

Does the Composition of Government Reflect Citizens' Party Preferences?

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Literature on Representation

- ▶ Link between public opinion and public policy (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008)
 - ▶ No difference between PR and non-PR (Kang and Powell 2010)
 - ▶ Stronger under non-PR (Wlezien and Soroka 2012)
- ▶ Ideological congruence (CSES data)
 - ▶ Greater level (Powell 2000, Powell and Vanberg 2000) and lower variance under PR (Powell 2009)
 - ▶ No difference (Blais and Bodet 2006, Golder and Stramski 2010, and Golder and Lloyd 2014)
 - ▶ Golder and Lloyd (2014): level is lower and variance greater under PR, when control for legislative congruence.
 - ▶ These are based on the left-right scale

Our Approach

- ▶ How well citizens' ratings of parties are reflected in the composition of cabinets in non-presidential systems
- ▶ Assumptions:
 - ▶ Elections are ultimately about which parties form the government.
 - ▶ Bottom line: are party preferences reflected in government?

Our main question

Does the composition of government better reflect citizens' feelings about parties in PR or non-PR systems?

Criteria of Representation

1. Is the most liked party in government?
2. Is the least liked party in government?
3. How liked are the governing parties, compared to the non-governing parties?
4. How many citizens' most liked parties are in government?
5. How many citizens' most disliked parties are in government?
6. How different is the distribution of sincere preferences among voters from the distribution of seats in government?

Independent variables

- ▶ Dummy for proportional systems
- ▶ Mean district magnitude
- ▶ Gallagher's index of disproportionality

Control variables

- ▶ GDP per capita
- ▶ Average of Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores

Data

- ▶ Elections to the lower house of a legislature in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes in modules 1, 2, and 3 of CSES
- ▶ 77 elections in 34 countries
- ▶ Like/dislike question asking respondents to rate each party from 0 to 10
- ▶ Cabinet data from various sources (CSES, EIU, EJPR)

Criterion 1: Is the most liked party in government?

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Yes (%)	100	83	86
No (%)	0	17	14
N	11	66	77

Regression Results for Criterion 1

DV: Most liked party in cabinet		
	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	-0.42 (1.67)	2.12 (1.97)
Freedom House	0.81 (1.01)	1.15 (0.91)
GDP per capita	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Log Gallagher	0.75 (0.35)*	
Log MDM		-0.69* (0.18)
<i>N</i>	77	77
<i>ePRE</i> ¹	0.048	0.141

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

¹ Expected proportional reduction in error

Criterion 2: Is the least liked party in government?

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Yes (%)	0	12	10
No (%)	100	88	90
N	11	66	77

Regression Results for Criterion 2

DV: Least liked party in cabinet		
	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	-2.79 (1.70)	-5.47* (1.70)
Freedom House	1.21 (0.78)	1.26 (0.85)
GDP per capita	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Log Gallagher	-0.61 (0.55)	
Log MDM		0.62* (0.23)
<i>N</i>	77	77
<i>ePRE</i> ¹	0.063	0.124

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

¹ Expected proportional reduction in error

Criterion 3: How liked are the governing parties, compared to the non-governing parties?

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Mean	1.00	0.92	0.93
N	11	66	77

Regression Results for Criterion 3

DV: Difference in like-dislike scores between
governing and non-governing parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.45 (0.54)	0.23 (0.46)	0.61 (0.49)
Freedom House	0.38 (0.28)	0.36 (0.28)	0.37 (0.27)
GDP per capita	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Proportional	-0.08 (0.22)		
Log Gallagher		0.09 (0.11)	
Log MDM			-0.12* (0.06)
<i>N</i>	77	77	77
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.10
adj. R^2	0.01	0.02	0.06
Resid. sd	0.71	0.71	0.69

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Criteria 4: How many citizens have their preferred party in government?

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Percent (%)	44	49	48
N	11	66	77

Regression results for criterion 4

DV: Proportion whose most liked party is in cabinet			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.35* (0.06)	0.43* (0.06)	0.38* (0.05)
Freedom House	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
GDP per capita	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Proportional	0.05 (0.03)		
Log Gallagher		-0.02 (0.02)	
Log MDM			0.01· (0.00)
<i>N</i>	77	77	77
<i>R</i> ²	0.10	0.08	0.09
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.06	0.04	0.05
Resid. sd	0.09	0.10	0.09

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

· indicates significance at $p < 0.1$

Criteria 5: How many citizens' most disliked parties are in government?

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Percent (%)	16	26	25
N	11	66	77

Regression results for criterion 5

DV: Proportion whose least liked party is in cabinet			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.12 (0.12)	0.24* (0.12)	0.15 (0.11)
Freedom House	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
GDP per capita	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Proportional	0.10 (0.05)		
Log Gallagher		-0.02 (0.03)	
Log MDM			0.03 (0.02)
<i>N</i>	77	77	77
<i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.07	0.12
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.07	0.03	0.09

Criterion 6: How different is the distribution of sincere preferences among voters from the distribution of seats in government?

Cabinet disproportionality

$$= \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^n \frac{(\%mostliked_p - \%cabinetseats_p)^2}{2}}$$

Cabinet Disproportionality Index

	Non-proportional	Proportional	Overall
Mean	0.46	0.35	0.36
N	11	66	77

Regression Results for Criterion 6

DV: Disproportionality index			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Intercept	0.56* (0.06)	0.39* (0.06)	0.52* (0.05)
Freedom House	-0.05· (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05· (0.03)
GDP per capita	-0.00· (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Proportional	-0.11* (0.03)		
Log Gallagher		0.04* (0.02)	
Log MDM			-0.03* (0.01)
<i>N</i>	77	77	77
<i>R</i> ²	0.21	0.17	0.23
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.18	0.14	0.20
Resid. sd	0.09	0.09	0.09

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

· indicates significance at $p < 0.1$

Criteria and Electoral Systems that Perform Best on Each

Criterion	PR(P)/ Non-PR(N)
1 Most liked party in cabinet	N
2 Least liked party not in cabinet	N
3 Like-dislike score of parties in cabinet compared to opposition	N
4 Proportion whose most liked party is in cabinet	P
5 Proportion whose least liked party is in cabinet	N
6 Cabinet disproportionality index	P