Issue Voting in Portugal: The 2002 legislative elections

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Issue Voting in Portugal: The 2002 legislative elections

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Abstract:

The major objectives of this article are: first, to analyse the relative impact of different types of issues (position versus performance issues) in Portuguese voting behaviour in the 2002 legislative elections; second, to analyse the relative importance of issues compared to other determinants of voting behaviour in the above mentioned elections. Issues are defined in a broad manner to include both voters’ positions about major ideological conflicts in society (position issues) and voters’ evaluations of current economic conditions and government performance (the so-called consensual and/or performance issues). In the first section of the paper, after giving contextual information about the 2002 elections, we define issues and present the model of voting choice that will be used. In the second section, salience and polarization of the different issues among the mass public are analysed. In the third and fourth sections, the impact of issues, against other major voting determinants (social structure, party identification/ideological self-placement, and candidate likes and dislikes), is evaluated as vote predicting factors in terms of individual voters’ decisions.
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Introduction

The 2002 legislative elections in Portugal produced a change in government. With 37.8% of the vote the incumbent Socialist Party\(^1\) (PS: *Partido Socialista*) was defeated, losing about 6% of the suffrage and 19 seats compared to prior legislative elections. The winner was the Social Democratic Party\(^2\) (PSD: *Partido Social Democrata*) with 40.2% of the vote, getting more about 8% of the suffrage and 24 seats than in the last parliamentary elections (see Freire and Lobo, 2002: 225). However, the PSD fell short of a majority in Parliament and so had to consider a minority government or a coalition. Since the latter party, as well as the PS, spent a large part of the campaign asking for a majority, this result can be seen as a defeat of the party’s strategy. Many attributed this result to the weak leadership of Durão Barroso, PSD’s leader and nowadays also Portugal’s prime minister\(^3\), for a bad conducting of the campaign, with policies proposed and abandoned during the campaign\(^4\), among other bad performances\(^5\) (Freire and Lobo, 2002: 224). Moreover, despite the enormous difficulties due to

\(^1\) A centre left party with a social democratic profile.

\(^2\) A centre right party with a liberal profile. Actually, the PSD was a member of the Liberal Party Group in the European Parliament (EP) until the beginning of the nineties, and nowadays is a member of the Popular Party Group in the EP.

\(^3\) See, for example, *Expresso*, 23/03/02.

\(^4\) Namely the proposal for increasing the VAT, in order to compensate for the fiscal shock and reduce the budget deficit, but also the one on the partial privatisation of the major bank owned by the Portuguese State (CGD: *Caixa Geral de Depósitos*). About the fiscal shock, see bellow.

\(^5\) See *Expresso*, 23/03/02; *Público*, 18/03/02; *Diário de Notícias*, 18/03/02.
leadership change and preparation of the electoral campaign in a very short period, the PS achieved its best result ever as a second major party, very close to the PSD.

Contrary to what was said in terms of the PSD, the 2002 electoral results were a clear victory for the CDS-PP’s (Centro Democrático Social – Partido Popular) electoral strategy, lead by Paulo Portas. The latter party campaigned for the need to throw the Socialists out of power and the need for an electoral coalition between the two major parties of the right, PSD and CDS-PP, in order to avoid excessive power concentration. Both objectives were fulfilled. In addition, contrary to almost all opinion polls’ predictions the CDS-PP achieved 8.7% of the popular vote and became the third major party in Portuguese Parliament, larger than the communist party (PCP: Partido Comunista Português) and its coalition ally (the tiny Green party, PEV: Partido Ecologista Os Verdes), together with 6.9% of the vote, reversing 1999’s results.

The picture of party fortunes in the 2002 elections is only completed when we refer to the 2.7% of the vote and 3 seats achieved by the extreme left wing “Left-Bloc” (BE: Bloco de Esquerda), a coalition between two extreme left wing micro parties (PSR, a former Trotskyist party, and UDP, a former Maoist party) and a political

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6 A right wing party with some Christian Democratic origins. After the country’s entrance in the EU the party joined the European’s People’s Party in the EP. However, in the beginning of the 1990s it adopted an anti-EU stance, now strongly mitigated, and thereafter it joined the Union for Europe of the Nations Group in the EP.
7 See Freire and Lobo, 2002b: 228, note 12.
8 These two parties run together in national elections since 1987 under the label CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária/Unitary Democratic Coalition), but the micro Green Party is a mere satellite of the Communists.
movement (*Política XXI*), defending some new left issues. Despite enormous pressures on tactical considerations about forming a majority single party government, the BE increased its score with one extra seat vis-à-vis the 1999 elections, the first time the coalition contested an election.

**Table 1 (around here)**

When the 2002 elections took place the PS was in the middle of its second consecutive term. After ten years in opposition, in 1995 the Socialists arrived in government and benefited from an exceptionally favourable conjuncture during this first term, 1995-1999: the economy was growing fast, unemployment and budget deficit were reduced (see Table 1), and the PS’ government could also increase public expenditure in some social welfare services, namely the minimum guaranteed income program. Moreover, in spite of the PS’ minority status in Parliament, the high government’s popularity and the need to meet the European Monetary Union (EMU) criteria made it easy to get opposition support to pass the annual budget.

Given those favourable conditions, it was quite a surprise that in the 1999 national elections the PS did not achieve a parliamentary majority. Actually, the party obtained its best result ever, 44% of the vote, and managed to get two additional seats compared to 1995, but this gave it only exactly the same number of seats as the opposition (115). So, in this second term (1999-2002) the PS’ government could not be brought down by the opposition, but still needed the latter’s support (or at least abstention) to pass the annual budget (and other bills). Meanwhile, the postponed reforms became increasingly urgent but also more difficult to implement in an increasingly difficult economic environment: the rate of economic growth declined

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9 Other micro parties contested the 2002 legislative elections but none of them achieved any seat.
significantly, unemployment and inflation began to rise (see Table 1), specially the latter, and finally the PS’ government received a EU Commission warning about an excess budget deficit in 2001. Plus, due to the lack of any major EU objective, opposition willingness to negotiate with government for budgetary purposes practically vanished (Freire and Lobo, 2002). In the first year of the second term (1999) the PS could still count on abstention by the CDS-PP to pass the budget, but in the two following years the government had to persuade a right wing MP (Daniel Campelo, from CDS-PP) to break ranks with his party and abstain in the vote on the budget in return of specific government benefits for his local county. Finally, after a not very strong defeat in the 2001 local elections, the Prime Minister and PS’ leader, António Guterres, resigned. Faced with the lack of an alternative government solution in parliament, the president called for early elections in March 17, 2002. As was said elsewhere, “it was the government’s growing unresponsiveness and the Prime Minister’s willingness to step down which largely determined the unexpected outcome on local election night (Freire and Lobo, 2002: 222).”

