

# **Japanese National Election in 2005:**

## **Based on JES III project**

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[This is a preliminary report of the Japanese 2005 General Election.]

### **Koizumi years up to 2005**

Jun-ichiro Koizumi became Japanese Prime Minister in April 2001 by succeeding the wildly unpopular Mori government. Although Koizumi was a member of the Mori faction in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), his source of support was not only from the faction, but also from grassroots members of LDP. The in-party election to choose the LDP President—which in essence chooses the Prime Minister due to the LDP's domination of Japanese politics—uses a kind of weighting voting procedure in which the first-stage grassroots votes have substantial influence on the second and final-stage votes from LDP parliament members. Koizumi's substantial support in the first grassroots stage was widely covered in the media, resulting in the final lopsided victory.

This grassroots support was very peculiar in the long history of LDP. And this peculiarity cast a large shadow over Koizumi's leadership, the style of which many named "populism". In order to face and to change the LDP consensus building system, Koizumi often invokes support from the populace. He called for "overthrowing the LDP old system" at several key occasions and the call evoked a large public support. During the first several months, he had an unprecedented Cabinet approval rate, around 80%. In the 2001 House of Councilors Election held in July 2001, his popularity benefited the LDP. Many voters were influenced by Koizumi's words "politics of hope", which led the LDP to a substantial victory. After two years, the heat cooled down slowly but steadily. Although the message of hope still gave the PM midrange results in the 2003 House of Representatives Election, Ikeda (2005) revealed that the basis of support shrunk mainly only among those who have the LDP party identification and those who are economically advantaged, in other words those who are originally LDP voters.

In the 2004 House of Councilors Election the decline basically remained. Also the problems of lack of visible outcomes after three years of his governance loomed large. Multiple regression analysis showed that the effect of retrospective evaluation was larger than the effect of politics of hope, (prospective evaluation). The votes for LDP declined because the level of general retrospective evaluation of the Cabinet was not positive. However, there are still a few positive elements for Koizumi; one was the national economic improvement (actually, those who perceived

improvement kept their prospective hope for the PM); the other was a high feeling thermometer for Koizumi remained intact, i.e. his hero image as a strong de-structor of the old system was still alive.

In the summer of 2005, Koizumi tried to pass a “Postal privatization bill”, in which he promised a smaller government and restructuring of national fiscal system. The bill narrowly passed the House of Representatives and sent to the House of Councilors in the early August, in which it was rejected. A substantial number of LDP councilors opposed to the bill.

Koizumi was swift at dissolving the House of Representatives (Lower House) for the General Election in the afternoon of the rejection (the only dissolvable House is House of Representatives. There was a controversy that PM is able to dissolve this House after the rejection in the Upper House). He declared a single issue election, i.e. the election is on “whether or not to advance the reform by passing the Postal privatization reform”. He also asked “assassins” to run against those LDP members who opposed his bill; in other words he sent new LDP candidates to the single districts of reform-opposed LDP representatives and did not allow them to become formal LDP candidates, all of which were unprecedented in the history of the party.

The PM’s agenda-setting and adroit tactics in the campaign to fight against the “Old Guards” within the LDP as well as the opponent parties, especially DPJ (Democratic Party Japan) were successful. Media also supported the tactics by focusing on “assassins”, as it contained a lot of human interest elements that played well on television. The campaigns by the candidates of DPJ and other smaller parties failed to get much coverage by the media.

Koizumi had a large success in the 2005 Election: The incumbent parties, LDP and CGP, obtained 2/3 of the House of Representatives Seats. The Postal Reform bill passed House of Representatives in October 11<sup>th</sup> and House of Councilors in October 14<sup>th</sup>.

## **Investigative analyses on Koizumi years focusing on the 2005 Election**

In order to investigate what were the mechanisms in the Koizumi years, I analyze panel data covering 2001-2005. The dataset is from the Japanese Election Study III project which is Pled by the author. The project is supported by the Specially Promoted Research on Science (Ministry of Education). As the JES III is 9 waves of the panel for Japanese national sample, it will be the best data for the purpose. The panel covers the following elections (see Appendix for more information on the surveys).

- 2001. 7 H of Councilors Election : Pre and Post design
- 2003. 3 General Local Elections : Pre design
- 2003.10 H of Representatives Election : Pre and Post design
- 2004. 7 H of Councilors Election : Pre and Post design
- 2005. 9 H of Representatives Election : Pre and Post design

Let us start from the changes in the marginal distribution of the data.


