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CSES Bibliography - Conference Papers ( listings)

The listings are arranged in alphabetical order by the author's last name. Selecting the first letter of an author's last name will go to the section containing the listing.

 
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Aarts, K. and J. J. A. Thomassen (2005). Electoral Institutions and Satisfaction With Democracy. International Conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Acree, B. (2012). Effective Parties and Voter Choice: Revisiting Sociotropic and Pocketbook Voting. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 50. In two-party systems, voters can readily use macroeconomic conditions to reward or punish the incumbent party. In multiparty systems, however, this calculus can become more convoluted. When multiple parties share power, attributing responsibility to specific parties is complex, and increasing the number of parties in the system only makes it more so. In this paper, I present a theory and empirical evidence to support this claim. My theory argues that more political parties allow for more precise utility calculations by voters. Macroeconomic variables perform well in models explaining evaluations for incumbent parties, but the effects of these sociotropic considerations are strongly attenuated by the presence of additional political parties. Using data from the CSES, I show that as the number of parties increases, the ability of voters to use sociotropic evaluations to judge incumbents falls.

Albright, J. (2006). Party Discipline, Voter Heterogeneity, and the Notion of Representation: The Strange Case of Spain. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. This paper explores how multi-level government in Spain has functioned to compensate for substantial distortions created by the country's electoral system. It argues that the literature on comparative political representation has been too narrowly focused on rules of governing elections to the national assembly, creating a bias which potentially leads to overly pessimistic evaluations about the quality of representative democracy in many countries. It proposes instead that political institutions operating at multiple levels may provide citizens alternative mechanisms for influencing the central government when electoral laws create substantial distortions in the translation of votes to seats. The case of Spain is used to illustrate the argument. The country’s very disproportional PR rules and highly disciplined parties co-exist with one of the most heterogeneous populations in Europe, raising questions about how well its institutions provide mechanisms for guaranteeing the representation of citizen interests. Spain gets around this paradox through its State of Autonomies, a system of decentralization that has institutionalized bargaining between regional and central elites and given voters an alternative path to make their opinions known to the government in Madrid.

Albritton, R. and T. Bureekul (2006). Consolidating Democracy in Thailand: The First Four Years of Democracy under the Constitution of 1997. 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. This paper compares data from polls taken during the 2001 and 2005 elections that will be found in the CSES data archives. It will address several issues representing change or stability in attitudes and opinions associated with the four year period of the first majority government to survive a full term in Thai history and be returned to office by a large majority. The paper will offer comparisons of evaluations of government performance, support for democracy, and evaluations of corruption in government and the electoral process. Many of these attitudes are shaped by the conversion of the electoral system from multimember to single member districts. Results of the comparisons provide an assessment of the degree to which democracy is consolidating among Thai mass publics.

Aldrich, J. H., S. Dorobantu, et al. (2010). The Use of the Left-Right Scale in Individual's Voting Decisions. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington D.C.: 28. In modern politics, the left-right divide has served as a political schema classifying ideologies that has allowed parties to communicate with voters and the latter to orient themselves in a complex political world. Although the left-right scale has been the most extensive instrument used to identify party positions in the political arena, we have little comparative evidence of the way individuals use it in their voting decisions. We analyze the variance of individuals’ perceptions of parties’ positions on this scale to explore the usefulness of this metric for evaluating political parties and for voting decisions in comparative perspective. Our results show that parties that are ambiguous in their stance on the LR scale attract lower preferential evaluations from individual respondents and, as expected, individuals’ level of misrepresentation of a party’s left-right position is inversely related to their preference for that party. Not surprisingly, voters like less the parties about which they have less or noisier information. But we also find that ambiguity is strongly related to the likelihood of individuals voting for the proximate party. More uncertainty about where parties stand appears to encourage voters to bet on the higher probability that the party may be closer to them than where the electorate perceives it.

Aldrich, J. H., M. Fernandez, et al. (2013). Uncertainty or Ambiguity? Sources of Variation in Ideological Placements of Political Parties. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago.

Aldrich, J. H., R. K. Gibson, et al. (2014). Offline and Online Political Mobilization: Prevalence and Consequences on Electoral Participation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Anderson, C. D. (2004). Economic Voting and Multi-level Governance: An Individual-level Analysis. 77th Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Canada. The literature on economic voting has moved well beyond the initial formulations of a simple reward and punishment calculus. One of the most important developments concerns the clarity of attributions of responsibility in different political contexts. The clarity of responsibility argument contends that economic perceptions will play a greater role in determining support for the government where responsibility is more clearly attributable to the government (e.g. under a single party government) than under conditions where responsibility is less clear (e.g. coalition government). While the clarity of responsibility literature is extensive, a surprising omission has been the comparative consideration of economic voting in the context of federal or multi-level institutions of government. The proposed paper tests the proposition that the presence of multi-level and/or federal institutions of government will decrease the effects of economic evaluations on voting for the incumbent government in elections to the national parliament or congress. The logic underlying this proposition is that the existence of more than one level of government makes it harder for voters to attribute credit and blame for economic conditions. There are two reasons for this. First, the actions of other levels of government also have an effect on economic conditions, and second, incentives are created for government actors to engage in blame-shifting and credit-taking. It is hypothesized that the effect of economic evaluations on incumbent support in national elections will be inversely related to the extent of sub-unit autonomy: the more decentralized a federal state the smaller the effect of economic evaluations. This hypothesis is tested using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1. This cross-national individual-level dataset, developed between 1996 and 2001, includes over 30 countries that exhibit institutional variation ranging from unitary states through federalizing states and highly centralized federal states to highly decentralized federal states. The degree of sub-unit autonomy is determined on the basis of the division of powers and the extent of sub-unit spending relative to the national government. In addition to addressing an important gap in the economic voting literature, the proposed paper raises significant issues about the link between multi-level governance and democratic accountability.

Anderson, C. J. and P. Beramendi (2005). Income Inequality and Turnout Inequality in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. We examine the link between income inequality and electoral turnout. We argue that the competition among political parties as well as the interplay between political parties and voters can be characterized as prisoner’s dilemmas. Following on this, we develop a theory, which predicts that countries will be characterized by one of two stable equilibria: Countries where low income individuals feel represented by political parties, are mobilized by parties, and turn out to vote; and, conversely, countries where low income individuals are not mobilized by parties and fail to vote. Based on individual level data from Sweden and the United States as well as macro-level data collected in 13 OECD democracies, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses.

Arnold, J. R. (2007). Individual and Contextual Effects on Political Knowledge. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. The vast literature on political knowledge has given us two apparent truths. First, in Converse’s concise words about “mass electorates”, “the mean is low and variance high”. Second, variation in political knowledge can mostly be explained with a laundry list of individual-level variables, such as education and income. This article presents evidence challenging both claims, which are shown to be artifacts of the prevailing single-country approach. Multilevel analysis of a cross-national dataset reveals knowledge levels rise and fall with contextual variables like electoral system proportionality, presidentialism, and government ownership of television outlets. Moreover, the “usual suspects” in existing studies (e.g. education, income) are shown to be context-bound-for example, presidentialism decreases the effect of education on political knowledge. These findings demonstrate the limits of current theorizing about public ignorance, which commonly draws on evidence from the American case to make general claims about democratic citizens.

Arnold, J. R. (2010). The Electoral Consequences of Voter Ignorance in Western Europe. Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Chicago. What are the electoral consequences of widespread voter ignorance? A great deal of research has suggested that scholarly and popular concerns about low levels of citizen political knowledge are unwarranted, since voters can use a variety of cues to vote as if they were better informed. The implication is that political history would have unfolded just as it did even if electorates had been more politically informed. This paper presents evidence that counters these claims, showing an infusion of electorally relevant information would have changed the fates of left parties and government coalitions in six Western European multi-party systems. The paper also directly and systematically examines what we might call the “enlightened natural constituency” hypothesis, which expects citizens from lower socio-economic strata to vote disproportionately for left parties once armed with more political knowledge. While the basic argument about how political ignorance disproportionately affects the left’s natural constituency is not new, the hypothesis has thus far not been tested. The analysis supports the hypothesis in most of the cases.

Bădescu, G. and P. Sum (2000). Political Choice in an Unstructured Party System: The Importance of the Left-Right Schema in Post-Communist Europe. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Bădescu, G. and P. Sum (2005). The Importance of Left-Right Orientations in the New Democracies. International conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Bågenholm, A., S. Dahlberg, et al. (2014). Does Politicization of Corruption Affect Turnout? Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC. This paper tests to what extent voters’ perceptions of corruption in the political system affect turnout and in particular if politicization of corruption in electoral campaigns affects that relationship. In previous research, some studies find that corruption increases turnout because voters either are bought off to participate or because they are mobilized on clean government issues, but the majority, more often country comparative studies, show that corruption decreases turnout because the presence of corruption corrodes the political system which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter apathy. In this paper, we test a previously neglected factor, namely if politicization of corruption, defined as any party campaigning on anti-corruption issues, dampens or even reverses the presumed negative effects of perceiving political corruption on turnout. We argue that it is reasonable to believe that people’s willingness to participate will increase if parties address this important issue in electoral campaigns, as it will indicate party responsiveness to voter concerns. We apply multilevel modeling combining individual-level data and country-level data from 20 countries from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set and a unique data set on politicization of corruption issues in the election campaign. The findings suggest that politicization of corruption in the election to some extent dampens the negative effect of corruption perceptions on turnout, as the obtained positive interaction effect indicates that the negative effect of perceiving corruption as a problem on turnout is reduced in an election context where corruption is politicized. The results thus show that if corruption is not politicized, the individual corruption perceptions exert a significant negative effect on voting.

Bargsted, M. A. and O. Kedar (2007). Voting for Coalitions: Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Inspired by analyses of majoritarian systems, students of consensual systems have analyzed strategic voting due to barriers to party entry, namely, district magnitude and threshold. We analyze a type of strategic voting almost entirely overlooked so far: how expected coalition composition affects voter choice. In line with the importance of post-electoral negotiations in proportional systems, we extend the Duvergerian logic to participation in the coalition. We demonstrate that voters take into consideration the likely composition of the government and cast their ballot accordingly. In particular, when voters on the left (right) expect a right-leaning (left-leaning) coalition, they desert parties ideologically similar to them on the left (right), and endorse the lesser of evils (least-rightist/leftist) they expect to participate in the coalition. We demonstrate our argument using unique data of coalition expectations from the 2006 Israeli elections. Our findings suggest strong effect of coalition expectations on voter choice. Results hold once coalition preferences are taken into consideration.

Barnes, T., R. M. Duch, et al. (2010). Clarity about Clarity: Sorting through Competing Explanations for the Clarity of Responsibility Hypothesis. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL.

Bean, C. (2008). How Well Does the Political System Represent the Public Interest? A Comparison of Voter Perceptions in Australia and New Zealand. Australasian Political Science Association Annual Conference. Brisbane: 27. One of the enduring lines of division and potential conflict within any representative democracy is between the represented and the representatives. Just what do our elected representatives represent? One answer is representation of the views and interests of voters which, collectively, amount to ‘the public interest’. In a representative democracy most citizens are not in a position to represent their own views and interests directly most of the time. Hence we have the democratic institution of elections through which members of parliament are chosen to represent the interests of their constituents. One problem with such collective notions of representation is that different individuals have different interests and thus representing the public interest is no uncomplicated matter. However, the representation of the public interest is arguably as much about process as it is about substance. One of the key aims of this paper is to consider, from the voter’s perspective, how well political institutions, parties and elected representatives appear to behave in ways that are consistent with representing the public interest. A second aim is to see whether perspectives on the public interest diverge substantially according to social and political differences within the public.

Bean, C. S. (2008). How Well Does the Political System Represent the Public Interest? A Comparison of Voter Perceptions in Australia and New Zealand. Australian Political Studies Association 2008 Conference, Brisbane, Australia. One of the enduring lines of division and potential conflict within any representative democracy is between the represented and the representatives. Just what do our elected representatives represent? One answer is representation of the views and interests of voters which, collectively, amount to ‘the public interest’. In a representative democracy most citizens are not in a position to represent their own views and interests directly most of the time. Hence we have the democratic institution of elections through which members of parliament are chosen to represent the interests of their constituents. One problem with such collective notions of representation is that different individuals have different interests and thus representing the public interest is no uncomplicated matter. However, the representation of the public interest is arguably as much about process as it is about substance. One of the key aims of this paper is to consider, from the voter’s perspective, how well political institutions, parties and elected representatives appear to behave in ways that are consistent with representing the public interest. A second aim is to see whether perspectives on the public interest diverge substantially according to social and political differences within the public.

Beard, V. P. (2006). Democratic Behaviors in Emerging African Democracies: The Role of Gender and Religion. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Are Islam and Christianity driving forces in democratic orientations among African women? In order to add to the growing conversation on the compatibility (or not) of religious beliefs with stable democracy1, this study asks if adherence to Islam and Christianity, within the context of other factors, helps to explain African women’s political behaviors. Despite democratic transitions across Africa, and an increase in female voice and activity in African democracies, numerous reports indicate that a democratic ‘gender gap’ remains in developing nations.2 It is unclear why this gap persists. There is a dearth in close examinations of democratic affects in response to female religious identification and intensity in Africa. Thus, I believe that it is important at this juncture to examine the validity of the gender gap claims in regards to democratic behaviors, as well as examining other factors behind political values across Africa. This paper empirically investigates popular democratic behaviors, specifically addressing the effects of gender and religion. How widespread are political behaviors in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) generally? Do women engage in these behaviors more or less than men? If so, what are some of the potentially significant factors, including religion, driving political behaviors across genders in Africa?

Beauregard, K. (2013). The Influence of Parties, Ideology and Party Polarization on Gender Gaps in Political Participation. 3rd European Conference on Politics and Gender. Barcelona, Spain. The paper investigates the relevance of party ideologies and party polarization on gender gaps in political participation. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, we argue that party polarization has a stronger negative effect on women’s versus men’s levels of political participation given that women are more risk averse when faced with potential conflict. Conflict between citizens may be more likely to occur in high polarization contexts where some citizens support parties and positions that are more ideologically distant from the centre. Women may place greater salience on the importance of interpersonal relationships, which may inhibit their participation levels in situations where polarization and hence greater potential conflict is high. Alternatively, we test for the possibility that the ideological polarization on the left will have a stronger positive influence on women’s levels of political participation than men’s. Since women lend greater electoral support to left-wing parties, their presence, particularly in government, may send a signal that women’s interests have greater salience in the political system, which in turn may increase their willingness to engage. Results suggest less support for the second than the first hypothesis.

Beltrán, U. (2005). Do Economic Differences or Institutions Explain Variance in the Economic Vote Among Countries? International conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan. Despite all the methodological problems in defining the proper variables and methods to estimate it, an association between economic perceptions and vote choice or vote outcomes in the expected direction seems to be a regular feature of voting behavior. Nonetheless, there is important instability among elections and countries that tends to be attributed to methodological flaws or to contextual differences. Three basic research questions are addressed in this paper: the weakness and instability in the effects of the economic retrospective vote (ERV) results from contextual differences among countries or from measurement errors and bias in the models used? Do differences in the general economic contexts of countries explain variation in the effects of the ERV? If so, is it variance in the economic vote among countries or are elections better explained by differences in general economic context or by differences in institutional arrangements? The data used in this paper come from 31 post electoral surveys taken in 29 countries, as part of Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Multilevel models were used since they are geared towards the statistical analysis of data that have a hierarchical or clustered structure. Relatively small effects of economic perceptions on vote choice are found, and no consistent explanations of variance among countries associated with economic or institutional contextual variables could be identified. These findings do not seem to be the consequence of serious measurement errors, but of insufficiently specified variables and models. The number of country-elections at hand and the variance in institutional arrangements are too small.

Beltrán, U. (2006). Contextual Effects on the Individual Rationality: Economic Conditions and Vote. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Despite all the methodological problems in defining the proper variables and methods to estimate it, an association between economic perceptions and vote choice in the expected sense seems to be a regular feature of voting behavior. Nonetheless, there is important instability among elections and countries that tends to be attributed to methodological flaws or contextual differences. Two basic research questions are addressed in this paper: the weakness and instability in the effects of the economic retrospective vote (ERV) is factual or methodological, that is, it results from contextual differences among elections and countries or it results from measurement errors and bias in the models used? Do differences in the general economic contexts of countries explain variation in the effects of the ERV? The data used in this paper come from 29 post electoral surveys taken in 26 countries, as part of Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Vote choice and economic perceptions are nested or clustered within the specific economic contexts of the polities where they are expressed. Multilevel models are geared towards the statistical analysis of data that have a hierarchical or clustered structure. These are the statistical models used in this paper. The models produce negligible and unstable estimates of the effects of economic perceptions on vote choice, and no testable explanations of variance among countries associated with economic contextual variables. These findings seem to be the consequence of insufficiently specified variables and models.

Beltrán, U. (2007). Efectos contextuales sobre la racionalidad individual: Condiciones Económicas y voto retrospectivo. Primer Congreso Latinoamericano de Opinión Pública, Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay.

Bengtsson, Å. (2005). Inclusiveness or Accountability: What brings about the most Responsive System? Workshop no. 15 "Democracy, accountability and political behaviour", Nordic Political Science Association, Reykjavik, Iceland.

Bengtsson, Å. (2005). Prerequisites for Accountability and External Efficacy. 1st Karlstad Seminar on Studying Political Action, Karlstad University, Sweden. This study deals with the trade off between accountability and representation. Does good conditions for accountability - ex post controls - foster more positive apprehensions about of governmental responsiveness? Or, is it circumstances that favour representation and ex ante controls more favourable in this task? Governmental responsiveness - in the literature known as external efficacy - is a concept that captures perceived possibilities to influence politics and the importance of voting. The general expectation in this study is that blurred responsibility patterns makes voters less positive about influencing politics at the macro level. Not the least since the literature and empirical evidence acknowledges that voters in the act of voting are becoming more interested in assigning accountability than in active delegation. The aspects that are believed to be of greatest importance when it comes to affecting external efficacy is the two concepts of “clarity of responsibility” and “clarity of available alternatives” that are likely to affect voters possibilities to be assign responsibility in an effective manner. It appears logic that voters may have a more pessimistic view of their possibilities to influence politics and the importance of voting in contexts where power distribution is blurred and no obvious alternatives to take stand for are offered before the election. Results, however, indicate the opposite.

Bengtsson, Å. (2005). Prerequisites for Accountability and Political Efficacy. International Conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan. The literature offers two strategies for voters to apply when voting in elections: delegation and accountability. Most electoral research indicates that voters are becoming more volatile and parties more alike, which makes delegation a difficult task. But if voters are becoming more interested in the second strategy - ex post controls - it appears other institutional characteristics are likely to be desirable. This study looks at how the political context of elections affects voters’ view of governmental responsiveness. More specifically focus is put on the two concepts “clarity of responsibility” and “clarity of available alternatives” that are likely to of importance if voters are to be able assign responsibility in an effective manner. It appears logic that voters may have a more pessimistic view of their possibilities to influence politics and the importance of voting - what is generally known as external efficacy - in contexts where power distribution is blurred and no obvious alternatives to take stand for are offered before the election. Results, however, indicate the opposite.

Bermudez Torres, S. (2010). The effects of partisanship, ideology and leadership on turnout: Under which institutional settings are these relationships enforced? . Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Conference Chicago. This article examines which institutions promote the use and well-functioning of ideology, party identification and leadership on individual’s turnout. Literature specialized on heuristics tends to assume that shortcuts can effectively assist individuals on their electoral decisions correcting for their lack of political information. "evertheless, these studies have mainly focused on individual characteristics forgetting the effect that political institutions can have in facilitating or hampering the use of shortcuts. With a multilevel logit analysis, this study seeks to integrate the electoral context in the study of political shortcuts. The findings suggest that presidential systems, closed party lists, a closer political competition between parties and a more institutionalized party system encourage the well functioning of these three shortcuts.

Bernauer, J. (2010). Descriptive Representation and Satisfaction with Democracy. A Multilevel Analysis of Twenty-Nine Eastern European Minorities. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. The paper focuses on the descriptive parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities in eastern Europe and its effect on individual levels of satisfaction with democracy. Descriptive representation is conceptualized on the level of single minorities in terms of the presence of an ethnic minority party in the legislature. Data from the first two waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) on over 1000 minority members from 29 minority groups and 8 countries are used. Bayesian multilevel models indicate that descriptive representation increases satisfaction with democracy, once factors suppressing the effect are controlled for. Crosslevel interactions show that the benefits of descriptive representation are confined to males who did not vote for a party which later joined the government.

Bernauer, J., N. Giger, et al. (2010). The Substantial Representation of Subconstituency Interests in European Democracies. 17th International Conference of the Council for European Studies: 36. Subconstituencies are groups within the electorate. The paper examines the substantial or policy representation of potentially disadvantaged subconstituencies like women, ethnic minorities and low income groups in the European context. Three research questions are explored: 1) Are these subconstituencies represented worse by political parties? 2) Can individual-level explanations such as political participation, education or saliency of the policy dimension studied account for such differences? 3) Are system-level factors such as the electoral structure responsible for differing degrees of under-representation of the subconstituencies? Multilevel analyses of survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) indicate that all three subconstituencies are less well represented than the majority population, that alternative individual-level explanations account for some, but not all of these differences and that system-level factors such as the electoral system, relative turnout of subconstituencies and levels of social inequality mediate the relationship.

Bernauer, J., J. Rosset, et al. (2012). Relative Turnout of the Poor and Responsiveness of Parties in Europe. A Chicken-and-Egg Dilemma? . Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Assosiation (MPSA). Chicago. Policy representation − the extent to which the political preferences of citizens are reflected by those of the political elites − is a central aspect of political representation. The paper analyses whether parties are more responsive to segments of society which tend to turn out in higher numbers. Less well-offcitizens, which have preferences different from the rest of the population and tend to turn out less at elections, are likely to suffer more from such selective responsiveness than other groups. Hence, we ask whether relative group turnout of the poor has an influence on the relative responsiveness of the parties to the preferences of that specific group. At the same time, the reverse relationship is controlled for, taking into account that (expected) close congruence between parties and citizens can motivate citizens to turn out. Longitudinal data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (citizens’ properties) as well as from the Political Documents Archive (party positions) and cross-lagged structural equationmodeling are used to test these propositions. The results indicate that while responsiveness indeed causes higher turnout, the absence of a clear effect of turnout on congruence suggests that parties do not pursue uniform strategies in targeting either groups with higher or lower turnout.

Bernhagen, P. (2005). Information, Organization and Structural Power: Estimating Business Influence over Environmental Policy in 22 OECD Countries. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The political influence of business is frequently ascribed to three distinct sources: business organizational strength, a structurally privileged position in capitalist democracies, and informational privileges. Yet, to date, few empirical assessments of the relative contribution of these explanations of political outcomes exist. This paper presents a novel approach to the empirical enquiry into the political influence of business and provides a test of the explanatory contributions of three sources of business political influence in the context of environmental politics. Formulating a standard macro-level model of environmental regulatory stringency, I use OECD and World Economic Forum data to test if business’ organizational strength, economic voting, and information asymmetry affect the strength of environmental regulatory regimes. The results show that the three indictors of business political power do not explain cross-country variation in the strength of environmental regulation after standard economic, political and institutional determinants of regulation have been taken into account.

Bernhagen, P. (2005). The Political Power of Business: Environmental Regime Stringency and Information Asymmetry in Thirty-one Capitalist Democracies. 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. This paper presents an empirical test of the informational role of special interest groups in public policymaking. I argue that business’ influence over public policy in-creases with its privileged access to pertinent information about the consequences of policy. I use OECD and World Economic Forum data to test an informational-struc-tural model of business’ political influence in a simultaneous equation model of the causal relationships between economic voting, information asymmetry, environmental issue salience, and environmental regime strength. My results show that business’ in-formational power exerts significant negative effects on environmental policy pledges when operationalised as the private-public ratio of third-level education expenditure. An alternative operationalisation of business-state information asymmetry, using ex-penditure on research and development, affects environmental policy pledges posi-tively. Through the positive link between environmental pledges and policy, business’ informational power also indirectly affects the environmental regime. However, no direct effect on environmental regulation appears, suggesting that business’ influence over public policy takes place during the early stages of agenda formation.