Having set the general context of the 2002 legislative elections, let us pass to the major electoral campaign issues and parties’ proposals. “A campaign study found that the PSD leader, Durão Barroso, was the most discussed leader, with 32% of all news items dealing with him, followed by Ferro Rodrigues at 26%. The most common campaign issue, was not a theme at all, but an appeal for votes, with both the PS and the PSD calling for an absolute majority. The second theme was football. In third place

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10 Between 3-15 March, Memorandum, a communication strategy firm, analysed 1423 news items, both in the written press and on TV. The newspapers included Correio da Manhã, Diário de Notícias, Jornal de Notícias, Público and 24 Horas. The four main TV channels were analysed.
came the first real policy matter, work and employment, fourth was the economy and fifth state finances and fiscal reform (Freire and Lobo, 2002: 223).”

The PSD’s outdoors campaign emphasized the need for change in economic issues, namely the reduced economic growth vis-à-vis the other EU countries, the need to reduce the budget deficit, and other policy shortcomings of the PS government, namely concerning the National Health System. A specific and significant feature of the PSD’s outdoors campaign was that the leader’s image was carefully avoided most of the time: only near election day was the leader’s face shown in the billboards.

The contrary was true for the PS’ strategy in terms of the outdoors campaign: the leader’s image was a central feature in billboards’ advertisements. Moreover, there was a great emphasis on social policy, an area in which the PS had been relatively successful and that had been directed most of the time by the current PS’ leader, Ferro Rodrigues, as Minister of Employment and Social Solidarity.

As for the smaller parties, the CDS-PP emphasised mainly the need for a right wing party in government. On the left, the Communists (PCP) claimed that a vote for them was needed for a real (leftwing) change in policies. The BE stressed mainly the abortion liberalization issue, the need for deep fiscal reform, and the party’s singular stance in terms of the football issue.

Political commentators and journalists agreed that the 2002 elections were one of the most polarized in the country’s democratic history, even if policy proposals were not very clear in many domains. The PSD placed more emphasis on reducing the role of the state in the economy, both in terms of expenditure and taxes. This was a general proposal, which was also backed by the other party on the right side of the ideological

11 About the outdoors’ campaign, see Expresso/Revista, February 23, 2002: 30-41.
spectrum, the CDS-PP. Yet, the PSD was not explicit on where the cuts would be made in order to reduce the budget deficit, proposing to audit state finances before announcing the cuts. The PSD proposed a fiscal shock, which consisted essentially in a decrease in corporate and higher income wage earners’ taxes to boost competitiveness and increase overall tax receipts.

The Socialist Party did not agree with the diagnostic on the country’s finances presented by the PSD. Additionally, the former party criticised the fiscal shock severely, exposing the inherent difficulty in both cutting taxes and the budget deficit. Ferro Rodrigues also assumed the need to decrease the budget deficit and fulfil the EU criteria, a proposal that was clearly not in line with the parties on the left of the PS (PCP and BE) which emphasised that the EU criteria were not adequate to Portugal’s needs in the present conjuncture. Despite the acception of the EU public budget deficit criteria, the PS gave greater emphasis in its proposals to social cohesion and welfare provision.

Immigration, environmental protection and abortion liberalization were also themes debated in the campaign, although with a much lower salience than the economic, budgetary and welfare issues. The rightwing parties advocated greater restrictions in terms of immigrants entrance in the country than the left, specially the extreme left (BE). Abortion liberalization was also an issue mainly raised and advocated by BE, although PS and PCP also backed this position, in opposition to the rightwing parties’ stances. In terms of environmental protection, the main issue was clearly PSD’s proposal to abandon the project of industrial waste co-incineration developed by the PS and with the populist opposition of all the other parties, a clear NIMBY stance backed by the local populations affected.

Having set the general context of 2002 elections and the major campaign issues and policy proposals, let us pass to the two major objectives of this article. First, to
analyse the relative impact of different types of issues (position versus performance issues) in Portuguese voting behaviour in the 2002 legislative elections. Second, to analyse the relative importance of issues compared to other determinants of voting behaviour in the above mentioned elections.

The analysis that follows is based on the Portuguese National Election Study (NES) 2002 (the data set can be found in Freire, Lobo, Magalhães, and Santo 2003; and it is also archived at the ZA/Cologne/Germany), the first one conducted in the country. This was a cross sectional study based on a multi-stage probability sample of the population aged 18 years old or more and living in the mainland (N = 1303). The lack of a NES prior to the 2002 elections resulted in the fact that issue voting was seldom studied in the Portuguese context. Various individual level studies showed the weak social anchors of partisanship (Gunther and Montero, 2000; Freire, 2001 and 2003a; Freire and Lobo, 2003), and the importance of candidate (Gunther and Montero, 2000) and economic (Freire and Lobo, 2003) evaluations in explaining the vote. In terms of the position issues, they were found to have only a weak (or inexistent) linear relationship with the vote (Freire, 2003a) or the individuals self placement in the left-right scale (Freire, 2003a e 2003b; Freire, Magalhães e Santo, 2003; Knutsen, 1995 and 1997).

However, prior Portuguese studies of voting choice were not based on surveys fielded during election contexts and so missed their impact on voting behaviour. Other studies were based on aggregate data (Freire, 2001; Veiga, 1998) and so tested mainly the impact of social structural and objective economical variables on the vote (Freire, 2001).

12 The Portuguese NES 2002 coordinators are António Barreto, principal investigator, and André Freire, Marina Costa Lobo and Pedro C. Magalhães, both as executive coordinators.
2001) or government’s popularity (Veiga, 1998), but not of position issues. So, the present article, building on the Portuguese NES 2002, is quite a pioneer study in Portugal. Moreover, in a comparative perspective Portugal is a crucial case test for issue voting, i.e., due to the very low social anchoring of partisanship it is expected that the impact of short term effects (issues and candidates) on the vote is considerably high. That is what will be tested empirically in this paper.

**Defining issues and modelling voting choice**

As Ole Borre (2000) argues, in the early days of the western democratic regimes, issues were the bulk of mass politics. The liberal parties were formed explicitly to remove the political privileges of traditional strata and extend them to society at large; conservative parties were formed to defend the military establishment, the church and the monarchy; socialist parties were formed to defend the interests of the working class, namely their right to organize in unions, and to have better working and living conditions; etc. Moreover, in those days, electoral change was mainly seen as a result of the rise of new issues (Borre, 2000: 9). However, early survey research found little evidence of issue voting (Lazarsfeld et al, 1944; Beresoln et al, 1954; Campbell et al, 1960), except in terms of retrospective voting/performance issues (Key, 1966), and it was only with the electoral turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s that issue voting was argued to has became a major factor in electoral behaviour (for a review, see Borre, 2000).

