition. To conclude: flexibility in entering and exiting the electoral market seems to be a value in itself irrespectively of the particular electoral outcome.

H3 overlaps partly with one of the general research questions as it continues on the “ephemeral voters” and predicts their specific socio-demographic status (see table 2). And the prediction turns to be correct: indeed their electoral transitory status seems to be determined by their young age, poor education, rural residence, and low household per capita incomes Logistic regression models (see table 3 of the Appendix) shows that this set of socio-demographic factors explains best the electoral behavior of group 1 - stable nonvoters and group 7 – stable opposition supporters and to a much lower degree, group 4 – stable governmental supporters. The explanatory power of social background variables for the remaining six types of electoral behavior is negligible. The most general, though still partial, conclusion at this point is to emphasize that specific socio-demographic profile of citizens (older age and to a certain extent higher incomes) are conducive to political preferences stability. As far as the comparison of our two most prototypical groups of representation and accountability goes – groups 4 and 5 – they differ most in three respects: people consequently supporting the government are older, less educated and and less religious. A caveat is due at this point, apart from age all other social background factors do little in differentiating these two groups.

More or less the same messages can be drawn from the correlation and logistic analyses aimed at tracing the direct effects of particular socio-demographic factors (data not shown).

Finally, a legitimate question that should follow is how – compared to the socio-demographic factors – the political attitudinal/evaluative factors explain the between group variance. Entries of column (a) of table 3 indicate clearly that the latter set of factors exerts far more explanatory power than socio-demographic ones. And again the three groups indicative of stable behavioral preferences come to the fore – stable non-voters and the stable governmental supporters, as well as, though to a lower extent, stable opposition supporters are the ones whose behavior is more easily “explainable” than in the case of the remaining six groups. On the other hand, the set of political/evaluative factors hardly explain why the newly demobilized citizens (groups 2 and 3) and newly mobilized voters (groups 8 and 9) behave as they do. Part of their “confused” behavior is explained by their inability to see alternatives in the system and in fact pretty low belief in the merits of democracy as such – as an ideal political system (see table 1, columns LRDIFTER, WIDELR and DEMIDEAL). The details of the relationship between modes of electoral behavior and particular political attitudinal/evaluative factor has been discussed in the previous part, at this point I comment only on their capacity to explain particular types of electoral behavior. It is surprising also to see how the two main to our interest groups (no. 4 and 5) differ in this respect; whereas the behavior indicative of representation – stable governmental support can be explained significantly by the set of political factors (16% of the variance), the behavior indicative of accountability mechanism at work does not (barely over 2% of the variance explained).

How "rational" is the electoral behavior: do voters that act "logically" differ from those who don't?

On page 16 of this paper I have raised the issue of – for the sake of simplicity, lets call it – "rationality" of the electoral behavior. What follows does not mean that we enter rational choice approach with all its consequences. The exercise is in fact very simple, though necessary. Why? Mainly because, at times explicitly at times between the lines, the accountability literature (though not so much the political representation one)² assumes that retrospective evaluation and prospective delegation are processes clearly based on some kind of rational calculation. In the prototypical mode of accountability mechanism, there is really very little of an expectation that "standing-for" accountability may occur or that because of the very social composition of the electorate, accountability mechanisms will take place. Quite to the contrary, "throwing the rascals out" calls for

² From Pitkin (1967) via Converse and Pierce (1986) to the last publications on Esaisson and Holmberg (1996), there surfaces an assumption that good representation may take place accidentally, "malgre lui", just because of social mirroring of the representatives to the electorate etc. To be sure, most of the political representation concepts utilize the idea of "rationality" of such an endeavor – MP's really do frequently do a hard job in finding out what the "real" preferences of their voters are, and voters on their side are willing to comprehensively communicate to the elites what their preferences really are.

well grounded rationality, if not for other than for purely psychological reasons, of which – "reference group" mechanisms and cognitive dissonance and its consequences, prevents people from easy switches in their behavior, socially considered "disloyal" etc.. Changing the voting behavior from supporting one party to another, which is the essence of the attempt aimed at "throwing the rascals out", calls for internally acceptable justification.

An example may help: individuals forming group 5, which want to "directly punish" the incumbents, i.e. those who refrain from their former decision to support the incumbent party(ies) and willing to directly switch their preference and vote for the opposition, behave "rationally" (or "logically" if you will), **if** at the same time they are critical of governments' performance in the last period of time. **If** they are voting the incumbents out of office and simultaneously claim to be very satisfied with the performance of the government [SATGOV], the "rationality" of such a behavior – to say the least – is doubtful³.

"Raw" statistics of the results of the above described procedure is shown in table 11, where "fit" column stands for "rational" behavior. The results of dividing the population into "rational" and "less or irrational" electoral behavior categories and juxtaposing them by the attitudinal/evaluative political factors, are shown in table 4. The distributions presented in table 4 can be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) The differences between the particular modes of electoral behavior are much more significant (see "eta-squared indicator in the most-bottom row of table 4) among almost all "rational-logical" subgroups distinguished by the attitudinal/evaluative political criteria. In some instances – SATDEM, political efficacy indicators - POWERDIF, VOTEDIFF - and PREVPART the differences are very significant.

(b) Scholars of normative leaning would immediately note the promising fact that in the politics under analyses citizens' evaluations of political factors is fairly relevant to their electoral behavior mode, especially if supported by a "rational" configuration of the two (see for instance the mean of SATDEM in subgroups of groups 4 and 5

³ Two remarks: first, what I suggest here is that voters who are clearly dissatisfied with the performance of the government and vote – accordingly – for the opposition parties behave "rationally-logically". I have more reservations to call the reverse situation "irrational" – i.e. when voters satisfied with the government nevertheless vote for the opposition parties, as they might be attracted by the latter's promises. Equally complicated is the situation in which voters dissatisfied with the government continue supporting their party out of sheer loyalty. Both latter examples however indicate high level of incongruence between their cognitive/evaluative on the one hand and behavioral, on the other, aspects of their attitudes, which might be called "irrational".

Second, for the "Stable Non-Voters" to evaluate how rational is their withdrawal from electoral politics is to check their behavior with their evaluation of the "diffuse" representativeness of the electoral game, their assessment on whether elections "in practice ensure that the views of voters are represented" [REPRESENT]. "Rational NVs" are in the followings the ones that unveil deep disbelief in the electoral game. "Irrational" are the one who despite their positive evaluation of the electoral game, nevertheless refrain from voting. For groups no. 2 and 3 – the "newly demobilized voters" rational fit between their new decision to withdraw from electoral arena is if they simultaneously claim that party they voted for in the last election performed poorly [PREVPART]. If the opposite occurs – their behavior falls short of "rationality". Finally for the "newly remobilized" groups the test of rationality employs variable {PARTREP}.

