

Family, Religion and Electoral Participation in Canada:
an intergenerational comparative analysis

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Family and religious-based ties and networks have a profound impact on the lives of many Canadians. Most Canadians regard them as important sources of moral, social and financial support (Bibby, 2004a; 2004b; Rajulton and Ravanera, 2006), and recent immigrants rely upon them for information and assistance to meet their immediate settlement needs (Burnet, 1988; Boyd, 1989). As agents of early childhood socialization, they can play a critical role in transferring the attitudes and behaviours associated with social capital - trust in others, norms of generalized reciprocity, and participation in social networks that foster coordinated action - to younger generations (Coleman, 1990; Stolle, 2003). While their actual and potential contribution to the well-being of individuals and communities is recognized, their capacity to facilitate the political participation of Canadians is less well-understood.

The impact of family and religious life on individual involvement in public affairs is, not surprisingly, contested. In the United States and Italy, studies have shown that family and religious institutions can stimulate political and civic participation through the mechanisms of socialization, recruitment, and the transfer of communications and organizational skills (Cento Bull, 2000; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). A more pessimistic school of thought holds the view that in some settings, strong family networks have actually delayed the development of democratic practises because they encourage kin to achieve private, material interests at the expense of the broader community (Banfield, 1958; Ginsborg, 1995). Religious institutions that are structured on hierarchical relationships of obedience between clerical authorities and their congregations, or which have replaced the state as the main provider of charitable works, have also been blamed for delaying the development of dense networks of voluntary organizations in Italy (Putnam, 1993) or for discouraging voting or volunteering in Quebec (McRoberts, 1988; Gidengil, Blais, Nevitte and Nadeau, 2004).

The role these networks and ties may have in stimulating or depressing electoral participation merits

closer examination in Canada, where turnout rates in federal elections have declined from an average 75 percent in the mid-1980s (Gidengil et al., 2004) to a historic low of 58.8 percent in 2008. Between 1945 and 2001, an average 73.9 percent of registered voters cast a ballot, placing Canada 83rd out of 169 countries in terms of turnout (López Pintor, Gratschew and Sullivan, 2002). This paper will use data from the 2002 post-censal Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS) to examine whether Canadians who are more closely integrated into family and religious life are more likely to vote in federal, provincial and municipal elections than citizens who are less connected to these institutions.

Given the culturally diverse composition of the population, it will also compare the impact of family and religious ties and networks on three groups of native-born and foreign-born eligible voters: first generation citizens born outside Canada; second generation citizens who are Canadian-born and who have at least one parent who was born abroad; and third generation (or more) Canadians with both parents, and possibly grandparents, born in Canada. The study's comparative dimension will furnish new insights into the voting patterns of a significant portion of the Canadian population; according to the 2001 census, immigrants and their children comprised just under 39 per cent of the population aged 15 years and over (Mulder and Korenic, 2005: 21, 47, 53), and their numbers are continuing to grow. By comparing the impact of family and religious ties and networks on the electoral participation of first and second generation Canadians, relative to third generation Canadians, we will be able to assess the contribution of these important institutions to the future of democratic life.

Family Networks and Democratic Participation

Research conducted in Europe and North America has shown that the capacity of family networks to sustain different forms of participation in political and civic affairs is contingent on the geographic and historical context in which family relations unfold. Edward Banfield blamed “amoral familism”, which he defined as the inability of village residents to cooperate to achieve objectives that transcended the material, short-run

interests of the nuclear family, as largely responsible for the economic underdevelopment of a southern Italian village in the 1950s (1958: 9-19). Ginsborg initially concurred with this assessment, arguing that the strong Italian family unit, existing alongside the relative weakness of civil society (particularly in the South) and a profound distrust in the state, allowed a modern form of familism to persist. However, in later work, he acknowledged that the interests of the family and civil society have been congruent during specific periods of Italian history (2003: 97-98).

Critics of the “amoral familism” thesis have countered that the family culture of work, responsibilities, and obligations in southern Italy permitted the formation of mutual benefit societies that extended beyond the family (Harney, 1998: 14-15, 41). A more recent empirical study of political and civic engagement in two northern Italian towns found that although “familists” who considered family interests to be the most important life value were less likely to participate regularly in apolitical voluntary associations (i.e. sport/leisure, religious, voluntary, artistic/cultural, environmental, charity and professional) than the “solidarists” who valued universal/collectivist goals, or the “individualists” who valued personal fulfilment, the familists were more likely than the individualists to participate in political parties and trade unions (Cento Bull, 2000: 71-76, 82). Residents who enjoyed close social relations with family members and friends were also more likely to participate in voluntary associations, probably because they received information and positive feedback about the group from a relative or friend (76).

In the United States, Verba, Schlozman and Brady, have argued that the communications and organizational skills that allow citizens to use time and money effectively in political life are acquired throughout the life cycle, beginning at home (1995: 304-5). In their view, families bring individuals into politics indirectly by shaping their opportunities to acquire education, jobs and income, and directly by stimulating political interest, information and overall political activity through exposure to politics at home (422-51). Research on the influence of family attachments on the social, educational, and economic integration of second generation Americans has produced more ambivalent results. Although family

attachments were negatively associated with socioeconomic status and learning English for the children of immigrants, family cohesion (as measured by attitudes about the importance of family togetherness, perceptions of family closeness, and by the desire to spend free time with each other) was associated with psychological well-being and school engagement (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001: 201, 208-213).

A small body of Canadian research on the role of families in stimulating political and civic activity has found that while families influence their children's predispositions to volunteer, they do not appear to play a dominant role in providing political information. One survey found that just five percent of Canadians turned to family members as their main source of information about the 2000 federal election, with university graduates the least likely to depend on family or friends for information (Gidengil et al., 2004: 25-36). Related studies have examined how early childhood experiences and family structures influence civic engagement at different life stages. They have found that Canadians who in their youth had a parent who volunteered were more likely to volunteer when they reached adulthood (Hall, McKeown, and Roberts, 2001: 41). Marriage and the presence of children have also been positively linked to volunteering activities at mid-life (Ravanera and Rajulton, 2006: 270-274), while young persons living with lone parents were less likely to volunteer (273).

Religious Networks and Democratic Participation

Religious institutions can alter the character of public life by shaping perspectives on human nature, inter-denominational relations, and the priority given to political involvement (Bramadat, 2005). Optimists view religious congregations as sources of social capital for their members and communities (Smidt, 1999), and religious associations as places where people can address common concerns such as assisting needy individuals (177). A more cautious view of the role of religion in public life posits that some faith traditions are more likely than others to transfer the communication and organizational skills necessary for political and civic engagement (Smidt, 1999: 187-188; Uslaner, 2002: 246, 252), with inter-denominational differences

varying across historic and geographic settings.