## **Changes of votes 2001-2005**

Figure 1 shows the changes of vote share among the 5 major parties in the Koizumi years. It is apparent that Koizumi received the largest victory after his first election as PM. The support for LDP declined from 2001 to 2004. However, in the 2005 election he won a large rebound to receive

more than 40% of votes in the Proportional Representative Districts (PR has 11 divisions by local areas) and more than 50% in the average in the Single Districts.

On the other hand, DPJ's share of votes have been almost the reverse of that of the LDP. They had the greatest share in 2004 House of Councilors Election, when the share surpassed LDP in the PR. CGP (Komeito), as coalition party with LDP, cooperated with the LDP in the Election, by calling on supporters to vote LDP in the SMD (where no CGP candidacy), and ask LDP supporters to vote for CGP in the PR. The results reflects this strategy, i.e. votes for CGP are larger in PR than SD, and for LDP the reverse is true.


Figure 1



### Changes of the Cabinet support

Figure 2 is the result of Cabinet support question. We asked, independent from the vote in each Election, whether the respondents support the Koizumi Cabinet. The results show quite a similar pattern with the LDP votes; Extraordinary support in 2001, rapid decrease in the early 2002 and 2003 data and a slow decrease until 2004, and then revival of support in 2005. In the 2004, the difference between supporters and non-supporters was 10%, but in 2005 it became 16%, and it expanded even after several months of the Election.

Figure 2




### Changes of Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi

One measure of personalized opinions for Koizumi is a feeling thermometer. The thermometer measurement asks the respondents how much warmth or coldness they feel toward politicians / political parties; the coldest indicates 0 degree and the hottest 100. Koizumi recorded an unprecedented warmth in 2001; the average was 69 degrees (SD=19) far surpassing the past PMs. The left-most graph in the Figure 3 shows this warmth maintained across the different political party supporters; of course the JCP (Japan Communist Party) supporters felt less warmth toward the PM, but still the record showed 49 degrees which exceeded JCP supporters feeling toward socialist SDP PM Murayama in 1996 (40 degrees).

This consistently warm feeling toward Koizumi changes from 2001 to 2004; split by the incumbent party supporters (LDP and CGP) or oppositions. Also, the overall average feeling gets less warm. However, the trend somewhat reversed in 2005. Now the average is 55.3(SD=24; 53.0 degrees in 2004); even in DPJ supporters it became a little bit warmer (44 degrees as compared with 42 degrees in 2004).

Figure 3




### Change of National Economy Perception

Among the large amount of common measurements between 2001 and 2005, one of the only few indicators which showed monotonic change was the perception of national economy. As shown in Figure 4, the perception improved substantially; “very bad” occupied 50% in 2001, but declined to less than 20% in 2005. This clearly shows the public envisions a recovery of Japanese

economy from the “Lost 10 years” in 1990s.


Figure 4



### Changes in Retrospective /Prospective Evaluations of the Cabinet

Now let us examine our focal variables; retrospective and prospective evaluations of the Cabinet. The variables are known as important to influence vote in the American politics (Fiorina, 1981), but Japanese scholars failed to prove the case was also relevant to the Japanese context up until early 1990s (Ikeda, 2000). The situation suddenly changed by the end of LDP governance in 1993 (end of LDP one-party dominance since 1955). The event provided a clear visible evidence that Japanese are able to change the government, which empowered voters. Good government performance (or prospect) can be rewarded and a bad one punished (before 1993, even bad economic situation motivated voters to vote for LDP because they rely on LDP’s economic steering in hard times rather than the opponents).

Figure 5



In this context Koizumi came to power and emphasized the politics of hope. Ikeda showed a very powerful effect of prospective voting in Koizumi’s first election in 2001 (Ikeda, 2004), and also exhibited the effect of retrospective vote was effective in 2003 and especially in 2004 (Ikeda,

2005 and also shown below). The marginal distributions from 2001 to 2005 on these variables are shown in Figure 5. It is apparent the same patterns as were observed in the vote pattern and in the Cabinet support pattern re-emerged here; Prospective valuation recovered in 2005 to the level of 2003 and retrospective surpassed the 2003 level.

### More data on Retrospective/Prospective Valuations

As the prospective /retrospective valuations are important in this paper, the more detailed data on these points are provided in Table 1. Hopes or prospect must be realized as outcomes (as performance) to keep popular support remain high. Koizumi failed to do so up until 2005: Only “fiscal/ structural reform” received some positive retrospective evaluation bit by bit from 2003 to 2005 (2001 data is not very reflective on the reality as the data obtained just after 3 months of the Cabinet). As for other aspects of retrospective evaluations, the contra-cyclical policy received better evaluation gradually but far from positive even in 2005; Foreign policy received the best evaluation in 2004, but this was an exception due a widely reported reunion of kidnapped family in North Korea. Overall evaluation of the foreign policy output became worse.