(c) In terms of the socio-demographic profile of the subgroups distinguished by the electoral "rationality" criteria, the factor that differentiates most is individuals' age (see table 5), and to a lesser extent education. "Rational" voters are both slightly – on average – older as well as more stable and loyal in their party preferences between the two elections we covered.

(d) Interesting, though complicated for uncontested explanation, is the relationship of education with the "rational" electoral behavior. On average the "irrational" voters are better educated, which is counterintuitive. This result however is created almost exclusively by one subgroup of electoral behavior, namely those who "consequently support the opposition"; individuals that form this subgroup are by far overrepresented and it happens that they are well educated. On the other hand, which is a very initial hypothesis, stable opposition to the government might be indicative of highly educated post-materialists, who might be dealigned and detached from main-stream institutional politics, sequentially vote against incumbents.

Satisfaction with democracy, electoral accountability and political representation

New, fragile democracies differ from the stable ones in many respects. In this paper I am interested whether the "consolidation status" of a democracy matters for accountability and representation mechanisms as they occur in electoral behavior and attitudes. What follows is divided into several parts:

First, it is of interest to me whether the general differences between particular modes of electoral behavior are attributable more to social position of an individual or rather the attitudinal/evaluative political factors. The general answer, void of details, is to be found in table 8 B, where clear pattern seems to unveil: socio-structural factors matter more for distinguishing among particular modes of electoral behavior in the Old rather than New Democracies. Whereas the political attitudinal/evaluative set of factors – in the New ones. As far as social position profile is concerned, it pretty well explains, in Old Democracies in particular, who the particular groups of electoral behavior are comprised of; especially groups 1, 4, 7, which have one thing in common – they indicate political stability of the vote (for details – see table 6). In a nutshell however, (a) the Stable Non-Voters in New Democracies compared to the ones in the Old Democracies are: older, less educated and more devout. (b) The stable supporters of the government (group 4) in New Democracies are younger, relatively (though not absolutely) more educated, less religious and absolutely (though not relative to the New Democracies mean) poorer than in the Old ones. (c) Voters using the mechanism of "direct punishment" differ in both groups of democracies, in the New one they are absolutely less educated (and again, not relative to the NDs mean), live in smaller localities, are more religious and poorer. (For details about other groups, see table 6)

Second, and still pretty general, question is whether socio-structural or political/attitudinal factors explain more in differences between these three crucial groups of electoral behavior. Partial answer one finds in table 9 B. It is worth emphasizing that the difference between the indicative of

representation group 4 and that of electoral accountability, group 5 is insignificant in terms of their sociological profile, but very much so in terms of their political attitudinal characteristic. In a nutshell, the difference between the two opposing groups indicative of the two concepts we dwell upon in this paper belongs to and is based in the political realm. When the two groups are compared (separately) with Stable Non-Voters, the sociological traits (in the Old Democracies in particular) are almost as significant as the political/attitudinal ones. But the most profound effect of the political evaluative-attitudinal stances in diverging the two groups is found in New Democracies not when they are juxtaposed with each other but between the electorally indifferent group and the ones that either punish directly (group 5) or continuously reward – renew the delegation. The details of which particular social and political variables contribute to this effect is to be found in tables 6 and 7, respectively.

Third, although very telling I will not discuss here the detailed entries of tables 6 and 7 and instead go directly to the multivariate analyses presented in tables A1 through A3 of the Appendix. In the three tables one finds a specific configuration of our three prototypical electoral behavior: classical electoral exit – non-voting (group 1), prototypical accountability-driven behavior – "Direct Punishment" (group 5) and prototypical representation-backed behavior – "Incumbent Delegation Renewal" (group 4). The groups are moreover "fine-tuned", in that voters considered "irrational" were removed from the analyses, i.e. the ACCS6 group of directly punishing voters is composed of those who have changed the vote from incumbents in t1 to opposition in t2 and simultaneously have indicated that are dissatisfied with the performance of the government in the last term [SATGOV]. Such a group of citizens is juxtaposed with "rational" group of non-voters – the ones that don't vote and simultaneously are sceptical that electoral game can in any reasonable sense provide responsiveness of the elites [REPRESEN]. The same logic applies to the "fine-tuning" of the REPS6 group (table A2) and slightly different design in the direct comparison between ACCS6 and REPS6 in table A3, in that here the parallel is drawn between the "rational" accountability, on the one hand, and representation carriers on the other.

The results can be summarized as follows:

- (i) both electorally active groups are much better explained when compared to the group that refrains from electoral activity. This is true for both, the distinction between the old and new democracies, and between the selected socio-demographic factors and political-attitudinal ones.
 - (ii) The "rational accountability" electoral behavior is better explained in new that the old democracies, mainly due to the fact that political evaluations differ (12% of explained variance) among them what matters most is the efficacy indicator [VOTEDIFF] and party identification [PID01].
- On the other hand in the old democracies what contributes to distinguishing these two groups are not political factors (among the PID and VOTEDIFF do not matter at all, slightly does WIDELR), but

pure social position ones, among them the crucial is age – non-voters being clearly younger than the participating population.

(iii) The "rational representation" electoral behavior, depicted by contrasting groups REPS6 with rational non-voters, confirms that in new democracies this distinction explains (22% of variance explained) more than in the old ones and that in this case the political attitudinal factors among citizens of these fragile democracies are profoundly more important than they are both in the old ones and compared to sociological factors. Among them the crucial one is PID. On the other hand, in old democracies the explanation of the differences between these two groups are more balanced between sociological, which explain slightly more, and political; again, age being the number one factor, with older citizens significantly overrepresented among the electorally rational active group.

(iv) Finally, the comparative match between the two prototypical groups depicting accountability and representation unveils (in table A3) rather poor explanation, in this case however slightly more predictable in the old than the new democracies, because of the higher correlation in both groups of independent variables.

The general summary of the results of tables A1 to A3 is presented in the CONCLUSIONS.

Tables B1 through B3 present analyses aimed at answering another question: to what extent satisfaction with the performance of democracy [SATDEM] is explained by the set of this two "fine-tuned" rationally behaving voter groups, after controlling for both socio-demographic and political-attitudinal factors. The short description of the results allows us to say that the rational group of voters using accountability mechanism as compared to rational non-voters (ACCS6) does not add any explanation to what we can predict by using social and political variables alone, for this particular comparative configuration. In general the model explains very little, which means that electoral activity driven by accountability reasons is weakly associated with the satisfaction with democracy, and if it is, it shows up rather in the old than new democracies.