Generally speaking, in terms of policy ends it can be said that there are mainly two major types of issues: position issues and valence or consensual issues (Stokes, 1963; Fiorina, 1981: 3-19; Miller and Shanks, 1996: 197-203; Borre, 2000). Position issues refer to major conflicts in society and the ways that both parties and electors view them. According to the model proposed by Anthony Downs (1957), the so-called
proximity or spatial model of issue voting (Borre, 2000: 58-82), voters tend choose the party which issue positions are closer to their own. This perspective is very demanding in terms of the information needed by the voter to arrive to a decision: he (or she) needs to compare the different parties’ platforms and see, for each issue, which party’s position comes closer to his own; then he needs to make an overall assessment in terms of the various issues and decide which party’s positions are closer to his own positions, which will be the one that gives the voter a higher utility for his vote (Downs, 1957: 36-50). Other issue voting perspectives, namely the directional theory (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989; see also Borre, 2000: 73-82), are also very demanding in terms of the information needed by the voter. True, Downs (1957: 220-237) accepts that in a world characterized by limited information the voter will tend to use many information economizing devices: free accessible information; group cues; ideology; etc. Nevertheless, these models of issue voting make very strong assumptions about the information needed by the voter to arrive to a decision.

However, some policy objectives are consensual: improve the state of the economy; protect the environment; reduce unemployment and inflation; keep the country out of war; etc. These are consensual or valence issues (Stokes, 1963; Fiorina, 1981: 17-19; Miller and Shanks, 1996: 197-203 and 370-413; Borre, 2000: 99-126). In this case, the impact of issues on voting behaviour depends not on the positions of voters and parties on a issue dimension, but on matters such as the relative priority that the different parties give to the various issues, or their performance in each policy domain (Borre, 2000: 99-126). For example, some parties give more priority to fighting unemployment than reducing inflation, so if the voters are mainly concerned with unemployment they will tend to vote more in parties that give top priority to that issue (Anderson, 1995; Kiewiet, 1983; Kieweit and Rivers, 1984). In terms of performance,
the parties and governments are mainly judged retrospectively for the job they have
done in handling the economy, maintaining order in the nation, dealing with military
crisis, etc.

Position issues’ theory points to a voting decision mainly supported by
prospective judgements: the voters evaluate the parties’ policy proposals and choose the
one which is closer to their own and has the best prospects of being elected and
implement the policy. On the contrary, voters’ decisions based on performance
evaluations are mainly retrospective: if the incumbents have a good record, electors tend
to vote for them; otherwise, the voters will tend to choose the opposition parties (Key,
1966; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norporth, 1996; Lewis-Beck
and Paldam, 2000; Borre, 2000: 110-126). Economic voting studies are mainly of this
type. However, even in terms of economics, performance evaluations can also be
prospective: the voters evaluate the competitors in terms of their prospects to deal with a
certain (economic) issue and will tend to choose the party/candidate that has the best
prospect of being well succeeded in dealing with the issue (Miller and Shanks, 1996:
189-211; Lewis-Beck, 1998; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000).

Another major difference between the position and performance issues is that
the voters’ burden for collecting and processing information is very high in the case of
the former, as we have seen, but not so much in the case of the latter. As Fiorina states it
in terms of retrospective voting model: “they (the voters) need not know the precise
economic or foreign policies of the incumbent administration in order to see or feel the
results of those policies. And is it not reasonable to base voting decisions on results as
well as on intentions? In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed
well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare. If jobs have been
lost in a recession, something is wrong. If thugs make neighbourhoods unsafe, something is wrong. (…) (Fiorina, 1981: 5, italics in the original).”

As was said before, the main objectives of this paper are to evaluate the relative impact of position and performance issues on Portuguese voters’ decisions in the 2002 legislative elections, and to assess the relative importance of issues compared with other major voting determinants. These objectives will be fulfilled only in terms of individual voters’ decisions.

**Table 2 (around here)**

In Table 2 we present the independent variables used in this article to explain Portuguese voting choices in the 2002 legislative elections. In terms of position issues, five variables are used. The first two are indexes, which refer to the role of the state in the economy and to the extent of public control over the social welfare services. The other three refer to the questions of abortion liberalization, immigration access to the country and who should pay for environmental protection. The full text of the questions referring to both position and performance issues can be found in Annex 1.

The Portuguese NES 2002, despite its pioneering character, suffered from two major limitations in terms of its conception. First, the questionnaire had to be prepared in a very short period because the Portuguese President called for early, unexpected elections. Second, the will to field in the same survey Modules 1 and 2 of the CSES questionnaires, due to late entrance of Portugal in the network, imposed space limitations. This explanation is presented for the reader to understand some of the limitations for testing the position issues model. First, a question is missing on a major campaign issue proposed by the centre right party PSD: the fiscal shock. Second, it is not possible to either the proximity or the directional models of issue voting because no questions about the parties’ issue positions were asked. In these conditions, the model
for position issues is clearly under specified. So, we will able to see only if voters’ issue positions have any impact on their vote, a strategy also employed in other studies (see for example, Heath et al, 1991; Borre, 2000). Third, the questions on position issues presented in the Portuguese NES questionnaire are perhaps better indicators of long term/mid term “ideological orientations” than indicators of truly short term “current policy preferences”, as Miller and Shanks call them (1996: 283-369). This is hardly a specific problem of the Portuguese NES 2002. Nevertheless, it’s something we should bear in mind when analysing the data and that’s why, in the model of voting choice presented in Figure 1, we present the position issues as belonging simultaneously to block 3, “ideological orientations”, and block 3’, “current policy preferences”.

**Figure 1 (around here)**

In terms of performance issues, two types of questions were included. The first type refers to the “perceptions of current economic conditions” and allow us a very good test for the economic voting model, because both the egocentric versus sociotropic and the retrospective versus prospective dimensions of the model are tapped (Table 2). The second type of questions refers to evaluations of the incumbent government performance in general and in terms of the respondent’s most important issue. The performance evaluations block is also somewhat under specified because it is not divided in policy dimensions and includes only retrospective assessments (see Miller and Shanks, 1996: 370-413).

