CSES Bibliography - CSES Conference Presentations ( listings)
The listings are arranged in alphabetical order by the author's last name.
Aarts, K. (2006). Determining the Pattern of Party Evaluations: Proximity and Directional Models of Ideology. CSES Conference and Planning Committee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Aldrich, J. and S. Popa (2008). Clarity of Party Positions on Ideology: A Cross-National Analysis. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw, Poland.
Bădescu, G. and P. Sum (2005). Mapping Political Preferences: The Emergence of Citizen Left-Right Orientations in New Democracies. CSES Plenary Session, Washington D.C.
Beltrán, U. (2008). Contextual Effects on the Individual Rationality: Economic Conditions, Institutional Arrangements and Retrospective Vote. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw Poland.
Borg, S. and H. Paloheimo (2003). Research and Data on Finnish Elections: An Overview. CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden.
Castillo, A. M. J. (2006). Institutional Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy. A Comparative Analysis. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Clarke, H., D. Sanders, et al. (2005). Political Choice in Britain: The 2005 BES. CSES Plenary Session, Washington, DC.
Czesnik, M. (2008). Polish 'Exceptionalism': Voter Turnout in Poland in the light of CSES data. CSES Conference and Planning Comittee Meeting, Warsaw, Poland.
Freire, A. (2003). Issue Voting in Portugal: The 2002 legislative elections. CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden. The major objectives of this article are: first, to analyse the relative impact of different types of issues (position versus performance issues) in Portuguese voting behaviour in the 2002 legislative elections; second, to analyse the relative importance of issues compared to other determinants of voting behaviour in the above mentioned elections. Issues are defined in a broad manner to include both voters’ positions about major ideological conflicts in society (position issues) and voters’ evaluations of current economic conditions and government performance (the so-called consensual and/or performance issues). In the first section of the paper, after giving contextual information about the 2002 elections, we define issues and present the model of voting choice that will be used. In the second section, salience and polarization of the different issues among the mass public are analysed. In the third and fourth sections, the impact of issues, against other major voting determinants (social structure, party identification/ideological self-placement, and candidate likes and dislikes), is evaluated as vote predicting factors in terms of individual voters’ decisions.
Haerpfer, C. W. (2006). Political Support for Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy in European Political Systems. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Hobolt, S. B. and R. Klemmensen (2005). Welfare to Vote: The Effect of Government Spending on Turnout. CSES Plenary Session, Washington DC, United States. Why turnout levels vary so considerably between countries remains a puzzle in the literature. In recent years, many scholars have moved beyond the exclusive focus on individual level factors to examine how institutions affect voter participation. However, a contextual factor that has been largely overlooked in the literature is the role of the state involvement in the economy. In this paper, we attempt to redress this gap by examining the impact of welfare spending on voter participation. High levels of education tend to lower the costs associated with voting, and we therefore expect turnout to be higher in welfare states where mass education is provided freely to the citizenry and where resources in general are redistributed more equally. Further, we examine how individual-level patterns of voting vary across different levels of welfare spending. Since voting is less costly for the general population in welfare states, we argue that political information and partisanship are likely to be more important in determining an individual’s likelihood to vote, relative to socio-economic factors such as income. We test these hypotheses using data from Modules 1 and 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), compromising of 57 democratic elections held in 34 countries. First, we look at the aggregate relationships between turnout and the economy. Thereafter, we employ at two-step hierarchical modeling approach to show that the impact of political information and partisanship on turnout vary according to the level of welfare spending. The empirical investigation demonstrates that government welfare spending has a positive effect on turnout and enhances the individual-level effects of information and partisanship.
Howell, D. A. and K. J. Long (2002). The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Questions for the Future: Methodological Research Opportunities. Conference on the "Comparative Study of Electoral Systems", WZB, Berlin, Germany.
Huang, C. (2003). Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2001 (TEDS 2001). CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden. Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) is a face-to-face survey interview project aiming at collecting data of voting behavior and changes in democratic values in Taiwan on a regular basis. TEDS 2001 was the first implementation of this long-term project immediately after the fourth Legislative Yuan (the Congress) election held on December 1, 2001. All the questions listed in the CSES Micro Questionnaire Module 2 are integrated into the TEDS 2001 questionnaire. The raw data and the related documents of TEDS 2001 were submitted to the CSES for deposit for CESE module 2. This paper briefly reports the TEDS 2001 project and offers some suggestions to the CSES Module 3.
Ikeda, K. (2006). Japanese National Election in 2005: Based on JES III project. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Ikeda, K. (2006). Recent Japanese Elections with CSES2 Data: Based on JES III project. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Ikeda, K. (2008). Recent Japanese Elections with CSES3 Data: Based on a Panel Survey with Asian Barometer. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw Poland.
Isaev, K. (2006). Peculiarities and Results of the 2005 Elections in Kyrgyzstan. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Jasiewicz, K. (2008). The Old Regime and Democracy. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw Poland.