In Italy, rates of newspaper readership and political discussions were lowest in the regions where Catholicism (i.e. measured by attendance at Mass, expressions of religious identity, religious marriage rates, and opposition to divorce) was relatively strong (Putnam, 1993: 107). Cento Bull has criticized Putnam for ignoring how Catholic associations and unions fostered networks of civic engagement in northern and central Italy. Her research found that devout Catholics who attended Church and believed in Catholic values could be more civic-minded than non-Catholics (2000: 71). Although lay people participated more often in trade unions or political parties (91), Catholics in the town of Erba were as or more likely to take part in apolitical voluntary associations and to read the local press than non-Catholics (70, 78, 91).

In the United States, religious beliefs and participation in religious activities exert overall salutary effects on democratic institutions and civil society. Religiosity or regular church attendance has been linked to higher rates of electoral turnout (Miller and Wattenberg, 1984; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 358; Wuthnow, 2003), political interest (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995: 434), voluntary organization memberships (Smidt, 1999: 185-87), and volunteering and philanthropy (Wuthnow, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Greeley, 2001). Church associational life has also provided Americans from across the socio-economic spectrum with social contacts and opportunities to acquire and practise the communications, mediation, and organizational skills that enhance political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995: 320-30, 378, 444; Smidt, 1999: 178). About a third of church members or regular attendees of services reported that they received requests for political activity or were exposed to political messages at church-based meetings or discussions from the pulpit (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995: 278-81). The civic benefits of religious attachments can also extend beyond the faith community. Although volunteering for religious organizations constitutes a large portion of American civic life, Uslander found that fundamentalist religious values made people more likely to take part in secular causes (2002).

In Canada, positive links have been detected between religiosity or regular attendance, and higher

rates of voluntary organization memberships, philanthropy and/or volunteering (Smidt, 1999: 185-89; Gidengil et al., 2004: 161; Bowen 2004; Ravanera and Rajulton, 2006: 277). Berger has attributed the lower levels of giving and volunteering reported by the non-religious to the absence of feelings of communal responsibility or reciprocity (2006). The connection between religious behaviour and volunteering has been attributed to the fact that individuals who attended services on a weekly basis were more likely to volunteer for religious groups and to say they gave their time in order to fulfil religious obligations (McKeown et al., 2004). The impact of religious life on electoral participation in Canada has been less consistent. In the 1997 federal election, people who described themselves as religious were more inclined to vote, most likely because those beliefs encouraged a sense of duty to vote (Nevitte et al., 2000). By 2000, religiosity was not significantly associated with turnout (Blais et al., 2002: 51). Likewise, Bowen found that religious commitments exerted no discernible impact on watching the news, voting and participating in a protest march (2004).

One branch of the literature has focussed on how the political and civic consequences of religion may vary across denominational groups. Verba, Schlozman and Brady found that Protestants in the United States were more likely than Catholics to exercise civic skills at their churches (1995: 325). Some Canadian researchers have attributed Quebec's lower rates of associational involvement, volunteering, and philanthropy to the influence of the Catholic Church (Gidengil et al., 2004: 167), which discouraged popular participation and the state provision of charitable works prior to the Quiet Revolution (McRoberts, 1988: 138, 155). Uslaner has questioned this thesis, noting that American and Québécois Catholics were as likely to volunteer for religious and secular causes as non-Catholics (2002: 246, 252).

Family, Religion, and First and Second Generation Canadians

The potential for religious and family-based ties and networks to contribute to the political integration of first generation Canadians and their offspring lies in their role as facilitators of the migration and adaptation

process, and as socializing agents that transmit norms about the meaning of migration. Prospective migrants to Canada often receive financial contributions from their relatives, and are expected to remit funds home or assist other relatives to join them (Burnet with Palmer, 1988: 83, 96). New immigrants most frequently mention a desire to improve the future for their families and to join family or close friends already living in Canada as the most important reasons for migrating to Canada. Many newcomers settle where they already have relatives or friends who can provide immediate settlement assistance and social support (Statistics Canada, 2005: 18-19, 91-95). Religious organizations have also been the focal point of community life and source of group identity for newcomers, binding together those who share beliefs and practises (Burnet with Palmer, 1988)

Despite the centrality of family and religious networks in the migration process, very few studies have examined their capacity to facilitate the long-term political integration of immigrants, let alone their offspring. A qualitative study dealing with the civic integration of Central American immigrants in Montreal found that newcomers employed strong ties (e.g. family members) to find employment or to access community organizations for material aid, practical advice, or social activities (Rose, Carrasco and Charbonneau, 1998: 14). These family networks had direct and indirect positive effects on their subsequent community involvements. The newcomers' strong ties with family members led to their involvement with church-run social activities, and the contacts they made at the community organizations in turn prompted some women to volunteer for the same or other community groups (17-19).

It is important to explore the potential for family and religious ties and networks to facilitate the political integration of first and second generation Canadians because immigrants, newcomers, and members of some visible minority communities are less likely to vote, in some instances, than more established Canadians and Canadians from European backgrounds. Although foreign-born citizens did not vote at significantly lower rates than the Canadian-born in the last federal and municipal elections held prior to the administration of the EDS, their turnout rates in provincial elections were significantly lower (Tossutti,

2005). It is also well-established that recent immigrants who are eligible to vote are less likely to cast a ballot in federal elections than the general population (Nevitte et al., 2000; Blais et al., 2002) and more established immigrants (Tossutti, 2007). Previous research has shown this voting gap only disappears after twenty years of residency in their new homeland (Statistics Canada, 2003).

There are also differences in voting rates across ethnoracial communities. Members of the Chinese, South Asian, and Black visible minority groups voted at lower rates than Canadians from European backgrounds in the last federal and subnational elections held prior to the administration of the EDS, regardless of whether they were born in Canada or abroad (Tossutti, 2005). Although these differences disappeared after the introduction of statistical controls such as the timing of arrival in Canada, age, and income, these attributes are not, in actuality, distributed evenly across the population. Certain communities are more recently-established, younger and less well-off than others. Consequently, lower turnout will be more prevalent in certain cultural communities than others, because of their distinct social profile.