On the other hand, somewhat different observations are possible for prospective evaluations. There is a substantial general decline of prospect from 2001 to 2004 but resurgence occurred for fiscal and structural reform as well as for contra-cyclical policy in 2005. Although the foreign policy prospect declines even more than 2004, the overall prospect recovered to almost the level of 2003. I construct two scales on prospective/ retrospective evaluations of the Cabinet based on two independent principal component analyses of these variables.

Table 1

Prospective Evaluation	Fiscal/Structural Reform		Contra-cyclical Policy		Foreign Policy		General/overall	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
2001	66%	12%	44%	23%	49%	17%	65%	12%
2003	36%	34%	27%	41%	32%	37%	36%	35%
2004	30%	40%	28%	41%	37%	32%	33%	39%
2005	43%	35%	32%	39%	26%	48%	39%	38%

Retrospective Evaluation	Fiscal/Structural Reform		Contra-cyclical Policy		Foreign Policy		General/overall	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
(2001)	37%	7%	15%	23%	38%	13%	46%	6%
2003	30%	30%	13%	50%	31%	34%	33%	31%
2004	32%	27%	23%	38%	41%	23%	36%	27%
2005	39%	26%	24%	40%	27%	43%	43%	28%

### Basic analyses of vote 2001-2005

#### Method

In order to reveal more dynamic and net effects of each of the possible influential variables, we will firstly conduct 3 groups of ordered logit analyses of the LDP votes in 2003, 2004 and 2005 as dependent variables. As the Japanese system in both of the House of Councilors and Representatives elections provides two tickets, i.e. the PR and SMD votes, we counted the numbers of votes for LDP to get scales for dependent variables. The data is from the JES3 panel data from 2001 to 2005; As panel data usually causes a large number of sample attrition, we weighted the sample when doing the analyses. Also missing values are often very serious in

estimating effects, then we used multiple imputation by Amelia for 2003 and 2004 data, and also used EM imputation algorithm in SPSS for 2005 data.

### (1) 2003 votes

The results for 2003 LDP votes are shown in Table 2. Firstly, for independent variables we used demographic variables (gender, age, education, years of residence in the same town/city, urban-rural measurement), knowledge indicator (knowledge on national administration), party ID for 3 major parties (4 point scales). In addition to these basic variables we put in or put out retrospective/ prospective evaluations of the cabinet from the equations, and then finally put LDP vote in 2001 as a control variable.

The results were very similar to 2001 vote analyses (Ikeda, 2004), i.e. dominance of prospective vote over retrospective one; when put retrospective variable without prospective variable, the former is significant, but when put both its significance disappears, suggesting that the prospective elements for vote is stronger. Another interesting result is that feeling thermometer for Koizumi remains significant throughout the every model of analysis, positively contributing to LDP vote (the same was true for 2001 vote).

In Model 4 we put the 2001 LDP vote variable, and we found that the effect of prospective vote disappears. This means that LDP fails to recruit new voters with the hope message. The party seems to keep the 2001 voters, but as the prospective element fails to be significant when controlling 2001 vote, the prospective valuation seems to have failed to attract new voters from outside the 2001 LDP voters.

Table 2

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Vote for LDP 2003	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	0.30 *	0.27 +	0.30 *	0.38 *
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01
Education	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05
Years of residence	0.21 **	0.22 **	0.21 **	0.23 *
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.09 *	0.09 *	0.09 *	0.06
Knowledge	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.00
LDP support	0.72 **	0.74 **	0.71 **	0.49 **
DPJ support	-0.69 **	-0.70 **	-0.69 **	-0.76
CGP Support	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.00
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet		0.25 **	0.03	0.12
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.46 **		0.44 **	0.25 +
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.01 **	0.02 **	0.01 **	0.01 **
01 LDP votes				0.59 **
Cutpoint 1	2.97	3.20	2.94	2.26
Cutpoint 2	4.35	4.55	4.32	3.92
N	1617	1617	1617	688
Pseudo R2	0.24	0.233	0.24	0.246

.05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

### (2) 2004 votes

In 2004, as is shown in Table 3, the pattern of determinants of LDP vote changed. The model 3 reveals that the effect of retrospective evaluation now overrides the prospective one, suggesting the power of hope politics declined. Voters started to focus on the outcome side of the governance after three years of Koizumi incumbency. Nevertheless, by controlling the past votes, even such effect disappears, showing that LDP now keeps only adhesive Koizumi fans.