Table B2 presents a different story: rational electoral behavior driven by representation considerations does impact satisfaction with the performance of democracy, mainly because of the political evaluation factors and mainly in new democracies (7% explanatory power as compared to the 4% for the old democracies). All in all, citizens of new democracies activated for rational electoral participation by representation-backed considerations, employ this mechanism mainly of political considerations. In new democracies because of their strong PID, in the old ones because they see programmatic alternatives in the party system. Nonetheless, these political factors do not cover the whole story – a significant direct effect of the interactive REPS6 variable remains in place; it alone adds almost 4% of the predictive power in the new democracies and more than 1% in the old. This means that representation-backed electoral behavior is a factor in itself contributing to the higher satisfaction with the democratic performance.

In table B3, the direct effect of the difference between the two prototypical accountability and representation rational electoral behavior is tested, after controlling for the same set of independent variables. Briefly: the differences between these two electoral modes of behavior – accountability-driven and representation-backed ones – do add to the SATDEM, fairly significantly in the old democracies, slightly less so in the new ones. They add after controlling for the political attitudinal factors impact alone, as the socio-demographic ones do not exert among such a juxtaposition of the two groups – any effect on satisfaction with democracy. In other words, the two – otherwise important in our analyses – social position variables: age and education do not differentiate the two groups with respect to satisfaction with democracy. In a way irrespectively whether one is young or old and educated or less, embarking on accountability-driven or representation-based electoral participation does not add to our understanding how democracy is evaluated. What matters are political factors and the unique effect derived from the ontology of the two mechanisms under scrutiny.

Finally, democracy is evaluated not only in its "performance" aspect, we want to know whether the "diffuse" support for democracy is somehow dependent on the set of social and political factors and to what extent they explain the unique impact of the "fine-tuned" interactive relations between the three groups of electoral behavior. The short summary (see details in tables C1 to C3) points to the fact that the employed logic of analyses yields better result for the DEMIDEAL phenomenon rather than for SATDEM. Among other things worth interpretation is the fact that this diffuse evaluation of democracy is strongly related to the age of democracy – in old democracies the pure rational accountability-driven mechanism is explained plausibly, while in the new ones it is the representation-backed behavior that – even more so – is more comprehensible. In all instances, save one, after controlling for the set of factors the same as in the previous models, added value by the ACCS6, REPS6 and REPACC2 interactive configurations is unveiled. And one more important phenomenon, the added value of these three variables is far more significant in the new democracies than in the old ones. What it means is that in new democracies satisfaction with the democratic ideal and enhancing the "diffuse" support for it is much more dependent not so much on who the people are and even how they evaluate the political realm, but much more what they do in reality when it comes to participate in elections. Moreover, it is extremely important in case they embark on rational representation-backed electoral behavior.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The two concepts and phenomena, that of political representation and accountability do not seem to be that contradictory and structurally reverse ones as the theory assumes. One caveat however is due at this point: although the CSES theoretical background and its empirical approach focuses on this differences it is because we assume that these two qualities of democracy prevail each in another institutional setting. Presidential systems and plurality FPTP parliamentary systems are the ones believed to enhance the effective operation of accountability mechanisms, whereas the parliamentary PR systems are expected to be conducive to the representativeness of the polity. Unfortunately in our sample we were unable to test hypotheses deriving from this institutional predictions, as we had virtually no polity that enhances accountability. Consequently, the results presented, are limited and should read: in parliamentary PR, mixed (MMP) and majoritarian party systems no profound opposition between accountability and representation mechanism are negligible.

2. This is not to say that differences do not exist. Quite to the contrary, they differ depending which aspect of the political realm is taken into account. Representation is more clearly associated with positive features of democracies – satisfaction with their functioning and the performance of the government. These two features point that those being represented contribute clearly to the growth of the "specific" political support. There is however virtually no difference between the group indicative of representation and the one that depicts best the accountability mechanism as far as more "diffuse" political support features are taken into account – the two groups unveil the same level of political efficacy and not that different acceptance of democracy as an ideal. On the other hand, the group indicative of accountability mechanism at work unveils higher perception of system alternativeness, which is a necessary prerequisite of smoothly functioning party system and making meaningful choices.

3. The "fine-tuned" juxtaposition of the three prototypical electoral behaviors allows us to conclude that de facto the representation-backed and accountability-driven rational behavior have fairly similar social and, slightly less so, political roots. In a nutshell thus, it does not seem to be the case that accountability and representation are "reversely" relation. Although the qualification stressed in concluding remark no.1 on the composition of the countries under scrutiny applies here as well. "directly punish" are less determined by the evaluation of the deeds of the government, contrary to the very strong effect of SATGOV on positive decision to renew the term for parties voted at t1. The groups differ as well in their satisfaction with democracy, more performance than the ideal. There are also identity and party system perception differences – "directly punishing" group unveils lower PID and – interestingly – higher stretch and alternativeness of the party system.

4. The nine types of electoral behavior between two elections that covers the universe of all possible decisions taken at t1 and t2, are logically related to the phenomena that were the subject of our analyses. Not only the clear distinction between citizens who decided not to participate in the electoral procedures and the clearly most engaged ones, but also the subgroups jointly labeled here as "ephemeral" or "capricious" voters align very well with the logic of the analyses presented above.

5. The comparison of new and old democracies shows the differences in the role accountability and representation mechanism can play in a democratic polity varies. Some of the results show that the accountability mechanism might be more demanding one. Not a surprise in new democracies citizens who practice democracy for few years only might encounter problems in rational decisions concerning whom to support, if not for other reasons, because they are not well experienced what is politically feasible. Political representation mechanism seems to be easier for digesting by even less politically socialized citizens of the new democracies.

6. Accountability and representation are related to two facets of democracy – its performance and normative ideal – in a slightly different way, that was described above, but definitely needs further in-depth analyses.