When the Canadian-born group is divided into second and third generation Canadians, small, but statistically significant differences in turnout rates begin to emerge. First generation Canadians voted at rates 2-3 points lower than second and third generation Canadians in the last federal and provincial elections held previous to 2002, and second generation Canadians voted at equal or slightly higher rates than third generation Canadians in all national and subnational elections (Table 1). A study of turnout in the 2000 federal election found that with all else equal, immigrant offspring voted at the same rates as the British/northern Europeans and francophones outside Quebec (Soroka, Johnston and Banting, 2006: 23, 36). These observations follow a pattern first detected by Chui and her colleagues in the early 1990s, who found that political involvement peaked in the second generation and declined in subsequent generations (Chui, Curtis and Lambert, 1991: 375-96). However, a different study found that second generation visible minorities are experiencing difficulties integrating into social and political life. They were most likely to report discrimination and lower life satisfaction, less likely to self-identify as Canadians, and less likely to

vote in federal elections than second-generation “Whites” (Reitz and Banerjee, 2007).

TABLE 1 HERE

The previous review has demonstrated there are conflicting accounts of the impact of religious and family ties and networks on various forms of political and civic participation, likely due in part to the fact that the nature and societal roles of these institutions varies across time and space. Some studies have shown they stimulate engagement, while others have held that they discourage participation in political and civic affairs. Due to the contested nature of these relationships, this study’s first hypothesis will simply posit that religious ties will affect electoral turnout. The second hypothesis posits that family ties will affect electoral turnout.

The dearth of research on the political and civic functions of family and religious ties and networks across different generational groups complicates the task of formulating hypotheses about their potential in Canada. Furthermore, since most studies have focussed on how these institutions help first generation Canadians meet their short-term migration and adaptation needs, it is difficult to anticipate how they might influence their long-term political integration into Canadian society. Nevertheless, our third and fourth hypotheses will posit that religious and family ties, respectively, will exert a larger impact on the electoral participation of foreign-born Canadians than on second and third generation Canadians. This is because family and religious institutions often represent an immigrant’s first connections to a new country, while native-born Canadians would have access to more varied networks by virtue of their early socialization in this country.

The Ethnic Diversity Survey and Methodology

The hypotheses will be tested using statistical data from the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), a post-

censal, national survey of 41,666 citizens, landed immigrants and temporary residents. The survey used a two-phase stratified sampling design to reach persons aged 15 years and older in two main groups. One third of the sample was composed of persons reporting Canadian ethnic origin, with the remainder composed of individuals belonging to non-Canadian, non-British or non-French ethnic groups (Statistics Canada, 2002). Respondents indicating Aboriginal ancestry or identity were excluded from the analysis. Population and bootstrap weights were used for all estimates and analysis, ensuring that the EDS sample was representative of the target population. The EDS was selected because it is the only national dataset that combines sufficient sample numbers of three generational subgroups with measures of family and religious networks and ties, and participation in federal and subnational elections.

The dependent concept of electoral participation was measured with the reported turnout of citizens who were eligible to vote in the last federal, provincial, and municipal elections. It is well-known that self-reports of electoral participation tend to exceed official turnout rates due to faulty voter recall and the misreporting of socially desirable behaviour. Although misreporting is not correlated with specific traits of individuals and does not bias the results except for the intercept of the regression (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 1995: 292), vote validation studies in the United States have revealed there are racial differences in overreports of voting (Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde, 2006: 87-88). To the best of our knowledge, there is no Canadian evidence that certain subgroups are more likely to overreport voting behaviour.

Survey data are imperfect measures of complex concepts such as family and religious ties and networks, and this study does not claim to have captured their full meaning. Nevertheless, the EDS featured useful items that have been used in similar studies. Cento Bull relied on expressions of life values and frequency of contact with kin as indicators of family attachments (2000). Rajulton and Ravanera developed a three-dimensional measure of family solidarity: affinity (emotional support given and received by family members); opportunity structure (frequency of contact, residential proximity, giving and seeking advice, sharing family news, financial and housing support); and functional exchange (tangible forms of help such as

housework, transportation, shopping and personal care). We selected the only EDS items that captured the affinity and opportunity structure dimensions of family solidarity: frequency of contact with family living in Canada outside the respondent's household, and the strength of attachments to one's family. Integration into religious networks and religious attachments was measured with three commonly-used survey measures: expressions of the personal importance of religion¹; frequency of worship at regular religious activities, services or meetings with others; and frequency of worship/meditation on one's own.²

After exploring the bivariate relationships between measures of religious and family ties and networks and electoral participation for the general population, we conducted a multiple regression analysis using binary logistic regression techniques to assess whether Canadians who described themselves as more religious, who worshipped more often in communal and solitary settings, and who contacted their families more frequently, were also more likely to vote, after controlling for other predisposing factors. Multiple regression analyses were also conducted for each of the three generational groups. Three blocs of variables - socio-demographic, family/religious networks and ties³, and social trust/life experience items⁴ - were added cumulatively to these models so that the contribution of family and religious life to turnout could be assessed. The socio-demographic controls included age, gender, education, personal income, community type, marital status, the presence of children in the household, timing of arrival in Canada (for first generation respondents only), language, and the ethnic and racial origins of respondents (Black, 1982; 1991; Hall et al., 2001; Blais et al. 2002; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2003; Tossutti, 2003; 2005; Ravanera and Rajulton, 2006).

¹ Coding for "personal importance of religion" item in regressions: 1-5 scale with 1= not important at all thru to 5=very important.

² The religious denomination item was not used in this study because we are primarily concerned with testing the impact of religious networks and attachments, rather than specific religious affiliations. Furthermore, preliminary analyses showed that religiosity and religious affiliation were too highly correlated to use in the same regression model. When separate regressions using all the main independent variables of interest were run for broad denominational subgroups (i.e. Christians, non-Christians), several items had to be omitted from the models because of unstable standard errors.

³ The family attachment item was removed from the regression models because it was collinear with trust in one's family members.

⁴ Coding for interval-level trust/life experience items used in regressions: Life satisfaction: 1-5 scale with 1=not satisfied thru to 5=very satisfied; Trust in people in family, people in neighbourhood, people at school/work: 1-5 scale with 1=can't be trusted at all thru to 5=can be trusted a lot. The wording of the social trust/life experience bloc of variables is provided in the endnotes.

The third bloc of variables tapped into the respondents' life experiences and levels of social trust. They included measures of life satisfaction, generalized trust in people, trust in one's neighbours, trust in one's family members, and trust in the people at work/school. The social trust variables were included because interpersonal trust and civic engagement, which is associated with voting in Canada, share a reciprocal relationship (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Variables measuring attachments to Canada, one's province and one's town were added to the federal, provincial and municipal turnout models, respectively, since territorial affinities may pique interest in electoral processes. Since perceived discrimination influences naturalization and voting rates (Bloemraad, 2003), and visible minorities reported they were more likely to face discrimination than nonvisible Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2003), an item measuring perceived discrimination was also considered in the models.⁵ Unfortunately, other items associated with turnout such as interest, voter registration, and party contact during campaigns (Blais et al., 2002; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003) were not available in the EDS.