Bernhagen, P. (2006). Political Power and International Environmental Agreements: Business Influence over Participation and Compliance. 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego. This paper develops a model of the political influence of business in the context of international environmental cooperation. Locating the sources of business political power in three distinct factors – organizational strength, a structurally privileged position in capitalist democracies, and informational advantage – I test the contributions of these factors to cross-sectional explanations of states’ ratification of, and compliance with, international environmental agreements. The results show that countries participate less and are less compliant with international regimes if their economies are heavily exposed to international trade and if domestic environmental movements countervailing business are weak. Countries are, furthermore, shown to be more compliant with international environmental regimes the more integrated their systems of interest group intermediation are. The findings lend partial support to structural theories of business power and the role of information asymmetry in government-business relations.

Bernhagen, P. and M. Marsh (2003). Citizen Participation: Voting and Beyond. "Democracy in the New Europe" conference of the Institute d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, Dijon, France.

Bernhagen, P. and M. Marsh (2004). Turnout Matters: Sometimes. Uppsala 2004 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden. Despite widespread concern about the partisan and policy implications of low and socially unequal turnout, few studies to date have succeeded in gauging with significant certainty the extent to which socio-demographically differential voter turnout has real and tangible effects on election outcomes. In this paper we suggest a partial remedy for this situation by providing a systematic assessment of the partisan effects of socially unequal voter turnout in representative democracies. To this end we propose a novel approach to estimating the magnitude of turnout effects which treats vote abstainers as missing data on a variable measuring vote choice. Using an efficient and unbiased estimator, we impute the missing data points (the vote choices of non-voters) on recalled party choice at 28 elections in 25 countries in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset. Based on these imputations, we calculate the difference between observed and hypothetical (100 percent) turnout and identify party and country-level conditions under which socially low turnout translates into biased electoral outcomes. While our findings confirm earlier studies reporting little to no systematic gains from turnout for left-of-centre parties, our evidence suggests that small parties and non-incumbents would benefit from full turnout.

Bernhagen, P. and M. Marsh (2004). Turnout Matters: Sometimes. International conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Best, R. E. (2011). Do Voters have a Choice? Establishment-Party Polarization and Support for Non-Establishment-Parties in 13 Advanced Industrialized Democracies. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. How do the policy positions of establishment-parties affect support for non-establishment-parties? Low levels of polarization among establishment-parties are expected to encourage support for non-establishment-parties by (1) generating protest votes against establishment-party positions that have become too similar and (2) creating ideological space for non-establishment-parties to capture sincere votes. These expectations are tested using individual-level data from Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The results indicate that, as expected, low levels of polarization among establishment-parties increase the likelihood of non-establishment-party support. This effect intensifies for two types of voters: those on the extremes of the ideological spectrum and those who are ideologically closest to a non-establishment-party.

Birch, S. (2005). Explaining Confidence in the Conduct of Elections. 2009 Annual Conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Group of the Political Studies Association, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom. There is a growing interest among comparative political scientists in electoral integrity, yet little is known about what motivates citizens’ perceptions of the electoral process. The aim of this paper is to explore, in a cross-national context, the factors that shape perceptions of electoral fairness. The analyses carried out here are based on 31 elections that formed part of Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Project. The main hypothesis to be tested is that perceptions of electoral quality are enhanced by institutions that work to ensure a ‘level playing field’ and a transparent electoral process. This hypothesis is largely confirmed in a multilevel model that includes both individual- and election-level variables.

Birch, S. (2005). Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. This paper investigates the link between perceptions of electoral fairness and reported turnout. Previous research has established a link between electoral participation and the extent to which voters are faced with a ‘meaningful’ partisan choice at election time; this study extends the logic of this argument to perceptions of the ‘meaningfulness’ of the conduct of elections. It is hypothesized that that perceptions of electoral integrity are positively related to turnout (all else being equal), whereas skepticism with regard to the conduct of elections has a depressing effect on propensity to vote. If citizens perceive that the election is likely to be marred by electoral manipulation, corruption, or other unfair practices, they have less of an incentive to go to the polls. The empirical analysis to test this hypothesis is based on aggregate-level data combined with survey data from 31 elections drawn from Module 1 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey project, which includes new and established democracies. Multilevel modeling is employed to control for a variety of individual- and election-level variables that have been found in previous research to influence turnout. The results of the analysis show that perceptions of electoral integrity are indeed positively associated with propensity to vote, suggesting that this variable ought to be included systematically in individuallevel studies of turnout.

Birch, S. (2007). Compulsory Electoral Participation and Political Legitimacy. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The institution of compulsory electoral participation is commonly held to influence popular perceptions of political legitimacy. There are a variety of arguments suggesting both a positive and a negative relationship between these two variables, but previous research has not provided a strong test of these arguments. This paper tests the impact of compulsory electoral participation on three measures of political legitimacy using individual-level data from Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project, together with relevant aggregate-level data. The results of this investigation are somewhat inconclusive: analyses of the impact of compulsory voting on efficacy, satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of the quality of representation find that survey respondents living in states employing this institution have significantly higher levels of satisfaction with democracy, but lower levels of efficacy (though the latter finding is weak). There is no statistically significant relationship between compulsory electoral participation and perceptions of the quality of representation. On balance, the evidence therefore suggests a positive relationship between the legal obligation to attend the polls and political legitimacy.

Birch, S. (2009). Electoral System Design and Electoral Malpractice. 5th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research Potsdam, Germany. A considerable body of literature has sought to demonstrate the factors that influence electoral system design. However, choices over recognised democratic options must be distinguished from design choices that draw the electoral system away from democratic norms. The latter phenomenon, which may be termed the ‘manipulative design’ of electoral institutions, should be thought of as a form of electoral malpractice. This paper seeks to assess the manipulative design strategies that actors in non- semi- and new democracies employ. Specifically, the paper provides an overview of the most common forms this practice takes. It then goes on to evaluate (1) the prevalence of different forms of manipulative design; (2) the conditions under which actors are likely to seek to engage in electoral system manipulation, and (3) the mechanics of manipulative design. The paper draws on a newly-created dataset of Eastern European, Latin America and Sub-Saharan African cases. The investigation involves both large-N quantitative analysis and case studies.

Blais, A. (2003). How Do Losers Assess Electoral Democracy? 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. How do those who vote for losing parties assess democracy? This chapter measures losers’ assessments of three aspects of democracy: their level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country; their evaluation of the fairness of the most recent election; and their evaluation of the responsiveness of elected representatives. The model includes systemic-, party-, and individual-level variables in 21 legislative elections in 20 countries from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES).

Blais, A. and P. Loewen (2006). Electoral Systems and Evaluations of Democracy. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.

Boonen, J., E. F. Pedersen, et al. (2014). The influence of political sophistication and party identification on party-voter congruence: a comparative analysis of 37 countries. Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Conference. Edinburgh. In this paper, the individual ideological congruence between voters and parties is studied in a comparative perspective. We use data from the third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to investigate the congruence between voters and their parties on the left-right scale. The results from the multilevel regression models suggest that, on the individual level, political knowledge increases the ideological congruence between voters and parties, whereas a strong party identification decreases this congruence. This suggests that party identification is indeed an affective orientation, which is not necessarily ideologically congruent with one’s own ideological preferences. On the country-level, we did not observe the hypothesized relation between the effective number of parties (ENEP) and ideological congruence.

Bousbah, K. S. (2012). The mediating effect of the institutional/electoral and the welfare context on the political participation of young citizens. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. New Orleans. Low and biased political participation are likely to negatively affect the functioning, the legitimacy, and the quality of democratic political systems. Particular concern has been raised by the increasing age gap in voter turnout. Age-related resources and the cost of electoral participation are identified as the main causes of young voters' abstention. Based on theoretical expectations and empirical evidence of cross-national variations in the age gap, the paper focuses on the micro-macro relationship between age and electoral institutions, and the welfare context. The analysis combines individual level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the European Social Survey (ESS) for 68 elections in the period 2001-2011 with country level information for eight electoral institutions and two welfare context characteristics (social protection expenditure and labour market regulation). The empirical results reveal that two electoral institutions and the welfare context characteristics appear to effectively moderate the effect of age and the electoral participation of young citizens.

Bovens, M. and A. Wille (2007). Diploma Democracy: The Disappearance of the Less Educated from Political Life. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Contemporary western democracies have become diploma democracies. They are ruled by the well educated, the citizens with college and graduate diplomas, whereas the least educated tend to be absent in most political arenas. Of course, the well educated have always been more politically active than the less educated, but in the past decades this gap seems to have widened substantially. Almond and Verba (1963: 386) in their seminal study of political participation, could still conclude that ‘in the United States, Britain, and Germany, large proportions of the uneducated (though much smaller than the educated) are oriented toward political input. (...) In other words, there are substantial numbers of citizens among them.’ Forty years later, the uneducated, even though they still comprise up to about half of the population, seem to have disappeared from most forms of political participation. Well-educated citizens are more inclined to vote, or to visit consultative or deliberative meetings than citizens with a low level of education; and most, if not all, members of parliament, all political officials, and almost all of the political lobbyists, have college or graduate degrees. This paper focuses on the impact of education on different forms of political participation across countries (and through time). The first part of the paper documents the disappearance of the least educated from political life in the past decades for a number of OECD countries, using, among others, CSES and WVS data, and discusses several explanations. The second part of the paper examines some risks of representational distortions as a consequence of the rise of diploma democracy.

Bowler, S. and T. Donovan (2000). Public Attitudes About Changing Political Institutions. Political Economy Conference, Washington University.

Brader, T. (2009). Of Time and Partisan Stability Revisited: The Post-Communist Puzzle. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. We find broad support for the contemporary relevance of classic hypotheses about party identification using CSES data from 40 countries, yet not all receive unequivocal support. We explore why patterns in post-communist countries don't always fit.

Brader, T. A. and J. A. Tucker (2008). Do Party Cues Affect Policy Opinions in New Party Systems? Survey Experiments in Three Post-Communist Countries. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.

Brader, T. A. and J. A. Tucker (2010). Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems. Oxford: 55. In the United States, considerable evidence documents the power of partisanship to shape voters’ choices and policy preferences. But does partisanship have similar powers beyond American shores? Many presume it does, while others claim it is weaker or practically meaningless elsewhere. Clear evidence on behalf of either view is limited. We argue that comparative scholars should move past protracted debates over the meaning of correlations and collect experimental data to ascertain what powers, if any, partisanship wields over voters in the countries they study. If such evidence suggests that partisanship “means” something different (i.e., has distinct effects) across countries, then scholars can begin to use the same data to explain why. We seek to push that project forward by presenting results from a series of experiments designed to test whether party identifiers adopt policy preferences to match those of their party. We carried out these survey experiments in three countries where, unlike the U.S., multiple parties viably compete for legislative seats. These cases include Great Britain, one of the most stable and venerable party systems in the world, Hungary, a young but relatively stable party system, and Poland, a young and still fairly volatile system. Consistent with work in the U.S., we find that partisans do follow party cues in expressing policy preferences in these countries. Moreover, the pattern of results across cases suggests that this power may emerge and strengthen with party system crystallization.

Brockington, D. (2003). Constricted Policy Space and Political Participation: Evidence from 34 Democracies. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.

Brockington, D. (2003). Familiarity Breeds Contentment: Contextual and Individual Determinants of Democratic Satisfaction in 34 Democracies. 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Evidence suggests that the manner win which citizens of emerging democracies reason about the performance of democracy is “fundamentally different” than citizens of established democracies. Relying on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this paper examines underlying differences in support for democracy. Employing a hierarchical research design, I find that citizens in emerging democracies pay more attention to economic outputs, while those in established democracies are more likely to focus on political outputs of the system. Arguing that a possible explanation might be the way that parties organize mass attitudes, attention shifts to variance in the strength of partisan identification. Findings here suggest that partisan loyalties in emerging democracies exhibit weaker connections to strength of ideological attitudes, a reduced cohort effect, and virtually no relationship to feelings of political efficacy. This suggests that a learning function might be at work, where some degree of experience is required before parties learn how to make coherence out of politics, and for citizens to distinguish the realms of responsibility between the incumbent government and the fundamental democratic regime.

Brockington, D. and J. Karp (2002). Social Desirability and Response Validity: A Comparative Analysis of Over-Reporting Turnout in Five Countries. 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Theory and evidence suggests that the source of overreporting of turnout in election surveys is due to the respondent's wish to offer a socially desirable answer to a survey question. While this has been examined in several single country studies, no effort has been made to consider this question in a comparative context. While it has been assumed that the socially desirable bias affects everybody equally regardless of context, it has become a salient issue with the recent availability of large scale cross-national surveys of electoral behavior such as the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

Burlacu, D. E. (2012). Leader Effects on Vote Choice in Corrupted Countries: Do Voters Choose the Lesser Evil? . Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago.

Carlin, R. and G. Love (2007). Policy Salience, Strategic Mobilization, and Voter Turnout. 65th Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Though many scholars theorize that the institutional context of an election explains why voter turnout varies across systems, very few explore the causal mechanisms governing this relationship. Explanations that focus the decision to vote on individuals weighing the rational costs and benefits of voting dead-end into the paradox of voting. However, we believe representative institutions, civic organizations, the press, religious groups, and other interests groups can effectively make these calculations for citizens based on the policy salience of a given election in a given political system. Therefore, when an election is highly salient for policy, group mobilization turns out people whose resource endowments and predispositions augur against electoral participation. When the policy salience of an election is low, groups relax their efforts and citizens' resources and attitudes more clearly distinguish voters from abstainers.

Chu, Y.-h., M.-h. Huang, et al. (2005). Identifying Sources of Democratic Legitimacy in Established and Emerging Democracies. International conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Claibourn, M. and V. Sapiro (2000). Gender Differences in Citizen-Level Democratic Citizenship: Evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association. Quebec, Canada.

Claibourn, M. and V. Sapiro (2001). Gender Differences in Citizen-Level Democratic Citizenship: Evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. 59th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Clausen, L. (2008). Party Democratization and Citizens: The Impact of Candidate Selection Rules on Voters. 79th Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans. Political parties vary widely in the degree to which they allow party members to participate in the selection of candidates running on a party ticket or list. Indeed, the comparative party system literature does a good job of categorizing and describing the ways in which a party defines its "selectorate" and governs its behavior. Where the literature falters, however, is in giving us a clearer picture of how those candidate selection rules affect the voting members of the party on Election Day. The common wisdom is that electoral systems using proportional representation will have higher levels of turnout, but this common wisdom has never been tested using a measure of how involved voters are in the selection of their candidates or lists. In this paper, I use Bille's (2001) classification of party rules to create an indicator for the openness of candidate selection methods among political parties in several Western European countries. I then use CSES data to test the extent to which these party rules affect voter turnout, levels of political information, and degree of political participation (such as campaign contributions, volunteering, etc.)—at both the party level and national level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript

Colton, T. J. (2000). Babes in Partyland: The Riddle of Partisanship in Post-Soviet Russia. 2000 World Democratization Conference on Rethinking Democracy in the New Millennium, University of Houston, Houston.

Comsa, M. and C. D. Tufis (2014). Reassessing the Effect of Economic Conditions on Support for Democracy: Evidence from the 2009-2013 Romanian Election Study Panel. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Crow, D. and E. Berumen (2007). Who Really votes? Rethinking the effects of sociodemographic conditions on voting in Mexico in light of turnout overestimation. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chigago. One of the most constant relationships to emerge from the systematic study of politics is the relationship between sociodemographic variables (such as age, education, income, and employment) and voting. However, as in other countries, these results in Mexico are based on self-reported voting behavior. Post-electoral surveys invariably overestimate the proportion of people who vote either because the sample includes too many non-voters and not enough voters or, more likely, respondents claim to have voted when they really did not (i.e., they overreported). Under reasonably general conditions, unit non-response and overreporting bias our estimates of predictors’ effects on turnout. We parse the problem of turnout overestimation in Mexico’s 2000 presidential election and test three corrective methods: (A) survey “filters” to reclassify as non-voters respondents unlikely to have voted, (B) sample weights derived from aggregate data, and (C) a sample selection model with Heckman-type correction. The results of all three methods suggest that failing to account for turnout overestimation exaggerates the effects of sociodemographic variables on turnout.

Curini, L. and S. M. Iacus (2013). Explaining Party Ideological Stances: From Simulation to Real Elections. EPSA Annual General Conference. Barcelona. By relying on survey-data from the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) project, we run a number of simulated scenarios assuming that parties are interested in vote-maximizing, and we compute for each election the distribution of party ideological positions that corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium along a one-dimensional space. This is accomplished with the help of an original package that we have developed in R that implements Merill and Adams (2001) iterative algorithm. Through that it becomes possible to evaluate in a systematic way which are the factors that can push parties toward a more centrifugal (i.e., extreme) positions in equilibrium. Secondly, we show how the equilibrium positions so derived can become a counterfactual scenario against which contrasting the actual (perceived) position of parties. The aim of the comparison is to understand the nature of the electoral incentives facing parties, and deriving insights on real party system competition.

Curtice, J. (2003). Elections as Beauty Contests: Do the rules matter? International Conference on 'Portugal at the Polls', Lisbon, Portugal. Leaders have become the human face of election campaigns. This has lead to the suggestion that many voters now vote for the party leader they like best rather than the party they prefer. However, people would seem more likely to vote for the leader rather than the party in presidential elections rather than parliamentary ones, and amongst parliamentary elections themselves when a majoritarian rather than proportional electoral system is used. In addition we might expect these propositions to be particularly true if few people have a strong party identification and many people watch a lot of television news. This paper uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project data to assess whether there is any systematic evidence to support these expectations.

Curtice, J. and W. P. Shively (2002). Who Represents Us Best? One Member or Many? International Fulbright Conference "Eleições e Democracia". Lisbon, Portugal.

Dageförde, M. (2013). Exploring the Effects of Congruence: Party-Voter-Agreement and Citizens' Evaluation of Representation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Congruence between citizens and political actors is one of the most frequent discussed topics in research on representation nowadays. The concept is one of the main indicators for evaluating representation. The implicit assumption is: the higher the congruence, the better the quality of representation. This article attempts to test the (normative) assumption empirically and relates congruence to the citizens’ judgments about representation. In doing so, subjective congruence between citizens and political parties is analyzed by measuring the many-to-many-relationship. The data is driven from EES (2009), CSES (2005-2009). The results prove that congruence as well as perceived parliamentary responsiveness differ among the European citizenry. Despite, the findings indicate that congruence as a many-to-many relation does not correlate strongly to citizens’ (positive) evaluation of parliamentary representation.

Dahlberg, S. (2010). Misperceptions and Effective Representation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.: 20. According to the responsible party, parties are assumed to present prospective policy programs on to which voters make their choices. The voters are assumed to vote for the party whose policy program is closest to their own policy preferences. The elections are in this context reckoned as a process of mandate giving where parties, when in government, will strive for realizing their policy programs. Voters’ perceptions of party positions are essential in this context since they affect the extent to which voters are meaningfully represented in a political system. Common and accurate perceptions are hence a prerequisite for effective policy representation. Prior research on perception among voters have, however, mainly focused on the impact of internal features among voters on the perceptual process while in general less research has been spent on the impact and characteristics of external stimulus. A relevant question in this aspect is thus if and to what extent the electoral and the political context also matters for voters’ perceptions. The focal point in this study is on how voters’ perceptions are affected not only by individual characteristics but also by various contextual factors related to the political parties and the political systems. With data from the CSES modules 1 and 2 on individual voters and various system characteristics from election surveys in 29 countries, this article shows that individual factors such as individuals left‐right positions, education and gender are important factors behind voters’ perceptual deviations (i.e. the deviation between individual’s placement of parties and the median party position made by all voters). However, the strongest impact is to be found in the degree of divergence in a party’s left‐right position together with party size, party labels and the degree of competition within a system. In general it seems as ‘wishful thinking’ seems to occur when the policy positions of parties are blurred due to either that a position is shared by several parties, or if a party is big or do not have a brand name that gives a clue to its expected position or the degree of competitiveness with in a system.

Dahlberg, S. (2011). The contextual sources of voters’ satisfaction with democracy 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Voters’ satisfaction with the democratic system is an important, for not to say, fundamental aspect of the legitimacy of the political system but also an important indicator for the function of the electoral l process as such. This paper explores the impact of quality of government, party system simplicity and individual resources on voters’ satisfaction with the democratic system (SD). The paper investigates to what extent the levels of SD between countries can be explained by differences in formal and informal institutional or contextual structures. The paper takes its theoretical point of departure in the idea that when it comes to informal institutions a) simplicity (in terms of dimensionality of the party systems), b) responsiveness (issue congruence between voters and representatives) and c) clarity (the degrees of perceptual agreement among voters on party positions) are crucial aspects related to the political system that will have a direct impact on voters’ satisfaction with democracy. When it comes to formal institutions it is believed that factors such as freedom of press, impartiality of legislative bodies and the absence of corruption are factors that may generate greater levels of SD. The paper uses data from CSES (www.cses.org) on individual voters and party system characteristics together with data on governmental institutions from the QoG-institute (www.qog.pol.gu.se).

Dahlberg, S. and S. Holmberg (2011). Policy representation, government effectiveness and satisfaction with the way democracy works. 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Most research on how citizens judge democracy as such or how they judge the functioning of democracy have been focusing on micro-level factors on the individual level or on system factors on the input side of democracy. This is well and good, but it misses the heart of the problem. The proof of a pudding is not in the making; it is in the eating. Consequently, studying satisfaction with the working of democracy without taking the output side of democracy into consideration is a serious mistake. Representation and electoral systems in all honor, but they are rather impotent without successful policy implementations, high quality of public service provisions and impartial bureaucracies. Except for the pioneering work of Bruce Gilley (2009), this is something that more than often is forgotten when studying citizens' satisfaction with the working of democracy. The present study takes it point of departure by focusing on one system factors related to the input side of the political system, i.e. the electoral dimension, and one factor related to the out-put side of the political system, i.e. the quality of government. Hence, we will investigate to what extent policy representation (in terms of ideological congruence between voters and representatives) and the presence of effective, impartial governmental institutions is related to citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works. The obvious but rather novel hypotheses of this paper is that ideological congruence between citizens and their representatives and impartial and effective governance will lead to high degrees of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Furthermore, we expect our output factor to outperform the traditional input factors in explaining citizens satisfaction with how democracy works. We believe that output matters more than input. The paper uses data from CSES (www.cses.org) on individual voters and party system characteristics together with data on governmental institutions from the QoG-institute (www.qog.pol.gu.se). The data builds on CSES modules 1, 2 and 3, covering 49 124 respondents from 42 countries in 91 elections.

Dahlberg, S., H. Oscarsson, et al. (2005). Ideological voting under different institutional contexts: Political communication and effective representation in 37 countries. XIV Annual Meeting of the Nordic Political Science Association, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland. The impact of electoral systems on party systems has long been regarded as one of the most important effects of electoral engineering (Duverger 1954; Lijphart 1994; Sartori 1997; 1976a). A common assumption among rational choice institutionalists is that electoral rules have a certain impact on the party systems and the patterns of competition, since the adoption of certain rules creates incentives for rational vote-seeking parties to either emphasize particularistic or programmatic benefits during the election campaigns (Downs 1957; Sjöblom 1968). The strategies adopted by political elites are indirectly expected to influence the voting behavior among citizens. Yet, it is not quite clear to what extent electoral institutions affect voters on a micro level, only that they do. By combining contextual variables on electoral system features with cross-national surveys of voting behavior, we empirically explore how citizens are affected by the institutional context. A simultaneous modeling of macro and micro data from CSES shows a weak but significant contextual effect of type of electoral system on voting behavior. Proportional multiparty-systems seem to induce parties to communicate their policy positions by means of ideology. The parties’ left-right positions are more known to voters in proportional systems than in non-proportional systems and the effect of ideology on party choice is also stronger in proportional systems. The fact that the left-right dimension is not a valid operationalization of ideology in some countries does raise doubts over the validity of the findings. If only polities where the left-right dimension plays an important role are included, the support for this main finding becomes stronger. A more elaborated conclusion would be that among countries where the left-right dimension is an important distinction for voters, we find a significant effect of institutional context on the levels of ideological voting.

Dalton, R. J. (2007). The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party System Polarization, its Measurement and its Consequences. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. One of the most widely examined properties of party systems is the counting of the number of parties. Research has posited that the number of parties affects the representation of social cleavages in voting behavior, election turnout, patterns of political conflict, and other party system effects. This article argues that research typically counts the quantity of parties, and often the more important property is the quality of party competition—the polarization of political parties within a party system. We begin by discussing the concept of party system polarization in the research literature; and why polarization is important to study. Second, we provide a new measurement of party system polarization based on party positions in the two waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). This includes more than fifty separate elections, spanning more than three dozen nations from the established and developing democracies. Third, and most important, we compare party fractionalization and party polarization as influences on the strength of cleavage and ideological alignments in voting choice, and as predictors of turnout levels. The results indicate that party polarization is theoretically and empirically more related to the behavioral outcomes.