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Figure 1.

| Types of electoral behavior | Delegation <i>prospective</i> | Evaluation <i>retrospective</i> | | | N |
|---|--|--|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | punishment | reward | exit | |
| 1. Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | | | | + | 1240 |
| 2. Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | | + | | + | 580 |
| 3. Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | | + | | + | 586 |
| 4. Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | + | | + | | 3585 |
| 5. Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | + | + | | | 1676 |
| 6. Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | + | + | | | 461 |
| 7. Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | + | | + | | 5500 |
| 8. Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | + | | + | | 348 |
| 9. Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | + | + | | | 725 |

Table 1. Types of electoral behavior by political / attitudinal factors (means of categorized variables)

| Types of electoral behavior | PID 01 | SAT GOV | SAT DEM | POWERDIF | VOTEDIFF | DEM IDEAL | PREV PARTY | REPR ESEN | PART REP | LR DIFFER | WIDELR |
|--|--------|---------|---------|----------|----------|-----------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|
| 1 Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | 0.17 | 2.50 | 2.71 | 2.99 | 2.98 | 3.62 | --- | 2.55 | 1.59 | 2.64 | 6.68 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | 0.36 | 2.93 | 3.04 | 3.45 | 3.44 | 4.02 | 2.89 | 2.91 | 2.02 | 2.74 | 7.05 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | 0.42 | 2.79 | 2.90 | 3.36 | 3.45 | 3.97 | 3.32 | 2.75 | 2.12 | 2.74 | 7.25 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | 0.61 | 3.61 | 3.59 | 3.73 | 3.92 | 4.35 | 3.78 | 3.23 | 2.57 | 2.88 | 7.41 |
| 5 Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | 0.43 | 2.66 | 2.90 | 3.70 | 3.81 | 4.09 | 2.59 | 2.91 | 2.25 | 2.92 | 7.60 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | 0.46 | 3.56 | 3.38 | 3.58 | 3.77 | 4.30 | 3.26 | 3.03 | 2.39 | 2.82 | 7.26 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | 0.59 | 2.80 | 3.00 | 3.73 | 3.94 | 4.17 | 3.60 | 2.94 | 2.52 | 2.89 | 7.50 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | 0.42 | 3.59 | 3.50 | 3.75 | 3.85 | 4.16 | --- | 3.16 | 2.42 | 2.79 | 6.95 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | 0.38 | 2.70 | 2.79 | 3.61 | 3.79 | 3.83 | --- | 2.87 | 2.16 | 2.76 | 7.12 |
| total | 0.51 | 2.99 | 3.11 | 3.63 | 3.79 | 4.13 | 3.45 | 2.97 | 2.36 | 2.85 | 7.37 |
| N = | 14432 | 14605 | 14672 | 14287 | 14268 | 14536 | 10958 | 12855 | 14484 | 13227 | 13266 |
| Eta² | 6.8% | 11.1% | 5.9% | 2.6% | 4.8% | 4.2% | 14.1% | 2.9% | 10.1% | 0.5% | 1.0% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

NOTE: **PID 01** – strength of party identification;
SATDEM - satisfaction with the performance of democracy;
POWERDIF - Who is in power can make difference
VOTEDIFF - Who people vote for makes a difference
DEMIDEAL - democracy better than any other form of government;
PREVPARTY - performance of party R-voted for in previous election;
REPRESEN – representation of voters via elections
PARTREP – existence of a party that represents R
LRDIFFER – mean distances b. parties on the L- R scale (perception of ...);
WIDELR: - perception of the Left – Right ‘stretch’ (maximum distance b. the most leftist and most rightist parties);

Table 2. Types of electoral behavior by selected socio-demographic factors (means of categorized variables)

| Types of electoral behavior | Age | Age5 | Education | Rural or urban residence | Religious: services attendance | Household income |
|---|-----------------|-------|----------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|
| | <i>hi = old</i> | | <i>hi = hi</i> | <i>hi = urban</i> | <i>hi = devout</i> | <i>hi = hi</i> |
| 1 Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | 43.40 | 2.65 | 4.26 | 2.31 | 2.86 | 2.62 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | 46.63 | 2.89 | 4.72 | 2.47 | 2.95 | 2.77 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | 44.52 | 2.74 | 5.01 | 2.54 | 2.85 | 2.80 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | 50.89 | 3.29 | 4.87 | 2.60 | 2.80 | 3.01 |
| 5 Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | 47.94 | 3.06 | 5.09 | 2.49 | 2.98 | 3.12 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | 46.16 | 2.92 | 5.42 | 2.73 | 2.39 | 3.13 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | 50.41 | 3.27 | 5.15 | 2.51 | 2.92 | 3.03 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | 38.86 | 2.26 | 4.77 | 2.40 | 2.56 | 2.97 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | 40.85 | 2.48 | 4.86 | 2.44 | 2.80 | 2.97 |
| <i>total</i> | 48.39 | 3.09 | 4.96 | 2.51 | 2.86 | 2.98 |
| N = | 14651 | 14651 | 14294 | 14635 | 12833 | 12742 |
| Eta2 = | 4.3% | 4.5% | 2.1% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.9% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

Table 3. The magnitude of explained variance of particular types of electoral behavior by the sets of: (a) socio-demographic (b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors [logistic regression]

| Types of electoral behavior | Nagelkerke R Square | | |
|---|----------------------------------|--|---------------------|
| | socio-demographic factors (a) | political / attitudinal factors (b) | <i>Total</i> (c) |
| 1 Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | 5.0% | 17.7% | 19.6% |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | 0.3% | 2.0% | 2.1% |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | 0.4% | 1.3% | 1.8% |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | 3.2% | 15.8% | 18.2% |
| 5 Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | 0.7% | 2.4% | 3.2% |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | 1.9% | 3.8% | 5.0% |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | 5.1% | 8.6% | 12.2% |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | 3.3% | 3.5% | 6.9% |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | 2.0% | 2.4% | 4.1% |

Table 4. Types of electoral behavior by political / attitudinal factors by “rational” (fit) and “irrational” (unfit) subgroups