In terms of the model of voting choice (see Figure 1), we followed the “funnel of causality” approach presented in the original “Michigan model” (Campbell et al, 1960), updated by Miller and Shanks (1996: 189-211), and adapted to the available indicators in the survey and to domestic political conditions. So we begin with the more distant antecedents of voting choice, in the base of the funnel, and end with those factors that
are more near to the vote, in the end of the funnel: “social structure” and “short term effects II”, respectively. Moreover, following a similar strategy as the one used by Milller and Shanks we divided the variables into six “explanatory themes”, according to their theoretical status and their place in the temporal sequence, and we will try to estimate their specific contribution to the explanation of Portuguese individual voting decisions in 2002.

There is a central element in the Michigan model, “party identification”, for which we will use a proxy, “respondent’s self placement in the left-right scale” (Figure 1 and Table 2). This is not because we do not have the indicator of the former concept in the Portuguese NES 2002 questionnaire, but because its theoretical and methodological status in Portugal is not clarified. On the one hand, we know that in Europe the independence of party identification vis-à-vis the vote was never so clear as it was in the US (several articles in Budge et al, 1976). In Portugal there is no research about this subject. On the other hand, we know that the respondent’s position in the left-right scale has both a value and a partisan component, and Portugal is no exception in this matter (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Knutsen, 1995 and 1997; Freire, 2003a and 2003b). So, the latter measure can be used as a proxy of party identification, specially if we can control for citizens’ issue positions (the value component), as we do. The problem is that the value component of left and right is a kind of a super-issue, so using the respondent’s left-right self placement as a proxy of party identification can be said to depress (partially of totally) the impact of position issues on the vote. Although in Portugal, as in Ireland, Belgium and Austria the value component of left-right ideology is very weak (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Knutsen, 1995 and 1997;

\[\text{13 Of course, as is very well known, as closer we get to the vote, as higher the problems of reverse causality becomes.}\]
Freire, 2003a and 2003b), to avoid the above mentioned problem we will test the voting model also with “party identification”, instead of the respondent’s left-right self placement, and compare the results of both models.

In terms of the institutional and political conditions influencing voting choice, namely in terms of clarity of responsibility, of course tests can not be done, unless we use a comparative and/or longitudinal perspective (Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka, 2002). However, we should bear in mind that before the election a single party minority government was in place. As we argued elsewhere (Freire and Lobo, 2003), theoretically this might be thought of as a situation of medium clarity of responsibility, in between single party majority government and coalition, because the government still needs opposition support to pass the annual budget and all the other bills. Still, the question remains if voters see things this way, but some recent tests point in a negative direction, i.e., showing no difference in voters’ decisions between single party minority and majority governments (Freire and Lobo, 2003).

The vote is measured through a recall question on participation and voting choice in 2002, and the survey was fielded during the two immediate weeks after the March 17, 2002 legislative elections.

**Issue salience and polarisation among Portuguese electors**

In the Portuguese NES 2002 we included an open ended question about issue salience, whose exact wording is “what do you think has been the most important issue facing Portugal over the last three years?”. It was then coded into about 20 categories, aggregated into five major sets of responses. From these data – not shown due to spatial considerations - we can see that answers aggregated under the label “economic issues”
were the most salient ones (36.4%), followed by those referring to “social welfare issues” (31.7%). According to issue salience theory of voting (Borre, 2000: 99-109), we have here reasons to expect issues related to the economy and the social welfare services to have a significant impact on the vote. What is in a way surprising about these results is that given the problems of political management by the Socialist Party in the period 1999-2001 the salience of “political issues” is very low, fourth position in five (6.1% of the answers).

Figure 2 (around here)

In terms of the position issues the responses were recoded into three categories, left, centre and right (Figure 2; see Annex 1 for the exact wording of the questions). We can see that in terms of the “state power” issue there are slightly more electors favouring state intervention than the contrary, but the largest group is a centrist one. On the question of “welfare services”, there is a large majority, above 60%, favouring public services. Additionally, the centrist position is larger than the rightwing one. In terms of the “abortion” issue polarization is greater than in the two prior issues because the centrist position is the smallest, but there is also a clear left leaning. So, in terms of the so-called “old” left and right issues public opinion mood seems to favour the left wing parties.

On the contrary, in terms of the so-called “new politics” issues the public opinion’s mood seems to favour the (“new”) right wing parties: there are clear majorities favouring more restrictions to immigrants’ entrance in Portugal, and of people unwilling to spend their own money on environmental protection.

Figure 3 (around here)

In terms of evaluations of current economic conditions, negative public opinion perceptions almost always outnumber the positive ones (Figure 3). The only exceptions
are the prospective evaluations, both in terms of personal finances and the national economic situation, where positive expectations outnumber the negative ones. So, the retrospective and current views of the state of the economy were clearly negative by the time of the election, but there was also some optimism for the future. Nevertheless, another salient feature in terms of the data presented in Figure 3 must be stressed: perceptions of the respondent’s personal financial situations were always rather more optimistic than those perceptions that refer to the national economy, because in the case of the former the largest category of responses was always the mixed one (“the personal financial situation stayed or will stay the same”). In terms of prospective perceptions of the national economic situation, the mixed category is also the largest, but nevertheless not so large as in the case of the personal financial situation.

In terms of government’s performance evaluations there was no mixed category and perceptions are overwhelmingly negative: a large majority of 80% or more of the respondents said that the incumbent Socialist government had done a bad job, specially in terms of the respondent’s most important issue (Figure 3).

**Modelling individual level voting choice I: bivariate relationships**

In terms of the “old” left and right position issues, we can see that except for the liberalisation of abortion issue, the relationship between issue positions and the vote is not linear (Figure 4). Note that in the X axis we ordered the voters, according to their 2002 voting choice, in a left-right dimension: from BE, in the extreme left, to CDS-PP, in the right. In the Y axis we present the positions of the same voters on each issue – positions are ordered from right (1) to left (10). In terms of “state power” and “social welfare services” the Communists and Socialist’s voters are the ones located more on the left. However, BE’s voters are located more to the right wing than the voters from
all the other parties, namely the two right wing ones. On the other hand, CDS-PP’s voters are more favourable to state intervention in the economy and public welfare services than its centre right ally, PSD, and have very similar positions to the PS’ voters on these issues.

**Figure 4 (around here)**

Understanding these peculiar results, much in line with what was previously found in other studies (Freire, 2003a and 2003b), is beyond the scope of this article. But we believe this might be due to a post materialist syndrome\(^\text{14}\), on the extreme left, and a authoritarian heritage mixed with a specific voters’ profile (old, retired, etc.) on the right. Nevertheless, these data points to the need to use non linear models in estimating the impact of the position issues on voting choice. The only exception in terms of old left-right issues is the abortion liberalisation one: here the relationship is clearly linear with the left supporting more the liberalisation pole.