After analyzing the bivariate relationships between family and religious ties and electoral participation for each generational group, we controlled for the same predisposing effects in binary logistic regression models. The models for the first generation Canadians were modified slightly by replacing the immigrant status control with an item measuring the timing of arrival in Canada. That item distinguished between immigrants who had arrived before and after 1991. The regression analysis permitted an assessment of whether and how the integrative functions of family and religious ties and networks differed across generational groups, with all else equal.

Family, Religion and Turnout: the Canadian population

An analysis of the bivariate relationship between different measures of family ties and turnout initially revealed that Canadians who reported strong attachments to family members and weekly/monthly contact

⁵ Respondents were asked if they had experienced discrimination or had been treated unfairly because of their ethnicity, religion, skin colour, culture, race, language, accent or religion in the last five years in Canada (or less if they were recent immigrants).

with them were significantly more likely to have voted in federal, provincial and municipal elections, than those with weak attachments and who did not see their families at all. Canadians who reported that religion was very important to them and who worshipped at regular services or on their own at least once a week/month were also more likely to have voted in the previous year than those who worshipped less frequently or not at all (data not shown). These relationships were controlled for in binary logistic regression analyses for the general population and for each of the generational groups. The results are expressed as odds ratios in Tables 2 thru 8. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate the effect of the variable is positive, while odds ratios less than one indicate the effect is negative.

Religious behaviour remained a significant determinant of turnout, with all else equal for the general population (Table 2). The odds of voting in all types of elections were higher for Canadians who attended communal religious services on a more frequent basis, than for people who never attended religious services. These findings are congruent with similar research in the United States. However, unlike patterns in the United States, self-described religiosity was unrelated to turnout in federal and subnational elections. This suggests that religious behaviour, rather than attitudes, is a stronger facilitator of electoral participation in Canada. Interestingly, solitary worship did not affect turnout when other factors were held constant, meaning that the experience of worshipping with others has unique consequences for involvement in public affairs.

In contrast to the positive impact of frequent communal worship, frequent family contact did not stimulate turnout, and higher levels of family trust actually *reduced* the odds of voting in subnational elections. Canadians who were in frequent contact with family members were no more likely to have voted in any type of election than individuals who did not communicate with them at all (Table 2). This may reflect the possibility that communications between family members were dominated by subjects unrelated to politics and elections, although further qualitative research would be required to probe these results. Intriguingly, higher levels of family trust were associated with lower odds of turnout in provincial and municipal elections (Table 2). Two tentative explanations are proposed for the negative relationship between

family trust and turnout in subnational elections: Canadians who become disillusioned with electoral politics may turn inwards to their family members, or Canadians who trust their family members the most are uninspired by elections. The first explanation was originally proposed to account for the delayed development of democracy in southern Italy in the mid-twentieth century, at a time when family ties were strong and trust in the state low. Unfortunately, the content of the EDS questionnaire does not permit further testing of these explanations, but qualitative research could root out the underlying reasons for the negative relationship between family trust and turnout in some elections in contemporary Canada.

TABLE 2 HERE

Family, Religion and Three Generations of Canadians

When the same bivariate relationships were analyzed for each of the three generational groups, it was found that respondents who expressed strong attachments to their families, who were in weekly or monthly contact with them, and who attended regular religious services on a weekly or monthly basis, also voted at higher rates than those who were not as close to their families, were in less frequent contact with family members, and who attended communal services less frequently. This was true for all generational groups and across all types of elections (data not shown). The impact of religiosity on electoral participation was not felt in the same way across all groups. Second and third generation Canadians who described religion as very important to them were significantly more likely than their less religious generational cohorts to vote in all three types of elections. Meanwhile, higher levels of religiosity were only associated with higher local turnout for first generation Canadians (data not shown).

In the bivariate analysis, frequent communal worship was positively associated with first generation turnout in all forms of elections. However, this same item became insignificant when factors such as the timing of an immigrant's arrival in Canada, age, marital status, income and/or education were controlled for

in the regression analyses of turnout in federal and provincial elections (Table 3). In the case of local turnout, the effects of weekly/monthly communal worship became insignificant after the addition of the third bloc of variables. The odds of foreign-born citizens voting in a local election were higher for those who expressed more life satisfaction, *less* trust in their family members, and closer attachments to their towns, regardless of their worship practises (Table 4). Furthermore, religiosity was no longer positively associated with higher local turnout after demographic factors were controlled, and frequent solitary worship was unrelated to any form of turnout (Table 3-4). Taken together, these findings show that religious ties, as measured in this paper, do not play an important role in stimulating the electoral participation of members of immigrant communities.

TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE

Turning to the question of family ties and their influence on the political integration of first generation Canadians, we found that frequent contact with family members exerted no impact on their participation in any type of election. Intriguingly, higher levels of family trust were consistently and *negatively* associated with all forms of electoral participation; the odds of voting in federal, provincial and municipal elections declined for immigrants who expressed the most trust in family members (Table 3-4). When similar results were observed for the general population (Table 2), it was proposed that individuals who were disillusioned with electoral politics may be turning inwards to people whom they know, or conversely, that people who trust their families are less interested in electoral politics. This explanation appears to extend to the immigrant population.

Regardless of the extent to which an immigrant was integrated into family and religious life, eligible voters who arrived in Canada from 1991 onwards were significantly less likely to vote in all forms of elections (Tables 3-4). This analysis suggests that the role of family and religious-based networks is likely

centred on meeting the short-term adaptation and spiritual and social needs of foreign-born citizens, rather than facilitating their long-term political integration. The fact that the bloc of religious and family network items did not substantially alter the fit of the models underscores this observation (Tables 3-4).

When the bivariate relationships between religious ties and electoral participation were examined for second generation Canadians, it was found that people who worshipped on a weekly/monthly basis at regular services voted at higher rates than the less observant in all types of elections (data not shown). However, communal religious behaviour had no impact on the odds of voting in federal and provincial elections after controlling for territorial attachments. Regardless of their worship practises, the odds of voting in the federal election increased for second generation respondents who expressed a strong attachment to Canada, and in the provincial election for those who expressed a strong attachment to their province, compared to their cohorts with weak territorial attachments (Table 5). Communal religious behaviour continued to be associated with a higher probability of local turnout amongst second generation respondents, which was not the case for first generation respondents. With all else equal, the odds of frequent worshippers voting in the previous municipal election increased by 42 percent compared to the reference group of non-worshippers (Table 6). The different impact that communal worship had on second generation participation in local and “higher order” elections might be explained by the fact that religious institutions raise the congregation’s awareness of local issues by virtue of their sponsorship of religious-based community groups and their position as a focal point of community life. These venues bring people from the same neighbourhood together, where they can discuss local public affairs, among other matters. These locally-based activities may serve to strengthen citizen connections to the municipality. Of course, without additional insight into the specific local initiatives that religious institutions undertake, this explanation remains tentative.