| Types of electoral behavior | PID 01 | SATGOV | SATDEM | POWERDI F | VOTEDIFF | DEM IDEAL | PREV PARTY | REPRESEN | PARTREP | LR DIFFER | WIDELR |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> | <i>fit/unfit</i> |
| 1 Stable NV | 0.16/0.28 | 2.26/2.97 | 2.51/3.14 | 2.81/3.47 | 2.73/3.60 | 3.60/3.94 | --- | 1.66/4.09 | 1.47/1.96 | 2.88/2.63 | 7.21/6.72 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization | 0.26/0.41 | 1.99/3.41 | 2.37/3.47 | 3.29/3.49 | 3.17/3.59 | 3.77/4.30 | 1.73/4.11 | 2.54/3.17 | 1.60/2.25 | 2.88/2.86 | 7.55/7.24 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization | 0.40/0.46 | 2.13/3.02 | 2.24/3.17 | 3.09/3.45 | 3.08/3.58 | 3.75/4.14 | 1.81/4.08 | 2.45/2.99 | 1.81/2.23 | 2.98/2.82 | 7.71/7.56 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Ren. | 0.61/0.60 | 4.12/1.73 | 3.73/2.86 | 3.74/3.50 | 3.94/3.69 | 4.39/4.27 | 4.00/3.00 | 3.30/2.74 | 2.64/2.25 | 2.91/3.01 | 7.58/7.89 |
| 5 Direct Punishment | 0.44/0.41 | 1.71/4.05 | 2.50/3.43 | 3.69/3.65 | 3.81/3.82 | 3.96/4.31 | 2.15/3.34 | 2.73/3.13 | 2.16/2.37 | 2.99/2.85 | 7.94/7.27 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch | 0.48/0.42 | 4.10/1.79 | 3.57/2.62 | 3.51/3.65 | 3.69/3.66 | 4.30/4.24 | 3.36/2.79 | 3.05/2.56 | 2.50/1.96 | 2.83/3.01 | 7.34/7.94 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support | 0.61/0.57 | 1.75/4.07 | 2.57/3.48 | 3.83/3.69 | 3.90/4.00 | 4.03/4.38 | 3.44/3.83 | 2.78/3.14 | 2.43/2.61 | 3.00/2.85 | 7.92/7.30 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization | 0.50/0.25 | 3.69/3.18 | 3.51/3.01 | 3.82/3.46 | 3.89/3.46 | 4.21/4.13 | ---- | 3.23/2.60 | 3.00/1.00 | 2.85/3.02 | 7.19/7.69 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization | 0.51/0.21 | 2.69/2.51 | 2.71/2.63 | 3.82/3.35 | 4.09/3.39 | 3.90/3.67 | --- | 2.98/2.61 | 3.00/1.00 | 2.92/2.70 | 7.50/7.05 |
| total | 0.53/0.50 | 2.70/3.36 | 2.97/3.25 | 3.68/3.59 | 3.79/3.81 | 4.10/4.26 | 3.35/3.59 | 2.86/3.05 | 2.40/2.31 | 2.95/2.87 | 7.70/7.39 |
| N = | 8603/4772 | 8744/4830 | 8741/4825 | 8576/4767 | 8560/4773 | 8675/4811 | 6988/3872 | 8361/4047 | 8634/4514 | 8099/4782 | 8119/4525 |
| Eta2 | 7.0%/5.5% | 78.2%/69.3% | 19.6%/6.2% | 4.4%/0.8% | 7.3%/2.6% | 5.1%/4.1% | 39.4%/16.5% | 13.6%/9.0% | 17.3%/21.3% | 0.3%/0.8% | 1.1%/1.6% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

NOTE:

PID 01 – strength of party identification

SATGOV - satisfaction with government:

SATDEM - satisfaction with the performance of democracy;

POWERDIF - who is in power can make difference

VOTEDIFF - who people vote for makes a difference

DEMIDEAL - democracy better than any other form of government:

PREVPARTY - performance of party R-voted for in previous election

REPRESEN – representation of voters via elections

PARTREP – existence of a party that represents R

LRDIFFER – mean distances b. parties on the L- R scale (perception of ...);

WIDELR: - perception of the Left – Right ‘stretch’ (maximum distance b. the most leftist and most rightist parties);

Table 5. Types of electoral behavior by selected socio-demographic factors by “rational” (fit) and “irrational” (unfit) subgroups

| Types of electoral behavior | Age5 | | Education | | Rural or urban residence | | Religious: services attendance | | Household income | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| | <i>hi=old</i> | | <i>hi = hi</i> | | <i>hi = urban</i> | | <i>hi = devout</i> | | <i>hi = hi</i> | |
| | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> |
| 1 Stable NV | 2.64 | 2.33 | 4.23 | 4.67 | 2.22 | 2.54 | 2.82 | 2.93 | 2.64 | 2.80 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization | 2.79 | 3.04 | 4.71 | 4.60 | 2.39 | 2.36 | 3.10 | 3.16 | 2.73 | 2.79 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization | 2.91 | 2.66 | 4.93 | 5.11 | 2.50 | 2.55 | 2.90 | 2.97 | 2.71 | 2.83 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Ren. | 3.32 | 3.21 | 4.85 | 5.02 | 2.61 | 2.59 | 2.84 | 2.62 | 3.05 | 2.92 |
| 5 Direct Punishment | 3.09 | 2.99 | 5.02 | 5.27 | 2.42 | 2.63 | 2.95 | 2.99 | 3.10 | 3.17 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch | 2.94 | 2.87 | 5.44 | 5.41 | 2.76 | 2.63 | 2.38 | 2.32 | 3.16 | 3.04 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support | 3.31 | 3.18 | 4.95 | 5.48 | 2.37 | 2.71 | 2.92 | 2.91 | 3.00 | 3.09 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization | 2.35 | 2.09 | 4.79 | 4.71 | 2.43 | 2.36 | 2.62 | 2.42 | 2.98 | 2.96 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization | 2.44 | 2.57 | 4.95 | 4.74 | 2.50 | 2.43 | 2.78 | 2.84 | 3.02 | 2.87 |
| total | 3.14 | 3.02 | 4.88 | 5.21 | 2.46 | 2.62 | 2.86 | 2.85 | 3.00 | 3.01 |
| N = | 8723 | 4816 | 8523 | 4689 | 8712 | 4817 | 8071 | 3772 | 7617 | 4202 |
| Eta2 = | 4.6% | 4.4% | 1.5% | 2.8% | 1.2% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.8% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

Table 6. Types of electoral behavior by selected socio-demographic factors in NEW and OLD democracies

