

# Strategies of Political Mobilization in Montenegro

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# Background

- Literature differentiates between two main strategies of voters' mobilization:
  - conversion and mobilization  
(Bergan D. E., 2005; Bergan, Gerber, Green, & Panagopoulos, 2005; Karp & Banducci, 2007; Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2008; Panagopoulos & Francia, 2009)
- We argue that in accordance with pre-dominant party systems literature and on contrary to main political mobilization literature, investing in conversion efforts is a cost-effective strategy for the incumbent parties since for them it is not only about winning but about winning with such a margin that sends a clear message to the voters that voting for opposition is futile.
- In case of Montenegro this margin not always reflects in percentage of votes but in the *image of invincibility* that puts an ordinary voter into position to choose between de facto known winner and loser.

# Research questions

- 1) which mobilization strategies employ government and opposition parties in Montenegro, and
- 2) does the profile of the voters that are dominantly targeted fits clientelistic linkage model expectations

# Hypotheses

- H1: The governmental parties are most likely to engage in *conversion strategy* during electoral campaign.
- H2: The opposition parties are most likely to engage in own mobilization strategy campaign.
- H3: Voters belonging to lower socio-economic status are more likely to be contacted during campaign than those that belong to higher ones.
- H4: Political parties predominantly contact opposition sympathizers and non-voters that show interest and initiative to be contacted.

# Data and methods

- This paper uses data collected during 2012 Parliamentary post election survey study (CSES)
- The first step was to establish voters' profiles using factor analysis according to party ratings: “governmental” and “opposition” sympathizers/voters
- The second step was to create four dummy variables:
  - 1) voted/not voted for the incumbent governmental parties,
  - 2) during campaign contacted/not contacted by the governmental parties,
  - 3) during campaign contacted/not contacted by the opposition and
  - 4) during campaign contacted or not (regardless of who made the contact).

**H1: The governmental parties are most likely to engage in *conversion strategy* during electoral campaign.**

**H2: The opposition parties are most likely to engage in own mobilization strategy campaign.**

		Governmental parties' supporters	Opposition parties' supporters
Did not vote for governmental parties	Mean	-.3479622	<b>.3171309</b>
	N	302	302
	Std. Deviation	.86012203	1.01264628
Voted for governmental parties	Mean	<b>.6074253</b>	-.5536042
	N	173	173
	Std. Deviation	.93672089	.69023683
Total	Mean	.0000000	.0000000
	N	475	475
	Std. Deviation	1.0000000	1.0000000
		0	0

		Governmental parties' supporters	Opposition parties' supporters
Did not vote for oppositional parties	Mean	<b>.1877802</b>	-.3960771
	N	315	315
	Std. Deviation	1.05088929	.83980885
Voted for oppositional parties	Mean	-.3696923	<b>.7797767</b>
	N	160	160
	Std. Deviation	.76992781	.81587192
Total	Mean	.0000000	.0000000
	N	475	475
	Std. Deviation	1.0000000	1.0000000
		0	0

		Governmental parties' supporters	Opposition parties' supporters
Not contacted	Mean	.0006723	-.0316152
	N	370	370
	Std. Deviation	1.02381747	1.01276547
Contacted	Mean	-.0023690	<b>.1114060</b>
	N	105	105
	Std. Deviation	.91574175	.94992885
Total	Mean	.0000000	.0000000
	N	475	475
	Std. Deviation	1.0000000	1.0000000

		Governmental parties' supporters	Opposition parties' supporters
Wasn't contacted by the opposition	Mean	.0029940	-.0091816
	N	451	451
	Std. Deviation	.99884910	.99849883
Contacted by the opposition	Mean	-.0562617	<b>.1725382</b>
	N	24	24
	Std. Deviation	1.0416374	1.0341464
Total	Mean	.0000000	.0000000
	N	475	475
	Std. Deviation	1.0000000	1.0000000

		Governmental parties' supporters	Opposition parties' supporters
Wasn't contacted by the governmental parties	Mean	.0035111	-.0234050
	N	428	428
	Std. Deviation	1.01203762	1.00335310
Contacted by the governmental parties	Mean	-.0319738	<b>.2131350</b>
	N	47	47
	Std. Deviation	.89205035	.95282359
Total	Mean	.0000000	.0000000
	N	475	475
	Std. Deviation	1.0000000	1.0000000

**H3: Voters belonging to lower socio-economic status are more likely to be contacted during campaign than those that belong to higher ones.**

**H4: Political parties predominantly contact opposition sympathizers and non-voters that show interest and initiative to be contacted.**

	Socioeconomic model	Political model	Combined model
Education	.157** (.069)		.139* (.072)
Urban settlement	-1.358* (.453)		-1.221** (.459)
Not owner	.656** (.254)		.600** (.262)
Self-employed	1.001** (.340)		.998*** (.353)
Voted opposition in last elections		.436 (.190)	.759*** (.245)
Did not vote the last elections		.575 (.236)	.866*** (.326)
Applied for information		1.512 (.265)	1.175*** (.325)
Constant	-2.154*** (.373)	-1.635*** (.111)	-2.491*** (.401)
Negelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.075	.064	<b>.141</b>
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodnes of fit X <sup>2</sup>	4.35 p=.629	.108 p=.947	5.41 p=.713

\*p<.01, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.001



# Conclusions

- We described mobilization tactics employed by political parties in Montenegro.
- We have shown that government parties mainly employ conversion tactic which is cost effective because they have unlimited access to resources and because for them it is not only about winning but about winning with such a margin that voting for opposition is considered futile. The opposition parties are on the other hand targeting and mobilizing own voters. This in fact means that the targeted population is the same for both camps.
- Looking closer into the targeted population in regression models we have detected specific profile of voters that can serve as predictor of party contact: people that do not own property, live in suburbs or in rural area, that are well educated, self employed, voted for opposition or did not vote and which is most important – applied for information during campaign. In other words these are disappointed people looking for a chance within the system.