Whereas religious beliefs had no impact on first generation involvement in elections, they did hold up as a significant factor influencing second generation turnout in the previous federal election; respondents who described themselves as more religious were more likely to have voted in 2000 than those who were not

(Table 5). As with first generation Canadians, variations in the frequency of solitary worship had no impact on electoral participation (Tables 5-6). It is difficult to explain why religiosity should have mattered for federal elections, but not for subnational elections. One possibility is that religious themes did emerge as an issue during the 2000 federal election campaign, during which former Canadian Alliance leader Stockwell Day reiterated his belief in creationism. However, there is no reason why these statements would have special significance for second generation Canadians. It is more plausible that second generation Canadians who consider themselves to be more religious are more likely to view federal elections as important.

The impact of family ties and networks on second generation electoral participation recalled one pattern observed for first generation Canadians; frequent contact with family members did not influence the odds of casting a vote in any form of election (Tables 5-6). Meanwhile, higher levels of family trust exerted a comparatively more benign affect on second generation Canadians, than on citizens born abroad. With all else equal, family trust did not affect the odds of immigrant offspring casting a vote in federal and provincial elections (Table 5), although it did reduce them for local elections (Table 6). In general, family ties and networks, as they are measured in this paper, are not channels through which second generation Canadians are encouraged to participate in politics.

Although the overall contribution of items measuring family and religious ties and networks to the fit of the electoral participation models was small (Table 5-6), these measures were relatively more conducive to second generation than first generation turnout (Tables 3-6). One possible reason for this difference is that the religious congregations and associations situated in immigrant communities were less likely to link spiritual themes with secular political issues, and that communications between immigrants and their family members living outside the household were less concerned with public affairs than family contacts between second generation Canadians and their relatives.

Contrary to the expectations of the third hypothesis stated earlier in this paper, religious ties exerted a stronger influence on the electoral participation of native-born third generation Canadians than foreign-born

first generation Canadians. Frequent religious worship at regular services increased the probability of voting in federal, provincial, and municipal elections, with all else equal. The odds of voting in previous federal and subnational elections were between 67 and 97 percent higher for third generation Canadians who worshipped on a weekly/monthly basis, compared to those who did not worship at all (Tables 7-8). Third generation Canadians who worshipped 1-3 times per year were also more likely to vote in federal and provincial elections than non-worshippers (Table 7). These results contrast sharply with those reported for first and second generation Canadians. Amongst foreign-born citizens, frequent communal worship was not related to any form of electoral participation, while local turnout was the only voting measure that was positively associated with frequent communal worship for the offspring of immigrants (Table 6). There were, however, intergenerational similarities in the observed impact of religiosity and solitary worship. As with first generation Canadians, expressions of religiosity and frequent solitary worship neither improved nor reduced the odds of voting in any type of election (Tables 7-8).

Support was found for the fourth hypothesis that family ties and networks would exert a stronger impact on the participation of first generation Canadians than native-born Canadians. As with immigrant and second-generation citizens, the odds of third generation Canadians voting were unaffected by variations in the frequency of contact with one's family members. This finding underscores the relative weakness of family networks as facilitators of electoral participation across all generational groups. However, variations in family trust did not influence the turnout of third generation Canadians, whereas they did influence the behaviour of members of other generational groups, particularly foreign-born citizens. While higher levels of family trust reduced the odds of first generation Canadians casting a vote in national and subnational elections, as well as the odds of second generation turnout in municipal elections (Tables 3-6), they did not adversely affect the odds of third generation Canadians participating in any type of election, with all else equal (Tables 7-8). Canadians with deeper ancestral roots in the country did not withdraw from public affairs as they expressed more trust in their family members; trusting one's family simply had no impact on

their turnout.

The unrealized potential of religious and family institutions

This article examined the impact of religious and family networks and attachments on electoral participation in Canada, and the integrative function of these ties for three generational groups. When the general population was examined, we found support for the first two research hypotheses: religious and family ties and networks affect electoral participation. More specifically, frequent religious worship at regular services improved the odds of turnout in federal and subnational elections, while higher levels of family trust were associated with lower turnout in provincial and municipal elections. We also found that religious-based ties were more effective stimulants of turnout than family ties, possibly because they influenced perspectives on the priority assigned to political involvement or communal responsibilities. As others have argued, congregants may have been exposed to political messages or requests for political participation at services or meetings.

We found no support for the third hypothesis that religious ties would exert a stronger influence on the electoral participation of first generation Canadians. In fact, religious ties were more important channels of political participation for third generation Canadians than for other generational groups; third generation Canadians who worshipped frequently with others were more likely to have cast a ballot in all types of elections. Meanwhile, neither religiosity nor any form of religious worship (communal or solitary) were associated with the turnout of first generation Canadians, with all else equal. Amongst second generation Canadians, only religiosity was positively linked to federal turnout, and frequent communal worship with casting a municipal ballot. The findings suggest that the religious institutions, associations and traditions embedded in immigrant communities were less likely to be arenas where elections were discussed, and connections drawn between spiritual themes and secular issues. Another possible explanation is that religious institutions situated in immigrant communities primarily serve as facilitators of the immediate

settlement, social and spiritual needs of their congregants. Follow-up research could reveal the underlying reasons for intergenerational differences in the function of religious networks.

While religious ties were relatively more important predictors of voting amongst Canadian-born respondents, family ties were more critical predictors of immigrant participation, providing support for the fourth hypothesis. Immigrants who expressed the most trust in their families were less likely to vote in all types of elections. In contrast, with one exception, family trust had no impact on the electoral participation of second and third generation respondents. In general, families played a largely neutral role in facilitating the turnout of the Canadian-born, and a primarily negative one for first generation Canadians.

Contrary to pessimistic accounts about the impact of family and religious-based networks on democracy and community life in some countries and historical periods, closer integration into family and religious networks was not usually associated with a withdrawal from electoral processes. This may indicate that these institutions have evolved into less hierarchical forms of human association. Nevertheless, these institutions, and family ties in particular, hardly reached their potential to facilitate political integration, as shown by most of the regressions. The intergenerational comparative analysis revealed that the meaning and political consequences of these institutions vary across immigrant and native-born populations. In-depth explanations of why these differences exist must await the development of survey samples and questionnaires that are specifically designed to address these complex questions, as well as the use of mixed methods research strategies.