In terms of the clearly “new” left-right issues (immigration and environmental protection), party voters’ positions are not much differentiated. However, BE generally stands apart from the other parties as the “newest” left wing party, but even in this case with a centrist position... The other three parties are practically equal, except perhaps in the environmental issue where the CDS-PP is clearly more to the right. These data point to a two dimensional space of competition, although the second dimension have very low salience and polarization potential. Again, these results point to the need for using non linear models in estimating the impact of position issues on voting choice.

**Table 3 (around here)**

\(^{14}\) Actually, according to our sample, compared to the other parties the BE constituency is the one where post materialists have the highest weight.
In terms of the impact of economic perceptions on the vote for the incumbent party, we can see that all variables except one, the prospective personal financial situation, have a significant impact on the vote (Table 3). The most relevant variables are retrospective and current perceptions of the state of the national economy, a result much in line with prior studies (among many others, see Kiewiet, 1983; Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norporth, 1996; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). The relationship between prospective economic evaluations and the vote presents a singularity: the relationship is positive, which means that those who voted for the opposition parties have more optimistic expectations for the state of the economy. To put it another way, in a post electoral survey those whose think that the opposition parties have better possibilities to improve the state of the economy will tend to vote for them; or in a reverse causal relation, those who voted for the opposition believe they will improve the state of the economy in the near future. But this is in a way contrary to conventional economy voting theory, namely that positive perceptions of the (present and future) state of the economy will tend to increase support for the incumbents.

But incumbent government’s performance evaluations are clearly more important in explaining the vote than economic perceptions (Table 3), at least in term of bivariate relationships. Of course, what remains to be seen is if these relationships and their relative strength still hold when we control for other vote determinants. That’s what we do in next section by means of multivariate analysis.

**Modelling individual level choice II: multivariate analysis**

To estimate the relative impact of position and performance issues on the vote we will use the following strategy, similar to the one used by Miller and Shanks (1996: 189-450). Each of the sets of variables presented in Figure I (1 to 6) will be entered into
the regression equations by blocks, beginning with those sets of variables that are in the base of the funnel (1st set) and ending with those that are closer to the vote (6th set).

For each block of variables entered into the logistic regression equation until a specific step, the Pseudo $R^2$ (Nagelkerke) represents the contribution of all variables entered until that step to explain the vote. The Pseudo $R^2$ of one specific block, for example the number two, “party identification”, minus the Pseudo $R^2$ of the prior block entered, the number one “social structure”, represents the specific contribution of the former block of variables in explaining the vote, until that step. In Tables 4 and 5, there are always two measures for the Pseudo $R^2$: first, the total $R^2$ until that bloc; second, in parenthesis, the Pseudo $R^2$ that is specific of that particular block.

The variables are entered into the regression equation using “method enter”. However, only those variables that showed a significant bivariate relationship with the vote (see Table 3) are entered into the regression equations presented in Table 4. Since SPSS furnishes no standardised coefficients in logistic regression (“beta coefficients”), in the final step, and only for the variables that still have a significant impact on the vote, we present both the regression coefficients (B) and the partial correlation coefficients (in parenthesis). The latter will be used to assess the relative importance of each variable in explaining the vote.

Note that in explaining the individual voting decision we will use different operational definitions of the dependent variable: incumbent versus opposition; each

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15 About logistic regression, see the excellent introduction by Pampel (2000).  
16 If we have a dichotomous and a continuous variable, or an ordinal variable assumed as continuous, the appropriate association’s measure is the Point-Biserial correlation coefficient. However, it can be demonstrated that the latter give the same results as the Pearson’s $r$ correlation coefficient (Chen and Popovich, 2002: 26-28). So, we use always the Person’s $r$ correlation coefficient in Table 3.
party compared with all other parties included in the opposite ideological block (Tables 4 and 5).

**Table 4 (around here)**

In terms of incumbent party *versus* opposition (Table 4), we can see that position issues have a practically insignificant impact on the vote (0.5%), lower than the one from social structural characteristics (1.9%). On the contrary, performance issues are a very significant determinant of voting choice: perceptions of economic conditions have a specific contribution of 9.1%; government performance evaluations make a specific contribution of 13%. So, government performance evaluations in general had a more important role in explaining incumbents’ support than economics. However, the major determinants of voting choice are candidate evaluations (17.7%) and the respondent’s position in the left right scale (17%), a proxy for “party identification”.

Additionally, when we introduced candidate evaluations in the equation the impact of government’s performance evaluations completely vanish, which means that the impact of the latter in the vote for incumbents is completely mediated by the former. On the contrary, perceptions of economic conditions remain significant. Even if part of economics’ effects are mediated through government performance and candidate evaluations in the end retrospective evaluations of the national economy remain as the third major determinant of incumbents’ support. In the final equation only three variables have a significant impact on the vote, with the following relative importance: first, candidate likes and dislikes; second, respondent’s self placement in the left right scale; third, retrospective evaluations of the national economy – see the partial correlation coefficients in parenthesis. Note that in spite of a certain under specification of (at least parts of) the voting choice model, as referred to in the theoretical section of
this paper, the variance explained (59.2%) is very impressive for an estimation based on individual level data.

In substantive terms, we can see that the vote for incumbents was significantly explained by social class, with both “Bourgeoisie & Petty Bourgeoisie” and the “Service Class” revealing less support for incumbents than “Manual Workers”, which reveals a certain working class support for the Socialist Party. However, even the small impact of social class loses significance when we introduced “perceptions of economic conditions” in the equation. Which means that social class’ effects on the vote were mediated by economics. Moreover, no other social structural indicator (church attendance, region, and habitat) have any significant impact on the vote for incumbents. In terms of the “party identification” proxy, the results show that the more to the right respondents place themselves on the left right scale, the less support the incumbent Socialist Party receives, compared with all opposition parties.

In terms of the impact of economic perceptions on the vote for incumbents, we can see that in general negative assessments increase support for the opposition. The only exception is prospective economic evaluations, which show that negative assessments are associated with an increase in support for incumbents. In the bivariate analysis, we already mentioned the probable reason for this peculiar result: in a post electoral survey prospective economic evaluations have an ambiguous meaning in terms of its effects on the vote for incumbents. However, in the end (6th step) only national retrospective economic evaluations remain significant and their effects are in the expected direction.

Political performance evaluations reveal that (general) negative assessments of the government’s job increase support for the opposition, but this effect vanish when the candidate evaluations are entered into the equation. Finally, liking Ferro Rodrigues, PS’
leader, increased support for incumbents, and this factor is not only the single major vote predictor but it also mediates the impact of some other variables on the vote.