Dalton, R. J. (2009). Voter Choice and Partisan Representation: One Link in the Chain of Party Government. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto, CA: 32. Contemporary democracy is largely based on a framework of party government that connects the voters to the outputs of government using political parties as a linkage mechanism. This paper examines one aspect of this linkage process: how the public’s political orientations, based on the Left-Right scale, influence their voting choices. As we should expect, there is a strong relationship in most democracies, although also substantial cross-national variation. We then consider how this representation process functions for voter-party dyads, and the fit between the Left-Right orientations of party voters and their chosen party. These party dyads display very strong congruence; like-minded voters and parties are able to link together at election time. The results suggest party voters as a group are very well represented in the political system by a party that broadly shares their basic Left-Right orientations. We base our empirical analyses on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) module II.

Dalton, R. J., D. M. Farell, et al. (2011). The Dynamics of Political Representation. Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Seattle: 21-38. The linkage between the public and the political decision makers is one of the essential topics for the study of democratic political systems. Most of the previous literature views elections and political representation as a discrete decision-making process. This paper suggests that rather than a discrete, point-in-time choice, democracy is based on a process of ongoing, dynamic representation that occurs through a comparison of the past and the future across repeated elections. Thus, we examine the empirical correspondence between citizens and their government over time based on modules I and II of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The results strongly argue that there is a high level of democratic representation in contemporary democracies, and elections serve as a dynamic steering method to keep government in synch with their publics.

Dalton, R. J. and I. McAllister (2013). Why Parties Change - Or do they? Citizen Perceptions of the Partisan Landscape. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago: 33. Implicit in any theory of democratic elections is the idea of change—or at least the potential for change. Elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus alter the course of government if they so desire. This potential for change contributes to making democratic governments accountable and representative of public preferences. Our research asks how much parties actually change their broad political positions between elections and tests the existing theories of party change. Spatial modeling approaches argue that parties change their political positions between elections to seek electoral advantage (change as vote seeking). Other research claims that the characteristics of a party shape its behavior. We utilize a growing time series of citizen perceptions of party positions from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. First, we demonstrate very high stability in parties’ Left-Right ideological position over time. Second, we find limited evidence that parties change in a conscious process of vote seeking. Third, we show how electoral context affects the patterns of partisan change. We conclude by discussing the differential sources of stability and change in contemporary party systems, and the implications for electoral politics.

Dassonneville, R. and A. Blais (2013). Staying with the Party, Switching, or Exiting? Determinants of party switching and abstention in 27 countries. . Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Chicago.

Dassonneville, R. and Y. Dejaeghere (2013). Mind the Gap! Political Sophistication and the Ideological Distance of Party Switching. ECPR Joint Sessions. Mainz. Scholars have investigated the characteristics of volatile voters ever since the first voter surveys were carried out and they have paid specific attention to the role of political sophistication on vote switching. Nevertheless, the exact nature of this relationship is still unclear. With increasing volatility over the past decades this question has furthermore grown in relevance. Is the growing unpredictability of elections mostly driven by sophisticated voters making well-considered choices or is the balance of power in the hands of unsophisticated ‘floating voters’? Several scholars have argued that even under conditions of increasing volatility switching is still mostly confined to changes to ideologically close parties. Most researchers, however, have used rather crude measures to investigate this ‘leap’ between parties. To advance research in this field we suggest to directly take into account the ideological distance bridged by volatile voters when investigating the link between political sophistication and volatility. We do this using CSES-data that encompasses a broad sample of recent parliamentary elections worldwide. Results indicate that voters with an intermediate level of political knowledge are most likely to switch overall. When taking into account the ideological distance of party switching, however, the confining impact of political knowledge on the vote choices made is clearly dominant, resulting in a linear decrease of the distance bridged as voters

Dassonneville, R. and B. Ferland (2014). Shifting Parties, Sophisticated Switchers. Are Voters Responding to Ideological Shifts by Political Parties? Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington D.C. The trend towards increasing electoral volatility has triggered a rich literature investigating which voters are most likely to switch parties in subsequent elections. Less is known, however, on the role parties play in causing voters to switch parties. From a Downsian perspective we assume that changes in parties’ ideological positions should cause voters to switch parties from one election to another. The current paper addresses these shortcomings in the literature by bringing together literature on volatility and research on responsiveness to political party. For doing so, we make use of the data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. The results presented in this paper show that parties’ ideological shifts are indeed causing voters to switch parties. The extent to which this mechanism of accountability functions, however, is partly dependent on individual- as well as contextual-level factors.

De Vries, C. and N. Giger (2012). Holding Governments Accountable: Individual Heterogeneity in Performance Voting. Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference. Oxford. This study examines individual heterogeneity in performance voting due to political sophistication and salience. Building on two recently developed theoretical perspectives – heterogeneous attribution and heterogeneous information – we test whether low sophisticated voters reward or punish incumbents more strongly for past performance than the highly sophisticated or whether, as the heterogeneous information argument expects, the opposite is true. Secondly, we expect performance voting to be stronger when voters attach a high degree of salience to a particular policy field. Utilizing crossnational data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) including 26 democracies, we examine these expectations, and explore how political sophistication and salience attached to a policy area mediate performance voting across an array of policy fields including the economy, social welfare, immigration and national security. Our findings provide empirical support for our expectations and are in line with a heterogeneous information perspective: performance voting increases with political sophistication, but the sophistication gap narrows as voters view a policy field as more important. This suggests that the degree of salience voters attach to certain policy outcomes offsets the informational costs of performance voting.

Dejaeghere, Y. and R. Dassonneville (2012). The Impact of the Party System on Electoral Volatility. A Cross-Country Analysis of Inter-Election Switching. Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference 2012. Oxford: 38. In the literature on electoral volatility and party defection, structural elements have been put forward as crucial variables. Especially the party system is suggested to be of importance for understanding differences in levels of volatility between countries. First of all, the electoral system has been shown to have an impact on levels of volatility. In majoritarian and highly disproportional systems, electoral volatility proved to be more pronounced. With regard to the party system two dimensions can be distinguished. First, the number of parties within an electoral system is expected to be related to levels of electoral volatility. It is argued that the more options voters have, the more they will be inclined to switch. Second, the extent to which a party system is polarized matters as well. The more polarized a party system is, the larger ideological distances between parties are. Therefore, switching parties implies a more pronounced ideological shift for a voter and should therefore become less probable. Although these variables have been empirically studied separately, there has not yet been a large comparative investigation including them in one analysis with cross-national data on the individual level. Using the second and third module of the CSES project this paper investigated volatility for 25531 respondents in 32 elections between 2000 and 2010. Using multilevel models that include country level variables while controlling for important individual level characteristics we have an optimal control of the simultaneous effect of these separate variables. Our results show that the effect of individual-level variables such as education and a persons’ satisfaction with democracy remain strong predictors of electoral volatility even in a cross-national analysis. Of the variables on the contextual level proportionality and the number of parties seem to have an effect on switching parties between elections. Volatility is higher in more proportional systems. Furthermore, it seems that the sheer number of parties increases the propensity to change a voters choice regardless of their polarization. This last finding is a refutation of a longstanding claim in the literature that it is the distance between the parties rather than the number that influences volatility. Because we tested three different measures for polarization separately that can be found in the literature, this can be considered a robust finding. We furthermore find a cross-level interaction effect that shows that satisfaction with the way democracy works in a country leads to different odds of switching votes depending on the effective number of parties in that election.

Díez-Nicolás, J. (2000). An Attempt to Interpret Party Attachment in Old and New Democracies. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Díez-Nicolás, J., K. A. Rasinski, et al. (2005). A Comparison of Public Responses to Terrorist Attacks in Spain and the United States. International conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Dinas, E. and S. Pardos Prado (2007). Exploring contextual heterogeneity in issue voting: Proximity versus direction. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. A central question in issue voting is how people form their evaluations about parties’ issue positions. Spatial modeling has provided two seemingly contradicting answers without, however, proving either of them as the dominant one. Empirical evidence indicates that both the directional and the proximity model account equally well for voters’ party preferences. Instead of vainly trying to look for the ultimate ‘winner’, the aim of this paper is to examine whether this puzzling pattern is due to contextual and issue heterogeneity. The structure of the party system and the degree of ideological polarisation are deemed to account for this discrepancy. To test this hypothesis we use the 2004 European Election Study data which permit the specification of a linear hierarchical model so that we can control for these upper-level contextual factors. Furthermore, since different issues might encourage thinking either in proximity or in directional terms, it is also examined whether the common average performance of the two models conceals differences which can be identified by focusing on the nature of political issues. This is important because it is explicitly related to another fundamental issue, that is, how people understand attitudinal scale-questions. The findings seem to indicate that contextual determinants shape people’s thinking about issues. By the same token, the degree of generality in a given issue question is also important: proximity appears to work better with broad, encompassing-all political dimensions; more specific issues, however, encourage a rather directional thinking about politics.

Dowley, K. M. and B. D. Silver (2007). Political Institutions and Minority Group Perceptions of Democracy. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. This study examines how political institutions shape ethnic minority and majority group perceptions of governmental performance in democratic systems. Are system characteristics that are said to be more consensual than majoritarian likely to engender more positive orientations toward the system? Using data from 36 countries in the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we identify three distinct dimensions of system evaluation: democratic performance, voice, and external efficacy. We also identify ethnic group subsamples for 23 countries and then test for ethnic group differences in system evaluations and for the impact of institutional arrangements on those evaluations using a variety of methods including using OLS regression and two-level hierarchical modeling. We do not find consistent evidence that more consensual institutions evoke more positive evaluations, either among the ethnic minorities or among the majorities.

Dowley, K. M. and B. D. Silver (2015). Political Institutions and Minority Group Evaluations of Democracy. Conference of the European Consortium of Political Research. Montreal: 28. This study examines how political institutions shape ethnic minority and majority group perceptions of governmental performance in democratic systems. Drawing on the early work of Lijphart (1999), and more recently Norris (2008) and Kittilson et al. (2013), we examine whether systems characterized by more power-sharing institutions elicit more satisfaction and efficacy among ethnic, linguistic or religious minority group members? If, as Anderson et al. (2005) suggest, different system designs “allow for different relationships between majorities and minorities,” do minorities themselves perceive the benefits of one type over the other? Using data from democratic countries included in the second and third waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we identify two distinct dimensions of system evaluation: democratic performance and external efficacy. We also identify minority group subsamples for 30 democracies and examine the impact of power sharing vs. power concentrating institutional arrangements on evaluations by minority group members. We find that while institutions matter, they do not matter consistently in the same ways for minority and majority group members. The argument that more inclusive political institutions lead to greater system support by minority groups finds at best uneven support.

Drummond, A. (2007). Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Small and Large Party Systems. 65th Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Research has shown that when partisans are asked to place the parties in their system along a left-right dimension, they often pull their preferred party closer toward them (assimilation) and push the opposition farther away (contrast). This paper asks a simple question: are such assimilation and contrast effects similarly powerful across small and large party systems? I hypothesize that larger party systems will work to reduce the space for assimilation and contrast effects to manifest since additional parties may add perspective. Using data from 18 advanced democracies compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I find that contrast effects do seem to diminish as party systems grow, but very large party systems also produce large contrast effects. Assimilation, on the other hand, remains relatively strong regardless of the institutional setting. These findings add fuel to the notion that institutional design can hold lasting consequences for the way we perceive politics and maybe also for our ability to effectuate democracy.

Drummond, A. J. (2005). Thinking Outside the (Ballot) Box: Gauging the Cognitive Consequences of Electoral Rules for Partisans and Partisanship. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The rules of any game matter, as they define the parameters of competition and the conditions for victory. For this reason alone, electoral rules affect parties and their supporters, but do they also impact partisans in ways that last beyond the voting booth? I take up this line of research by combining two classic typologies-- Duverger’s mechanical and psychological effects and Rae’s distal and proximal effects-- to develop a new framework which accounts for the impact of electoral rules on both party systems and individuals. Utilizing data on 35 new and old democracies found in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Modules 1 and 2, and hierarchical modeling, I find that electoral rules do have lasting cognitive consequences for the individual; among them, that partisanship in closed systems leads to more positive attitudes toward parties and a stronger sense of political efficacy, and that system openness diminishes the negative impact of strong partisanship on partisan sophistication.

Drummond, A. J. (2006). Open and Closed: Party Affect and Sincere Voting in Electoral Context. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Building on scholarship that seeks to explain sincere voting in electoral context, this paper investigates whether system openness, defined by the complex of electoral institutions which shape party system dynamics like district magnitude, proportional seat allocation and legal thresholds, has consequences for voters’ decisions to remain loyal to their preferences. I begin by asking under what circumstances we should expect voters to be loyal to their preferences, identifying three baseline correlates of sincerity. I then investigate the extent to which such conditions hold when placed in the proper electoral context. The study makes use of matched vote choice and party preference data from respondents across 18 advanced democracies compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). I find that small party supporters are more likely to cast sincere ballots when they have strongly positive feelings for their party and when their affect toward the top two parties differs little. By contrast, when voters are less positive about their party and especially when they perceive a large difference between the top alternatives, they are much more likely to stray. Finally, Institutional characteristics alter these relationships, with more open electoral systems strengthening the relationship between affect and sincerity, and weakening the pressure to cast strategic ballots when the top alternatives seem very different. These results provide generalized support for previous work linking sincerity levels with system openness, while providing a contextualized understanding of how electoral institutions can impact voter rationale.

Drummond, A. J. (2009). Ideological Bias and Perceptions of the Party Space: Comparing New and Old Democracies. 80th Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans. When party supporters are asked to place their party and the opposition’s in the left-right ideology space they tend to assimilate the position of their preferred party to their own, while simultaneously pushing the opposition’s farther away – a phenomenon referred to in the literature as contrast. This paper uses survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems matching respondents’ own left-right positions with their perceptions of the party space in an effort to compare the strength of assimilation and contrast effects across 24 new and old democracies. Using hierarchical linear modeling, I test a number of hypotheses regarding expected variation in the strength of the effects, including the number of parties in the system, the number of elections held since democratization, and the range of ideological positions covered by the largest parties. At the same time, the individual level data allow for control of important factors like education level and interest in politics. The results suggest that assimilation and contrast are nearly universal phenomena that can shape perceptions of the party space even in the new democracies, while institutional factors may play a role in how powerful these phenomena turn out to be.

Duch, R. M., J. May, et al. (2008). A Strategic Ideological Vote. Designing Democratic Institutions, London School of Economics, London. Ideology is widely considered to be an important factor in shaping policy outcomes and in inuencing election outcomes. This essay confirms the importance of ideology in explaining vote choice, based on 245 voter preference surveys world wide, from 30 countries, and over a 25 year period. We also demonstrate, though, that the importance of ideology in the vote function varies quite significantly across countries and, within countries, over time. We propose a theory of the strategic ideological vote to explain this variation. The argument suggests voters anticipate the post-election bargains negotiated amongst members of the governing coalition and these anticipated policy agreements inform their vote choice. Our analysis confirms that voters exercise a strategic ideological vote and that it frequently differs from what would be predicted using sincere ideological voting models.

Duch, R. M. and R. Stevenson (2003). The Micro-Foundations of the Economic Vote in Comparative Perspective. 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Duch, R. M. and R. Stevenson (2003). The Micro-Foundations of the Economic Vote in Comparative Perspective. Edinburgh 2003 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Dunn, K. and J. Thornton (2007). Vote Choice and Ideological Consistency: A Comparative Examination. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Individuals may conceive of their own ideology in one of two ways: as an ideal view of society or as a symbolic reference, that is operationally or symbolically. However many individuals lack a consistent and constrained set of attitudes, a clear indicator of a lack of ideological reasoning. One may inquire, then, as to the role ideology may play in the political actions of these individuals. How does ideology influence these individuals’ voting behavior? This paper examines these questions using a cross-national dataset. The findings suggest that many individuals are conflicted ideologically and that when this is the case the symbolic aspect of ideology dominates. Furthermore, the same causes of inconsistency also cause individuals to not be able to use these shortcuts when voting.

Elff, M. (2008). Social Divisions, Political Sophistication, and Political Equality in Comparative Perspective. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Although there are various conceptualizations of political sophistication and political knowledge extant in the literature, almost all of the indicators of these concepts show clear correlations with education. Further, education usually correlates with social stratification. Thus, the political presentation of the socially and/or economically disadvantaged may be hampered to the degree that political knowledge and political sophistication distorts political choices and attitudes. On the other hand, the political heuristics literature has often stressed the role of the political environment for making heuristics useful or available at all. For this reason, the same gradient in political knowledge and political sophistication in a democracy's population need not always lead to the same discrepancy in the quality of political representation of different social classes. This paper explores the connection between social inequality, political sophistication and knowledge, and political attitudes in a comparative perspective. It those aspects of social and political systems that facilitate the use of political cues---how party organizations, the structure of party competition, the the degree of organization of the population by trades unions, and the structure of the educational system can help alleviating the averse effects of knowledge deficiencies of certain parts of the population and thus promote political equality. The empirical analyses of the paper show that the system of government and individual trade union membership impinge on the level and the evenness of the distribution of practical aspects of political sophistication, namely of naming political issues, locating parties political positions, and knowing more or less basic political facts.

Elff, M. (2009). Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective: The Problem of Cross-National Equivalence of Measurement. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) presents a unique resource for comparative research on political attitudes and behavior. From the beginning, country components of the CSES have contained each at least three items concerned with political information and knowledge. These items vary considerably across countries in terms of question format and question content. Using methods of Item Response Theory (IRT), the paper examines how these aspects impinge on the discriminance and difficulty of the items, both important aspects of their validity as indicators of political knowledge. It shows that the question content is especially important for the items difficulty: Notwithstanding the political context, items that ask for numbers (e.g. of federal states or EU member countries) are much more difficult to answer, given the level of political knowledge. Further, notwithstanding the political context, questions about foreign policymatters have a higher discriminance, that is, can better distinguish between di.erent levels of political knowledge, than other items. The paper concludes with a discussion on how cross-national equivalence of knowledge questions can be enhanced.

Ellis, A. (2004). Participation and Turnout: Relating Knowledge and Tools to the Practical Questions facing Democratic Reformers. "Challenges to Democratic Governance": A Roundtable organized by the Political Science Department of the University of Stockholm, Stockholm, Sweden.

Enyedi, Z. and B. Todosijevic (2006). Adversarial politics and party identification in Eastern and Western Europe. Nicosia 2006 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, Cyprus. The role of political parties in legitimizing regimes and integrating citizens into the democratic political order is often praised but rarely demonstrated. If parties have indeed such a role, they must exercise it, among other ways, through the emotional links that exist among parties and citizens. But identification with parties is declining in most established democracies, and seems to be relatively weak in new democracies. It becomes therefore particularly important to identify the conditions under which partisan attachments develop and to assess their attitudinal consequences. The present paper tries to find out what are the correlates of party identification (PID) in both ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Europe. While we have also analyzed sociological explanations, attitudes and institutions proved to be more consequential. We find ‘bright’ and ‘civic’ feelings behind PID as efficacy and positive evaluation of how democracy works, but also, and more importantly, ‘darker’ sentiments, like ideological radicalism, highly differentiated feelings towards parties (that is, both love and hate) and the perception of parties as standing far apart. Next to the length of democratic experience, polarized ideological space and institutions that foster adversarial politics also contribute to the level of partisan attachments Institutional regimes that encourage clear governmental responsibility and concentrate power proved to be beneficial as far as PID is concerned.

Esaiasson, P. and M. Ottervik (2014). Attitudinal Political Support and Behavioral Compliance – New Evidence to a Long-Standing Debate. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington D.C.: 36. Theory suggests that citizen attitudinal support is essential for regime stability. However, it is less clear that the survey indicators favored by attitudinal support scholars is informative about the theorized relationship. To contribute new evidence to this long-standing debate over measurement validity, we develop a theoretically grounded measure of compliant behavior that comprises law abidance, tax compliance, and conformance with an impartial state administration (the inverse of which is corruption). Combining our composite measure of behavioral compliance with attitudinal support measures as registered in WVS, EVS, CSES, and ESS, we find a strong and consistent country-level correlation between support and compliance. Further strengthening validity claims, the relationship is robust for controls of economic and democratic development, and support indicators pick up temporal dynamics of the support-compliance relationship.

Espirito-Santo, A. (2009). The Potential Symbolic Value of Descriptive Representation: The Case of Female Representation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto, CA: 35. This paper seeks to analyze the relationship between the existence of women in political power and citizens’ evaluation of the quality of democracy in their country. Using mainly data from The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), Module 2 (2001 – 2006), it focuses on post–elections surveys of 29 countries all over the world. It has two main objectives. The first is to present some mechanisms that might account for the relationship between the presence of women in key political positions and citizens’ evaluation of democracy and to do a preliminary analysis of how plausible these mechanisms are. The second objective is to check whether the feminization of different layers of political power is connected to satisfaction with democracy. In that sense, besides checking the impact of the percentage of female MPs (identified by Karp and Banducci 2008), it also considers the percentage of women in ministerial positions, and the presence of a female Prime Minister or President. My findings confirm that in countries with more gender-balanced parliaments, citizens tend to feel happier about their democracy. Furthermore, they suggest that the same can be said regarding countries with a female President. The latter result is particularly strong among women.

Farrell, D. and I. McAllister (2003). Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting Make a Difference? 51st Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, University of Tasmania, Australia.

Farrell, D. and I. McAllister (2003). Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting Make a Difference? 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. This paper revisits the question of whether electoral systems influence levels of satisfaction with democracy, in this instance examining a feature of electoral systems not so far considered - the ballot structure. We deploy CSES data to assess the relationship.

Feddersen, A. and S. Lanz (2015). Issue Ownership: More than just Party Identification? ECPR General Conference. Montréal. This article investigates the sources of individual perceptions of party competence. Classical issue ownership theory states that individual party competence evaluation stems from a party’s history of attention on a given issue (e.g. Petrocik 1996). Critics argue that party competence evaluation is little more than a product of party identification. Against the backdrop of this academic dispute, we investigate the factors influencing individuals’ perception of issue ownership. Drawing on data from post-electoral studies and on the Manifesto Project Database, we look at how partisanship and parties’ attention to issues influence voters’ competence evaluations. Adopting a comparative research design, we test our model for 20 OECD countries. The results show that issue ownership perceptions derive from both individual party identification as well as parties’ issue emphasis. Thus, viewing party competence as a mere expression of party ties is too simplistic

Fisher, S., P. Howell, et al. (2012). Winners and Losers in Electoral Politics. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 19. What causes individuals within a democratic society to be more or less satisfied with their governing system than their peers? Both theory and data have long suggested that satisfaction with democracy varies according to individuals’ associations with either the winning or the losing parties of a recent election: winners typically are more satisfied with democracy than losers. This intuitive finding does not tell the complete story, though. Theoretically, satisfaction with democracy should not remain constant for either winners or losers across elections of different levels of competitiveness; narrowly-won elections should bring relatively greater satisfaction to winners and less to losers, while blowouts should give winners relatively less satisfaction and losers relatively more. In other words, margin of victory also affects satisfaction with democracy. In this paper, we argue that previous studies have found little support for this theory because they do not focus on the distinction between winners and losers and because of limited data. Using CSES data covering 12 elections across 10 countries, we find that margin of victory does significantly affect satisfaction with democracy.

Fisher, S. D. and S. B. Hobolt (2008). Coalition Government and Retrospective Accountability. 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Single-party governments are commonly thought to be more clearly responsible for government policy than coalition governments. This is supposed to result in voters being less likely to hold coalition governments to account for past performance. One particular problem for voters evaluating coalition governments is how to assess whether all parties within a coalition should be held equally responsible for past performance. This paper uses data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to assess whether and how the composition of coalition governments affects the way in which people use their votes to hold governments to account.

Fisher, S. D., L. Lessard-Phillips, et al. (2006). How the effect of political knowledge on turnout differs in plurality electoral systems 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. There is reason to believe that when turnout is lower, it is voters who are less interested in and knowledgeable about politics who are particularly less likely to participate. A key question is therefore whether the use of proportional representation not only brings more voters to the polls, but is also more likely to bring less strongly motivated people to the ballot box. In addressing this question, we consider a number mechanisms through which the electoral system might change the relationship between political knowledge and turnout, including district competitiveness, mobilization efforts, satisfaction with democracy, feelings of efficacy, party polarization and the size of the party system. Although most of these factors have a role in explaining turnout variation in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) survey data, we find that those with low political knowledge are particularly unlikely to vote in plurality systems, and paradoxically this remains the case even after controlling for the effects of available intervening variables.