Another point of worth noticing is that the effect of feeling thermometer for Koizumi

strengthened as compared with 2001 and 2003 results, meaning that the diversity of the rating among different voters now has a more discriminant value than the past.

Table 3

Vote for LDP 2004	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	-0.15	-0.13	-0.13	-0.17	-0.13
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01
Education	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.15
Years of residence	0.31 **	0.30 **	0.31 **	0.34 **	0.34 **
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.09 **	0.09 **	0.09 **	0.03	0.15 **
Knowledge	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11	-0.12	-0.14
LDP support	0.96 **	0.96 **	0.95 **	0.64 **	0.85 **
DPJ support	-0.77 **	-0.78 **	-0.78 **	-0.98 **	-1.13 **
CGP Support	0.22 **	0.22 *	0.20 **	0.04	0.18
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet		0.27 **	0.19 *	0.20	0.24
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.22 **		0.14 +	0.09	-0.02
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 **	0.02 **	0.02 **	0.02 **	0.02 **
03 LDP Votes				0.98 **	
01 LDP Votes					0.43 **
Cutpoint 1	3.99	3.97	3.88	3.70	4.23
Cutpoint 2	5.20	5.18	5.09	4.96	5.50
N	1577	1577	1577	1053	568
Pseudo R2	0.296	0.30	0.30	0.37	0.34

.05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

### (3) 2005 votes

Finally, the influential variables changed again in 2005 LDP vote. As is presented in Model 3 of Table 4, revival of prospective influence over the retrospective one is easily observable. And different from the 2003 and 2004 elections, even by controlling the past votes (04, 03 and 01 vote respectively), its effect strongly survives as is shown by its coefficients. This means that LDP is now successful in recruiting new voters by prospective evaluation of the government.

Table 4

	Votes for LDP 2005							for DPJ
	model 1	model 2	model 3	model 4	model 5	model 6	model 7	
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	
Gender	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.06	-0.15	0.01	0.06	
Age	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01 *	
Education	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.29 +	-0.09	
Years of residence	0.13 *	0.11 +	0.13 *	0.05	0.07	0.10	-0.11 +	
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.06	-0.01	
Knowledge	-0.04 *	-0.04 *	-0.04 *	-0.03	-0.05 *	-0.04	-0.01	
LDP support	0.83 ***	0.88 ***	0.82 ***	0.76 ***	0.52 ***	0.70 ***	-0.15 +	
DPJ support	-0.31 **	-0.31 **	-0.31 **	-0.19 +	-0.23 +	-0.27	1.02 ***	
CGP Support	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.10	-0.12	0.03	-0.51 ***	
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet		0.34 ***	0.05	-0.01	0.07	-0.09	-0.03	
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.59 ***		0.57 ***	0.59 ***	0.61 ***	0.78 ***	-0.54 ***	
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.02 ***	0.02 ***	0.03 ***	0.03 ***	-0.02 ***	
04 LDP votes				0.59 ***				
03 LDP votes					0.71 ***			
01 LDP votes						0.51 ***		
Cutpoint 1	2.20 ***	2.43 ***	2.15 ***	2.46 ***	2.30 **	3.03 **	-1.33 *	
Cutpoint 2	3.73 ***	3.93 ***	3.68 ***	4.07 ***	3.82 ***	4.48 ***	-0.24	
N	1336	1336	1336	1175	927	485	1336	
Pseudo R2	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.26	

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*


### Midpoint summary

In order for more visual understanding of the changes of the effects of prospective/ retrospective

votes, I conducted post-hoc simulations of the ordered logit models. Figure 6 shows the results. In consistent with the descriptions above, the effect of prospective vote weakened in 2004 but arose again in 2005 and even more strongly; In 2005 those who are the least prospectives vote for LDP around 30%, but those who are the highest voted for LDP more than 80% (more than half of them voted two tickets for LDP only). On the other hand, retrospective vote has never showed such powerful effects; Only in 2004 the difference between low evaluator and high evaluator made some difference, however in 2005 it disappeared (though the average votes for LDP is much higher).

Thus, we witnessed a revival of prospective vote and weakness of retrospective vote after 4 years of incumbency. We may call Koizumi's years "Hope dependent governance", as if 4 years are not enough for asking fruitful outcomes. We may wonder when we evaluate the government by its performance/ outcome?