In the prior analysis we compared vote for incumbents with support for all the opposition parties merged together. Now we will proceed with an analysis party by party (Table 4). In the latter procedure, we follow a similar strategy as the one employed by Gunther and Montero (2001), comparing the vote of each one of the major four parties with all parties located in opposite side of the ideological spectrum.

On position issues, the expectation is that parties on the left side of the ideological spectrum receive greater support from voters that favour more state power in economic affairs, more public welfare services, less restrictions to abortion, less restrictions to immigrant entrance in the country, and more willingness to spent their own money in environmental protection. The opposite trend might be expected for right wing parties. However, as we have seen before (Figure 2) the relationship between issue positions and left right vote is note linear. Nevertheless, the models used will allow us to detect non linear relationships.

Multivariate analysis reveals that position issues have only a significant impact on the vote for the Communists (PCP), “social welfare index”, and the right wing CDS-PP, “abortion”. In both cases, the relation is in the expected direction. So, after controlling for other voting determinants only the vote for the parties located closer to the extremes of the ideological spectrum is dependent on position issues in a significant way. In any case, they are the least important set of factors in explaining voting choice.

Party by party vote predictions in terms of performance issues is not very clear. Actually, one of the major limitations of the economic voting model might be said to be that it only predicts support for incumbents or opposition, but generally does not tell us which opposition parties the unsatisfied electors would vote for. In a way, it can be
expected that negative assessments of both economic conditions and government’s performance would benefit more those opposition parties which have a higher probability to control future government, and less so protest parties (Lewis-Beck, 1997) like the Portuguese Communist Party. However, data from the 2002 legislative elections show a mixed picture. In a negative sense, the vote for all opposition parties is significantly related to economic perceptions. In a positive sense, in terms of national economic perceptions, those for which political responsibility is more clearly attributed, the relationship is not significant for the PCP. Moreover, only the vote for PSD, the major opposition party, is significantly related to both national and personal economic perceptions, and to government’s performance evaluations. I.e., it was the major incumbents’ competitor that most benefited from (bad) performance evaluations, both economic and political.

In substantive terms, negative national economic assessments benefited both the PSD and the CDS-PP. However, in terms of personal economic assessments the picture is mixed: voters that have an optimistic expectation for their own economic situation in the next year tend to vote more for the PSD; voters that have a pessimistic expectation for their own economic situation in the next year tend to vote more for the PS and, to a much larger extent, for the PCP. These results in terms of the PSD and the PS vote contradict economic voting theory’s predictions and might be due to the post electoral nature of the survey, as mentioned before.

In general, economic factors are always the third major factors explaining party choice, after respondent’s self placement in the left-right scale (“party identification” proxy) and candidate evaluations. The PCP is the only party where left-right is more important than candidate evaluations, demonstrating the more ideological nature of this truly mass party in the Portuguese party system. In all the other parties, the vote is
slightly more determined by candidate evaluations than left-right self placement. The relationships are all in the expected direction: voters support the parties that are ideological closer to themselves; positive evaluations of the party leader have a positive impact on that party vote.

Note that these results are partially contradictory those from Gunther and Montero (2001), and may reflect some declining impact of ideology in Portuguese politics. For 1993, Gunther and Montero (2001: 133) revealed that candidate evaluations were only more important than respondent’s self position in the left-right scale in the CDS-PP. Nowadays the CDS-PP profile in 1993 is a generalised phenomena and only PCP is not yet contaminated. Still, we clearly need more elections in the same direction before we can conclude for a trend.

Another interesting feature from the party by party analysis is that social structure is now more important than in the incumbent versus opposition operational definition of the vote, and parties reveal a different profile in this respect. The two major catch-all parties, PS and PSD, but specially the former, have the weakest social anchoring of the vote. On the contrary, parties located more close to the ideological extremes show a stronger social anchoring of partisanship, specially the PCP. In substantive terms, the significant variables are church attendance (PS and CDS-PP, although in different directions), social class (PSD), and region (PCP). The effects of church attendance and social class are the traditional ones and so need no explanation. The regional effect consists in a larger support for the PCP in the areas of the southern regions where the largest urban centres are located (Lisbon and Tagus Valley), as compared to the North and Centre regions.

Many prior studies about Portugal have shown the vote for left wing parties to be overwhelmingly concentrated in the secularised urban centres, specially in the
Lisbon’s region and in the South, and in the case of PCP mainly in the rural Alentejo, where the agricultural proletariat was concentrated (see for example Freire, 2001). These data reveal that the Alentejo’s effect completely vanished, at least for the moment, and that PCP is now mainly an urban party from the southern region.

Note also that the results point to the fact that the impact of social structural factors on the vote continues to decline (see Gunther and Montero, 2001: 125 and 133).

Table 5 (around here)

As said before, we used respondent’s self placement in the left-right scale as a proxy for party identification. However, we know from prior studies both in Portugal and abroad that this indicator of left-right ideology is also a summary measure of electors’ issue positions and so its use can depress significantly the independent effects of position issues on the vote. So, to control the validity of prior analyses, in terms of the effects of position issues, in Table 5 we run all the equations using “party identification” instead of “left-right self placement”.\textsuperscript{17} From the results presented in Table 5 we can draw three major remarks. First, the effect of party identification on the vote is much higher than the effect of left-right. Second, although its effect is higher the theoretical and methodological status of the measure is indeed questionable: for example, in the case of the PSD and the PCP vote the effect of party identification is very high – be it in terms of the contribution to the Pseudo $R^2$, the Wald statistic, or the partial correlation – but due to a very large standard error its effect on the vote is not statistically significant. Third, the use of electors’ left-right self placement instead of party identification depress the independent effect of position issues on the vote in a very slight measure. In fact, this happens only in the case of the PCP and the CDS-PP

\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, in this case we introduced all the independent variables in the equations, and not only those with significant bivariate correlations with the vote, as in Table 4.
vote. Moreover, even in the latter case only in the CDS-PP the difference might be said to be more important because in the case of the PCP none of the regression coefficients associated with issue positions are significant. So, we can conclude that use of the respondent’s self placement in the left-right scale does not depress significantly the independent effects of position issues on the vote, i.e., the latter tests – Table 5 – strengthen the validity of the results presented in Table 4.