Fisher, S. D., L. Lessard-Phillips, et al. (2007). Accountability and Representation: how do voters approach elections? 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. A commonly held view in the literature on elections is that majoritarian systems maximize accountability of the government while proportional systems optimize ideological representation. Hence, it is assumed that citizens in majoritarian systems with higher clarity of responsibility use elections as sanctioning devices whereas voters in proportional systems see them as an opportunity to select candidates that best represent their views and interest. This paper tests these assumptions by addressing three main questions: Are citizens more likely to treat the election as a referendum on the government in a more majoritarian system? Are citizens more likely to vote for a party that represents their views in a more proportional system? Is there a trade-off between voting for a party that represents your views and holding the government to account? Using data from the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), we find people are more likely to hold the government to account where there are fewer political parties, but there is no sign that people are more likely to vote for the party that best represents their views in more proportional systems. There is also no sign of a trade-off between accountability and representation in the way voters approach elections.

Flacco, F. and S. Willocq (2015). Investigating the Relationship between Personalisation of Voting Behaviour and Electoral Volatility in Europe: A Cross-National Analysis. ECPR Joint Sessions. Warsaw. In the last decades, the personalization of voting behavior and electoral volatility have become two of the most investigated phenomena in political science. This considerable attention is the corollary of debates on the well documented erosion of social cleavages (Franklin et al., 2009), the weakening of party affiliation (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002; Mair et al.,2004; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1998) and the dealignment of the electorate. Although some authors suggested the existence of a strong relationship between personalization and volatility, just few case-studies have empirically questioned the link connecting these two phenomena (Brettschneider and Gabriel, 2002, Karvonen, 2011). This paper aims at providing a more comprehensive perspective, by proposing a cross-national analysis which includes the established democracies of Western Europe, as well as the young democracies of Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. We hypothesize that voters whose electoral decision is strongly influenced by leader evaluation are more volatile than those who manly rely on partisan cues when making their choice. The stronger the impact of the leader evaluation on voting behavior, the higher will be the probability of party switching. Using data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (Module 3 and 4), we will assess the predictive power of the leader evaluation as source of volatile behavior in 23 countries in the last decade. In addition, we argue that some specific macro and micro factors can strengthen or weaken the intensity of the relationship between personalization and volatility: the electoral system, the existence of preferential voting, the degree of party system polarization, the effective number of parties and voters’ socio-demographic characteristics. Specific attention will be devoted to identifying distinct trends between the three European regions exhibiting different degree of party system institutionalization: Western, Southern and Central and Eastern Europe.

Fortin, J. (2012). Do Different Degrees of Electoral Integrity Affect Satisfaction with Democracy and Efficacy? Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.

Fortin, J. and D. Howell (2010). Cross-National Comparison in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES): Capturing Demographics – the Case of Religious Denomination Ad Hoc Session AH02: Cross-national, survey-research methodology. XVII International Sociological Association (ISA) World Congress of Sociology. Gothenburg, Sweden.

Fortin-Rittberger, J. (2014). A Cross-national Investigation of Gender-based Differences in Political Knowledge. Annual Midwest Political Association Conference. Chicago, Il.

Fortunato, D. (2012). Legislative Review and Party Differentiation in Coalition Governments. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 27. Coalition governance requires compromise and this compromise can lead to electoral losses. In this essay I argue that coalition parties are motivated to differentiate themselves from their partners in order mitigate possible electoral losses resulting from voters perceiving them as too cooperative, not rigorously pursuing their core policy positions, or selling out. I support this argument with original data on the legislative review process in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands that incorporates data on voter perceptions of partisan ideology. I find that coalition parties amend the legislation of their partners more freely when they are perceived by voters as growing more similar to their partners | an indication that voters perceive an overly accommodative policy process; i.e., that the parties are not vehemently pursuing their core policies. The findings presented here serve to improve our understanding of coalition politics and legislative review in consensual democracies. This essay is also novel in that it is the first essay to incorporate voters directly into a comparative empirical model of legislative behavior, rather than simply assuming an electoral connection.

Foucault, M. (2014). Comparative Patrimonial Voting. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Fraile, M. (2005). Political Knowledge and the logic of voting: A comparative study. 3rd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Budapest, Hungary.

Freire, A. (2005). The Social Bases of Left and Right in Western Europe. Electoral Behaviour and Political Attitudes: Portugal in the European Context, Lisbon, Portugal, Social Science Institute of the University of Lisbon.

Freire, A. and M. Baum (2002). Election Order and Electoral Cycles in Democratic Portugal, 1975-2001. 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.

Gallego, A. (2008). Why is Turnout More Unequal in Some Countries Than in Others? The Impact of Institutions and Political Mobilization. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. Socially privileged citizens vote more frequently than the socially disadvantaged in some countries such as the USA. But unequal voter turnout is not universal. In many countries there are no such differences. The classical explanation to the presence orabsence of inequality in voting is that political mobilization sharpens or reduces it. In particular, left-wing political parties and trade unions are supposed to is proportionately foster the electoral participation of the socially disadvantaged. In this paper an alternative explanation is proposed: unequal turnout might be due to changes in the costs of voting due to institutional arrangements. When voting is easy because the voting procedure is simple, registration is compulsory, there are few parties, the electoral options are distinguishable, or in the presence of compulsory voting, turnout should be more equal. I test both theories using hierarchical modelling with data from 28 advanced industrial democracies and focusing on the impact of education on the vote. Political mobilization does not predict variation in the strength of the link between education and the probability to vote. The cost-based institutional model is a better explanation of changing levels of unequal turnout.

García Trejo, Y. A. (2012). Studying the Roots of Gender Differences in Political Knowledge in Mexico. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chigago. What are the roots of gender differences in political knowledge? While scholarship identifies differences in the opportunities, resources and motivations adult men and women have to acquire political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Stolle and Gidengil 2010), few studies address whether the gender gap in political knowledge also exists before adulthood. To address this gap I use data from an original survey conducted in 2010 and 2011 of 1,925 students in 14 public high schools located in two different states in central and northern Mexico. The survey includes knowledge questions about public figures and institutions. The analysis indicates that there are no gender differences in political knowledge among high schools students. This finding suggests that schools act as suppliers of information (e.g. through classes) and insulate students from external factors (e.g. working at home) that could otherwise limit student's access to information about politics. The non-existence of gender differences in political knowledge also suggest that the gender gap appears during adulthood. Thus, we need to focus on theorizing about how motivation and exposure to political information change as men and women age.

Garcia-Trejo, Y. (2009). A Never-Ending Gap? Political Knowledge and Gender Differences in Mexico. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Do women know less about politics than men do? This study analyzes the existence and persistence of a gender gap in political knowledge in Mexico. While there is evidence of gender differences in political knowledge in the United States that in turn shape patterns of political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Dow 2008; Kenski 2006; Kenski and Jamieson 2000; Mondak and Anderson 2004; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997), this topic has received very little attention in the context of new democracies. This paper seeks to address that gap by analyzing surveys conducted in Mexico from 1997-2006 as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project. I find that there is a gender gap in political knowledge in Mexico. I also find evidence that differences in education patterns between men and women have the largest impact on differences in political knowledge. However, a sizable difference across the two genders continues to exist even after controlling for other sociodemographic factors. I then discuss the implication of these findings for the conditions that might help reduce the gender differences in political sophistication.

Ghergina, S. (2013). Interchangeable or Different? the Levels of Gross and Net Electoral Volatility in Eastern Europe 20th International Conference of Europeanists-Crisis & Contingency: States of (In) Stability. Electoral volatility is a measurement developed to assess the intensity and nature of change in political support. As this support is the direct effect of two interrelated forces – voters as principals and political parties as agents – electoral change is measured and calculated separately on the demand (voters) and supply (parties) sides. On the one hand, at the individual level, gross electoral volatility refers to the total amount of vote switching in a party system (Crewe 1985). This measure basically gauges the electorate’s loyalty on a continuum with extremes at a situation in which no voters change their preferences in any way, and at an instance at which every single voter behaves differently than they did in the previous election. By focusing on vote shifts at the individual level, gross electoral volatility attempts to explain processes and phenomena within the political system with characteristics of the electorate and observed patterns like partisan dealignment and a decrease in party identification in mind. On the other hand, as individual data regarding voting behavior are not always available, net electoral volatility was considered an appropriate proxy to measure the aggregate vote transfers between political parties within a party system in subsequent elections. The measurement equivalence rests on the assumption that aggregate changes at various levels over time accurately reflect the corresponding levels in individual volatility (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Earlier research indicated that in Western Europe up to three quarters of the amount of gross electoral volatility being reflected in the measure of net electoral volatility (Lane and Ersson 1997). This paper investigates the relationship between gross and net (party level) electoral volatility in Eastern Europe, a region known for its low levels of partisanship, low continuity of parties, large number of splits and mergers, and high volatility rates (Bielasiak 1997; van Biezen 2003; Millard 2004; Sikk 2005; Spirova 2007; Tavits 2008; Gherghina 2012). The analysis includes the parties from 10 post-communist countries between 1996 and 2011 and uses individual level data from the CSES.

Ghergina, S. (2013). Is there life after voting? The political participation of ethnic minorities in Europe. 20th International Conference of Europeanists-Crisis & Contingency: States of (In) Stability. Existing research indicates that ethnic parties are among the most electorally stable political actors in Europe. Similarly, their electorates are seen as the most organized, disciplined, and involved. While the voting behavior of ethnic groups has been intensely investigated, less attention was paid to other forms of political participation. This paper seeks to address this empirical gap by answering two inter-related research questions: to what extent is the political participation of ethnic minorities limited to voting (compared to the majority populations) and what factors favor various types of political participation? Five forms of political participation are considered: voting, persuasion of other citizens to vote, participation in campaign activities, contacts with politician or official, and participation in demonstrations or protests. The study is carried at individual level using data from the Candidate Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). It includes the European countries with relevant ethnic minorities (i.e. relevance according to several criteria) and provides a cross-national analysis. The empirical tests account for three types of determinants enhancing the political participation of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities: political (i.e. satisfaction with democracy, government performance, closeness to a party, importance of elections), economic (retrospective and prospective evaluations), and social (income, education, residence) variables.

Giger, N. (2009). The electoral consequences of social policy. An empirical answer to the new politics literature. 67th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, Il. In Western democracies welfare state institutions have come under pressure and governments are forced to cut back social security. The welfare state literature states that the political costs associated with such changes are high and governments risk their re-election. Despite its fundamental position in the literature, the link between retrenchment and electoral behavior has not been established empirically. Addressing this deficiency, the paper examines the political consequences of social policy reform in comparative perspective using data from the CSES survey 2001-2006. Thereby, it is of interest not only to establish the micro level link between social policy attitudes and incumbent support but also to study whether social policy plays a role in determining the election outcome and ultimately the government composition. I employ multilevel regression and simulations based on counterfactual scenarios to do so. The findings indicate that social policy performance is a good predictor for incumbent vote and has the potential to shape aggregated incumbent vote shares; in some instances this issue can be ruinous for incumbent parties.

Golder, M. and J. Stramski (2007). Ideological Congruence and Two Visions of Democracy. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. A growing consensus has emerged that proportional democracies produce more ideological congruence between their citizens and representatives than majoritarian democracies. As we demonstrate, though, this consensus is open to question since it rests on a weak conceptualization of congruence, a poor theoretical foundation, and problematic data. In this paper, we introduce a new conceptualization of congruence and operationalize it with measures constructed with particularly appropriate data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. In direct contradiction to almost all of the literature, our empirical analysis of 41 elections in 24 countries from 1996 to 2005 illustrates that majoritarian and proportional democracies do not produce any substantive differences in terms of congruence. This suggests that if scholars wish to advocate on behalf of proportional democracies, then they should do so on grounds other than increased congruence. Our analysis has important implications for comparative and American scholars interested in political representation and congruence more generally.

Gray, M. M. (2003). In the Midst of Fellows: The Social Context of the American Turnout Decision. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. Voting behavior studies have historically highlighted institutional, psychological, and rational choice models to describe a voter turnout decision process that is profoundly individualistic. I argue that there is a social context to the decision to vote that can transcend individual cost-benefit decisions, resources, or psychological attachments to political figures or parties. This can be seen when one looks at the electorate not as randomly distributed atomistic decision makers but instead as pairs, or in more everyday terms couples, families, roommates or neighbors. I use official Registrar of Voter data from four California counties linked to a survey of 1,651 residents from those areas inquiring about their political attitudes and household makeup to study the household patterns of voter turnout in the 2000 primary and general elections. Replications using the American National Election Study (NES) and the Census Bureau Voter Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the 2000 elections are presented in the Appendix. The empirical results of this study reveal a strong social connection between the turnout of the individual and that of others living in their household while controlling for the demographics and attitudes of the respondent and the mobilization attempts of a variety of actors. The root of this connection is based in norms and a reflection of household participatory political cultures.

Grönlund, K. (2002). How Education and Political Information Affect Turnout in Different Electoral Systems. Turin 2002 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Universitá di Torino, Italy.

Grönlund, K. (2003). Knowledge and Turnout: A Comparative Analysis. 2nd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany. Political scientists tend to consider people’s political participation as a vital part of democracy (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972, Kaase and Marsh 1979, p. 27-56, Barber 1984). Participation is valued as a positive action that strengthens democracy: “Government by the people” (Heywood 2002, p. 69). On the one hand, there is a normative view that taking part in democratic decision-making is desirable1. On the other hand, there is a discussion on the prerequisites for taking part in politics. Further, the latter can be divided into at least two sub families of arguments. There are pluralist and egalitarian views (e.g. Beitz 1989, Dahl 1989) where full political equality is seen as desirable, and there are more elitist views (e.g. Schumpeter 1942) where voters are seen as ill informed about the content and context of the policy alternatives. Even though the conclusions differ, citizens’ knowledge of the political system and parties’ policy differences plays a central role in the theories of democracy. When it comes to empirical analysis, aggregated political knowledge at the individual level has been found to increase turnout at the macro level (Milner 2002, p. 64)2.

Grönlund, K. (2005). Political Knowledge and the Internet. XIV Annual Meeting of the Nordic Political Science Association, Reykjavik, Iceland.

Grönlund, K. and H. Milner (2004). The Determinants of Political Knowledge in a Comparative Perspective. 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associaton Chicago, IL. Political knowledge is a powerful predictor of political participation. Moreover, what citizens know about the political system and its actors is a central aspect of informed voting. This article investigates how and why political knowledge varies between citizens. The analysis is comparative and based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. At the micro level, the results confirm results from national surveys – specifically that education explains what citizens know about politics. It is found in a contextualized analysis, however, that the effect of education varies with the country's degree of economic redistribution. In more egalitarian countries, political knowledge is less contingent on education attained than in more inegalitarian countries. Similarly, education seems to have a stronger effect in countries with majoritarian electoral systems compared to countries with proportional systems.

Gschwend, T. (2003). Comparative Politics of Strategic Voting: A Hierarchy of Electoral Systems. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Traditionally the literature about electoral systems and electoral behavior argues that the size of the district magnitude determines the amount of strategic voting that has to be expected. I argue, however, that different electoral systems provide incentives that potentially undermine or facilitate the Duvergerian logic in practice. The aim of this paper is to provide a hierarchy of electoral systems that helps to predict the share of strategic voters following the wasted vote strategy. Evidence supporting such a hierarchy stems from the CSES data module 1. The systematic differences resulting from the variation in the institutional context are generally more pronounced at the district level across electoral systems the smaller the particular district magnitude gets. Thus, contrary to the literature the results indicate that the impact of the district magnitude on the frequency of strategic voting in a given polity is conditional on the type of seat allocation system that defines how votes get translated into parliamentary seats.

Gschwend, T. (2003). Comparative Politics of Strategic Voting: An Empirical Test of the Leys-Sartori Conjecture. 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The aim of this paper is to provide a test of the Leys-Sartori conjecture. In its general version there is no support for their prediction that the smaller the district magnitude the higher the frequency of strategic voting at the primary district level using data of the first CSES data module. Nevertheless, after looking more closely at the particular seat-allocation rules in participating countries and distinguishing between SDSA (supra district seat-allocation) systems, where various situational criteria should undermine the Duvergerian logic, and LSA (local seat-allocation) systems, where these criteria are presumably absent, the main result of this paper shows that the predictions of the Leys-Sartori conjecture does hold for electoral districts in LSA systems but not for SDSA systems.

Gschwend, T. (2006). Comparative Politics of Strategic Voting: A Hierarchy of Electoral Systems. 2006 Annual Conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Group of the Political Studies Associations, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK.

Guntermann, E. and A. Blais (2014). Does the Composition of Government Better Reflect the Party Preferences of Citizens who are Better Off, More Educated, and More Informed? Second Annual Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop. University of Toronto. Studies on possible inequalities in the representation of citizens’ preferences have mostly focused on the United States and have yet to arrive at definitive conclusions. Rather than analyzing the representation of political opinions on issues that citizens may not have thought much about, we focus on the representation of the party preferences of citizens with different levels of income, education, and political information. This paper focuses on elections in non-presidential systems covered by CSES modules 1 to 4. Using multi-level Bayesian analyses, we find that better off citizens are better represented than the poor in about a third of elections. Inequalities in representation are greater under proportional representation and in countries with lower levels of inequality. However, the tendency for the rich to be better represented may be due to the over-representation of right-of-centre governments in the dataset. We conclude that the inequalities in representation do not exist in most elections.

Guntermann, E. and A. Blais (2015). Does the Composition of Government Better Reflect the Party Preferences of Citizens qho are Better Off?" Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco.

Guntermann, E., A. Blais, et al. (2014). Does the Composition of Government Reflect Citizens' Party Preferences?" Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Hellwig, T. and L. Ezrow (2011). Globalization and the Responsiveness of Political Parties 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Do levels of economic globalization shape the extent to which political parties respond to public opinion? We evaluate this question by employing measures of political preferences of citizens and parties based on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).

Hellwig, T. T. (2006). Policy Voting in Postindustrial Democracies: Measuring and Explaining the Salience of Left-Right Ideology. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Does policy agreement in terms of “left” and “right” structure political competition in industrial democracies? Researchers continue to identify political ideology, measured in terms of left and right, as one if not the most powerful determinant of voter choice in many developed democracies. Yet such findings are in contrast to widely-held and growing claims that the electoral utility of left-right ideology has declined in recent decades. These contrasting views suggest that the salience of left-right ideology may vary according to time period or electoral context. Accordingly, the objectives of this paper are measure and explain the salience of left-right policy voting. I do so by extending utility models of the voter’s decision problem to generate hypotheses for where the left-right scale structures voter choice and where it does not. I focus on changes in the structural organization of economies in advanced capitalist democracies. I test the argument through an individual-level analysis of voter choice in the 2001 Danish election and through a multilevel analysis of the effect of policy-based appeals for 81 parties across 16 democracies.

Henderson, A. (2004). Satisfaction with Democracy: Evidence from Westminster systems. 62nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Attempts at institutional reform in Westminster systems seek implicitly to redress declining voter satisfaction. This paper examines voter satisfaction with democracy in Westminster systems in an effort to determine which factors can best account for declining confidence, satisfaction, efficacy and trust in politics. It pays particular attention to the influence of electoral systems, the role of politicians, and other civic institutions to determine whether the Westminster system itself is producing citizen malaise, or whether certain design features can be held responsible.

Henderson, A. (2004). Satisfaction with Democracy: Evidence from Westminster systems. 77th Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Canada. Attempts at institutional reform in Westminster systems seek implicitly to redress declining voter satisfaction. This paper examines voter satisfaction with democracy in Westminster systems in an effort to determine which factors can best account for declining confidence, satisfaction, efficacy and trust in politics. It pays particular attention to the influence of electoral systems, the role of politicians, and other civic institutions to determine whether the Westminster system itself is producing citizen malaise, or whether certain design features can be held responsible.

Henjak, A. (2003). New Social Divisions and Party System Developments. Edinburgh 2003 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Hill, D. (2008). The Impact of the Separation of Powers on National Level Turnout. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.

Hill, D. (2008). Presidents, Parliaments and Turnout: The Indirect Effects of the Separation of Powers on the Probability of Voting. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Boston, MA Variation in cross-national turnout is well established and the explanations for this variation tend to focus on the effect of institutional frameworks. For example, laws governing the nature of electoral competition and access to voting the voting booth such as registration laws (Powell 1986), compulsory voting (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995); the proportionality of the electoral system (Powel 1986; Fisher et al 2005.; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995) and the size and competitiveness of electoral districts (Powell 1986; Jackman 1987 and Jackman and Miller) have been found to have a substantial impact on national turnout levels. The actual structure of government can also impact voter turnout. Unicameralism and federalism, for instance, have both been found to reduce turnout levels (Jackman 1987; Brockington 2005). Franklin (1996; 2004) argues that because of the reduced ability of the executive to be responsive to the preferences of the electorate, many citizens come to believe that elections and policy outcomes are not linked and refrain from voting because elections are seen as less important.

Hobolt, S. B. and R. Klemmensen (2006). Welfare to Vote: The Effect of Government Spending on Turnout. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Despite the substantial scholarly interest in the question of voter participation, we still have a limited understanding of why turnout levels vary so considerably between countries. Recent studies have examined how electoral competitiveness and institutions affect turnout levels. However, a contextual factor that has been largely overlooked in the literature is the role of the state involvement in the economy. In this paper, we attempt to redress this gap by examining the impact of welfare spending on voter participation. We argue that welfare spending augments education levels, the equality of income distribution and social capital, which in turn leads to higher levels of turnout in welfare states. Hence, at the aggregate level we expect welfare spending to be a stronger predictor of turnout than other institutional and socioeconomic factors. Further, at the individual level, we expect the effect of income and education to vary across different welfare settings. We test these hypotheses using Modules 1 and 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset compromising 58 democratic elections held in 34 countries. First, we look at the aggregate relationships between turnout and the economy. Thereafter, we estimate a multilevel model, which demonstrates that welfare spending explains much of the cross-national variation in turnout. This evidence suggests that measures of welfare spending should be included as a variable in future research on cross-level variation in turnout.

Holmberg, S. (2000). Candidate Knowledge Differs Across Electoral Systems. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Holzner, C. (2008). Political Opportunities and Political Participation in Mexico. 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Research into the causes of political participation have emphasized the primary role of individual attitudes and resource constraints in explaining who participates in politics and how. By emphasizing the importance of individual-level factors, such theories have often ignored the powerful role the state plays in shaping, encouraging, and suppressing certain kinds of acts or certain groups in society. This is perplexing given how central the state and public policies are for political action. New data from Mexico and other Latin American countries shows that patterns of political participation increasingly mirror those in the United States, where citizens that have more politically relevant resources (income, education, skills) participate more frequently than citizens who have fewer of these resources. The paper evaluates two competing hypotheses that might account for this pattern: 1) the poor participate less than the rich because they have fewer resources and are less engaged in politics; 2) the poor participate less than the rich because state policies and features of the political process create greater obstacles and fewer incentives for the poor to participate than for the rich. Interview and survey evidence from Mexico supports the second explanation, suggesting that standard explanations of political activism need to be revised to better account for the effect of political opportunity structures on political participation.

Holzner, C. A. (2005). Poverty of Democracy: Neoliberal Reforms and Political Participation of the Poor in Mexico. 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Holzner, C. A. (2006). Policies and Political Participation in Latin America. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. The spread and consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America over the past decades combined with the availability of new national and cross-national data sets (such as the CSES) makes it possible to study the causes of political participation in new settings where there is sufficient institutional variation to test the effect of political institutions and policies on political participation. This paper explores the empirical relationship between social and economic policies and political participation in Latin America, with a special focus on the case of Mexico. In particular, it examines the impact that neoliberal economic policies have on the political participation of the poor. New data from Mexico and other Latin American countries shows that patterns of political participation increasingly mirror those in the United States, where citizens that have more politically relevant resources (income, education, skills) participate more frequently than citizens who have fewer of these resources. The paper evaluates two competing hypotheses that might account for this pattern: 1) the poor participate less than the rich because they have fewer resources and are less engaged in politics; 2) the poor participate less than the rich because state policies and features of the political process create greater obstacles and fewer incentives for the poor to participate than for the rich. Evidence from Mexico supports the second explanation, suggesting that standard explanations of political activism need to be revised to better account for the effect of the state on political participation.