Figure 6



### Meaning of Koizumi effects

Over the four years of Koizumi cabinet, Japanese experienced four National Elections, two House of Councilors Elections in 2001 and 2004, and two House of Representative Elections in 2003 and 2005. Throughout these years, despite some changes, our panel data clearly revealed that even under a parliamentary cabinet system, prospective evaluations influence support for the PM leadership are effective like presidential system.

Also notable was that differences in social groups are minimized; Looking back to Table 2 to 4, some variables are effective at some point, generally, however, gender, age, education do not have important effect especially for 2005 (and 2001 (Ikeda, 2004)). A psychologization of politics is in progress.

In this line of psychologization we may ask whether hopeful politics is the essence of the much-discussed "Koizumi effect". In the 2003 election, hope remained meaningful but shrunk. In 2004 hope was still effective but overtaken by performance evaluation. In 2005, the impact of hopeful politics revived substantially. By investigating this revival phenomenon more thoroughly, i.e. how the hope politics revived in 2005 from several aspects of campaign processes, we will have more insight on the influence of Koizumi. More concretely, we will explore four Research Questions empirically;

- RQ 1: Agenda setting of “single issue voting” which formed a new hope.
- RQ 2: Hopes are brought by mass media
- RQ 3: Are manifestos effective?
- RQ 4: Rising economy contributes to the Incumbent success

-RQ 1: Agenda setting of “single issue voting” which formed a new hope

By dissolving the House of Representatives in the reason that the bill of Post-Privatization did not pass both of the Parliaments, the PM Koizumi set the agenda of the election on this single issue. He claimed that the issue itself is the gate to the whole structural and financial reform of Japan, whereas the House of Councilors rejected his course. Thus, he betted the dissolution to judge the public willingness to go forward under his type of reform. His address for the dissolution was decisive. He even mentioned that he would resign immediately if LDP could be defeated. Then this single issue election was to ask for voters whether they can have prospective sentiment to pursue the Koizumi type reform. We will examine whether this agenda-setting was effective as compared with other national serious issues such as pension issue, economic issue or foreign affair issues.

-RQ 2: Hopes are brought by mass media

Mass media widely reported the whole process of the bill debate in the Parliaments, the dissolution, and the campaign process, especially focused on the human interest dramas that occurred in a dozen of SMDs. The dramas included struggles between “Old Guards” and “assassins”. Many “assassins” selected were relatively young candidates who support the Koizumi policies, and often women, often ex-high rank officials, often politicians having different district in the past elections. This frame of fights received wide coverage of the media especially by soft news (called “wide-show” in Japan). Then our research question is whether the coverage affected the election results.

-RQ 3: Manifestos are effective

In the 2003 House of Representatives Election, DPJ, the opposition party introduced a party platform called a “Manifesto” and won a good success. LDP countered by also introducing their own Manifesto, but was not very effective as DPJ’s. Manifestos are different from Election Pledge which had been made public by political parties in the past elections; Manifestos are with a package of policies with showing more concrete course of policy implementation, financial planning, and agenda, i.e. feasible promises from the side of the parties, the model of which are taken from Italian politics into Japanese context. In the 2005 Election LDP as well as DPJ published their own Manifestos and fought the campaign with these (especially the case is true for DPJ). We may wonder how effective these Manifestos are to influence voters’ judgment.

-RQ 4: Rising economy contributes to the Incumbent success

Japan is on the way to economic recovery from the 1990s’ “lost ten years” when the Koizumi government started. The government claimed that only reforms make economic re-developments possible. Through 2003 to 2005, the national economy slowly revitalized. The government attributed it to their policy success. Ikeda (2005) found that those who remain positively

prospective were those who perceived the economic improvement. In 2005 the economic trend came clearer in a better direction. Then, RQ could be whether this rising trend contributes to the LDP victory.

## New winds in 2005

### (1) Issue voting

The analyses in Table 5 investigated the RQ 1. The equations are based on the model 3 of Table 4, and then added issue related variables; firstly added two major opinions on postal privatization reform (opinion on the reform bill itself and opinion whether the dissolution is justified because of the rejection of the bill), secondly added into the first model other major issues in the country.

As is easily observable from the table, success of issue agenda setting is apparent. Even after controlling prospective/ retrospective evaluation (or the past vote in 2003 or 2004(not shown)), the post reform issue is clearly effective in explaining LDP votes. Also effective was the PM's appeal to dissolve the House of Representatives. Figure 7 depicts the simulated graph based on this result. Whether or not one is for or against the reform, the probability to vote one ticket for LDP did not change very much (6% difference), but the probability to give both of the two ticket to the LDP changed by 16% (after controlling every relevant variables set at the mean). This is a very large effect by a single issue. Also the effect of opinion on the dissolution again raises 10% for LDP two ticket voters. Another interesting observation in the model 2 is that no other important issue contributes to increase the LDP votes.