Conclusions

In spite of the fact that political commentators and journalists considered the 2002 Portuguese legislative elections one of the most polarised in the country’s democratic history, voters’ positions about major conflicts in society (position issues) had only a minor impact on the vote. This negative result might be due to several factors. First, the issue voting model in terms of controversial policy ends is clearly under specified because the questions included in the Portuguese 2002 NES questionnaire did not allow for the test of the proximity or the directional models of issue voting, and also because at least one major issue was missing in the questionnaire: the fiscal shock. Second, in spite of the high polarisation in the 2002 elections, at least in comparison to prior Portuguese national elections, the truth is that political parties were not very clear in terms of their major policy proposals. For example, PSD proposed rolling back the state, both in terms of expenditure and receipts but then the party did not inform the voters where the cuts were supposed to be made. On the other hand, the Socialist Party presented itself committed to comply with the EU public budget deficit criteria, but the party did not say where expense cuts (or tax increases) were supposed to be made in order to meet public budget criteria and simultaneously maintain public expenditure in social areas. In these conditions, it is not only hard for
researchers to find questions about truly short term policy issues but, most of all, it is hard for voters to decide their vote in terms of controversial policy ends.

Nevertheless, despite their limitations in terms of not covering some relevant policy debates, the position issues’ indicators included in the Portuguese NES 2002 questionnaire do cover some of the most important controversial issues between left and right in industrial (the role of the state, the extent of public social welfare services) and post industrial societies (abortion liberalization, environmental protection, and the immigrants access to the country). Thus, the lack of a significant impact of position issues on voting behaviour points to the fact that Portugal stands up as special case study. I.e., contrary to modernization thesis, despite the enormous growth in terms of citizens’ education and political information since the democratic revolution (1974), and despite the exceptionally low social anchors of partisanship, position issues do not stand up as major determinants of voting behaviour, quite the contrary. Moreover, the Portuguese case points to the primordial importance of political conditions vis-à-vis structural ones. I.e., the lack of clear policy proposals presented to the voters seems to be more important than the structural trends in terms of the voters’ social (higher levels of education) and psychological (higher levels of political information and cognitive mobilization) profile, and the very low levels of cleavage voting.

But if position issues had only a minor effect in the Portuguese voters’ choices in the 2002 elections, the same can not be said about performance issues. The significant effects of performance issues on the vote in Portugal, namely economics, is much in line with prior research about this matter (Veiga, 1998; Veiga and Veiga’s paper in the present book; Freire, 2001; Freire and Lobo, 2003). In this paper, both the economic and political performance evaluations were important, even if the effect of the latter on the vote were completely mediated through candidate likes and dislikes.
Between 2000 and 2001 the economic situation was indeed beginning to deteriorate, at least in terms of GDP growth and inflation, because unemployment growth was still very slow between 2000 and 2001. After candidate evaluations and the voters’ self placement in the left right scale, economics were generally the third major factor in determining the vote. These results might be due to the objective economic situation, and of voters’ perceptions about it, but we should also consider the possibility that when ideological polarisation and the social anchors of partisanship are both weak, there is plenty of room for performance evaluations to take the centre stage, but testing this possibility clearly require a comparative approach. Finally, the exact meaning of both the respondent’s self placement in the left right scale and candidate likes and dislikes still remains to be (further) explained, although there are some studies that investigate this matters (about the meaning of left and right, see Knusten, 1995 and 1997; Freire, 2003a and 2003b; about candidate evaluations, see Crewe and King, 1994; King, 2002; and also the paper by Marina Costa Lobo in this book). But this is clearly material for at least another paper.

Annex 1

Questions referring to performance and position issues (due to spatial considerations, categories for “don’t know” and “no answer” are always omitted):

P11 - What do you think about the state of the economy these days in [country]? Would you say that the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good not bad, bad or very bad?
1 – Very good
2 – Good
3 – Neither good nor bad
4 – Bad
5 – Very bad

**P12** - Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy on Portugal has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse?
1 – Gotten better
2 – Stayed the same
3 – Gotten worse

**P12a** - Would you say much better or somewhat better?
1 – Much better
2 – Somewhat better

**P60** – Would you say that you (and your family living with you) are better off, worse off financially, or just about the same than you were a year ago?
1 – Better off
2 – About the same
3 – Worse off

**P61** – Now looking ahead – do you think that a year from now you (and your family living with you) will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?
1 – Will be better off
2 – Will be about the same as now
3 – Will be worse off

**P62** – Looking ahead again, do you think the Portuguese economy next year will be better, will be worse, or will be about the same as now?
1 – Will be better
2 – Will be about the same as now
3 – Will be worse

**P24** - And thinking about that issue, how good or bad a job do you think the government has done over the past three years. Has it done a……
1 – Very good job
2 – Good job
3 – Bad Job
4 – Very Bad Job

**P25** - Now thinking about the performance of the government in general, how good or bad a job do you think it done over the past three years? Has it done a...
1 – Very good job
2 – Good job
3 – Bad Job
4 – Very Bad Job

**P58** – Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

**P58a** (scale 1 to 10)
1 The state should give more freedom to firms.
(…)
10 The state should control firms more effectively.

**P58b** (scale 1 to 10)
1 Private ownership of business and industry should be increased.
(…)
10 Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.

**P58c**
1 Each individual should be responsible for arranging his or her pension.
(…)
10 The state should be responsible for everyone’s pension.

**P58d** (scale 1 to 10)
1 The health national system should be private.
(…)
10 The health national system should be controlled by the state.

**P58e** (scale 1 to 10)
A couple/woman should never have the right to do an abortion.

A couple/woman should have the right to do an abortion if they/she didn't want to have children.

PS8f (scale 1 to 10)

1 In order to face the situation we are living in Portugal, we should stop all the immigrants from coming to live here.

10 In order to face the situation we are living in Portugal, we should allow all the immigrants to come and live here.

PS8g (scale 1 to 10)

1 The Government should reduce environmental pollution but that should not cost me any money.

10 I would give a part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution.

Bibliographic references


elections”, *West European Politics*, 25 (4), pp. 221-228.