Huang, S.-h. (2010). Institution Matters: The Impacts of Political Institutions on Public Confidence in Parliament. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL. The decline of confidence in parliament has been studied in literature. However, rare scholars focus on institutional effects on confidence in parliament. With the concern of political engineering, this paper tries to examine whether political institutions, including electoral systems, presidency and structure of parliament have impacts on public confidence in parliament. By regression analysis of the data from World Values Survey 2005, I find that Institutions matter. Under systems with elected presidency or with bicameralism, fewer people have confidence in parliament, while under PR system, more people express they are confident in parliament, ceteris paribus.

Huber, J., G. Kernell, et al. (2003). The Institutional Origins of Party Identification. 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. In the paper, we develop country-level arguments about how individuals identify with parties based upon the running tally and psychological theories of party identification. Using Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems (CSES) data we test our arguments, finding some support for the running tally view.

Huber, J. D. (2014). Inequality and identity in electoral politics. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington DC. This paper examines empirically a theory suggesting that economic inequality interacts should weaken incentives for class-based politics (where lower income individuals vote for rich-to-poor redistribution and richer individuals vote against such redistribution) and should increase incentives for ethnic politics (where members of the same ethnic group tend to vote together). Individual-level survey data reveal that the association between individual income and vote choice is strongest in societies where inequality is lowest, and that the same relationship holds for income and attitudes toward redistribution. But this relationship is conditional on the level of ethnic diversity. In addition, when inequality is high, the degree to which parties have a clear ethnic basis of support increases (again, conditional on the level of ethnic diversity). Thus, conditional on the level of ethnic diversity, inequality is associated with weaker class politics and stronger ethnic politics. An important implication is that we should expect democracy to do least to redress inequality when inequality is highest.

Huber, J. D., G. Kernell, et al. (2003). Institutional context and party attachments in established democracies. 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper develops and tests arguments about how social and institutional factors that vary cross-nationally influence the propensity of individuals to form attachments to political parties. Our tests employ a two-step estimation procedure that has attractive properties when there is a binary dependent variable in the first stage, and when the number of second-level units is relatively small. We find that institutions that encourage retrospective clarity of responsibility and party discipline also encourage the formation of party attachments. We also find that party attachments are more likely to form when the social context enhances the importance of group identities. The contextual variables, however, do not operate the same on all types of individuals. Instead, features of political systems that make it more difficult to form party attachments have their biggest impact on individuals who have the fewest cognitive resources.

Jaime-Castillo, A. M. (2009). Economic Inequality and Electoral Participation: A Cross-Country Evaluation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto, CA: 31. Empirical research has shown that electoral engagement is positively correlated with income at the individual level. At the same time, the aggregate relationship between income inequality and electoral turnout is still unclear. While most studies show a negative impact of inequality over turnout, some others have found no relationship at all, and some others even suggest a positive impact. In this paper I argue that more fine-grained research is needed to understand this relationship. Firstly, standard measures of inequality, such as the Gini index, do not seem to be adequate to study the effect of inequality over turnout, given that changes in the Gini index may reflect either a change at the top or at the bottom of the income ladder. For that reason, alternative measures, such as the income ratio between quintiles, need to be tested. Secondly, differences in electoral engagement by income may be affected by the set of political alternatives available in each country. I hypothesize that when the polarization between parties on economic and social issues is high, that will induce a higher electoral turnout, given that voters will be highly motivated to avoid the undesired outcome. In order to test these hypotheses, I use data from CSES (Module 2) as well as aggregate data. Multilevel analysis is used to these hypotheses. Results are also compared with estimated dependent variable (EDV) techniques. Findings show that different measures of income inequality may change the relationship between inequality and electoral turnout. On the other hand, party polarization seems to be correlated with differences in turnout.

Jennings, J. (2010). Decentralization and the Winner-Loser Gap. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 23. Political institutions have been shown to influence the level of satisfaction with democracy differently in those who voted for the winning party in an election than it does in those who voted for the losing party (Anderson et al 2005). Federalism is believed to effectively represent heterogeneous preferences within one nation-state, but is it the constitutional structure that is important or is it the current functional relationship between national and sub-national units? This paper investigates this question by looking at the conditioning effect decentralization has on the the winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy. If the fiscal autonomy of sub-national units explains variance in the level of satisfaction of winners and losers better than does federalism, this will be evidence that fiscal decentralization levels more accurately measure a sub-national unit's ability to represent the unique preferences of its citizens. While using a fiscal decentralization measure constructed by Rodden (2002) and CSES Module II data, this study finds that decentralization has a greater conditioning effect than does federalism.

Jhee, B.-K. (2004). Economic Voting in the Third World. 62nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Economic voting has been one of the enduring themes of political science for several decades (Dorussen et al. 2002: xxiii). A lot of literature on economic voting has examined how macroeconomic conditions shape election outcomes in western democracies and evinces that incumbents are rewarded or punished for their economic performance. (Jacobson, 1991: 33). Surprisingly, however, very few studies have examined if electorates of new democracies also assign the responsibility of economic performance to incumbents. One reason for the limited scope of the research is related to a conventional belief that electorates in the Third World are not “highly informed, policy-oriented economic voters” (Dorussen et al. 2002: 2). This paper is one of very few cross-national macro level studies on economic voting in the Third World. Even though there have been a couple of case studies based on survey data, cross-national studies analyzing elections in new democracies are very rare. This paper analyzes 70 legislative elections and 50 presidential elections in 35 new democracies. Using Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) estimation method, this paper tests three controversial hypotheses: first, that economic conditions shape election results in new democracies (the economic voting hypothesis); second, that the economic impact on the vote share of incumbent parties is constrained by the level of institutional clarity that affect electorates’ perception of incumbents’ responsibility for economic performance (the clarity hypothesis); third, the economic impact also depends on other economic and socio-political conditions that affect the relative importance of economic issues in elections of new democracies (the relative importance hypothesis). The expansion of the research on economic voting to new democracies provides us important clues to the features of transitional societies because “economic voting as a mechanism of democratic accountability” is a useful indicator of democratic consolidation (Dorussen et al. 2002: 2). As Richard Rose (1999) argued, a fully democratic regime “must be accountable to the electorate” (p. 35). Therefore, research on the conditions under which electorates realize democratic accountability through economic voting may improve our understanding of the democratization processes in the Third World. Analyzing an original dataset, this study shows that the economic voting function is not consistent in new democracies and is strongly constrained by economic and socio-political conditions. Except for some poor countries, voters did respond to economic performance of incumbents in presidential elections. Furthermore, this paper shows that political contexts, which influence voters’ perceptions of incumbents’ responsibility for economic performance, were also important determinants of the economic voting function in new democracies; the bicameral system and the proportional electoral system reduce economic voting function. Lastly, the relative importance of economic issues determined by the level of economic development, ethnic fractionalization and the level of democracy also affected the economic voting function. However, the effect of economic conditions on the voting share of incumbent parties in legislative elections was very limited. No robust evidence that corroborates economic voting theory was found in the analysis of legislative elections.

Johann, D. and M. Wagner (2011). Do knowledgeable voters take more complex decisions? Political sophistication and models of issue voting. 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. Issue-based models of electoral choice differ in their cognitive requirements. We should thus expect more knowledgeable voters to be more likely to use relatively complex models. Differences in voter sophistication should therefore help to explain whether and how voters make use of issues in determining their vote choice. In this paper, we compare two models of issue voting: the classic Downsian proximity model and Kedar’s (2005) compensational model. The former model only requires voters to take into account their spatial closeness to parties; voters who follow the latter model also need information on the likely outcome that will result from their choice. We suggest that the less politically informed voters are more likely to follow the proximity model while the more politically informed might take into account expectations about what parties can realistically achieve. Moreover, the importance of knowledge may differ across party systems: the more complex the political environment, the greater the difference between highly sophisticated and less sophisticated voters should be. This paper addresses issues of political representation as it studies differences in voter understanding of policy outcomes both across individuals and across electoral contexts. We use CSES data to test this hypothesis cross-nationally. This data is particularly suited to this project as it includes knowledge questions and assessments of left-right party positions and is available for a large variety of political systems. This paper has implications for understanding the role of voter heterogeneity and spatial models in vote choice.

Jusko, K. L. (2002). Are all Politics Local? A Multi-Level Analysis of Voters' Decisions. PhD Summer School on European Parties and Party Systems, Keele, UK. The dynamics of party competition vary across electoral districts, and from the dynamics of competition at the national level. To which level of competition are voters attentive? With evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I propose a theory that explicitly links each individual's decision to the patterns of competition at both the national and district levels via their ability to navigate the choices presented to them, and their level of political knowledge. My findings are two-fold: First, the number of parties competing in an election at the national level (and not within the districts) negatively effects an individual's propensity to vote, insofar as the individual is unable to navigate the choices before her. Second, the margin of competition contributes in the expected direction to citizen's vote decisions: The probability that an individual will vote increases as the margin of competition in their primary electoral district narrows. Note, this relationship is most pronounced among those individuals with low levels of political knowledge. This discussion, therefore, establishes that while some elements of local competition are important to some voters, not all politics are local. Further, individual level attributes mediate the extent to which the dynamics of party competition shape voters' decisions.

Kage, R. (2000). Path-Dependency Effects in Electoral System Change. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Karp, J. (2011). Party Systems and Mobilization: How Polarization Reduces Efficacy and Engagement 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. This paper focuses on how political and institutional features enhance political efficacy and encourage participation through party mobilization. Specifically, it explores how party competition and other contextual factors, such as the electoral system create incentives for parties (or candidates) to mobilize voters. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) provides a useful source for testing these hypotheses. This paper makes use of survey data collected after elections in more than 30 countries spanning a variety of party systems in both established and new democracies. The results demonstrate that political efficacy and behaviour is enhanced when parties have a strong incentive to mobilize voters. This is most likely to occur in systems where parties compete in a narrow issue space. In contrast, citizens are less likely to come into contact with parties in polarized systems. This has consequences for both political attitudes and engagement. Paper

Karp, J. A. (2003). Electoral Systems and Party Mobilization. 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa.

Karp, J. A. (2006). Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

Karp, J. A. and S. A. Banducci (1999). Electoral Rules and Voter Participation: A Cross-National Analysis of Individual-Level Behavior. 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA. Advocates of proportional representation (PR) often cite its potential for increasing citizen involvement in politics as one of PR's fundamental advantages over plurality or first past the post (FPP) systems. Electoral systems that distort the translation of votes into seats are assumed to alienate and discourage small party supporters leading to lower levels of political efficacy and participation. We examine these theories across a diverse set of countries using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Our results suggest that supporters of small parties are more likely than large party supporters to be dissatisfied with the political process and have lower levels of efficacy and participation in both PR and plurality systems. These differences, however, between large and small parties are smallest in PR systems. Differences in satisfaction with the political process are also likely to reduce the likelihood of voting for small party supporters in plurality systems.

Karp, J. A. and S. A. Banducci (2000). Electoral Rules and Voter Participation: A Cross-National Analysis of Individual-Level Behavior. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Karvonen, L. (2000). Preferential Voting: Does it Make a Difference? 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Kayser, M. A. (2013). Double Jeopardy. How the Left Loses from Asymmetry of Partisan Accountability. Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. That voters often punish incumbent parties for poor economic performance has been a tenet of electoral research for decades. Recent work, however, has strengthened the evidence for a partisan model of electoral behavior suggesting that voters turn against \luxury parties" mostly parties of the left inclined toward higher social benefits and possibly accompanying taxes in bad economic times. This paper simultaneously tests both electoral models and demonstrates one key implication: that when both behaviors obtain, left-of-center incumbent parties are more severely punished for economic contractions than their right-wing counterparts. Because the luxury goods model of voting only emerges once voters are sufficiently wealthy, this asymmetric partisan accountability mostly arises in developed democracies in later decades. Left parties in developed democracies pursue expansionary and possibly inflationary policies not only in the interests of their core constituents (Hibbs 1977) but also in their own interest.

Kayser, M. A. and M. Peress (2010). The Buck Stops over There? Globalization and Electoral Accountability. Political Science Seminar, University of Mannheim. As national markets have become more internationally integrated over the last halfcentury the ability for voters to hold governments accountable for economic outcomes has remain unchanged. Yet, do voters hold incumbents less accountable for economic events that originate abroad and, hence, are beyond their government’s control? We conduct the first cross-national test of electoral accountability that (a) explicitly models the multiple-party choice faced by most voters and (b) directly estimates and compares electoral responses to domestic and foreign economic shocks. Little evidence that voters condition their vote on the source of economic variation emerges. This result, we argue, arises from an empirical regularity in voter behavior never demonstrated before outside of the United States: High-information voters, being more ideological, respond less to the economy in their voting decision; lowinformation voters respond more to the economy but are less able to discern the origin of economic variation.

Kazunori, I. and T. Kobayashi (2012). The Effect of Media Environment on Electoral Process: Comparative Perspective Using CSES Module3. Annual meeting of Japanese Electoral Studies Association 2012 Held at Tsukuba University.

Kedar, O. (2003). Policy Balancing in Comparative Context: Institutional Mediation of Voter Behavior. Edinburgh 2003 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, Scotland. This work develops and tests a theory of issue voting. I demonstrate that in seeking to affect policy outcomes, voters do not necessarily vote for the party whose positions are most similar to the voters’ positions, but rather reward parties that pull policy in their preferred direction. In democracies where policy outcomes are a product of compromises among multiple agents, voters understand that their vote will be ‘diluted’ by power sharing and compensate for it by voting for parties whose positions are more extreme than the voters’ positions. This points to an institutional effect on voter behavior: voters behave differently in majoritarian and power-sharing systems. I build on this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between directional and proximity theories of voting, and show that variation in types of democracies account for proximity or directional policy-oriented voting. I test the model by conducting empirical analysis of voting behavior in four democracies that vary in their institutional design. Finally, the model implies a possible micro-foundational explanation for a persistent empirical finding unaccounted for theoretically in political science menu dependence in voter choice.

Kees, A. and J. Thomassen (2006). Satisfaction with Democracy: Do Institutions Matter? 102nd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. According to mainstream normative democratic theory elections in a representative democracy have two important functions. First, elections allow voters to determine the political colour of their government, making government accountable to the judgment of the people. Secondly, elections should produce a legislature that is representative of the division of political opinion amongst the electorate. However, there is a certain tension between these two functions. Electoral systems and more in general democratic systems cannot optimally serve both functions at the same time. Majoritarian models of democracy are supposed to optimise the accountability function, consensus models of democracy the representation function. Previous research showed that people in consensus democracies are more satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country than people in majoritarian democracies. In this paper we try to assess to what extent this relationship can be explained by people’s perception of the accountability and representiveness of the political system in their country. Our findings show that people’s satisfaction with their democracy primarily depends on their perception of the representation function, and to a lesser degree on the accountability function. Surprisingly, both the representation and the accountability perception are enhanced by a proportional-type constitutional design. In contrast, our evaluative measure of satisfaction with democracy is hardly affected at all by constitutional design – it appears that at the macro-level satisfaction with democracy is primarily affected by the age of the democracy one lives in.

Kernell, G. (2006). Candidate Selection and Political Participation. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia, PA.

Kernell, G. (2006). Party Constitutions and Constituent Representation. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. This paper investigates how a party’s level of decentralization in candidate selection shapes political participation. Two theories are presented that lead to divergent expectations. Empirical results support the argument that parties with decentralized candidate selection encourage competition within the party at the local level, and that this has potential for dividing and demobilizing party supporters. This argument is tested using individual level survey responses from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and original data on candidate selection procedures in competitive parties in long standing parliamentary systems. The surveys were conducted within one year of the last national legislative election in each of the 13 countries in this data. Party voters are found to be more likely to campaign and attempt to persuade others of their political views when nominations occur at the national level than if subnational party organizations select candidates. The next section presents an overview of candidate selection mechanisms in long standing parliamentary parties. Next, I consider the influence of candidate selection on constituent participation. The last two sections test the theory and discuss the results.

Kernell, G. (2007). Party Experience, Consistency and Partisanship. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper investigates how party experience and consistency shape party identification and vote choice. I find that individuals are more likely to be partisans of parties with electoral and governmental experience, but that they are not more likely to vote for experienced parties, controlling for their party identification. Second, I find that parties are more likely to attract individuals that are ideologically distant from them if they adopt ambiguous positions. This is the case for both partisans and voters. Ambiguity does not have a robust effect on partisanship for individuals ideologically close to a party, but it has a significantly negative effect on vote choice for individuals close to a party. The paper draws on the retrospective notion of partisanship to form hypotheses about party experience and consistency. These are then tested using a multilevel model of survey respondents in 41 parties in 14 advanced parliamentary democracies.

Kernell, G. (2012). Descriptive Representation of Women and Ideological Congruence in Political Parties. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. This paper examines the relationship between a party's descriptive representation of women and its ideological proximity to female and male voters. I find that male and female voters are both objectively closer to parties with more females in their delegations. However, males are more likely to subjectively assess parties with more women as far from them, and females are more likely to place these parties close. Controlling for subjective ideological distance, both women and men are less likely to vote for parties with equal male and female representation.

Kittilson, M. C. (2005). Rising Political Inequality in Established Democracies: Mobilization, Socio-Economic Status and Voter Turnout, 1960s to 2000. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The findings of this paper challenge the conventional wisdom of past research: socioeconomic inequalities in voter turnout are no longer unique to the United States, rather these biases pervade post-industrial democracies. This research draws on individual national election study series and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to examine both cross-temporal and cross-national differences in the relationship between voluntary organization membership, socio-economic characteristics, and voter participation. The results reveal that formal organizations such as unions and religious organizations still mobilize their members to vote. Thus, the greatest drop-off in turnout has been among non-members. However, the memberships of formal organizations are generally declining in their share of the population, and these analyses reveal that unions are increasingly comprised of those with greater educational and income resources. In addition, the findings suggest that the changing social distribution among union members is linked to rising inequality among voters. Trade unions no longer appear to be the class-based equalizers they once were, but rather reinforce existing disparities in voter turnout.

Kittilson, M. C. and C. J. Anderson (2009). Comparing Voter Participation: Individual Resources, Orientations and the Context of Party Politics. Annual Meeting of The American Political Science Association. Electoral institutions shape the potential costs and benefits of participation. We argue that, by shaping the range and diversity of choices available to voters, electoral institutions can pull citizens into the democratic process by making voting meaningful. Our analyses of data from 29 contemporary democracies around the world collected by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project suggest that a differentiated and more numerous electoral supply powerfully influence voter engagement, and that these effects are both indirect and contingent. First, the electoral supply has an indirect effect on turnout by shaping civic attitudes conducive to turnout. More numerous and differentiated choices among parties boost feelings of representation and responsiveness, such as feeling represented by parties and that one’s vote matters. Second, a differentiated electoral supply has a contingent effect on turnout by conditioning the effects of political attitudes on voter participation. Citizens who feel represented by a party are more likely to vote if they live in countries where parties present more differentiated policy profiles.

Kittilson, M. C. and M. M. Gray (2006). Voter Equality in Post-Industrialized Nations: Individual Resources and Political Context. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Differences in turnout literature at the macro and micro levels are in part caused by the different questions being asked. Aggregate-level scholars are more concerned with levels of overall participation, which may have implications for democratic support and legitimacy whereas the individual-level research more often focuses on who participates and the resulting political inequalities. In this research note we make the case that these questions are not conceptually independent. We systematically examine aspects of the ‘cost of voting’ and how these are assumed by different parts of the electorate. We utilize the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 2 data set (19 OECD nations) and statistical techniques appropriate for two-level data. We find that many of the national level institutions often thought to promote higher turnout by providing increased benefits are not as conducive to participation once one accounts for micro-level factors. The results of this study continue to emphasize disparities in turnout related to socioeconomic status and the existence and success of organizations and institutions that make it easier and more worthwhile for many in the periphery to take part in electoral politics. Labor Unions and Labor parties are shown to be important conduits to political action. Institutions that decrease the costs of voting or those that increasing the penalty for not voting (i.e. compulsory laws) are central to increasing the probability of turnout as is automatic registration.

Kline, R. (2011). Representation: What Is it Good For? Estimating Representation’s Impact on Voters’ Attitudes Using Regression Discontinuity Design. Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Seattle. This study proposes the use of regression discontinuity design (RD) in electoral systems and cross-national public opinion research. As an illustrative example, we use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project in an attempt to identify a causal effect of representation on respondents’ attitudes toward the state of the economic and political system in their country. RD exploits a strict cutoff value of a variable — in this case the threshold for representation that is common in many parliamentary democracies —and employs it as a treatment assignment mechanism. Under certain assumptions, if a discontinuity in the estimation is observed at the cutoff value, then this discontinuity can be used to estimate a local average treatment effect. Though in the analysis of two dependent variables (satisfaction with democracy and subject assessment of economic performance) a discontinuity is observed, in neither case can this discontinuity be attributed causal significance due to the fact that the key identifying assumption for RD — that of conditional continuity — appears to have failed based on on an analysis of potential covariates. Despite this failure to identify the causal effect, we propose additional techniques that hold promise for identification of such effects in similar situations.

Klingemann, H.-D. and B. Wessels (2000). Voter Rationalities in Different Electoral Systems. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada. Is there an effect of electoral and party systems on the ability of voters to express and vote by their preferences? Under which conditions do they vote sincerely, or, to put it the other way around, in which contexts are they not forced into strategic voting? Sincere voting has institutional preconditions. This is true for strategic voting as well.

Klingemann, H.-D. and B. Wessels (2002). Sincere Voting in Different Electoral Systems. Berlin Conference “The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems“, Berlin, Germany. This paper discusses the impact of electoral institutions on individual voting behavior. Is there a difference in the degree to which different electoral systems allow citizens to vote by their own preferences? Or, to put it in more technical terms, is there a relationship of the possibility for sincere voting and electoral rules? Sincere voting consists of more than just the absence of strategic voting. Sincere voting means to have a clear preference for a particular political party or candidate and to vote accordingly. Thus, the vote must be based on ones own preferences. Strategic voting, on the other hand, may well be based on other considerations such as helping to bring about a certain coalition government.

Koo, S. (2012). Comparing Party-voter Linkages across Parties and Party Systems: Ideological Partisanship in Voters’ Mind. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA). New Orleans. This study answers the question of why an ideological party system emerges in some democracies but not others. Despite the importance of ideology in party competition, the relationships between parties and voters in developing democracies and how these are different from, or similar to, that of established democracies with respects to ideology have received relatively less attention. Scholars have long agreed that parties of late democratizers have failed to develop ideological linkages to the same extent as their established, Western counterparts. The comparability between the two worlds is often questioned. Even recent efforts to account for the party-voter relationships in developing democracies fall short of providing valid measures for cross-national comparison. To address these theoretical and empirical gaps, this paper investigates the cross national variations in the nature of party-voter linkages and underlying conditions for the development of ideological linkages. First, I provide a novel measure of ideological linkages between a party and its voters at the party and the party system level in 33 free and partly free democracies, by using the public opinion survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module II (2001–2006). Next, I evaluate competing theories of party-voter relationships: institutional, socioeconomic and democratic. I find neither being a developing democracy nor the level of democratic maturation is as critical for the development of ideological linkages as institutional and socioeconomic factors. By offering a basis for both cross-party and cross-national comparisons for future research in party-voter relationships, this study attempts to challenge the 'incomparability thesis’ in the study of party politics

Kostelka (2010). The Turnout Decline in the Post-Communist Members States of the EU: A Multicausal Explanation. ECPR Graduate Conference. Dublin: 31. Since the very beginning of the democratic transition, post-Communist countries have experienced a spectacular decline of electoral participation, which has not yet been satisfactorily explained by political scientists. The present paper focuses on the evolution of electoral participation in national contests in the post-Communist members states of the European Union. This helps to avoid some biases that affect most existing studies (e.g. the inclusion of both democratic and non-democratic countries). Using numerous post-electoral surveys and originally designed variables, it tries to test as rigorously as possible all the explanations found in literature based on political, institutional, economic and social factors. Moreover, building on insights from research on established democracies, it proposes new hypotheses that incorporate phenomena neglected in the post-Communist context so far such as generational replacement. Empirical analyses draw from both aggregated and individual survey data.

Kroh, M. (2003). Contextual Variation in Voters' Reasoning: Voting in Systems of Single Party and Coalition Governments. 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa. The paper investigates differences in citizens’ decision-making process of vote choice between systems of single party and coalition governments. Using data of the CSES project of 30 parliamentary elections in 27 democracies, I demonstrate that voters in different contexts systematically rely on different considerations when casting ballots. This paper conceptualises voters’ reasoning by three very general considerations, citizens potentially use across contexts: party, politician, and policy orientations. A multilevel conditional logit model estimates the effect of these three orientations on vote choice in a pooled model of 30 parliamentary elections. Random effect parameters at the contextual level demonstrate the variability of the importance of parties, politicians, and policies for individual vote choices. Modelling interactions between these orientations and a variable of the effective number of parties in government shows that single party governments promote a reasoning that is strongly affected by orientations towards politicians. This propensity towards political leadership is explained by the style of electoral campaigning in systems of single party governments, which is very much focused on the candidates for prime minister. The findings of this paper also indicate that voters in systems of coalition governments often opt for coalitions instead of supporting single parties with their vote. Since these coalitions are generally formed on basis on shared ideological positions, such policy dimensions become a focal orientation for voters. While single party governments seem to increase a presidentialisation of parliamentary elections, coalition governments appear to encourage their policy orientation.