Butler and Stokes (1974) posited three conditions for meaningful issue voting; (1) Many voters have their own opinion on the issue as well as interesting in it, (2) distribution of opinion on the issue is skewed, (3) perceived positions of the parties on the issue is apparent for voters. The post reform fills all these three conditions; Firstly, 62% of voters were interested in the issue. Secondly voters' issue position was skewed 2 to 1 for the reform. Thirdly, 91% voters perceived LDP is "for" and 66% perceived DPJ is "against".

Table 5

Votes for LDP 2005	model 1	model 2
	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	0.03	-0.03
Age	0.00	0.00
Education	0.04	0.04
Years of residence	0.14 *	0.13 *
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.06 +	0.06 +
Knowledge	-0.04 *	-0.03 +
LDP support	0.83 ***	0.83 ***
DPJ support	-0.27 **	-0.27 **
CGP Support	0.01	0.03
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.00	0.02
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.43 ***	0.45 ***
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 ***	0.02 ***
Postal Privatization Reform (For vs Against)	-0.29 ***	-0.31 ***
General Election is justified or not	-0.21 **	-0.22 **
Issue: Economy vs Fiscal reform		-0.11 +
Issue: Collective Self-Defence(for vs against)		0.07
Issue: Big vs Small Government		-0.05
Issue: Participation in Multinational Security Force		0.09
Issue: Local Autonomy(against vs for)		-0.02
Issue: Constitutional Amendment (for vs. against)		0.04
Issue: Pension program issue(Premium vs. tax)		-0.01
Issue: Iraq involvement (for vs.against)		0.06
Outpoint 1	0.93	1.13
Outpoint 2	2.51 ***	2.72 ***
N	1336	1336
Pseudo R2	0.31	0.31

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

Figure 7



## (2) Effect of mass media

RQ 2 requires us to investigate whether mass media exposure changed the LDP vote. Table 6, shows no clear discernible direct effect of mass media news exposure on the LDP votes.

Then, we moved on to more indirect effect of media, i.e. effects on prospective/ retrospective evaluation as well as feeling thermometer on Koizumi. The results are shown in Table 7 (OLS analyses). Clearly TV news exposure had some impacts on warming the feeling toward the PM and on a more positive prospective opinion. Again these effects are the net effects after controlling the past feeling thermometer/ prospective / retrospective evaluations (not shown in the table); one TV news program viewing in the campaign push up the warmth 0.6 degree and increased having a good prospective opinion by 0.02 SD. In these senses, TV positively but indirectly affected the Koizumi, although the effects are tiny as compared with the huge impact of the single “postal reform” issue.

The last note should go to the fact that “Wide-show” effect seems not present (different from pundit observations).

We conducted one more set of analyses on mass media; i.e. post reform issue and the effect of mass media, as the issue was the focal point of the election. We regressed two opinions on postal reform as shown above on a set of exposure variables by controlling other relevant variables. The results are presented in Table 8.

TV news exposure contributed to increase positive opinion on the postal privatization. No clear mass media effect on the opinion on the dissolution tactic. But here again, TV news exposure indirectly, by stimulating the issue opinion, positively supported the LDP.

Somewhat less but consistent effects by the Internet news exposure are observable. The directions are also in consonant with LDP support.

Table 6

year 2005		LDP vote	DPJ vote
		Coef.	Coef.
	Gender	-0.03	0.08
	Age	0.00	-0.01 *
	Education	0.07	-0.09
	Years of residence	0.13 *	-0.11
	Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.03	-0.02
	Knowledge	-0.04 *	-0.01
	LDP support	0.83 ***	-0.14 +
	DPJ support	-0.31 **	1.02 ***
	CGP Support	0.02	-0.50 **
	Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.05	-0.02
	Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.57 ***	-0.54 ***
	Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 ***	-0.02 ***
	Newspaper exposure	0.01	-0.11
	TV news exposure	-0.01	0.03
	“Wide show” exposure	-0.13	-0.23
	Read political news in the Internet	0.00	-0.01
	Cutpoint 1	2.15 **	-1.40 *
	Cutpoint 2	3.68 ***	-0.31
	N	1336	1336
	Pseudo R2	0.29	0.26