Table 1: Turnout by Generational Status (column %)

	First Generation	Second Generation	Third Generation	Pearson Chi-Square
Federal Election	78.6	80.8	79.4	10.16 ^b
Provincial Election	75.5	78.7	78.7	31.38 ^a
Municipal Election	63.5	64.4	64.3	1.52 n.s.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: $p < .001$; b: $p < .01$; n.s. nonsignificant

Table 2: Odds or exp(β) of turnout in federal and subnational elections for the general population*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference groups)</i>	Federal	Province	Municipal
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.35 ^a	.34 ^a	.41 ^a
Male (female)	1.1	1.13	.95
Education (less than high school):			
University/College	1.94 ^a	1.77 ^a	1.32 ^b
Some college/university	1.49 ^b	1.53 ^a	1.27 ^c
High school	1.31 ^c	1.26 ^{ac}	1.25 ^c
Personal Income (more than \$50,000):			
Less than \$20,000	.72 ^b	.73 ^b	.91
\$20,000-\$50,000	.77 ^b	.89	.95
Language (other):			
English	.41	.57	.5
French	.96	1.27	.68
Married/common-law (single, divorced, widowed)	1.48 ^a	1.56 ^a	1.46 ^a
Number of children in household	.94	.97	1.00
Rural residency (urban)	.91	.87	.86
Canadian-born (foreign-born)	1.07	1.2	1.06
Racial origins (other):			
Not a visible minority	1.16	1.42	1.38
Chinese	1.11	.91	.84
South Asian	1.45 ^c	1.17	1.17
Black	.88	.65 ^c	1.01
Ethnicity (other):			
British, French and/or Canadian	.72	.78	.94
European & European-Mixed	.75	.81	.87
Non-European & Non-European Mixed	.54 ^b	.71	.78
<i>Religion and Family:</i>			
Personal importance of religion	1.02	.95	1.02
Worship at regular services (not at all):			
Once week/month	1.63 ^a	1.79 ^a	1.57 ^a
1 to 3 times per year	1.26 ^c	1.43 ^a	1.15
Worship on own (not at all):			
Once week/month	1.02	1.18	.98
1 to 3 times per year	1.02	1.05	.99
Family contact (not at all):			
Once week/month	.99	1.11	.93
1 to 3 times per year	.97	1.02	.84
<i>Social trust/life experiences:</i>			
Life satisfaction	1.4 ^a	1.18 ^c	1.02
People in general can be trusted (cannot be trusted)	1	1.05	1.10 ^b
Trust in people in family	.90	.85 ^b	.86 ^b
Trust in people in neighbourhood	1.12 ^c	1.14 ^b	1.16 ^a
Trust in people at work/school	1.02	1.1 ^c	1.03
No discrimination in last 5 years (yes)	.82 ^c	.82 ^c	.95
Attachments to country/province/town (weak)			
Strong	2.16 ^a	1.62 ^a	2.27 ^a

Medium	1.42 ^c	1.18	1.61 ^a
N (weighted)	8,963,460	8,942,870	8,920,210
-2 Log Likelihood	7632155	7790522	10518233
Likelihood ratio (Estrella)	.09	.10	.10
<u>Model significance</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>	<u>.00</u>

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: p < .001; b: p < .01; c: p < .05

Table 3: Odds or exp(β) of Federal and Provincial Turnout, First Generation*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Fed. 1	Fed. 2	Fed. 3	Prov. 1	Prov. 2	Prov.3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.41 ^a	.39 ^a	.40 ^a	.41 ^a	.42 ^a	.47 ^a
Male (female)	.96	1.09	.96	.97	1.03	.95
Education (less than high school):						
College/university	1.13	1.31	1.12	1.02	1.08	.95
Some college/university	1.05	1.42	1.04	1.07	1.25	1.04
High school	.75 ^c	.79	.64 ^c	.85	.94	.76
Income (more than \$50,000):						
Less than \$20,000	.66 ^b	.51 ^a	.57 ^b	.79	.69	.67 ^b
\$20,000-\$50,000	.80	.67 ^c	.62 ^b	.96	.88	.83
Language (other):						
English	1.20	.93	.36	1.27	.97	.56
French	1.68 ^c	1.68	.68	1.70 ^c	1.67	1.21
Married/common-law	1.91 ^a	1.89 ^a	1.72 ^b	1.85 ^a	1.99 ^a	1.86 ^a
Number of children in household	.93	.85 ^b	.92	.97	.91	.99
Rural residency (urban)	1.11	1.07	1.32	.90	.83	.99
Arrived before 1991 (arrived since 1991)	3.26 ^a	3.02 ^a	2.98 ^a	2.89 ^a	2.70 ^a	2.60 ^a
Racial origins (other visible minorities):						
Not a visible minority	1.02	.81	.70	1.27	1.42	1.30
Chinese	1.03	1.18	1.13	1.13	1.08	.98
South Asian	1.35	1.34	1.55	1.42 ^c	1.32	1.26
Black	1.38	1.38	1.19	1.10	.94	.75
Ethnicity (other):						
British, French and/or Canadian	.82	1.44	1.29	.82	1.01	1.07
European & Euro-Mixed	.74	1.18	.91	.70	.83	.73
Non-European & Non-Euro- Mixed	.47 ^c	.58	.57	.49 ^c	.66	.77
<i>Religion and Family:</i>						
Personal importance of religion		1.01	1.02		.98	.95
Worship at regular services (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.18	.95		1.30	1.24
1 to 3 times per year		1.02	.93		.95	.94
Worship on own (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.37	1.34		1.30	1.31
1 to 3 times per year		1.16	1.00		1.04	.96
Family contact (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.26	1.26		1.00	1.02
1 to 3 times per year		1.33	1.41		1.10	1.10
<i>Social trust/life experiences:</i>						
Life satisfaction			1.06			1.11
People in general can be trusted (cannot)			1.32			1.19
Trust in people in family			.68 ^b			.67 ^b
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.03			1.01
Trust in people at work/school			1.10			1.19 ^c
No discrimination in past 5 years (yes)			.85			.88
Attachments to country/province (weak):						
Strong			2.64 ^c			1.49
Medium			1.88			1.10