Kroh, M. (2004). Personal Voting: Individual and Contextual Determinants of Political Leadership. Gemeinsame Tagung des Arbeitskreises Interkultureller Demokratievergleich und der Ad-hoc-Gruppe Empirische Methoden der Politikwissenschaft, Universität Lüneburg. This paper investigates the relevance of politicians for individuals’ voting decision. Drawing on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) on 30 parliamentary elections, it is demonstrated that characteristics of voters and elections systematically affect the likelihood of leader-oriented voting. The analysis tests three hypotheses: first, that a lack of political information increases the relevance of politicians for voters’ reasoning; second, that the dominance of television strengthens the role of national candidates; and third, that personal voting derives from incentives provided by institutional settings of parliamentary elections. While the first two hypotheses do not find support in the data, the analysis confirms the hypothesis on institutional settings: politician-oriented voting is particularly widespread in quasi-presidential elections, i.e. legislative elections in parliamentary systems with single-party governments.

Lacewell, O. (2007). Measures of Immigration and Radical Right Voting in Europe. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper examines the explanatory power of three different measures of immigration on radical right voting in Western Europe and Europe as a whole. The analysis compares the explanatory power of immigration flows, immigration stocks, and perceptions of immigration. The findings indicate that the three measures are substantially different in their ability to predict radical right voting in the sample. Moreover, the findings suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom and popular opinion, immigration is not a key explanatory variable driving voting for radical right parties.

Lachat, R. (2011). Ideological voting and satisfaction with democracy. 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. From the point of view of normative models of political representation, issue and ideological voting are positive factors. When citizens rely more strongly on substantial criteria when making their voting decision, the quality of political representation should be positively affected. A high level of ideological voting should reinforce the congruence between the preferences of citizens and the positions advocated by their representatives. This should also lead citizens to be more satisfied with the functioning of the system of representation. While much research has investigated the relationship between issue voting and the citizens-legislators congruence, we know less about how ideological voting and the level of congruence influence citizens’ satisfaction. This paper investigates this link by analyzing how the degree to which citizens rely on ideology influences their satisfaction with the political process. It also investigates how this relationship is moderated by the general level of congruence between citizens’ preferences and representatives’ positions in a given polity. This study is based on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

Lau, R. R., P. Patel, et al. (2005). Correct Voting Across 30 Democracies (and 40 Elections). 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Political scientists have often employed turnout rates to judge the relative health of the world’s democracies. We propose another criterion. Lau and Redlawsk (APSR, 1999) introduced the notion of correct voting – the extent to which voters actually choose the candidate they would have chosen had they been fully informed about the issues and candidates running in that election. Healthy democracies, we would argue, must not only engage their citizens in the decision making process by encouraging them to vote, but also must provide the information and institutional arrangements that allow them to choose wisely. Here we extend the notion of correct voting to 30 established and emerging democracies around the world, using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set. The advantage of the CSES data is that we have the same questions asked across these 30 democracies (and 40 different head-of-state elections). We first explore issues of measurement, but then turn to testing hypotheses about the effects of different institutional factors on levels of correct voting. These hypothesis tests provide strong construct validity for our application of correct voting. Finally we consider whether cross-national differences in correct voting, turnout, and/or economy well-being, help explain differences in levels of satisfaction with democracy and the country’s system of government.

Lau, R. R., P. Patel, et al. (2008). Correct Voting Across 32 Democracies. 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Historically, political scientists have employed turnout rates and, more recently, perceived satisfaction with democracy, to judge the relative health of democratic governments. We propose another criterion. Lau and Redlawsk (1997) introduced the notion of correct voting – the extent to which voters, under conditions of uncertainty, actually choose the candidate they would have chosen had they been fully informed about the issues and candidates running in that election. Healthy democracies must not only engage their citizens in the decision making process by encouraging them to vote, but also must provide the information and institutional arrangements that allow them to choose wisely. Here we extend the notion of correct voting to 32 established and emerging democracies around the world, using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set. We offer and test 13 hypotheses about the effects of different individual and institutional factors on levels of correct voting. These results provide guidance to both new and established democracies that want to refine and improve their system of government.

LeDuc, L., J. H. Pammet, et al. (2008). The Problem of Young Voters: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. It is well established that the withdrawal of young voters from the active electorate accounts for a substantial part of the decline in voting turnout that has taken place in many western democracies in recent years. The reasons which lie behind the unwillingness of newly eligible young voters to participate in electoral politics to the same extent as was found in previous generations are less well understood. This paper draws upon two Canadian studies that were designed specifically for the purpose of investigating the role of young voters in the turnout decline. A national survey of non-voters, based on a two-stage sample design, provides the basis for a quantitative analysis of young non-voters. This is supplemented by a qualitative analysis of two focus groups held at the time of the 2007 provincial election in Ontario – one of potential first-time voters (18-20 years) and the other of individuals who had been eligible to vote in a previous election (age 20-24). The qualitative data provide new insights into young peoples’ attitudes toward the relevance of politics in their lives and their perceptions of electoral democracy, over and above that which can be established by the survey based studies alone. They suggest, for example, that the hesitancy of newly eligible young citizens to vote rests as much on self-perceived low information levels as on apathy toward politics. The combination of the two analytic methods adds depth to the survey analysis of attitudes towards politics, political reform and future behavior.

Lee, H. (2006). Gender Differences in Political Participation in Korea and Japan. 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. Studies carried out in many countries in previous decades have found that women were more conservative than men and less likely to participate in politics. This paper examines the nature of gender differences in Korean and Japanese voting behavior. Here, we examine whether this traditional gender gap persists today, or whether the phenomenon of the modern gender gap, with women being more left wing, has indeed become evident. Material for the analysis will be derived from the Korean Election Survey (1988-2004) and Japanese Election Survey through the CSES data set. This paper will consider how far gender differences have changed in Korea and Japan in several modes of participation: voting turnout and so on. This paper explores the reasons for the changing nature of female participation and concludes by considering the political implications of the findings.

Lefkofridi, Z. and A. Gallego (2011). Policy (in)congruence & Abstention in European democracies 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. While policy congruence constitutes an important indicator for evaluating political representation in democracies (e.g. Wlezien and Soroka 2007; Powell 2009; Franklin and Wlezien 1997) and turnout is a crucial indicator for assessing democratic performance (e.g. Jackmann 1987; Powell 1986; Powell 1982), their potential bond remains under-researched. Seeking to contribute to the debates on citizens’ representation and turnout, we focus on European democracies and inquire about whether abstention is associated with policy (in)congruence by posing two interrelated questions: firstly, to what extent are non-voters’ positions on offer by party systems across Europe? And secondly, to what extent is abstention affected by policy incongruence between citizens’ and parties’ positions? To answer these questions, we proceed as follows. Firstly, we examine the link between party systems as collectives (e.g. Ezrow 2007) and the positions of non-voters across European democracies. Secondly, we build on previous works (e.g. Thurner and Eymann 2000; Aldrich 1993; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Downs 1957) to explore whether individual abstention is affected by policy incongruence with existing parties. In doing so, we take into account factors that, operating at different levels of analysis, could affect this relationship (e.g. Gallego 2010; Geys 2006; Blais 2006) but have been neglected by research focusing on single cases (e.g. Thurner and Eymann 2000). For the purposes of our inquiry, we estimate party and citizens’ positions based on data collected by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) respectively. Our inquiry has implications for the study of political participation and representation in modern democracies.

Lefkofridi, Z., A. Gallego, et al. (2011). Ideological Congruence and Voter Turnout. 6th ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik. In this paper,we utilize CSES data to study whether lack of congruence between individual citizens’ideological self-¬-placement and the viable party options discourages voter turnout. We additionally examine under which conditions lack of congruence produces abstention. We conceive congruence from the perspective of the individual citizen and operationalize it as the distance between her own ideological position on the left-¬-right issue dimension and that of the closest among parties obtaining parliamentary representation. The main finding of the present study is that ideological congruence seems to matter for turnout: more specifically, lack of congruence decreases voter turnout and the effect is stronger in proportional systems than in majoritarian ones.

Lewis, P. G. (2008). Party System Institutionalisation in East-Central Europe: Empirical Dimensions and Tentative Conclusions. Rennes 2008 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Rennes, France. The nationalisation of party systems is a topic closely related to processes of party system institutionalisation, an area that has developed its own literature and dimensions of analysis. Institutionalisation is understood to comprise four main dimensions: the growth of stability in the rules and nature of inter-party competition, the development of stable roots in society that help ensure a measure of regularity in how people vote, the acquisition of legitimacy by parties and the electoral process, and the establishment of party organisation that have an independent status and some value in their own right. The idea of party system institutionalisation was first presented by S. Mainwaring and T. Scully in 1995 and has been developed in a range of other publications, mostly by Mainwaring with a number of different contributors. It was first developed in a Latin American context but has an obvious relevance to developments in other newly democratising countries. In terms of outcomes, party system institutionalisation is understood to have a strong impact on the quality of democracy and to reduce tendencies to clientelism, political populism and the growth of anti-politics sentiments, and to foster mechanisms of democratic accountability and effective policy formulation. Over the years, a substantial literature on the process of party system institutionalisation has been produced and, in recent years, a growing proportion of this has concerned systems in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper will, firstly, survey and evaluate some of the most recent literature with a view to establishing what light it sheds on the process in East-Central Europe and, secondly, identify and assess the key data that enable any judgement to be made on the course of this process in the region and to identify the contributions in this area of various data-bases relating to party politics.

Lewis-Beck, M. S. and M. C. Lobo (2008). Anchoring the Portuguese Voter: Panel Dynamics as a New Electorate. 107th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston , MA. Portuguese democracy is new, and national election surveys newer, the first in 2002. Scientific findings on political behavior are just coming in. With respect to the vital question of what provides the voter a social-psychological anchor, initial evidence gives the nod to party identification over ideological identification. However, party identification is poorly measured, data are cross-sectional, and the models are single-equation. Fortunately, panel studies are now available, for the 2005 legislative and the 2006 presidential elections. Estimating dynamic, multi-equation models with two-stage, instrumental variable, regression procedures establishes the preeminence of ideology, in this French-style, hybrid presidential-parliamentary system.

Listhaug, O., B. Aardal, et al. (2000). Institutional Variation and Political Support: An Analysis of CSES Data from 16 Countries. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association., Québec City, Canada.

Litton, K. (2011). Party Novelty and Economic Voting. North Eastern Political Science Association Anuual Meeting. Philadelphia.

Litton, K. (2012). Party Novelty and Economic Voting: The Evidence from the EU Parliamentary Elections. Annual Conference of the Midewest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. In previous research on economic voting, it was found that the effect of the economy on voters’ party preferences is not uniform across various party characteristics. This work brings attention to yet another important party characteristic – party novelty, which is defined as the quality that reflects the degree and type of change within party organization. It is argued, novelty determines the extent to which each party is held individually accountable for the state of the economy by altering party identity and party ability to be recognized. The study introduces a newly developed Party Novelty Database measuring party change in the EU (1989-2009). Results show, that party novelty, in its broadest meaning, suppresses the reward/punishment mechanism in economic voting models for opposition parties, while its effect is only marginal for government parties

Lobo, M. C. (2002). The Impact of Party Leaders on the Outcome of the 2002 Portuguese Legislative Elections: Choosing between Relatively Unpopular Candidates. International Conference on 'Portugal at the Polls', Lisbon, Portugal. This paper analyses the importance of affect towards party leaders in voting behaviour in the 2002 Portuguese legislative elections. It starts by presenting the electoral context and the way this may have influenced party leader effects. Two questions are then investigated: following Gunther and Montero’s voting model we measure the importance of leader effects in explaining the vote for each of the five main parties in Portugal, namely PSD, PS, CDS/PP, CDU and BE. Then, we repeat the model to explain the vote within each block of parties. Affect towards party leader is a very important explanatory factor of the vote in Portugal, second to ideology, considering the five main parties. When votes within each block were considered, differences between the Left and the Right emerge: whereas on the Left, ideology continues to be the most important explanatory factor, on the Right it becomes unimportant due to the perceived ideological proximity between the two parties, and party leaders become the most important factor.

Long Jusko, K. (2014). Electoral Geography, Strategic Mobilization, and Implications for Voter Turnout. First Annual Toronto Political Behaviour Workshop. Toronto. When will parties mobilize the electoral support of low-income voters? This discussion presents evidence that rates of turnout among low-income citizens reflect legislators' and parties' electoral incentives to be responsive to the poor, and that these electoral incentives are determined by electoral geography - the joint geographic distribution of legislative seats and low-income voters across electoral districts. Further, this discussion demonstrates that under SMD electoral rules, low-income voters are more likely to vote in those electoral districts in which they are likely to be pivotal. By presenting a strategic mobilization account of voter turnout, this discussion breaks with current accounts of voter turnout that emphasize facilitative and motivational individual- and system-level factors. Instead, this discussion argues that low-income voters' turnout decisions, in fact, reflect parties' electoral incentives to cultivate and mobilize a low-income constituency.

Lucas, L. (2005). The Institutional Determinants of Political Sophistication. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The delegate model of representation implies that at the individual level, citizens will demand responsiveness from parties and candidates: they will possess sophisticated knowledge of parties’ ideological positions and form favorable attitudes toward parties whose positions align with their own. Conversely, the psychological model of voting behavior implies that citizens will base their attitudes on established orientations toward the parties. The empirical evidence from previous studies is mixed, suggesting that institutional context may affect whether citizens behave as the delegate model or the psychological model predicts. This study investigates the effect of electoral systems on citizens’ likelihood of behaving either as the delegate model or the psychological model predicts in five European democracies. In all five cases, the evidence suggests that attitudes toward parties are influenced both by citizens’ established orientations and by the alignment of party positions with citizens’ positions. However, citizens are more likely to possess sophisticated knowledge of a party’s ideological position, as the delegate model predicts, in the context of a proportional representation system.

Mahler, V. (2006). Income Redistribution by the State: A Comparative Analysis of the Developed World. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. This paper offers an empirical assessment of the sources of variance in government redistribution in the developed world over the last two decades. The paper begins by describing data on redistribution via taxes and transfers that have been calculated from micro-data available in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. Comparative data are presented not only for overall redistribution across all income groups, but also for several individual social program types, and income and demographic groups. The paper then goes on to consider four broad themes in the literature on government redistribution: the median voter approach, which argues that redistribution is associated with inequality in pre-government income; the power resources approach, which emphasizes partisan political contestation and electoral participation; the institutional approach, which focuses on political institutions such as the nature of the electoral system; and the globalization approach, which argues that economic globalization has fostered a “race to the bottom” whereby government efforts to provide social protection are increasingly constrained by the exigencies of global competition. The paper finds reasonably strong relationships between government redistribution and three variables representing these theoretical perspectives: the extent of pre-government inequality; the level of electoral turnout; and whether elections to national legislatures employ majoritarian or proportional representation electoral systems. Beyond these broad findings, the paper offers a good deal of detail concerning the relationship between specific modes of government redistribution and individual independent variables, a level of specificity that is made possible by the flexibility, detail and cross-national comparability of LIS data on household income.

Mahler, V. and S. Skowronski (2008). Inequality, Redistribution and Electoral Turnout: A Cross-National Analysis of the Developed Countries. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. The central task of this paper is to explore the relationship between income inequality, electoral turnout and government redistribution in the developed countries. The paper begins with a cross-national analysis of 14 countries over the period from the late 1970s through the mid 2000s that explores both the sources of variation in electoral turnout and the effect of turnout on government redistribution, making use of data from the Luxembourg Income Study and other sources. The paper then offers a multilevel analysis of the relationship between income and voting, employing data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The central findings are as follows. First, income inequality is negatively related to electoral turnout and turnout is positively related to the extent of government redistribution, even when other variables are taken into account. And, second, the mechanism by which turnout is associated with redistributive policies reflects a process whereby, as electoral participation declines, the actual electorate becomes less representative of the potential electorate with respect to income, which in turn has consequences for public sector redistributive policies.

Maimone, C. R. and J. C. Pope (2005). Candidates vs. Parties: How Electoral Systems Shape Voter. 63rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The conventional wisdom about voting is that parties and their platforms matter more than candidates and their individual positions. This wisdom is so conventional that many studies of electoral systems ignore the potential for candidate effects, or do not even ask questions about individual candidates—even when voters are explicitly choosing between candidates (and not parties). But a careful look at the available cross-national data suggests that such views are overdrawn. There is much more candidate-voting going on than might be expected. In those systems where we were able to investigate the phenomenon (Canada, New Zealand and the United States), approximately 20 percent of the voters are found to vote for a candidate other than the one from the party that they clearly prefer. However, there appears to be little evidence of variation due to political systems: there is almost as much candidate-voting going on in Canada and New Zealand as there is in United States—despite variation in the degree to which electoral rules favor candidate-centered voting. Individual level effects are similarly unable to explain the variation: political information, interest and education were uncorrelated with voting based on candidate considerations. More work is needed to study what is clearly a significant, but often ignored, phenomenon.

Mainwaring, S. and M. Torcal (2005). Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory: After the Third Wave of Democratization. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The main argument of this paper is that the level of institutionalization is a critical dimension for understanding party systems. Until the mid-1990s, the literature on parties and party systems neglected this fact, as most work on these subjects implicitly assumed a high level of institutionalization of the party system. Yet without focusing on institutionalization, it is impossible to account for important characteristics of party systems in most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies. Voters, parties, and party systems in most post-1978 competitive regimes are qualitatively different from those of the advanced industrial democracies.
We focus on the first two dimensions of party system institutionalization that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999: 22-39) developed: the stability of interparty competition and the depth of party roots (or anchoring) in society. In these two dimensions, there are persistent and large differences in institutionalization between most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies and the advanced industrial democracies. Most of the advanced industrial democracies exhibit far greater stability in interparty competition than most post-1978 democracies.

Marinova, D. M. (2015). Electoral Accountability in Complex Information Environments. ECPR Joint Sessions. Warsaw. How well does electoral accountability function in a dealigned and increasingly complex political environment? This paper looks to one of the elements of electoral dealignment – the instability in political parties (e.g., splinters, mergers, new parties). I argue that as parties transform repeatedly between elections, they reduce the quality and quantity of electoral information available to voters, with potential implications for voter ability to sanction correctly incumbents for their performance. After a party transformation has taken place, voters may intuit that prior information may no longer be a reliable indicator of the party's future performance and may become increasingly reluctant to rely on a party's record of governance in their electoral calculus. As a result, voters may be less willing to rely on retrospective evaluations of incumbents' governance record. I conduct two sets of analyses to test the empirical implications of my argument: at the micro level with survey data from the CSES; and at the country level with macroeconomic indicators. Controlling for variation in the clarity of responsibility of institutions, I find that electoral accountability is weaker where parties change repeatedly. Implicit in my argument is parties’ active role in the process of electoral accountability. Such room to maneuver is afforded to parties by the dealignment of partisan attachments and weakening electoral ties. Hence parties can resort to organizational and leadership changes. They may replace an unpopular leader, “hoping that a new face will win the favour of the voters” (Baekgaard & Jensen 2012, 135); or a faction of party members may abandon the party to compete independently in an attempt to distance itself from a poor record of governance. Therefore this paper affords parties the agency to influence voters’ electoral decision-making in an effort to sweep a poor record of governance under the rug.

Markowski, R. (2000). Satisfaction with Democracy and Diffuse Political Support. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Markowski, R. (2002). Diffuse Political Support in New and Stable Democracies: Do Institutions Matter? IWM Conferences, Lectures and Seminars, Vienna, Austria, Institute for Human Sciences (Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen). I will begin by recalling the Eastonian and Lipsetian traditions and then move to the problems in operationalizng the concept of "diffuse political support". I will next procede specifying my own proposal and describe the multi-national comparative research project (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems), which will serve as the empirical source for further presentation. The main part seeks to answer the question under what conditions - institutional, cultural and procedural - diffuse political support is likely to manifest itself in new and stable democracies. In explaining the main relationship between the institutional infrastructure and the discussed phenomenon, accounting for intervening factors (social structure, economic and political attitudes, and the like) contributes substantially to the overall picture under scrutiny.

Markowski, R. (2003). Electoral Accountability in New Democracies. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

Markowski, R. (2003). Incumbents and Opposition: On Two Different Manifestations of Representation and Accountability. 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa.

Markowski, R. (2005). Synergy and Trade-offs between Political Representation and Accountability in Stable and New Democracies. International Conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan. The two concepts mentioned in the paper title denote real existing political phenomena and have a rather different ontological status: political representation is an old concept, deliberated by the classics and pretty well clarified, while political accountability is both fairly new and still a vague one. Moreover, many scholars consider them to be so closely related as to claim each a sine qua non condition for understanding the other. Most of them assume the two are equally desirable qualities of a functioning liberal democracy, albeit contend that in practice there is a trade-off between the two, and there is little agreement as to the superiority of one over the other. This alleged contradiction derives from institutional factors – political infrastructure of a polity. It is widely believed that presidential systems and two party systems, an effect of SMD plurality electoral rules enhance accountability, whereas parliamentary, multiparty systems, consequence of PR electoral rules boost representation. Both political representation and accountability are possible only in the context of democracy, democratic elections in particular. It is consequently believed either that voters are better integrated into democracy they live in and value its merits if elections allow them to replace incumbent government with oppositional alternative, if they negatively evaluate the performance of the former, or when they feel their views are adequately represented in the parliament. The first conjecture reflects option for accountability as the major merit of democratic elections, whereas the second presumption – representation.

Markowski, R. (2007). Representation, Accountability, and ‘Rational Electoral Behavior'. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Marsh, M. (2003). An insecure anchor for a floating party system: party identification in Ireland. Edinburgh 2003 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Marsh, M. and J. Tilley (2006). Golden halos and forked tails: The attribution of credit and blame to governments and its impact on vote choice. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia. This paper examines how voters attribute credit and blame to governments for policy success and policy failure, and how this affects their party support. We show that unpopular governments tend to carry with them a ‘forked tail’ effect that leads voters to attribute less responsibility to perceived successful policy outcomes, and more responsibility to outcomes that are perceived to be unsuccessful. Conversely popular governments tend to have a ‘golden halo’ effect that leads voters to give them extra credit for successful outcomes. Using panel data from Britain between 1997-01 and Ireland between 2002-06, we show that changes to the governing party, in Britain, and changes to the perceived success of policy outcomes, in Ireland, led to dramatic shifts in how these tail and halo effects operated. Following from this, and modelling attribution, we find that it is the interaction between partisanship and evaluation of performance that is most important. We also argue that partisanship will serve to resolve incongruities between party support and policy evaluation through selective attribution. In this way favoured parties are not blamed for policy failures and less favoured ones are not credited with policy success. We go on to show how attributions affected defections from Labour over the 1997-2001 election cycle in Britain, and defections from the Fianna Fáil/ Progressive Democrat coalition after the 2002 election in Ireland. Using models of vote switching and controlling partisanship to minimize endogeneity problems, we find that with attribution of responsibility evaluations of government performance have a much greater effect on vote intention.

Marsh, M. and C. van der Eijk (2007). Don’t expect me to vote for you just because I like you, even if you do make me feel warm inside: A comparison of the validity of non-ipsative measures of party support. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The inclusion of non-ipsative measures of party preference (in essence ratings for each of the parties of a political system) has become established practice in mass surveys conducted for election studies. They exist in different forms, known as thermometer ratings or feeling scores, likes and dislikes scores, or support propensities. Usually only one of these is included in a single survey, which makes it difficult to assess the relative merits of each. The questionnaire of the Irish National Election Study 2002 (INES2002) contained three different batteries of non-ipsative party preferences. This paper investigates some of the properties of these different indicators. We focus in particular on two phenomena. First, the relationship between non-ipsative preferences and the choices actually made on the ballot. In Ireland this relationship is more revealing than in most other countries owing to the electoral system (STV) which allows voters to cast multiple ordered votes for candidates from different parties. Second, we investigate the latent structure of each of the batteries of party preferences and the relationships between them. We conclude that the three instruments are not interchangeable, that they measure different orientations, and that one –the propensity to vote for a party– is by far preferable if the purpose of the study is the explanation of voters’ actual choice behaviour. This finding has important ramifications for the design of election study questionnaires.