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

Table 7

year 2005	Feeling Thermo for Koizumi	Retrospective Evaluation	Prospective Evaluation
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	-0.32	-0.08	-0.05
Age	-0.06	0.00	0.00
Education	-1.97 *	-0.02	-0.04
Years of residence	-0.06	0.02	-0.01
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.34	-0.01	0.00
Knowledge	-0.11	-0.01 +	-0.02 ***
LDP support	9.66 ***	0.39 ***	0.42 ***
DPJ support	-0.15	-0.01	-0.03
CGP Support	7.88 ***	0.34 ***	0.39 ***
Newspaper exposure	-0.48	0.07	0.04
TV news exposure	0.55 +	0.01	0.02 +
"Wide show" exposure	-1.55	-0.06	0.00
Read political news in the Internet	0.86 +	0.02	0.03 +
constant	49.35 ***	-0.36 +	-0.30
N	1426	1426	1426
Pseudo R2	0.21	0.24	0.28

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

Table 8

	Postal Privatization Reform (For vs Against)	General Election is justified or not
	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	0.41 ***	0.18 +
Age	0.01 *	0.01 *
Education	-0.08	0.02
Years of residence	-0.02	0.01
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.08 **	0.06 *
Knowledge	0.02	0.03 *
LDP support	-0.59 ***	-0.55 ***
DPJ support	0.17 *	0.16 *
CGP Support	-0.58 ***	-0.36 ***
Newspaper exposure	-0.09	-0.06
TV news exposure	-0.08 **	0.02
"Wide show" exposure	0.21	0.04
Read political news in the Internet	-0.08 +	-0.07
Cutpoint 1	-0.16	-0.24
Cutpoint 2	1.16 *	0.79 +
Cutpoint 3	2.13 ***	1.65 ***
N	1426	1426
Pseudo R2	0.07	0.05

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

### (3) Effect of manifestos

By utilizing the same pattern of analysis, we checked the RQ 3 for the effects of manifestos. This time we set two dependent variables; LDP vote and DPJ vote to see how the manifestos are effective for the opposition party (in 2003 the effect was very strong). Table 9 clearly shows strong pattern of effects in both of LDP and DJP regardless we use two different types of measurements; exposure to manifestos, and sum of issue-by-issue valuations of party manifestos. This means in 2005 LDP finally adapted to use manifesto effectively. The effects remained even after controlling 2003-2004 votes.

Table 9

year 2005	LDP vote	DPJ vote	LDP vote	DPJ vote
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.05
Age	0.00	-0.01 **	0.00	-0.01 **
Education	0.04	-0.10	0.04	-0.11
Years of residence	0.13 *	-0.11	0.09	-0.07
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.06 +	-0.03	0.06 *	-0.03
Knowledge	-0.04 *	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
LDP support	0.81 ***	-0.11	0.77 ***	-0.10
DPJ support	-0.25 *	0.99 ***	-0.19 +	0.88 ***
CGP Support	-0.01	-0.49 ***	0.00	-0.49 ***
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	-0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.06
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.43 ***	-0.44 ***	0.36 **	-0.37 **
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 ***	-0.01 **	0.02 ***	-0.01 **
Postal Privatization Reform (For vs Against)	-0.29 ***	0.16 *	-0.33 ***	0.18 *
General Election is justified or not	-0.21 **	0.17 *	-0.17 *	0.12 +
LDP manifesto exposure	0.74 ***	-0.87 ***		
DPJ manifesto exposure	-0.68 ***	0.96 ***		
LDP manifesto Valuation			0.08 ***	-0.08 ***
DPJ manifesto Valuation			-0.12 ***	0.18 ***
Cutpoint 1	0.94	-0.54	1.02	-0.61
Cutpoint 2	2.53 ***	0.57	2.66 ***	0.56
N	1336	1336	1336	1336
Pseudo R2	0.31	0.27	0.32	0.30

p value .05<p<.1 +, .01<p<.05 \*, .001<p<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

#### (4) Effect of economy

Our final RQ 4 was on the effect of economy. Here again we used two sets of analyses; one is to check a direct effect of economic perception, and the other is on indirect effects. The economic variables are so-called sociotropic perception (national economy perception) and egocentric perception (family economic situation perception).

The leftist column of Table 10 clearly shows the lack of direct effects of economy perceptions on LDP votes. However, in the right three column of the table (OLS) we find indirect effects of economy perception basically both in national and family economy. Sociotropic and egocentric perceptions both contributed majorly to LDP vote; one point up on the sociotropic perception (5 point scale) pushes up 5.7 degrees of warm feeling and also .34 and .32 SD of retrospective and prospective evaluations respectively. Sociotropic perception increases warmth, hope and satisfaction with Cabinet performance. Note that these effects are not reduced even after including the effect of warmth, hope and satisfaction in 2003 and 2004 (not shown).