| Types of electoral behavior | Age5 | | Education | | Rural or urban residence | | Religious: services attendance | | Household income | |
|------------------------------|---------------|------------|----------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
| | <i>hi=old</i> | | <i>hi = hi</i> | | <i>hi = urban</i> | | <i>hi = devout</i> | | <i>hi = hi</i> | |
| | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> |
| 1 Stable NV | 2.80 | 2.29 | 4.00 | 4.86 | 2.11 | 2.77 | 2.99 | 2.42 | 2.54 | 2.78 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization | 2.85 | 2.93 | 4.57 | 4.88 | 2.14 | 2.82 | 3.11 | 2.72 | 2.75 | 2.80 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization | 2.84 | 2.64 | 4.52 | 5.49 | 2.12 | 2.97 | 3.05 | 2.48 | 2.62 | 2.97 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Ren. | 3.19 | 3.38 | 4.83 | 4.91 | 2.34 | 2.81 | 2.61 | 2.97 | 2.94 | 3.07 |
| 5 Direct Punishment | 3.09 | 3.02 | 4.83 | 5.47 | 2.29 | 2.79 | 3.02 | 2.89 | 3.06 | 3.20 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch | 2.94 | 2.90 | 5.13 | 5.63 | 2.52 | 2.89 | 2.08 | 2.65 | 2.93 | 3.26 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support | 3.32 | 3.22 | 4.73 | 5.57 | 2.21 | 2.83 | 2.90 | 2.96 | 2.82 | 3.22 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization | 2.37 | 2.15 | 4.42 | 5.11 | 2.27 | 2.53 | 2.32 | 2.82 | 2.82 | 3.11 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization | 2.68 | 2.16 | 4.50 | 5.43 | 2.23 | 2.79 | 2.78 | 2.84 | 2.91 | 3.05 |
| total | 3.10 | 3.08 | 4.66 | 5.29 | 2.24 | 2.81 | 2.84 | 2.88 | 2.84 | 3.12 |
| N = | 7698 | 6953 | 7393 | 6901 | 7720 | 6914 | 7586 | 5246 | 6359 | 6383 |
| Eta2 = | 3.1% | 7.4% | 2.4% | 7.5% | 0.6% | 3.1% | 1.4% | 0.2% | 1.1% | 0.7% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

Table 7. Types of electoral behavior by political / attitudinal factors in NEW and OLD democracies

| Types of electoral behavior | PID 01 | SATGOV | SATDEM | POWERDIF | VOTEDIFF | DEM IDEAL | PREV PARTY | REPR ESEN | PART REP | LR DIFFER | WIDELR |
|-------------------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD | NEW/OLD |
| 1 Stable NV | 0.15/0.23 | 2.21/3.16 | 2.48/3.15 | 2.96/2.95 | 2.79/3.28 | 3.49/3.92 | ---/--- | 2.40/2.83 | 1.43/1.93 | 2.87/2.32 | 7.18/5.89 |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization | 0.31/0.42 | 2.42/3.27 | 2.62/3.35 | 3.45/3.34 | 3.19/3.61 | 3.84/4.20 | 2.49/3.43 | 2.74/2.97 | 1.73/2.22 | 2.93/2.67 | 7.56/6.82 |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization | 0.46/0.39 | 2.24/3.30 | 2.53/3.18 | 3.39/3.30 | 3.15/3.67 | 3.69/4.25 | 3.10/3.52 | 2.63/2.87 | 1.83/2.32 | 2.99/2.63 | 7.79/6.95 |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Ren. | 0.63/0.58 | 3.28/3.75 | 3.22/3.76 | 3.78/3.60 | 3.85/3.89 | 4.28/4.43 | 3.54/3.93 | 3.00/3.30 | 2.48/2.59 | 3.17/2.75 | 8.18/7.20 |
| 5 Direct Punishment | 0.48/0.36 | 2.37/2.89 | 2.55/3.27 | 3.90/3.37 | 3.86/3.73 | 3.91/4.33 | 2.36/2.92 | 2.88/2.86 | 2.19/2.30 | 3.07/2.75 | 7.95/7.33 |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch | 0.53/0.41 | 3.11/3.83 | 2.93/3.63 | 3.42/3.66 | 3.43/3.89 | 4.06/4.46 | 2.82/3.59 | 2.71/3.12 | 2.22/2.47 | 3.10/2.67 | 8.11/6.94 |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support | 0.66/0.53 | 2.31/3.18 | 2.52/3.39 | 3.90/3.61 | 3.91/3.97 | 3.87/4.49 | 3.51/3.69 | 2.86/2.97 | 2.45/2.56 | 3.18/2.67 | 8.11/7.13 |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization | 0.53/0.31 | 3.40/3.69 | 3.26/3.50 | 3.77/3.66 | 3.83/3.69 | 4.05/4.26 | ---/--- | 2.94/3.20 | 2.35/2.47 | 3.18/2.61 | 8.02/6.50 |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization | 0.44/0.29 | 2.26/3.22 | 2.39/3.19 | 3.73/3.41 | 3.76/3.81 | 3.60/4.14 | ---/--- | 2.78/2.87 | 2.09/2.25 | 3.03/2.53 | 7.82/6.45 |
| total | 0.54/0.48 | 2.55/3.36 | 2.69/3.46 | 3.72/3.52 | 3.70/3.85 | 3.90/4.38 | 3.24/3.66 | 2.82/3.06 | 2.23/2.47 | 3.11/2.68 | 7.96/7.05 |
| N = | 7510/6922 | 7717/6903 | 7718/6956 | 7474/6850 | 7415/6889 | 7710/6851 | 6217/5047 | 7710/5720 | 7634/6847 | 7221/6216 | 7248/6222 |
| Eta2 | 10.8%/4.5% | 13.8%/7.1% | 5.8%/3.5% | 4.9%/1.8% | 7.9%/2.0% | 4.7%/3.1% | 16.6%/9.8% | 2.4%/2.4% | 13.5%/4.2% | 0.9%/0.8% | 1.8%/1.6% |

All statistically significant

Sig < .001

NOTE:

;
PID 01 – strength of party identification
SATGOV - satisfaction with government:
SATDEM - satisfaction with the performance of democracy;
POWERDIF - Who is in power can make difference
VOTEDIFF - Who people vote for makes a difference
DEMIDEAL - democracy better than any other form of government:
PREVPARTY - performance of party R-voted for in previous election

REPRESEN – representation of voters via elections
PARTREP – existence of a party that represents R
LRDIFFER – mean distances b. parties on the L- R scale (perception of ...);
WIDELR: - perception of the Left – Right ‘stretch’ (maximum distance b. the most leftist and most rightist parties);

Table 8 A. The magnitude of explained variance of particular types of electoral behavior by the sets of: (a) socio-demographic

(b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors in “rational” (fit) and “irrational” (unfit) subgroups

[logistic regression]

| Types of electoral behavior | Nagelkerke R Square | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | socio-demographic factors | | political / attitudinal factors | | <i>Total</i> | |
| | (a) | | (b) | | (c) | |
| | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> |
| 1 Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | 8.2% | 7.7% | 40.5% | 31.0% | 44.1% | 35.0% |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | 1.6% | 2.1% | 13.9% | 1.5% | 14.7% | 3.8% |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | 0.9% | 1.6% | 8.3% | 2.5% | 9.0% | 4.0% |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | 2.3% | 1.9% | 76.0% | 63.8% | 77.2% | 64.9% |
| 5 Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | 0.3% | 0.5% | 20.5% | 14.3% | 20.9% | 14.5% |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | 2.5% | 1.2% | 21.9% | 21.8% | 24.2% | 22.4% |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | 2.1% | 5.2% | 48.9% | 52.5% | 50.0% | 53.8% |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | 5.0% | 9.0% | 16.7% | 25.2% | 22.1% | 30.8% |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | 4.7% | 4.9% | 15.6% | 42.1% | 20.6% | 43.3% |