Karp, J. A. and S. A. Banducci (2006). Electoral Systems and Political Efficacy. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain. One of the least disputed conclusions to emanate from the research on electoral systems and turnout is that countries with proportional representation (PR) have higher turnout. There is, however, disagreement over the mechanisms by which PR produces higher turnout. Some believe that PR helps to foster higher turnout by increasing a citizen’s perception that his or her vote matters in an election. We examine this theory linking institutions to electoral participation across a diverse set of countries using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).
Kedar, O. (2005). How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice. CSES Plenary Session, Washington DC I analyze how diffusion of power in parliaments affects voter choice. Using a two-step research design, I first estimate an individual-level model of voter choice in 14 parliamentary democracies, allowing voters to hold preferences both for the party most similar to them ideologically, and for the party that pulls policy in their direction. While in systems in which power is concentrated the two motivations converge, in consensual systems they diverge: since votes will likely be watered-down by bargaining in the parliament, outcome-oriented choice in consensual systems often leads voters to endorse parties whose positions differ from their own views. In the second step, I utilize institutional measures of power diffusion in the parliament to account for the degree to which voters in different polities pursue one motivation versus the other. I demonstrate that the more power-diffusion and compromise built into the political system via institutional mechanisms, the more voters compensate for the watering-down of their vote by endorsing parties whose positions differ from their own views.
Klingemann, H.-D. (2003). The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems: A Reminder of Module One. CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden.
Klingemann, H.-D. (2008). Questions and Answers: How Political Institutions influence the Voting Behavior. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Psychology, Warsaw, Poland.
Lee, N.-Y., H.-J. Kim, et al. (2005). The Political Effects of the Introduction of “Two-Ballot Votes” System in Korea: Comparison with Japan, New Zealand, and Germany. CSES Conference in Taiwan Taipei, Taiwan. Political institutions, and electoral systems in particular, are believed to affect and shape (if not predetermine) the way voters behave. In Korea, there has been an important change in the electoral system recently. That was the introduction of a “two-ballot” system in the 2004 National Assembly election. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects this change has had upon Korean politics as well as upon Korean voters. In doing so, we take a comparative approach, and compare the Korean case with those of three other political systems that employ two-ballot systems, Japan, New Zealand, and Germany.
Loewen, P. J. and A. Blais (2006). Testing Publius' Federalism: Losers Consent, Winners Lament? CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Long Jusko, K. (2005). The Political Representation of the Poor: A Research Note Using CSES Data. CSES Plenary Session, Washington, D.C. Studies of the public opinion-policy link argue that policy changes are representative when they reflect aggregate-level changes in public opinion. The opinions of most citizens, however, do not change very much over time. As result, government policy may reflect the changing interests of only a small subset of attentive, informed, and articulate voters. Who are these voters? Where do the poorest citizens of contemporary democracies fit in? Under what conditions are elected officials likely to be more or less responsive to the preferences of poor voters? What are the distributional consequences of partisan and electoral incentives to be more or less responsive to the poor? I address these questions in a larger, broadly comparative study of the political representation of the poor. Here, I focus on the question, “How well are the interests of the poor represented in contemporary democratic governments?” and develop a simple model of representation that will serve as a way to evaluate patterns of representation. The parameters of this model are estimated using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data.
Markowski, R. (2002). Diffuse Political Support in New and Old Democracies. Conference on the "Comparative Study of Electoral Systems", Berlin, Germany.
Markowski, R. (2006). Meaningful Choices: Micro Level Logic. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Markowski, R. and J. Tucker (2008). Subjective vs. Objective Proximity in Poland: Controversies in the Choice of Measurement? CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw, Poland.
Milner, H. (2006). Does Proportional Representation Boost Turnout? A Political Knowledge-based Explanation. CSES Conference, Toronto. Other things being equal, more politically knowledgeable citizens are more likely to vote. Whenever it is tested, researchers find a positive relationship with voting and other forms of political participation for virtually every indicator of political knowledge. For example, a simple test conducted on the author’s behalf using data from the huge Roper Social Capital Benchmark Surveys, controlling for education, sex, race, marital status, religion and group membership,1 showed a stronger relationship between voting and political knowledge than with other characteristics such as political trust, efficacy and even interest. Respondents who knew the names of both US Senators in their state were about 3.5 times more likely to turn out to vote in the 1996 US election than those who did not. Moreover, that knowledge had nearly four times the impact in boosting voter turnout in the younger and less educated population than among older and more educated eligible voters.
Norris, P. (2003). A Comparative Perspective on Political Behaviour and Turnout. CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden.
Ortega, C. (2006). Preferential Voting Systems and their Impact on the Personalization of Politics. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain. In most West European democracies, the voter is allowed to choose among a party´s candidates in parliamentary elections. This paper investigates the extent to which preference voting systems encourage competition among a party´s candidates and the personalisation of politics. Preference voting systems are defined in terms of three main components: ballot structure, constituency structure and formulatic structure. The analyses show that the degree of intraparty competition differs greatly across preference voting systems: it is lowest in rigid list systems, moderate in personal voting systems and highest in flexible lists. They also point to the conclusion that preference voting is not an important factor determining the personalisation of politics.