N (weighted)	2634600	1723600	1229610	2614580	1709100	1219540
-2 Log Likelihood	2396778	1468161	1051340	2600671	1626882	1169197
Model p value	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
Likelihood Ratio (Estrella)	.119	.108	.122	.115	.105	.124

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: p < .001; b: p < .01; c: p < .05

Table 4: Odds or exp(β) of Local Turnout, First Generation*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Municipal 1	Municipal 2	Municipal 3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.41 ^a	.43 ^a	.47 ^a
Male (female)	.90	.90	.92
Education (less than high school):			
College/university	.80	.77	.68 ^b
Some college/university	.81	.82	.69
High school	.86	.89	.72
Income (more than \$50,000):			
Less than \$20,000	.96	.93	.96
\$20,000-\$50,000	1.07	1.04	.91
Language (other):			
English	.81	.79	.51
French	1.08	1.21	.92
Married/common-law (single/divorced/widowed)	1.78 ^a	1.82 ^a	1.75 ^a
Number of children in household	.99	.94	.99
Rural residency (urban)	.89	.92	.92
Arrived before 1991 (arrived since 1991)	2.36 ^a	2.09 ^a	1.94 ^a
Racial origins (other visible minorities):			
Not a visible minority	1.34	1.05	.90
Chinese	.88	.85	.84
South Asian	1.20	1.09	1.18
Black	1.25	1.12	1.08
Ethnicity (other):			
British, French and/or Canadian	.98	1.64	2.05 ^c
European & Euro-Mixed	.94	1.45	1.48
Non-European & Non-Euro-Mixed	.75	.86	.93
Religion and Family:			
Personal importance of religion		1.00	.98
Worship at regular services (not at all):			
Once week/month		1.45 ^c	1.09
1 to 3 times per year		.98	.86
Worship on own (not at all):			
Once week/month		1.25	1.34
1 to 3 times per year		1.05	.89
Family contact (not at all):			
Once week/month		.89	.98
1 to 3 times per year		.93	1.13
Social trust/Life experiences:			
Life satisfaction			1.23 ^b
People in general can be trusted (cannot)			.96
Trust in people in family			.69 ^b
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.11
Trust in people at work/school			1.04
No discrimination past 5 years (yes) experiencediscrimi			.81
Attachments to town (weak): country/province/town			
Strong			2.15 ^a
Medium			1.52 ^b
N(weighted)	2593490	1694770	1212990

-2 Log likelihood	3130693	1985085	1424190
Model n value	.001	.001	.001
Likelihood ratio (estrella)	.102	.102	.13

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: $p < .001$; b: $p < .01$; c: $p < .05$

Table 5: Odds or exp(β) of Federal and Provincial Turnout, Second Generation*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Fed.1	Fed.2	Fed.3	Prov.1	Prov.2	Prov.3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.29 ^a	.25 ^a	.32 ^a	.29 ^a	.26 ^a	.35 ^a
Male (female)	.98	1.09	1.11	1.00	1.11	1.20
Education (less than high school):						
College/university	1.76 ^a	1.62 ^a	1.52 ^c	1.67 ^a	1.46 ^b	1.48 ^c
Some college/university	1.26	1.23	1.24	1.20	1.08	1.14
High school	.93	.86	.80	.97	.87	.82
Income (more than \$50,000):						
Less than \$20,000	.95	.97	1.07	.98	.96	.97
\$20,000-\$50,000	.93	.88	.85	1.05	.96	.89
Language (other):						
English						
French						
Married/common-law (single/divorced/widowed)	1.71 ^a	1.69 ^a	1.57 ^a	1.56 ^a	1.57 ^a	1.42 ^b
Number of children in household	.87 ^a	.85 ^b	.96	.89 ^a	.88 ^c	1.02
Rural residency (urban)	.86	.85	.74	1.01	.95	.80
Racial origins (other visible minorities):						
Not a visible minority	1.53 ^c	1.49	1.35	1.28	1.49	1.52
Chinese	.97	1.24	1.22	.79	.93	.85
South Asian	1.34	1.28	1.24	1.17	1.23	1.11
Black	.63	.78	.85	.63 ^c	.79	.82
Ethnicity (other):						
British, French and/or Canadian	.60 ^c	.70	.73	.85	.90	.86
European & Euro-Mixed	.49 ^a	.54 ^c	.61	.70	.69	.73
Non-European & Non-Euro-Mixed	.52 ^b	.53 ^c	.56	.65	.67	.74
Religion and Family:						
Personal importance of religion		1.06	1.12 ^c		1.00	1.00
Worship at regular services (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.66 ^b	1.31		1.66 ^a	1.34
1 to 3 times per year		1.47 ^b	1.32		1.43 ^b	1.29
Worship on own (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.04	1.05		1.13	1.20
1 to 3 times per year		1.20	1.18		1.20	1.21
Family contact (not at all):						
Once week/month		1.16	1.26		1.01	.95
1 to 3 times per year		.97	.99		.95	.88
Social trust/Life experiences:						
Life satisfaction			1.05			1.06
People in general can be trusted (cannot):			1.22			1.03
Trust in people in family			.95			.89
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.12			1.15 ^c
Trust in people at work/school			1.04			1.06
No discrimination past 5 years (yes):			1.13			.94
Attachments to country/province (weak):						
Strong			2.16 ^a			2.31 ^a
Medium			1.31			1.68 ^a
N(weighted)	2697460	2052780	1553720	2688280	2046120	1547790
-2 Log likelihood	2314467	1642242	1293682	2459687	1733186	1377974

Model n value	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
Likelihood ratio (estrella)	.081	.088	.108	.084	.087	.11

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates.

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: $p < .001$; b: $p < .01$; c: $p < .05$