Table 8 B. The magnitude of explained variance of particular types of electoral behavior by the sets of: (a) socio-demographic (b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors in NEW and OLD democracies [logistic regression]

| Types of electoral behavior | Nagelkerke R Square | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | socio-demographic factors | | political / attitudinal factors | | <i>Total</i> | |
| | (a) | | (b) | | (c) | |
| | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> |
| 1 Stable NV = Exit (NV → NV) | 4.4% | 5.6% | 22.3% | 9.5% | 23.8% | 13.2% |
| 2 Incumbent Demobilization (Opp→NV) | 0.2% | 1.0% | 4.0% | 1.0% | 4.1% | 1.7% |
| 3 Opposition Demobilization (Opp→ NV) | 0.5% | 1.0% | 3.8% | 0.9% | 3.9% | 2.0% |
| 4 Incumbent Delegation Renewal (Gov →Gov) | 3.0% | 5.3% | 18.7% | 11.8% | 20.5% | 16.4% |
| 5 Direct Punishment (Gov → Opp) | 1.3% | 0.6% | 2.0% | 3.9% | 3.2% | 4.4% |
| 6 Pro-Incumbent Switch (Opp→ Gov) | 3.4% | 0.8% | 4.0% | 3.2% | 6.2% | 4.2% |
| 7 Stable Opposition Support (Opp→ Opp) | 4.5% | 5.9% | 13.0% | 7.4% | 16.2% | 11.1% |
| 8 Incumbent Re-Mobilization (NV → Gov) | 3.4% | 4.7% | 6.3% | 3.3% | 9.1% | 7.3% |
| 9 Opposition Re-Mobilization (NV → Opp) | 0.8% | 5.2% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 3.1% | 7.2% |

**Table 9A – Pairwise comparison of selected groups of electoral behavior by “rational” – “irrational” subgroups;
 (a) socio-demographic (b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors [logistic regression]**

| | Nagelkerke R Square | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | socio-demographic factors | | political / attitudinal factors | | <i>Total</i> | |
| | (a) | | (b) | | (c) | |
| | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> | <i>fit</i> | <i>unfit</i> |
| STABLE NV vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 14.9% | 14.7% | 61.0% | 61.4% | 64.6% | 65.8% |
| STABLE NV vs RENEWED DELEGATION | 15.3% | 15.4% | 85.1% | 74.9% | 86.2% | 77.3% |
| RENEWED DELEGATION vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 2.0% | 3.7% | 9.6% | 9.9% | 11.2% | 12.4% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW DEMOBILIZED | 7.6% | 6.3% | 39.0% | 45.6% | 42.6% | 47.8% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW MOBILIZED | 6.3% | 1.0% | 86.6% | 77.6% | 86.7% | 77.6% |

**Table 9 B. Pairwise comparison of selected groups of electoral behavior by in NEW and OLD democracies;
(a) socio-demographic (b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors [logistic regression]**

| | Nagelkerke R Square | | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| | socio-demographic factors | | political / attitudinal factors | | <i>Total</i> | |
| | (a) | | (b) | | (c) | |
| | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> | <i>NEW</i> | <i>OLD</i> |
| STABLE NV vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 14.8% | 18.5% | 41.7% | 16.6% | 46.3% | 29.1% |
| STABLE NV vs RENEWED DELEGATION | 14.5% | 18.4% | 57.8% | 27.9% | 61.0% | 37.6% |
| RENEWED DELEGATION vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 2.3% | 3.8% | 23.5% | 22.8% | 24.9% | 25.1% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW DEMOBILIZED | 5.7% | 8.1% | 13.3% | 10.5% | 16.6% | 15.2% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW MOBILIZED | 4.6% | 4.0% | 36.2% | 10.6% | 37.3% | 13.0% |

Table 10. Pairwise comparison of selected groups of electoral behavior by (a) socio-demographic (b) political / attitudinal (c) both factors among all respondents [logistic regression]

| Types of electoral behavior | Nagelkerke R Square | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------|
| | socio-demographic factors | political / attitudinal factors | <i>Total</i> |
| | (a) | (b) | (c) |
| STABLE NV vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 15.8% | 30.3% | 37.3% |
| STABLE NV vs RENEWED DELEGATION | 15.1% | 48.5% | 52.5% |
| RENEWED DELEGATION vs DIRECT PUNISHMENT | 2.0% | 23.9% | 25.4% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW DEMOBILIZED | 7.4% | 14.7% | 18.4% |
| STABLE NV vs NEW MOBILIZED | 4.6% | 26.2% | 27.6% |

Table 11. “Row” statistic of groups of electoral behavior by “rational” – “irrational” subgroups and NEW and OLD democracies