Knutsen, O. (1995), “Value orientations. political conflicts and left-right


Figure 1: Model of Voting Choice

( inspired in Campbell et al, 1960; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Anderson, 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka, 2002)

External conditions:
Institutional setting
Social, economic and political context
Electoral campaign

Social structure:
1) Social class (Religion)
   Church attendance
   Urban/Rural Region

Party identification and long term ideological predispositions:
2) Party identification
   (Respondent’s position in left-right scale as a proxy)
3) Ideological orientations
   [≈ position issues]

Short term effects I:
3’) Positions issues
   [≈ current policy preferences]
4) Economic (and social, political) perceptions

Short term effects II:
5) Performance evaluations
   (gov./party)
6) Candidate evaluations
   (candidate likes and dislikes)

Voting Choice
Figure 2: Portuguese electors’ positions in “old” and “new” left-right issues, 2002

Figure 3: Evaluations of Economic and Political Performance, 2002
Figure 4: Voters’ Issue Positions by Party Choice
(1- extreme right, "old" and "new"; 10- extreme left, "old" and "new")

BE (Extreme Left) PCP (Communist) PS (Social Democrat) PSD (Liberal) CDS/PP (Right Wing)

State power
Welfare services
Abortion
Immigration
Environment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP growth (annual %)</th>
<th>Inflation, consumer prices (annual % growth)</th>
<th>Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>Annual variation</td>
<td>Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Independent variables for modelling voting choice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Categorization (only extreme categories shown)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1) Social structural characteristics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class (three dichotomies) (D11 and D13)</td>
<td>1 – Bourgeoisie, or Service Class, or Routine Non Manual Workers; 0 – Manual Workers (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance (d23)</td>
<td>1 – Never; 6 – Once a week or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/rural (c2)</td>
<td>1 – Until 100 inhabitants; 11 – More than 500,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (c1) (two dichotomies)</td>
<td>1 – Lisbon and Tagus Valley, or Alentejo and Algarve; 0 – North and Centre (reference group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2) Party identification (and proxy):</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four dichotomies (used in accordance with the dependent variable)</td>
<td>1 – PS; 0 – Other parties plus non-identifiers (which includes DK and NA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5a1.r1, P5a1.r2, P5a1.r3, P5a1.r4</td>
<td>1 – PSD; 0 – Idem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – PCP/CDU; 0 – Idem.</td>
<td>1 – CDS-PP; 0 – Idem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s position in left-right scale</td>
<td>0 – left; 10 - right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3) Position issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State power (index: (p58a + p58b) / 2)</td>
<td>1 – less state power; 10 – more state power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare services (index: (p58c + p58d) / 2)</td>
<td>10 – state controlled welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/couple access to abortion (p58e)</td>
<td>1 – No access; 10 – Complete access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants’ entrance in the country (p58f)</td>
<td>1 – Stop entrance; 10 – No restriction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection (p58g)</td>
<td>1 – Not with R’s money; 10 – With R’s money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(4) Perceptions of economic conditions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current state of the national economy (p11)</td>
<td>1 – Very good; 5 – Very Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy last 12 months (p12_r)</td>
<td>1 – Will be better; 3 – Will be worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy next year (p62)</td>
<td>1 – Better; 3 – Worse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial situation last 12 months (p60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial situation next year (p61)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Short term effects II:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5) Party/candidate performance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance in terms of R’s most important issue, during past three years (p24)</td>
<td>1 – Very good job; 4 – Very bad job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance in general, during past three years (p25)</td>
<td>1 – Very good job; 4 – Very bad job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6) Candidate evaluations</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate likes and dislikes (p10) (5 candidates, one for each of the 5 major parties)</td>
<td>0 – Strongly dislikes; 10 – Strongly likes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Pearson’s r correlations between the independent variables and the vote

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Government: PS (1); Opposition (0)</th>
<th>PS (1); Right Wing Parties (0)</th>
<th>PSD (1); Left Wing Parties (0)</th>
<th>PCP (1); Right Wing Parties (0)</th>
<th>CDS/PP (1); Left Wing Parties (0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>-0.084*</th>
<th>-0.090*</th>
<th>0.087*</th>
<th>Ns</th>
<th>Ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: data elaborated by the author from Portuguese NES 2002 (Freire, Lobo, Magalhães, and Santo, 2003). Note: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; Ns – not significant.
Table 4: Explaining party vote in the 2002 legislative elections (logistic regressions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government (PS (1) / Opposition (0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie &amp; PB / Manual Workers: MW</td>
<td>.4365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Class / MW</td>
<td>-.0962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Non Manual Workers / MW</td>
<td>-.0356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon &amp; Tagus Valley / North &amp; Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South / North &amp; Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Social structure: R² (%)</td>
<td>1.9 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R's position in left-right scale (proxy)</td>
<td>-2.755*** (-.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Party identification: R² (%)</td>
<td>18.9 (17.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State power index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Position issues: R² (%)</td>
<td>19.4 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current state of the national economy</td>
<td>.0225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy last 12 months</td>
<td>-.6325*** (-.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy next year</td>
<td>.2498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial sit. last 12 months</td>
<td>-.3261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial sit. next year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Economic Perceptions: R² (%)</td>
<td>28.5 (9.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance: in R's most important issue, last 3 years</td>
<td>-.2890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance: in general, last 3 years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Performance evaluations: R² (%)</td>
<td>41.5 (13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate likes and dislikes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(for each party the respective leader was considered)</td>
<td>.5940*** (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Candidate evaluations: R² (%)</td>
<td>59.2 (17.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (N = 1303)</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data elaborated by the author from Portuguese NES 2002 (Freire, Lobo, Magalhães, and Santo, 2003). Notes: 1) * p < 0.1 ; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; 2) in each cell: the regression coefficient, plus the partial correlation (in parenthesis). The latter measure presented only for independent variables with significant impact on the vote; 3) independent variables included: only those significantly related with the vote (Person's r bivariate correlation); 4) R² = Nagelkerke (in parenthesis: R² for each set of variables).
Table 5: Explaining party vote in the 2002 legislative elections (logistic regressions) – alternative tests using “party identification” instead of respondent’s position in left-right scale as proxy of the former measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Independent variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbent: PS (1) / Right wing parties (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie &amp; PB / Manual Workers: MW</td>
<td>0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Class / MW</td>
<td>-0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine Non Manual Workers / MW</td>
<td>-0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>-0.395**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitat</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon &amp; Tagus Valley / North &amp; Centre</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social structure: $R^2$</td>
<td>4.326***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) State power index</td>
<td>53.8 (51.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare index</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party identification dichotomies: $R^2$</td>
<td>55.1 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current state of the national economy</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy last 12 months</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National economy next year</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial sit. Last 12 months</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial sit. next year</td>
<td>0.709*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance: in R’s most important issue, last 3 years</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government performance: in general, last 3 years</td>
<td>-0.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic perceptions: $R^2$</td>
<td>68.6 (7.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal financial sit. next year</td>
<td>0.566***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance evaluations: $R^2$</td>
<td>75.4 (6.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (N = 1303)</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: 1) * $p < 0.1$ ; ** $p < 0.05$ ; *** $p < 0.01$ ; 2) in each cell we present the regression coefficient, plus the Pseudo $R^2$ Nagelkerke, presented in percentage terms; 3) for each block of variables we present both the total Pseudo $R^2$ and the incremental Pseudo $R^2$, the latter in parenthesis.