Matsubayashi, T. and M. Turgeon (2010). Citizen Competence and the Institutional Environment. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), this paper first examines a cross-national difference in the extent to which electorates think ideologically. Our analysis shows that the ability of voters to place themselves in the ideological space and place themselves “correctly” varies greatly by country. More importantly, we find that some institutional arrangements contribute to voters’ ability to do so. Next, we examine the direction of the distortion induced by low-levels of political information and ask: why are some populations placing themselves more to the left or to the right than their full-information placement. Our findings also indicate a role for institutional arrangements in explaining the direction of the distortion in ideological thinking attributed to political knowledge.

Mayne, Q. and A. Hakhverdian (2014). Does ideological congruence matter? The effect of congruence on system support in liberal democracies. 21st International Conference of Europeanists. Washington, DC. Ideological congruence is an important facet of democratic governance. The closer the match between the preferences of the public and those of elected elites, the better representative democracy is said to function. The bulk of the existing literature is concerned with the measurement of congruence and its treatment as the outcome to be explained. Little attention has been paid to the effects of ideological congruence. This paper analyzes whether ideological congruence increases the probability of citizens being satisfied with the overall functioning of democracy. While congruence is traditionally measured as the distance between the mean citizen and the government, we also include other types of congruence that take the dispersion of the public and the elite into consideration. The theory is tested with CSES data using multilevel methods

McAllister, I. (2006). The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Project: An Overview. 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. The CSES is a 50nation collaborative effort to gather data to study the effects of various electoral systems and other democratic institutions on citizens' choices and political perspectives. The election studies in each of the collaborating countries donate a fifteen minute section of their national postelection survey, in which they ask a common set of questions that the CSES designs. Each CSES "module" of questions is used for a period of approximately five years in length, to allow for the varying schedules of elections in different countries. Each module has a different theme. Module 1 (1996-2001) examined the impact of the performance of government; module 2 (2002-2006) was concerned with accountability and representation. Module 3, which will be in the field until about 2010, will examine the choices open to voters. All of our data are freely available to the academic community; the data and other project details can be found at www.cses.org. This presentation will provide an overview of the CSES project, and in particular discuss in detail the third module of the project, and what it promises for answering major theoretical questions in comparative electoral behavior.

McAllister, I. and S. White (2006). Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Postcommunist Societies. 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. Political parties have a central role to play in democratic consolidation, yet we know comparatively little about how effectively they represent social cleavages in newly emerging democracies. Using the LipsetRokkan framework, this paper examines the role of parties in articulating social cleavages in 14 established and six emerging democracies, using the Comparative Study of Electoral System datasets. The results show that social cleavages in the emerging democracies are similar to those of established democracies, with religion and class predominating. Parties are less effective in representing social cleavages in emerging democracies, especially with regard to voters who are religious, manual workers or trade union members. More generally, the results underpin the relevance of the LipsetRokkan framework to emerging democracies.

McDonald, M. and K. Myunghee (2009). On Observing the Variety of Party Policy Offerings in National Left-Right Policy Space. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The policy options political parties put on offer for voters are important elements in the operation of democracy. More versus less party variety of party policy choices has been shown to influence electoral choice, collective representation, political stability, and turnout. This paper steps back from the consequences of party system choices offered in order to distinguish among the ideas used to discuss and analyze party policy variety. We divide the notion of party policy variety into eight concepts and empirical referents. The analysis is exploratory and the results are descriptive. Nevertheless, the descriptions prove informative with respect to the following three observations. First, larger party systems with more polarization, more diversity, and more dispersion along a left-right dimension tend to come from systems with more permissive electoral formats—to be read here as PR systems, in comparison to SMD systems. But, second, because permissive systems are more likely to permit viable entry by both centrist and extreme parties, measurements showing more polarization and dispersion are not uniformly the characteristics of party systems operating under more permissive electoral rules. And, third, because voters in more permissive systems tend to concentrate their votes on one or more centrist alternatives, polarization and dispersion differences between more and less permissive systems are further reduced when the concept of interest is either electoral polarization or electoral dispersion.

Memoli, V. and A. Pellegata (2012). Electoral systems, corruption and satisfaction with democracy. General Conference of the European Political Science Association. Barcelona: 40. Corruption has been recognized as a detrimental factor of the citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country and their confidence with political institutions. On the contrary, the direct impact of the institutional context on political support is less clear and previous studies present contradictory results. However, from a recent literature emerges that the institutional context plays a role in mediating the impact that the performance of the government authorities have on political support. This paper aims to analyze if and how the restraints posited by the electoral systems on political corruption affect the citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The main argument advanced is that those characteristics of the electoral systems that help to constrain corruption among elected officials, strengthening the relation of accountability with the voters and favoring the monitoring by the opposition parties, weaken the negative effects of corruption on the level of political support expressed by citizens. Differently from previous studies that took into account the institutional context along the traditional distinction between majoritarian and proportional/consensual democracies, this paper focuses on specific aspects of the electoral system, such as the district magnitude, the ballot structure, the electoral formula and the level of vote-seats disproportionality. Several research hypotheses on the effect of corruption on political support conditional on the features of the electoral system are tested through a comparative multilevel design on a sample of 34 countries taken from the Module 2 of the CSES data. Results confirm that, even though there is not an electoral system that outperform the others, those features that reduce incentives of politicians to cultivate personal vote and extract rent from their position weaken the negative impact of perceived corruption on satisfaction with democracy.

Meneguello, R. (2007). A democracia brasileira, 21 anos depois. Primer Congreso Latinoamericano de Opinión Pública, Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay.

Menendez, I. (2010). Openness and perceptions of political choice: a test of economic, institutional and individual explanations. Evidence from 26 countries over 1996-2001. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, MPSA. Chicago.

Merolla, J. L. and E. J. Zechmeister (2007). El Poder del Peje: Crises and Leadership Perceptions following the 2006 Mexican Election. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Economic downturns, armed rebellion, natural disasters, crime waves, political assassinations and scandals are among the numerous crises that have been afflicted upon Mexican citizens over the last several decades. Under conditions in which crises loom or have been realized, citizens’ often turn to strong, charismatic leaders who appear capable of handling the given crisis. Deep national crises often coincide with the rise of highly charismatic leaders, such as Juan Perón and Adolf Hitler. Yet even in less extreme conditions, we assert that political leaders can come to be seen as more charismatic and as stronger leaders. To test for such effects, we turn to the 2006 Mexican presidential election. The 2006 Mexican election and its aftermath was a context characterized, at least for many, by conditions of crisis. Some of the issues over which the public was concerned include the political crisis that resulted from uncertainty over the winner of the election, the economy, and crime. In this paper, we argue that individuals who had negative evaluations of the general situation of the country, the economy, and the election should project greater leadership and charismatic qualities onto López Obrador, in part because he was a challenger to the incumbent party. Meanwhile, evaluations of Calderón’s leadership and charisma may suffer among those with negative evaluations. We test these arguments using data from the 2006 CSES-CIDE study. We find strong support for our arguments, even after controlling for other factors that might influence these evaluations.

Milner, H. (1998). Political Participation, and the Political Knowledge of Adults and Adolescents. 30th ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops 22: "Political Participation and Information", Turin. In a recently published book (Milner 2002), I attempt to establish the relationship between the level of political knowledge and political participation in advanced western democracies. In this paper, I reflect on the implications of my findings, as well as of new research that has emerged since the work was completed, on the debate surrounding contemporary analyses of voter turnout and its apparent decline. I take the position that if the knowledge dimension were better incorporated into their theoretical frameworks and research designs, political scientists, and thus policy makers, could better direct their efforts toward addressing declining political participation. And I suggest how we might move in this direction

Milner, H. (2002). Civic Drop-outs? What Young Citizens Know and Don’t Know About Politics: Canada in Comparative Perspective. 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. In this paper I draw the link between three developments in advanced Western democracies: the decline in voter turnout, the decline in political knowledge, and the depoliticization of youth. After summarizing what we know of these phenomena, I then, using Canadian data in particular, investigate the extent to which the first two are in fact outcomes of third. If, as I will try to show, this is significantly the case, it places challenges on policy makers and political scientists alike, challenges I address in the conclusion of the paper.

Milner, H. (2002). Civic Drop-outs? What Young Citizens Know and Don’t Know About Politics: Canada in Comparative Perspective. Citizenship on Trial: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Political Socialization of Adolescents, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. In this paper I draw the link between three developments in advanced Western democracies: the decline in voter turnout, the decline in political knowledge, and the depoliticization of youth. After summarizing what we know of these phenomena, I then, using Canadian data in particular, investigate the extent to which the first two are in fact outcomes of third. If, as I will try to show, this is significantly the case, it places challenges on policy makers and political scientists alike, challenges I address in the conclusion of the paper.

Milner, H. (2002). The Voters' Paradox: Bringing back the Knowledge Dimension. 52nd Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association, "Making Politics Count", Aberdeen, Scotland. In a recently published book (Milner 2002), I attempt to establish the relationship between the level of political knowledge and political participation in advanced western democracies. In this paper, I reflect on the implications of my findings, as well as of new research that has emerged since the work was completed, on the debate surrounding contemporary analyses of voter turnout and its apparent decline. I take the position that if the knowledge dimension were better incorporated into their theoretical frameworks and research designs, political scientists, and thus policy makers, could better direct their efforts toward addressing declining political participation. And I suggest how we might move in this direction.

Milner, H. (2003). Creating an Instrument for Testing Political Knowledge: Theoretical Considerations and Preliminary Findings. 2nd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany. Recently, the author, in the name of working group of researchers, submitted a proposal to include a battery of items testing political knowledge in the second round of the European Social Survey. As a result, the ESS agreed to include up to five such items in the upcoming round, with the possibility of including a full module in the third round. Once implemented, the survey is expected to provide data that could allow for a major step forward in comparative political analysis. It would facilitate researchers’ ability to compare levels of political knowledge in European and other advanced democratic countries and, in particular, identify those aspects of political knowledge linked to different forms of political participation and civic engagement.

Milner, H. (2004). The Phenomenon of Political Dropouts: Age, Abstention and Political Institutions. Uppsala 2004 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Uppsala, Sweden. Does low turnout matter? In this paper I start from the contention that, in long-standing democracies, the real question is not if turnout matters but when it matters. Or, to put it otherwise, any real threat to democracy lies not in citizens not voting per se, but in their not being in a position to vote when it is appropriate to do so. One aspect of being in such a position has to do with access to the ballot box. In the mature democracies, much has been learned and accomplished with regard to mechanisms to enhance voter access. Moreover, use of the new information technologies (“E-democracy”) raises new challenges in this regard, not only with regard to access to the ballot-box, but also on the information side. Though I am concerned with the information side in this paper, I shall not directly address this complex issue here - except to suggest that, like postal voting, but to a potentially far greater degree, E-democracy is a two-edged word when it comes to political participation. There is little evidence so far that it brings into the electoral arena those otherwise excluded. Its main function appears to be to facilitate voting for those who would normally vote in any case, but at the risk of distancing people from the human exchange that has been a key dimension of politics.

Milner, H. and E. Guntermann (2014). Political Knowledge in Comparative Perspective: The Impact of Electoral Disproportionality and Inequality. ECPR General Conference. Glasgow, Scotland: 26. What citizens know about the political system and its actors is a central factor when it comes to political engagement. Analyzing data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, including recent data from the fourth wave, which, for the first time, includes a set of common political knowledge questions, this paper uses Bayesian multilevel models to investigate how and why political knowledge varies among citizens. The paper adds weight and context to previous findings that the effect of education on political knowledge (and, indirectly, electoral turnout) varies with the proportionality of a country’s electoral system and degree of economic inequality.

Mochmann, E. (1999). European Infrastructure Needs for Comparative Socio-Economic Research. EU Socio-Economic Research Conference, Brussels, Belgium.

Murr, A. E. (2011). Data-collection equivalence in comparative survey research? How survey mode and timing affect recall rates of local candidate names across countries. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago. How do survey characteristics affect what the survey tries to measure? Past research highlighted how survey characteristics impact on measures of political knowledge within a country. But little is known about how varying survey characteristics may affect measures of political knowledge between countries. After reviewing how people learn political information, this paper explores whether (1) the surveys in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems vary in survey timing and survey mode, (2) whether people forget information as time goes by and (3) whether survey modes affect how thoroughly people search their memory. Multilevel models found that memory decayed with elapsed time. But survey mode had no robust effect on the probability to recall a candidate's name. A simulation of equal and fast survey timing across all countries found that (1) some countries substantially increased their recall rates and (2) that even the ranking of countries changed. The paper concludes by discussing what format and content of knowledge questions may guard against these survey timing effects.

Nagler, J. (2006). A Comparative Analysis of Variation in Turnout by Education. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. We use the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to compare how educational attainment impacts the likelihood that an eligible individual will cast a ballot in an election across nations.

Netscher, S. (2011). Transferring Knowledge: EU-Migrants and their Levels of Political Interest. 6th Global Conference: Pluralism, Inclusion and Citizenship. Prague. In the context of an eroding concept of nation state, according to the political coalescence and the enlargement of the European Union, the aim of the present paper is to focus on the political interest of EU-migrants, due to existing differences in the political systems of the country of origin and Germany. Based on a common model of citizens’ political interest, general findings are transmitted to the analysis of immigrants. It can be shown that socio-demographics are less powerful predictors. In contrast, the time of residence and the political socialization of the so-called first generation of EU-migrants are discussed as explanatory variables. The empirical results indicate that system ifferences matter in explaining immigrants’ political interest.

Nevitte, N., A. Blais, et al. (2000). Socio-Economic Status and Non-Voting: A Comparative Cross-National Analysis. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada. This study examines the relationship between socio-economic status and non-voting using data from the first module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project,. SES influences nonvoting in all countries included in the first module, regardless of economic, political or institutional characteristics. The strength and patterns of the relationship between SES and non-voting vary crossnationally. The main finding is that four SES variables are consistently related to non-voting even after contextual factors, like economic conditions, electoral history (whether a new or consolidated democracies), electoral rules, and party systems are taken into account, low SES is still associated with non-voting.

Nickel Makszin, K. (2009). Explaining Continuity and Change in Postcommunist Central European Family Benefits: The Politics of Redistribution in Postcommunist Central European Welfare States. My PhD International Conference "Europe in motion: society, labour market and sustainability in the age of migration", Bratislava, Slovak Republic.

Nishizawa, Y. (2000). Economic Voting: Do Institutions Affect the Way Voters Evaluate Incumbents? 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada. A classic reward-punishment model of economic voting (Key 1966; Goodhart and Bhansali 1970; Kramer 1971; Muller 1970) is a simple yet powerful tool to explain voting decisions. It holds that when voters find that an incumbent government has done a good job in controlling the state of the economy during its term, they vote for the incumbent government parties or candidates on election day, and when voters are not happy about the way that incumbents have handled the economy, they vote for the opposition parties or their candidates.

Norris, P. (1999). Ballots not Bullets: Testing the Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization. Conference on Constitutional Design 2000: Institutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy in the late Twentieth Century, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN. The late twentieth century has seen a resurgence of ethnic conflict in many states worldwide. In seeking the management and containment of such tensions, interest has increasingly turned to issues of ‘constitutional engineering’ or ‘institutional design’. One of the most important and influential claims in the literature is that proportional electoral systems are most appropriate for ethnic minority representation, promoting support for the political system, and therefore leading to conflict resolution in plural societies. But under what conditions do electoral rules shape the political support of different ethnic groups? Does this pattern vary according to the type of ethnonational, cultural-linguistic, racial, or ethnoreligious cleavage? Can we extend our generalizations from established democracies like Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland to plural societies in a wide range of transitional and consolidating democracies like the Ukraine, Romania and Taiwan? To explore these issues, this study examines patterns of support for the political system among ethnic minority populations under proportional, mixed and majoritarian systems in a dozen new and established democracies. Survey data is drawn from the second release of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. The preliminary results presented in this initial study remain subject to reanalysis in a wider range of democracies once more countries are added to this dataset. Nevertheless the initial findings indicate that there is a complex pattern at work and the claim that PR party list systems are automatically associated with higher levels of political support among ethnic minorities is not confirmed by the study.

Norris, P. (2002). Ballot Structures & Legislative Behavior. Exporting Congress? The Influence of U.S. Congress on World Legislatures, Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies, Florida International University, Miami, Florida. During the last decade international agencies launched multiple initiatives to strengthen legislatures in newer democracies. Attempts to ‘export Congress’ have used two primary strategies: direct forms of institutional capacity building and indirect forms of electoral engineering. The latter assumes that formal electoral rules have the capacity to constrain, modify and influence legislative behavior. This study examines evidence for these claims, in particular whether the use of candidateballot or party-ballot structures can shape the chain of accountability and responsiveness from legislators to local communities and to the central party leadership. To explore these issues, Part I outlines the theoretical framework based on rational choice institutionalism. Part II describes the research design derived from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, a survey covering 37 elections in 32 nations from Australia to the Ukraine. Part III analyzes the evidence. The conclusion summarizes the findings and considers their implications for electoral engineering.

Norris, P. (2003). Electoral Engineering: Electoral Rules and Voting Choices. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. From Kosovo to Kabul, the last decade witnessed growing interest in ‘electoral engineering’. Reformers have sought to achieve either greater government accountability through majoritarian arrangements or wider parliamentary diversity through proportional formula. Underlying the normative debates are important claims about the impact and consequences of electoral reform for political representation and voting behavior. This study compares and evaluates two broad schools of thought, each offering contrasting expectations. One popular approach claims that formal rules define the electoral incentives facing parties, politicians, and citizens. By changing the rules, rational choice institutionalism claims that we have the capacity to shape political behavior among politicians and citizens. Reformers believe that electoral engineering can solve multiple social problems, whether by mitigating ethnic conflict, strengthening voter-party bonds, generating democratic accountability, or boosting women’s representation. Alternative cultural modernization theories differ in their emphasis on the primary motors driving human behavior, their expectations about the pace of change, and also their assumptions about the ability of formal institutional rules to alter, rather than adapt to, deeply embedded and habitual social norms and patterns of human behavior. To consider these issues, this paper sets out the theoretical framework, derived from the introduction to a new book ‘Electoral Engineering’ forthcoming with Cambridge University Press, New York in Spring 2004. The book compares the consequences of electoral rules and cultural modernization for many dimensions of political representation and voting behavior, including issues of electoral behavior in patterns of party competition, the strength of social cleavages and party loyalties, and levels of turnout, and questions of political representation in the gender and ethnic diversity of parliaments, and the provision of constituency service. Systematic evidence is drawn the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems based on surveys of parliamentary and presidential contests held in over thirty countries ranging from the United States, Australia and Switzerland to Peru, Taiwan and Ukraine. The book concludes that formal rules do matter, with important implications for the choice of electoral systems.

Norris, P. (2004). The ‘new cleavage’ thesis and the social basis of radical right support. 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. The rise of the radical right is open to multiple interpretations. The question addressed in this paper is whether many of these parties have fostered an enduring social base among core voters and, if so, which social sectors are most likely to support them. Part I discusses the alternative theoretical frameworks provided by the classic accounts of the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘new social cleavage’ thesis common during the last decade, and the theory of partisan dealignment. The chapter then compares evidence to analyze rival hypotheses about the social basis of the radical right vote across fifteen nations, using data drawn from the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. Part II focuses upon the role of socioeconomic indicators, while Part III considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties. This paper is drawn from Chapter 6 of Radical Right: Parties and Electoral Competition, a new book by the author forthcoming with Cambridge University Press (2005).

Norris, P. (2005). The "new cleavage" thesis and the social basis of radical right support. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. The rise of the radical right is open to multiple interpretations. The question addressed in this paper is whether many of these parties have fostered an enduring social base among core voters and, if so, which social sectors are most likely to support them. Part I discusses the alternative theoretical frameworks provided by the classic accounts of the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘new social cleavage’ thesis common during the last decade, and the theory of partisan dealignment. The chapter then compares evidence to analyze rival hypotheses about the social basis of the radical right vote across fifteen nations, using data drawn from the European Social Survey, 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001. Part II focuses upon the role of socioeconomic indicators, while Part III considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties.

Norris, P. (2006). Fast Track Strategies for Achieving Women's Representation in Iraq and Afghanistan: Choices and Consequences. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. The rapid diffusion of fast-track strategies for gender equality in elected office that has occurred since the early-1990s raises a series of questions. What fast-track strategies are available? Where and why have these policies been adopted and, in some cases, abandoned? And what can we learn about the conditions which lead these strategies to ratchet up the number of women in elected office? This study examines these issues and discusses their implications. Part I provides a global overview of developments and trends. Part II focuses upon comparing the detailed case studies of Iraq (illustrating the implementation of statutory gender quotas) and Afghanistan (using reserved seats). Part III considers the underlying conditions leading towards the effectiveness of these arrangements. Part IV summarizes the conclusions.

Norris, P. (2007). Christian conservatism in global perspective: US exceptionalism (again)? The Christian Conservative Movement and American Society Conference, New York, NY. (Summary): Since at least the mid-twentieth century, Protestants have been part of the bedrock Republican base. In the early-1990s the American party system experienced an important long-term realignment, however, where the religious population shifted towards the Republicans, while secularists moved towards the Democrats. Is this ‘religiosity gap’, which evidence from the NES suggests has persisted in subsequent United States elections, yet another example of ‘American exceptionalism’, reflecting particular characteristics of American society, politics and history? Or does this phenomenon reflect broader developments with the heightened political salience of religion which is also evident in other societies? To examine these issues, this chapter analyzes the impact of religiosity on political ideology and voting behavior in cross-national perspective. Part I sets out Lipset and Rokkan’s classical theoretical framework for understanding processes of party-religious alignment. Part II considers cross-national survey evidence from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the World Values Study. The analysis compares the strength of religious participation, religious values, and types of religious faith with left-right ideological orientations and voting support for religious parties. The results of the multivariate analysis suggest that two major findings. First, religious participation is consistently associated with more rightwing ideological orientations in many post-industrial and industrial societies, not just in the United States. At the same time, support for religious parties exemplified by the Christian Democrats has gradually eroded in many post-industrial societies, a pattern consistent with broader processes of secularization evident in these nations. In this regard, the United States remains an outlier among affluent nations in the strength of religiosity and the powerful role it plays in shaping contemporary patterns of party politics and electoral behavior.

Northmore-Ball, K. (2012). Increasing turnout inequality in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: economic disengagement or a progression to normalcy? Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) Conference. Oxford. Post-Communist countries, with the exception of Belarus, Russia, and Hungary, have seen a decline in turnout since their first democratic elections. Studies that have so far examined this decline attribute it to a fading of the founding election euphoria (Kostadinova 2003, Kostadinova and Power 2007, and Pacek et al 2009). These studies, however, use only aggregate data and thus do not examine whether the decline has been even across all social groups. This paper instead uses pooled cross-sectional individual level data covering the period 1990 to 2007 across 12 post-Communist countries and asks if the lower turnout can be explained by frustration and disengagement among those people who benefited the least from the transition to a market economy. This new data confirms that the fall in turnout is mostly due to the wearing-off of founding election euphoria and a progression towards “normal” turnout patterns seen in established democracies where advantaged citizens are much more likely to vote than the disadvantaged. Other factors such as economic disengagement are found to be negligible in explaining the decline in voting.

Nový, M. and T. Katrnak (2014). The Maturity of Democracy, Political Attitudes and Participation in Elections: Towards Macro-micro Interaction. 3rd European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research. Thessaloniki, Greece. To a certain extent, every democratic model of government can be regarded as a particular organization of power. The decision-making process about political matters is carried out by representatives elected in free and periodical elections rather than through the direct voice of people. The examination of the different characters of democratic regimes worldwide can be the basis for explaining cross-national variation in voter turnout. Besides the features of a political system, many scholars have also emphasized the importance of variables at the individual level. For example, well-known Civic Voluntarism Model highlights the importance of personal resources, motivation and mobilization for taking part in political action. In this paper, we make an effort to delineate some specific interaction between macroand micro-explanations of voter turnout. At the individual level, our attention will be focused on the effect of political attitudes. We assume that psychological motivations for participation might be contingent on the maturity of a particular democratic regime. Thus, the main research question is: ‘Is the effect of political attitudes on participation in elections conditioned by the maturity of democracy?’ Considering the literature on political socialization, we hypothesize that the higher the age of democracy, the higher the effect of political attitudes on participation in elections. The study is based on the analysis of survey data from the third module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). In total, our dataset comprises 29 336 respondents nested in 27 countries. Multilevel logistic regression (including cross-level interaction) is employed to estimate the effects of independent variables on voter turnout.