| Types of electoral behavior: | | fit | unfit | Total | | new | old | Total |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| 1. Stable NV | N | 627 | 248 | 875 | | 864 | 376 | 1240 |
| | % in row | 71,7% | 28,3% | 100% | | 69,7% | 30,3% | 100% |
| | % in column | 7,2% | 5,1% | 6,4% | | 11,2% | 5,4% | 8,4% |
| 2. Incumbent Demobilization | N | 244 | 210 | 454 | | 300 | 280 | 580 |
| | % in row | 53,7% | 46,3% | 100% | | 51,7% | 48,3% | 100% |
| | % in column | 2,8% | 4,3% | 3,3% | | 3,9% | 4,0% | 3,9% |
| 3. Opposition Demobilization | N | 150 | 282 | 432 | | 296 | 290 | 586 |
| | % in row | 34,7% | 65,3% | 100% | | 50,5% | 49,5% | 100% |
| | % in column | 1,7% | 5,8% | 3,2% | | 3,8% | 4,2% | 4,0% |
| 4. Incumbent Delegation Renewal | N | 2667 | 828 | 3495 | | 1597 | 1988 | 3585 |
| | % in row | 76,3% | 23,7% | 100% | | 44,5% | 55,5% | 100% |
| | % in column | 30,5% | 17,1% | 25,7% | | 20,7% | 28,5% | 24,4% |
| 5. Direct Punishment | N | 1024 | 594 | 1618 | | 990 | 686 | 1676 |
| | % in row | 63,3% | 36,7% | 100% | | 59,1% | 40,9% | 100% |
| | % in column | 11,7% | 12,3% | 11,9% | | 12,8% | 9,8% | 11,4% |
| 6. Pro-Incumbent Switch | N | 338 | 113 | 451 | | 199 | 262 | 461 |
| | % in row | 74,9% | 25,1% | 100% | | 43,2% | 56,8% | 100% |
| | % in column | 3,9% | 2,3% | 3,3% | | 2,6% | 3,8% | 3,1% |
| 7. Stable Opposition Support | N | 3081 | 2191 | 5272 | | 2855 | 2645 | 5500 |
| | % in row | 58,4% | 41,6% | 100% | | 51,9% | 48,1% | 100% |
| | % in column | 35,2% | 45,3% | 38,8% | | 37,0% | 37,9% | 37,4% |
| 8. Incumbent Re-Mobilization | N | 232 | 89 | 321 | | 174 | 174 | 348 |
| | % in row | 72,3% | 27,7% | 100% | | 50,0% | 50,0% | 100% |
| | % in column | 2,7% | 1,8% | 2,4% | | 2,3% | 2,5% | 2,4% |
| 9. Opposition Re-Mobilization | N | 388 | 281 | 669 | | 444 | 281 | 725 |
| | % in row | 58,0% | 42,0% | 100% | | 61,2% | 38,8% | 100% |
| | % in column | 4,4% | 5,8% | 4,9% | | 5,8% | 4,0% | 4,9% |
| total | N | 8751 | 4836 | 13587 | | 7719 | 6982 | 14701 |
| | % in row | 64,4% | 35,6% | 100% | | 52,5% | 47,5% | 100% |
| | % in column | 100% | 100% | 100% | | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Table A

Socio demographic and political factors' impact on ('fit') direct punishment group and ('fit') delegation renewal group as compared with Non-voters and (3) between the two groups

| 1) Dependent variable: ACCS6 | ALL | | NEW | | OLD | |
|---------------------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,304 | 9,0% | 0,305 | 8,8% | 0,324 | 10,1% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,219 | 4,5% | 0,350 | 11,6% | 0,165 | 2,1% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,354 | 12,0% | 0,422 | 16,8% | 0,355 | 11,7% |
| N = | 886 | | 412 | | 473 | |
| 2) Dependent variable: REPS6 | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,261 | 6,7% | 0,206 | 4,1% | 0,307 | 9,3% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,350 | 12,1% | 0,469 | 21,7% | 0,249 | 6,0% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,406 | 16,3% | 0,493 | 23,9% | 0,357 | 12,4% |
| N = | 2332 | | 1010 | | 1322 | |
| 3) Dependent variable: REPACC2 | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,119 | 1,3% | 0,052 | 0,1% | 0,169 | 2,7% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,216 | 4,6% | 0,190 | 3,4% | 0,247 | 5,9% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,243 | 5,7% | 0,201 | 3,6% | 0,286 | 7,9% |
| N = | 2544 | | 1052 | | 1492 | |

Note:

ACCS6 – variable comparing (“rational”) direct punishment behavior with stable non-voting (0=stable non-voters; 1= direct punishment);

REPS6 – variable comparing (“rational”) delegation renewal behavior with stable non-voting (0=stable non-voters; 1= delegation renewal behavior);

REPACC2 – variable comparing (“rational”) direct punishment behavior with delegation renewal behavior (0= delegation renewal behavior 1= direct punishment behavior);

Table B

| 1) Dependent variable: SATDEM | | | | | | |
|--|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| | ALL | | NEW | | OLD | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,100 | 0,8% | 0,045 | 0,0% | 0,096 | 0,5% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,164 | 2,4% | 0,149 | 1,5% | 0,184 | 2,8% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,186 | 2,9% | 0,160 | 1,4% | 0,204 | 3,1% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, ACCS6 | 0,187 | 2,9% | 0,167 | 1,4% | 0,204 | 3,1% |
| N = | 885 | | 412 | | 472 | |
| 2) Dependent variable: SATDEM | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,086 | 0,7% | 0,056 | 0,1% | 0,051 | 0,1% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,248 | 6,0% | 0,269 | 6,9% | 0,216 | 4,4% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,253 | 6,2% | 0,273 | 7,0% | 0,218 | 4,4% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, REPS6 | 0,313 | 9,6% | 0,337 | 10,8% | 0,237 | 5,2% |
| N = | 2330 | | 1009 | | 1320 | |
| 3) Dependent variable: SATDEM | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,023 | 0,0% | 0,037 | 0,0% | 0,042 | 0,0% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,148 | 2,1% | 0,135 | 1,5% | 0,177 | 2,9% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,148 | 2,0% | 0,142 | 1,5% | 0,184 | 3,1% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, REPACC2 | 0,187 | 3,2% | 0,163 | 2,1% | 0,226 | 4,7% |
| N = | 2542 | | 1051 | | 1490 | |

Table C

| 1) Dependent variable: DEMIDEAL | ALL | | NEW | | OLD | |
|--|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,160 | 2,3% | 0,014 | 0,0% | 0,270 | 6,9% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,171 | 2,6% | 0,156 | 1,7% | 0,225 | 4,4% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,221 | 4,3% | 0,159 | 1,3% | 0,341 | 10,7% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, ACCS6 | 0,247 | 5,4% | 0,212 | 3,1% | 0,347 | 10,9% |
| N = | 878 | | 412 | | 465 | |
| 2) Dependent variable: DEMIDEAL | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,217 | 4,6% | 0,207 | 4,1% | 0,196 | 3,7% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,252 | 6,2% | 0,330 | 10,6% | 0,218 | 4,5% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,314 | 9,7% | 0,367 | 13,1% | 0,279 | 7,4% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, REPS6 | 0,357 | 12,5% | 0,416 | 16,8% | 0,285 | 7,7% |
| N = | 2311 | | 1007 | | 1303 | |
| 3) Dependent variable: DEMIDEAL | | | | | | |
| Independent variables: | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² | R | Adj.R² |
| EDUCAT, AGE5 | 0,172 | 2,9% | 0,128 | 1,5% | 0,195 | 3,7% |
| WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,149 | 2,1% | 0,151 | 2,0% | 0,196 | 3,6% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01 | 0,222 | 4,7% | 0,191 | 3,2% | 0,267 | 6,8% |
| EDUCAT, AGE5, WIDELR, VOTEDIFF, PID01, REPACC2 | 0,230 | 5,1% | 0,213 | 4,0% | 0,268 | 6,8% |
| N = | 2520 | | 1049 | | 1470 | |