Table 6: Odds or exp(β) of Local Turnout, Second Generation*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Municipal 1	Municipal 2	Municipal 3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.32 ^a	.31 ^a	.39 ^a
Male (female)	.96	1.06	1.11
Education (less than high school):			
College/university	1.19	1.18	1.27
Some college/university	1.07	1.03	1.07
High school	.98	.96	.89
Income (more than \$50,000):			
Less than \$20,000	1.09	1.12	1.09
\$20,000-\$50,000	1.21 ^c	1.22 ^c	1.14
Married/common-law (single/divorce/widow)	1.58 ^a	1.53 ^a	1.46 ^a
Number of children in household	.93 ^c	.91 ^c	.97
Rural residency (urban)	.83 ^c	.74 ^b	.67 ^b
Racial origins (other visible minorities):			
Not a visible minority	.85	1.07	1.07
Chinese	.58 ^b	.75	.71
South Asian	1.03	1.04	1.03
Black	.60 ^c	.70	.87
Ethnicity (other):			
British, French and/or Canadian	1.02	1.08	1.00
European & Euro-Mixed	.89	.84	.85
Non-European & Non-Euro-Mixed	.71	.77	.75
Religion and Family:			
Personal importance of religion		1.07	1.07
Worship at regular services (not at all):			
Once week/month		1.69 ^a	1.42 ^c
1 to 3 times per year		1.26 ^c	1.11
Worship on own (not at all):			
Once week/month		.85	.89
1 to 3 times per year		.97	.98
Family contact (not at all):			
Once week/month		1.02	1.02
1 to 3 times per year		.89	.83
Social trust/Life experiences:			
Life satisfaction			1.04
People in general can be trusted (cannot):			.96
Trust in people in family			.83 ^c
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.22 ^a
Trust in people at work/school			1.04
No discrimination past 5 years (yes)			1.12
Attachments to town (weak):			
Strong			2.46 ^a
Medium			2.21 ^a
N(weighted)	2679490	2036350	1542630
-2 Log likelihood	3239231	2360509	1788430
Model n value	.001	.001	.001
Likelihood ratio (estrella)	.084	.088	.128

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: p < .001; b: p < .01; c: < .05

Table 7: Odds or exp(β) of Federal and Provincial Turnout, Third Generation*

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Fed. 1	Fed. 2	Fed.3	Prov.1	Prov.2	Prov.3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.34 ^a	.30 ^a	.34 ^a	.31 ^a	.28 ^a	.31 ^a
Male (female)	1.01	1.20	1.13	.97	1.17	1.18
Education (less than high school):						
College/university	2.38 ^a	2.22 ^a	2.26 ^a	2.31 ^a	2.10 ^a	2.18 ^a
Some college/university	1.80 ^a	1.68 ^a	1.60 ^b	1.93 ^a	1.74 ^a	1.77 ^b
High school	1.55 ^a	1.49 ^b	1.65 ^a	1.54 ^a	1.42 ^b	1.54 ^b
Income (more than \$50,000):						
Less than \$20,000	.79 ^c	.78	.74	.84	.82	.76
\$20,000-\$50,000	.81 ^c	.84	.82	.96	.98	.95
English language (French):	.59 ^a	.60 ^a	.37 ^a	.44 ^a	.44 ^a	.39 ^a
Married/common-law	1.84 ^a	1.67 ^a	1.47 ^a	1.85 ^a	1.77 ^a	1.57 ^a
Number of children in household	.92 ^b	.90 ^c	.95	.96	.92	.97
Rural residency (urban)	1.00	.91	.94	1.01	.89	.89
Visible minority (not a visible minority):	.46	.31	.39	.32 ^b	.24 ^b	.32 ^c
Ethnicity (other):						
British, French and/or Canadian	1.10	1.20	.88	1.21	1.29	1.07
European & Euro-Mixed	1.08	1.14	.97	1.14	1.22	1.18
Non-European & Non-Euro-Mixed	1.00	1.13	.80	1.09	1.37	.98
Religion and Family:						
Personal importance of religion		1.01	1.00		.99	.95
Worship at regular services (not at all):						
Once week/month		2.11 ^a	1.83 ^a		2.22 ^a	1.97 ^a
1 to 3 times per year		1.31 ^c	1.28 ^c		1.51 ^a	1.52 ^a
Worship on own (not at all):						
Once week/month		.96	.98		1.13	1.17
1 to 3 times per year		1.10	1.07		1.05	1.11
Family contact (not at all):						
Once week/month		.89	.75		1.12	1.12
1 to 3 times per year		.92	.77		.99	1.00
Social trust/ Life experiences:						
Life satisfaction			.97			1.03
People in general can be trusted (cannot):			1.47 ^a			1.21
Trust in people in family			.93			.88
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.14 ^c			1.17 ^b
Trust in people at work/school			1.02			1.11
No discrimination past 5 years (yes)			.72 ^c			.74
Attachments to country/province (weak):						
Strong			2.25 ^a			1.46 ^b
Medium			1.41			1.03
N(weighted)	8881840	7467170	6060800	8866690	7455800	6054690
-2 Log likelihood	7854024	6124310	5051685	7817285	6046816	5016047
Model n value	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001	.001
-2 Log likelihood ratio (estrella)	.073	.081	.101	.091	.101	.116

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: p < .001; b: p < .01; c: p < .05

Table 8: Odds or exp(β) of Local Turnout, Third Generation

<i>Sociodemographic (reference group)</i>	Municipal 1	Municipal 2	Municipal 3
20 to 29-years (30 years and over)	.35 ^a	.36 ^a	.40 ^a
Male (female)	.88 ^c	.95	.94
Education (less than high school):			
College/university	1.32 ^b	1.26 ^c	1.46 ^b
Some college/university	1.29 ^c	1.25	1.42 ^c
High school	1.25 ^b	1.28 ^c	1.48 ^b
Income (more than \$50,000):			
Less than \$20,000	.99	.93	.90
\$20,000-\$50,000	1.04	1.01	.93
English language (French):	.78 ^a	.77 ^a	.70 ^a
Married/common-law (single/divorce/widow)	1.60 ^a	1.53 ^a	1.42 ^a
Number of children in household	.99	.97	1.02
Rural residency (urban)	1.02	.97	.91
Visible minority (not a visible minority):	.45 ^c	.34 ^c	.31 ^b
Ethnicity (other):			
British, French and/or Canadian	.99	1.04	.80
European & Euro-Mixed	.80	.81	.71
Non-European & Non-Euro-Mixed	.74	.81	.90
Religion and Family:			
Personal importance of religion		1.07	1.02
Worship at regular services (not at all):			
Once week/month		1.97 ^a	1.67 ^a
1 to 3 times per year		1.25 ^c	1.18
Worship on own (not at all):			
Once week/month		.93	.96
1 to 3 times per year		1.07	1.06
Family contact (not at all):			
Once week/month		.98	.88
1 to 3 times per year		.89	.76
Trust and Life Experiences:			
Life satisfaction			1.09
People in general can be trusted (cannot):			1.04
Trust in people in family			.89
Trust in people in neighbourhood			1.15 ^b
Trust in people at work/school			1.03
No discrimination past 5 years (yes)			.93
Attachments to town (weak):			
Strong			2.23 ^a
Medium			1.46 ^a
N (weighted)	3862770	7447500	6045080
-2 Log likelihood	10787323	8713321	7069763
Model n value	.001	.001	.001
Likelihood ratio (estrella)	.07	.085	.113

*Odds ratios based on binary logistic regression estimates

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; a: $p < .001$; b: $p < .01$; c: $p < .05$

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