Table 10

year 2005	LDP vote	Feeling Thermo for Koizumi	Retrospective Evaluation	Prospective Evaluation
	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.
Gender	-0.05	0.29	-0.03	0.00
Age	0.00	-0.11 *	0.00 *	0.00 **
Education	0.06	-2.01 **	-0.04	-0.04 +
Years of residence	0.13 *	-0.04	0.03	0.00
Megalopolis vs. Small Town	0.03	0.45	0.00	0.01
Knowledge	-0.04 *	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02 **
LDP support	0.82 ***	8.30 ***	0.30 ***	0.33 ***
DPJ support	-0.31 **	-0.37	-0.04	-0.05 +
CGP Support	0.02	6.78 ***	0.27 ***	0.32 ***
Retrospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.04			
Prospective Evaluation of the Cabinet	0.55 ***			
Feeling Thermometer for Koizumi	0.02 ***			
Perceived Economic Climate of Japan	0.04	5.72 ***	0.34 ***	0.32 ***
Perceived Family Economic Situation	0.02	0.55	0.08 **	0.09 ***
Cutpoint 1	2.31 ***			
Cutpoint 2	3.84 ***			
constant		37.24 ***	-1.21 ***	-1.14 ***
N	1336	1426	1426	1426
Pseudo R2	0.29	0.26	0.36	0.39

p value .05<p=<.1 +, .01<p=<.05 \*, .001<p=<.01 \*\*, p<.001 \*\*\*

## Conclusion

By utilizing Japanese Election Study 3 with a four year panel design, I showed the mechanisms that supported PM Koizumi. The analyses revealed a consistent but dynamical process of retrospective vs prospective evaluations on the Cabinet. More focus on the 2005 House of Representative Election highlighted the role of politics of hope, which was fortified by mass media and an upswing in the national economic situation. Another impactful factor in the election was the single issue agenda-setting, i.e. the Post-Privatization reform. Although manifestos were another effective factor in influencing vote for LDP as well as DPJ, the issue agenda was far more influential for the LDP victory.

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## Appendix

### JESIII 2001 House of Councilors Election

#### [Pre FtF Survey]

Target period: 19 July to 28 July, 2001 (29 July was the Election day)

Sample: 3,000 Japanese voters (over 20 years old) based on 2 stage stratified sampling

Response rate: 2,061(68.7%)

#### [Post Telephone survey]

Target period: 1 August to 5 August, 2001

Sample: panel from the previous wave.

Response rate: 1,253 (41.8% against the original sample; 60.8% against the 1st wave respondents; 791.% against those who provided their phone numbers)

### JESIII 2003 House of Representatives Election

#### [Pre FtF survey]

Period: 29 October to 8 November (9 Nov was the election day)

Respondents

Total	Sample=	3759	Response=	2162	Resp rate=	57.5%
Panel		2334		1340		57.4%
New Recruit		1425		822		57.7%

(addition of sample by random sampling)

#### [Post Ftf survey]

Period: 13 November to 24 November

Respondents

Total	Sample=	3573	Response=	2268	Resp rate=	63.5%
Panel		2356		1828		77.6%
New Recruit		1217		440		36.2%

Those who were accessible in both of the pre and post survey= 1769

### JESIII 2004 House of Councilors Election

#### [Pre FtF survey]

Period: 1 July to 10 July (the Election day was 11th)

Respondents

Total	Sample=	3735	Responses=	2115	Resp Rate=	56.6%
Panel		2614		1588		60.7%
Newly Recruit		1121		527		47.0%

#### [Post FtF survey]

Period: 15 July to 26 July

Respondents

Total	Sample=	2575, Responses=	1977, Resp Rate=	76.8%
Panel		2337	1918	82.1%
Newly Recruite		238	59	24.8%

Those who were accessible in both of the pre and post survey= 1810

JESIII 2005 House of Representatives Election

[Pre FtF Survey]

Period: 1 September to 10 September (11th was the Election day)

Respondents

Total      Sample=2134    Responses=1517      Resp.rate=71.1%

[Post FtF Survey:

Period: 15 September to 26 September

Respondents

Total      Sample=1735 Responses=1511      Resp.rate=87.1%

Those who were accessible in both of the pre and post survey=1428