Rico, G. (2006). Factors of voting personalization in Spanish elections, 1979-2004. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Schmitt, H. (2002). Multiple Party Identifications. Conference on the "Comparative Study of Electoral Systems", WZB, Berlin, Germany. This paper does three things. It explores the importance of the phenomenon: how prominent a feature of political orientations are multiple PIDs? It then tests three institutional factors that might be conducive to multiple PIDs – the format of the party system, the electoral system, and the age of a democratic polity. It finally assesses the effect of single vs. multiple PIDs on vote choice. It shows (1) that multiple party identifications are of more than marginal fre-quency and importance; (2) that the limited electoral experience of voters in new democracies is the best predictor of multiple PIDs; and (3) that the behavioural consequences of multiple PIDs are comparatively low.
Shastri, S. (2006). Comparing General Election Trends with By Elections: Emerging Patterns in the Indian Electoral Contest and its Implications for Electoral Politics. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Štebe, J. (2003). Consequences of Voting on Changes in Satisfaction with Democracy in Post-Socialist Countries. CSES Plenary Session 2003 Research Panel Stockholm, Sweden. The transition to democracy is both symbolically and from the point of view of a trial of how it is working, characterised by free elections. Such was also true after the “velvet revolution” of the early nineties in the socialist countries. Many factors influence any assessment of how a democracy is working. Among the most important are factors linking an evaluation of the political system with its economic effectiveness. These factors are present universally, both in well-established and new democracies. In the post-socialist countries perceptions of social rights provision can also be very important. There are high expectations of the role of the state in providing social rights, present due to the inheritance of their high fulfilment before transition and the resulting reduction in protection and increase in inequality on introducing economic reforms. Certain social groups can be identified, which are particularly at the sharp end of these measures. There are then in the assessment of a democracy political factors such as fulfilment and responsiveness of the system to initiatives and interests of citizens, individual political alienation and the inability to influence change as well as the level of trust, which is, in a sense of social capital, a public good that is chronically lacking in post-socialist countries.
Tigno, J. and L. L. Guerrero (2006). Political Capital: The Politics of Leadership Resilience in the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Tóka, G. (2002). Expressive vs. Instrumental Voting and Institutional Design. Conference on the "Comparative Study of Electoral Systems", Berlin, Germany.
Tóka, G. (2003). Turnout and Information Effects in Elections. CSES Plenary Session, Stockholm, Sweden. The paper empirically tests the proposition that because of the unequal social distribution of politically relevant resources, some groups of citizens may be less successful in expressing their specifically political preferences in the vote than others. Hence, the electoral arena may give different people different degrees of political influence even when the formal equality of all citizens before the law is rigorously upheld in the electoral process. Survey data on voting behavior from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and Larry Bartels’s (1996) simulation procedure -now extended to the analysis of multiparty-systems and non-linear information effects on the vote -are utilized to explore the question. The results show that social differences in political knowledge may lead to the hypothesized political inequalities but their size is remarkably modest.
Tóka, G. (2006). Citizen Information, Election Outcomes and Good Governance. Conference on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Bangalore, India. Citizen Information, Election Outcomes and Good Governanc
Tóka, G. (2006). Party Systems and Information Costs. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Tóka, G. (2008). The Impact of Full Turnout on the Policy Positions of the Median Voter. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw Poland.
Tumanov, S., A. Gasparishvili, et al. (2006). Political Parties and Electoral Preferences in Russia, Byelorussia and Ukraine at the Beginning of the 21st Century. CSES Conference and Planning Commmittee Meeting, Seville, Spain.
Vowles, J. (2007). Does Globalization Affect Public Perceptions of "Who is in Power Can Make a Difference"? Evidence from 37 Countries, 1996-2005. CSES Conference on Monitoring Democracy Development and Electoral Behavior in Central and Eastern Europe, Cologne, Germany.
Vowles, J. (2008). Making a Difference? Coalition and Single Party Governments, Public Perceptions and Turnout. CSES Conference: Political Institutions - Rationality - Electoral Behavior, Warsaw School of Social Psychology, Warsaw Poland.
Weßels, B. and H. Schmitt (2006). What Shapes Electoral Choice Options? Institutional Determinants of the Distinctiveness of Choice Options. CSES Conference on Electoral Systems and Electoral Politics, Bangalore, India.
Weßels, B. and H. Schmitt (2007). Meaningful Choices, Political Supply, and Institutional Effectiveness. CSES Conference on Monitoring Democracy Development and Electoral Behavior in Central and Eastern Europe, Cologne, Germany. This article explores the degree to which the meaningfulness of electoral choices is a result of the political supply structure and the institutional setup of an electoral system. We claim that meaningful choices require both a differentiated choice set and effective elections. In testing this claim, we follow two strategies. First, we take the level of turnout as an indicator of the meaningfulness of electoral choices and determine the impact of political supply and institutional structures on it. Second, we explore whether and how political supply and institutional effectiveness affect the calculus of voting. We test a set of specific hypotheses by determining the relevance of different criteria for choosing a party with conditional models of macro-micro interactions. Empirical data come from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).