Ohr, D. and H. Oscarsson (2003). Leader Traits, Leader Image and Vote Choice. 2nd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research Marburg, Germany. Secular changes are taking place in the way how election campaigns are conducted (Mancini/Swanson 1996) and how politics is portrayed in the mass media of advanced democracies. Political communication is said to have become more personalized during the last years - at the expense of abstract institutions such as the political parties. In parliamentary democracies in particular the coverage of politics in the major mass media appears to have moved towards a more presidentialized direction (Mughan 2000). If such changes are in fact occuring, it seems likely that gradually the criteria voters utilize in arriving at their voting decision will shift towards the characteristics of political candidates. The more ‘personalized’ voters decide the more important will be the criteria on which their judgement of political leaders is based. Is this basis a superficial image of political candidates or do voters instead build their judgement of leaders according to more rational criteria such as leaders’ competence to solve a nation’s urgent political problems, or the candidates’ leadership qualities? Obviously, the recruitment of democratic political leaders and the quality of democratic government both are heavily dependent on how this question can be answered.

Orriols, L. (2007). The effect of social spending on vote choice in OECD countries. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. The analysis of how governments allocate public resources between constituencies is a traditional concern of the political economy literature. Pork-barrel studies suggest that public transfers are not allocated randomly but instead they follow electoral criteria –either favouring swing voters or core supporters. However, the study of the influence of public spending on voting behaviour is much less developed. Most models in political science and political economy assume that benefiting from public spending increases the likelihood of voting for the government. However, we do not have much empirical evidence on the conditions under which recipients of public spending reward the government for its public transfers. This paper studies the influence of retired pension spending on vote choice in different OECD countries. Using CSES –Comparative Study of Electoral Systems- data, we test if the electoral support to the incumbent of retired voters depends on the generosity of pension benefits (measured with pension replacement rates) or on the increase (or decrease) of this benefit before the elections. As the paper combines the study of the determinants of individual characteristics –being retired- and contextual factors –pension’s expenditures and replacement rates- on vote choice, the statistical technique that we use is the multilevel model. In summary, we test if public benefit recipients reward the government because they benefit from government transfers and if their support is linked on how government is performing in that issue.

Ortega, C. (2000). Incentives to Organise Personal Campaigns in Preferential Voting Systems. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Oscarsson, H. (2003). Ideological Voting Under Different Institutional Contexts. 2nd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany.

Paskeviciute, A. (2006). Party Identification and System Legitimacy in Established and New Democracies. 64th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Although students of democratic politics believe that party identification is directly related to the legitimacy of democratic political systems, we know very little about the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. Drawing on public opinion survey data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) along with the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) project data my study examines the role of party identification for system legitimacy in established and newer democracies across Europe. I argue that partisanship operates on system support in two important ways. First, partisanship can stimulate citizen support for the political system if it signals allegiance to party-based democratic governance. This is certainly the case in established democracies, but not in new democracies of East Central Europe where in the initial stages of democratization partisanship predominates among supporters of former Communist parties. More importantly, however, partisanship operates on system legitimacy indirectly, that is, by providing a link that allows parties to communicate their opinions to citizens more effectively. This persuasion effect is particularly strong in new democracies, where low levels of political sophistication and high uncertainty associated with democratic transitions makes citizens especially susceptible to opinions of the political elites.

Paskeviciute, A. (2006). Party identification and system legitimacy in established and new democracies. Nicosia 2006 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, Cyprus. Although students of democratic politics believe that party identification is directly related to the legitimacy of democratic political systems, we know very little about the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. Drawing on public opinion survey data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) along with the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) project data my study examines the role of party identification for system legitimacy in established and newer democracies across Europe. I argue that partisanship operates on system support in two important ways. First, partisanship can stimulate citizen support for the political system if it signals allegiance to party-based democratic governance. This is certainly the case in established democracies, but not in new democracies of East Central Europe where in the initial stages of democratization partisanship predominates among supporters of former Communist parties. More importantly, however, partisanship operates on system legitimacy indirectly, that is, by providing a link that allows parties to communicate their opinions to citizens more effectively. This persuasion effect is particularly strong in new democracies, where low levels of political sophistication and high uncertainty associated with democratic transitions makes citizens especially susceptible to opinions of the political elites.

Paskeviciute, A. (2007). Partisanship and system support in comparative perspective. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. While partisanship is usually assumed to contribute positively to democratic governance, recent rise in the electoral strength of extreme-right parties in the West and persistence of ex-communist parties in East Central Europe suggest that partisanship may not have a uniform effect on democratic legitimacy. Drawing on public opinion survey data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 1 and Module 2, along with the Manifestos Research Group (MRG) project indicators, this study is designed to examine the role that party identification plays in shaping citizen attitudes towards their political system in established and newer democracies. As a first step in our analysis, we ask whether citizens with party identification are more likely to have positive attitudes towards their political system than unaligned voters, as suggested by existing research. As a next step, we investigate whether partisanship may also have an indirect effect on system legitimacy by encouraging citizens to adopt views about their system communicated by political parties. Finally, we test whether this persuasion effect might be stronger in newer democracies where due to lower levels of mass political sophistication and higher uncertainty associated with democratic transitions citizens are more likely to seek opinion guidance from their political parties.

Paskeviciute, A. and C. J. Anderson (2003). Political Party Behavior and Political Trust in Contemporary Democracies. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Students of democratic politics routinely emphasize the importance of political parties for structuring the electoral process as well as issues such as government formation and legislative behavior. Yet, few studies have investigated whether and how parties and party systems shape people’s beliefs about democratic governance. We draw on Strom’s behavioral theory of political parties, which suggests that parties often face trade-offs between competing goals (office v. policy). As a result, parties vary in the extent they pursue policy or office goals. Using the Laver and Hunt expert survey data, which classify political parties as policy-, office-, or balance-seeking together with survey data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project in nine established democracies, we analyze how party goals shape citizens support for political parties and the political system more generally. Consistent with prior research on the effects of partisan identification on attitudes toward government, we find that party identification generally produces more positive attitudes towards political parties and the political regime. However, we also find that political parties are not created equal: specifically, supporters of parties with different goals vary systematically in terms of their levels of support for the political system and political parties as an institution. Contrary to many common assumptions, supporters of office-seeking parties consistently exhibit more positive attitudes toward political parties and the performance of the political system. What is more, office-seeking parties that succeed in gaining the office are particularly likely to express their satisfaction with democracy. In contrast, citizens attached to policy-oriented parties are significantly more likely to express their support for the idea that political parties are necessary institutions.

Paskeviciute, A. and C. J. Anderson (2004). Political parties, partisanship, and support for the political system in established democracies. 62nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Although existing research has identified important system-level explanations of cross-national differences in the levels of political support, a lot of unexplained variation remains within countries across similarly situated citizens. This study is designed to show that the role political parties play in shaping people’s views about the political system is a missing reality in the research on political trust. We argue that political parties shape people’s views about the democratic governance by generating party identification, and that partisanship operates on system support in two important ways. First, it stimulates citizen attachment to a political system; and second, it provides an important link between parties and citizens that facilitates a more effective channeling of party views to their supporters. Drawing on the survey data collected as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project together with the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) data and Laver and Hunt (1992) expert surveys in eight established democracies, we find that party identifiers have more positive views about their political regime than unaligned citizens. What is more, the results of non-recursive two-stage least-squares model indicate that parties with more optimistic outlook towards the system produce higher levels of satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy among their supporters than parties with more dim views. We also find that office-seeking parties express more satisfaction with the status quo of the political regime and thus produce more positive attitudes among their supporters. This suggests that office-seeking party behavior appears to play a more favorable role for the democratic governance than has often been assumed by students of democratic politics.

Paskeviciute, A. and M. Rosema (2008). Political Cynicism and Electoral Choice. 31st Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Paris. Political trust and political cynicism are not key concepts in electoral research. However, if models based on traditional factors (social background, policy preferences, ideological positions, government approval, and candidate images) failed to provide an adequate explanation of the support of a particular party, political cynicism has been put forward as a relevant factor. Electoral support for so-called extreme right-wing and populist parties in Europe are well-known examples. The evidence for the impact of political cynicism on the vote is, however, rather limited and scattered. Moreover, how the concept of policial cynicism relates to notions like political trust, political alienation, and political support is not sufficiently clear. The aim of this paper is to take up both issues. Its first aim is to provide some conceptual clarity regarding the meaning of political cynicism, by discussing both political science literature as well as the psychological foundation of the concept. The second aim is to provide a more systematic analysis of the impact of political cynicism on the vote (both electoral participation and party choice), by focusing on a wide range of European countries and a wide range of parties. This will be done on the basis of survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Findings indicate that political cynicism affects voters’ preferences for some parties but not for others. Furthermore, findings indicate that whereas in some countries political cynicism leads to abstention, in other countries it leads to support for particular parties. We conclude by discussing the implications for the functioning of democracy.

Patrikios, S. and G. Xezonakis (2011). Globalization and the Politicization of Religion. An Empirical Test with CSES Data. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Assiciation. Seattle, USA: 25. The growing affluence and cultural pluralism generated by globalization are expected to lead to religious privatization, that is, to the demise of religion in the public sphere in general, and in electoral politics in particular. However, recent events suggest that the existential and ontological insecurity promoted by globalization may have triggered a religious resurgence in national elections. The present paper offers the first comprehensive empirical test of the two rival expectations. We further hypothesize that the emergence of these competing outcomes (demise or resurgence of the religious vote) depends on the structure of the religious economy: established churches are better positioned for a political resurgence. The analysis combines individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems with two types of country-level information: globalization indices and a measure of local religious competition. Our results suggest that globalization may be linked to stronger religious-voting patterns in national elections especially under an established church. Findings have implications for political research and for the long-running debate on the future of religion in modernity.

Patrikios, S. and G. Xezonakis (2012). Globalization, Religiosity and Vote Choice: An Empirical Test. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Assiciation. Chicago. Building on recent research that examines the impact of globalization in domestic political behaviour, particularly on economic voting, the present paper proposes that globalization strengthens the influence of religiosity on individual voting decisions (the „religious vote‟). We further hypothesize that the effect of globalization on the religious vote depends on the structure of the religious economy: some religious contexts will be more fertile settings for religious voting. The analysis combines individual-level data from CSES Module 2 (2001-2006) with two types of country-level information: globalization indices and a measure of the religious context. The main finding is that globalization strengthens the link between religiosity and right-wing party choice. This effect can be interpreted as an anti-globalization backlash that takes place within a shrinking pool of religious voters. The findings contribute to a hitherto ignored relationship between globalization and the non-economic foundations of political behaviour, and, in doing so, shed light on the religious foundations of Anti-globalization backlash, a rising phenomenon in industrial societies.

Persson, M. (2010). How Inequality Affects Political Engagement. Annual Scientific Meeting of the ISSP. San Francisco, CA, USA. According to a widespread assumption, a high level of inequality in a society has a negative effect on political engagement. In egalitarian societies the levels of social capital are higher which supposedly increases individuals’ willingness to participate in political and societal activities. However, there is no established knowledge concerning which aspects of inequality (e.g. economic or educational inequalities or so forth) that result in decreased political participation. In this paper, I aim to present a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between inequality and political participation by studying the effects of two different forms of inequality: income inequality and educational inequality. Multilevel regression analyzes are carried out on data from 42 elections from 25 countries supplied by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Results show that there are no significant main effects of neither educational nor economic inequality on political engagement. However, interaction shows that the level of inequality significantly affects individuals with low education and low income. Surprisingly, the effects of educational inequality and economic inequality work in opposite directions. While educational inequality has a positive effect on those with low education the effect of economic inequality is negative on those with lowest income. The paper thus challenges the conventional wisdom on how levels of inequalities affect the political behavior of citizens.

Pickup, M. (2007). Sifting through the endogeneity: How to measure the effect of a campaign poll with a poll. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Due to what has been termed "the failure of the polls" in a series of elections (e.g., UK, 1992; Germany, 2005), every country with election polling has heard calls for greater regulation of the polls, including calls for an outright ban. At least 30 different nations currently place some sort of embargo on the publication of results from election polls. The debate is fuelled by the concern that if political information is a key component of democratic elections then a functioning democracy requires unbiased information. Even free from bias, though, political information derived from polls may be troublesome. This is due to the multiplicity of mechanisms through which polls can have their effect on voters. Unfortunately, not enough is known about the effect of poll information on voters or about the polls themselves to properly conduct this debate. The key methodological challenge is in finding campaign poll effects on individual vote intentions. The challenges of finding any campaign effects on public opinion are vast, not the least of which is the endogeniety of campaign media coverage in a model of public opinion. This is many times worse for campaign polls, as the effect of the event (published vote intentions from a poll) is measured by a subsequent poll which is likely to be influenced by forces which are highly correlated with the previous poll. In this paper, I will demonstrate how to use a multilevel logistic regression with an autoregressive error process at the campaign day level, estimated using MCMC methods, to determine the effects of published polls on vote intention at the individual level, while controlling for endogeniety.

Ponce, A. F. and C. McClintock (2014). Assessing Party System Polarization: The Role of Runoff. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.: 29. This article analyzes the impact of majority runoff rules for the election of a president on party system polarization. Party system polarization is important since it can indicate the quality of party competition (Dalton 2008). According to Dalton (2008, 2), party system polarization reflects “the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system”. Distinctions among parties based on their ideological orientations might contribute to the formation of programmatic and institutionalized party systems (Ponce 2012; Kitschelt et al. 2010), stronger partisanship (Lupu 2014), and greater political engagement (Abramowitz 2010; Hetherington 2007). Some scholarly work argues that these benefits might increase the quality of democracy (Baumer and Gold 2009; Wang 2012) and political stability (Maoz and Somer-Topcu 2010). For instance, Wang (2012) finds evidence that party system polarization is positively correlated to the level of a democracy in a country. Wang (2012) shows that while party system fractionalization is irrelevant to the prediction of the level of democracy, the effect of party system polarization is significant and robust. If runoff can affect party system polarization, it could ultimately change the institutionalization of the party system and the level of democracy.

Potter, J. D., S. Olivella, et al. (2011). Party System Nationalization and Government Spending Priorities. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. Party system nationalization has been defined as the extent to which uctuations in support for individual parties are uniform across electoral districts. However, there is a potential observational equivalence problem in the study of party system nationalization because uniform fluctuations in support can occur for one of two reasons: either parties are making the same appeal to a homogeneous constituency across different electoral districts or parties are skillfully tailoring different appeals to diverse constituencies in each district. If nationalization occurs for the first reason, we should see broad-based, national spending priorities. If nationalization occurs for the second reason (or does not occur at all), we should see targeted spending priorities. Using electoral data from the CLE, CLEA, and EED electoral databases, budgetary data from the OECD, and sociodemographic data from the CSES, we test for the conditional effect of party system nationalization described above for 24 elections across 13 countries. We find that the normatively desirable ramifications of party system nationalization { namely, nationally-oriented policies { are not always realized and this realization is conditional on the level of similarity between districts' demographic composition.

Powell, G. B. (2007). The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Conceptualizations and Data on the Effects of Election Rules. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Powell, G. B. (2008). Changing Party System Polarization, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Ill. Ideological congruence between median voter and the government changes substantially from one decade to the next, especially in the SMD systems of Western democracies. These changes are closely linked to changing levels of party system polarization. When the large parties are close to the median voter, any outcome creates congruent governments. When they diverge, governments are usually much further away. In the PR systems, too, depolarization of the party system contributes to greater ideological congruence, although the connections are more complex, and cross-system differences are more diverse than in the SMD systems. This paper describes the changing levels of party system polarization from 1946 through 2003, explicating the positions of political party families and tracing the implications for ideological congruence. Under conditions of relative ideological consensus, such as the social democratic orientation of 1956-65 or today’s center-right orientation, there is little difference in the ideological congruence levels of SMD and PR electoral systems.

Powell, G. B. (2009). Voter Diversity, Ideological Trends, and Changing Party System Polarization in Western Democracies: Implications for Ideological Congruence. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, CA. Ideological congruence between the median voter and the government changes substantially from one decade to the next, especially in the SMD systems of Western democracies. These changes are closely linked to changing levels of party system polarization. When the large parties are close to the median voter, any outcome creates congruent governments. When they diverge, governments are usually much further away. This paper explores the relative influence and relationships between international ideological trends, domestic voter diversity and party system polarization. Citizen selfplacement data from Eurobarometer, World Value and CSES studies, and party position data from the comparative manifesto project and CSES, are used to analyze these dynamic movements and their consequences from the mid-1970s through 2005.

Powell, G. B. (2013). Party System Polarization and the Ideological Congruence: Causal Mechanisms (Updated). Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago. The ideological congruence between the median citizen and the government is shaped by various institutional features, especially the party system. The polarization of the party system has large and robust effects on ideological (in)congruence across a variety of political systems. As captured by several approaches to measuring congruence, and across a substantial span of time, more polarization makes it more difficult to form congruent governments in parliamentary democracies. This paper focuses on the process of parliamentary government formation as the causal linkage between polarization and congruence. The analysis supports our expectation that polarization works somewhat differently under the different election rules. In the PR systems we find polarization shaping congruence through its association with greater distances of the plurality or preelection coalition plurality vote winner, but also through the distances of the legislative median party, the previous government, and even the runner-up plurality party. In the SMD systems the effects are entirely through the plurality (or pre-election coalition plurality) vote winner. New data from CSES Module 3 and from the Manifesto project make it possible to analyze the two data sources in parallel and compare similarities and differences in polarization and its processes.

Powell, G. B. (2014). Minority Governments, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence. Annual Meeting of the American Political Sciences Association. Washington, DC. In this paper I first demonstrate that varying assumptions about estimating the ideological positions of minority governments have significant consequences for inferences about ideological congruence in parliamentary systems, especially for comparing majority and minority governments and consequences of PR and SMD electoral systems. Minority governments whose ideological position is estimated in the now standard way, from the positions of parties in the cabinet weighted by their legislative seat proportions or portfolios, are on average significantly more distant from the median voter than are majority governments. This descriptive fact holds across different estimation methods (manifesto-based or voter perception based) and times. Then, I draw on the previous literature on legislative bargaining and government formation (in general and in various contexts) to develop specific hypotheses about the influence of various legislative parties on the ideological position of governments. My analysis and various previous studies show evidence for all four bargaining hypotheses, but especially the weighted coalition parties, in the cases of majority governments. My analysis shows that minority governments are much less shaped by the median party and more by the largest party (where these are not the same) than are majority governments. However, research by Warwick 2011 on government program announcements and by Martin and Vanberg 2011, 2014 on committee modification of bills show no extra impact of the median party and nothing exceptional about minority situations. My analysis of the influence of formal support parties creating “formal” or “pseudo” minority governments that can count on formal outside parties for legislative majorities shows that these parties’ influence pushes the governments toward and away from the median voter about equally often. Literature on minority governments from Strom 1990 and after emphasizes the wide range of different arrangements that can connect governments and the parties that enable them to sustain themselves and pass budgets and policies in minority situations. At least until we have more research or theory, the evidence better supports using the standard portfolio-weighted approach for “true” minority governments than any adjustment favoring a particular direction.

Powell, G. B. J. (2008). Party System Change, Election Rules and Ideological Congruence. 66th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Ideological congruence between median voter and the government changes substantially from one decade to the next, especially in the SMD systems of Western democracies. These changes are closely linked to changing levels of party system polarization. When the large parties are close to the median voter, any outcome creates congruent governments. When they diverge, governments are usually much further away. In the PR systems, too, some depolarization of the party system contributes to greater ideological congruence, although the connections are more complex, and cross-system differences are more diverse than in the SMD systems. This paper describes the changing levels of party system polarization from 1946 through 2003, explicating the positions of political party families and tracing the implications for ideological congruence. Under conditions of relative ideological consensus, whether of leftist or center-right orientation, there is little difference in the congruence levels of SMD and PR electoral systems. The most recent decade seems to be such a period.

Powell, G. B. J. (2012). Representation in Context: Election Laws and Ideological Congruence Between Citizens and Governments. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. New Orleans. Democratic theory assumes that successful democratic representation will create close ideological congruence between citizens and their governments. The success of different types of election rules in creating such congruence is an ongoing target of political science research. As often in political science, a widely demonstrated empirical finding, the greater congruence associated with PR election rules, has ceased to hold. I suggest that systematically taking account in our theories of conditional effects of local context can often provide a remedy. The systematic incorporation of levels of political party polarization into theory of election laws and ideological congruence extended the temporal and spatial range of the theory. Data from the Comparative Manifesto research program and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems research program are used to test the revised theory empirically. Suggestions for generalizing our theories of political context are offered. The results of this research continue the interactions between substantive research, ongoing political events, and the great normative issues of representation and democracy.

Put, G.-J., E. Lavy, et al. (2014). Intra-Party Politics and Public Opinion: How Candidate Selection Processes affect Citizens' Views on Democracy. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Quinlan, S. (2010). Does 'Butskellism' contribute to a decline in youth electoral participation. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: 34. Most studies examining youth turnout have concentrated on establishing whether it is a lifecycle or generational phenomenon. This paper takes a different approach by examining one of the processes that may be driving the generational phenomena and which could also provide an explanation for the recent decline in youth electoral participation, namely the trend in some countries towards ideological convergence between the political parties on ‘left-right’ issues or what one could describe as the (re)emergence of Butskellism. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto’s Project (CMP) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), the paper devises a multi-level logit model to test whether the party differential at the time an individual enters the electorate conditions an individual’s electoral participation today. The paper finds that party differential the time an individual enters the electorate does not have a long standing impact on an individual’s future turnout behaviour, a finding which suggests that Butskellism does not contribute the recent decline in electoral participation, especially among the young. Thus, the processes underlying the decline in youth turnout and driving generational patterns of electoral participation lie elsewhere.

Quinlan, S. (2011). Is Butskellism Contributing to a Decline in Youth Electoral Participation? Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Rai, S. (2000). Political Participation and Voting Behavior: An Analysis of Motivating Factors for Voting in India and Bangladesh. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Rainey, C. (2012). Does District Magnitude Matter? The Case of Taiwan. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 33. A sizable literature in comparative electoral institutions argues that proportional electoral rules lead to higher voter turnout. However, recent work finds little evidence that the effect generalizes beyond western Europe and the theoretical arguments remain sparse, incomplete, and contradictory. Using a unique data set to resolve problems of omitted variable bias and methods recently introduced to political scientists to address model uncertainty and evaluate evidence both for and against our null hypotheses, I and strong evidence that the proportionality of electoral rules exerts no meaningful effect on turnout or the any of the theoretical mechanisms I test.

Raymond, C. (2009). The Continued Salience of Religious Voting in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Modernization signaled the de-alignment of traditional social cleavages in advanced industrial states. Implicit in this is a homogenization of electorates according to post-material, ‘new politics’ values. Although the impact of traditional social cleavages may have weakened, electorates are not de-aligned; the traditional social cleavages remain important divisions which structure the electorate in significant and meaningful ways. This paper focuses on the impact of religious voting relative to the other traditional social bases of politics in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, comparing the modern electorates to the electorates of the early 1960s. Using election survey data and focusing on the social bases of conservative parties’ support, the results show that while most of the social bases of electoral support have weakened, religious voting remains significant and has increased in the contexts of the United States and United Kingdom. This suggests that despite the decline in religious attendance, the traditional values shared by religious voters make them a tempting social basis of conservative parties’ voter coalitions, and that this may be occurring beyond these contexts.

Renwick, A. (2008). Is There a Trend in the Direction of Electoral Reforms in Established Democracies? 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. Both Lijphart and Colomer argue that there is a trend in electoral reforms towards greater proportionality. This paper reconsiders the evidence and theoretical arguments in relation specifically to electoral reforms in established democracies. Analysing evidence across twenty established democracies, the paper finds no clear trend towards greater proportionality. It then argues that the simple model that predicts such a trend is empirically unsuccessful: it both over- and under-predicts the incidence of electoral reform. Once a fuller conception of the nature of electoral reform – allowing for multiple actors, motivations, strategies, and time horizons – is developed, there is no reason to expect any general trend either. No one has denied that electoral reforms are complex processes, but this paper argues that that complexity must be placed at the centre of our analyses, not the periphery, if we wish to understand outcomes.

Rosema, M. and C. De Vries (2007). The Dual Nature of EU Issue Voting: The Impact of European Integration in National and European Parliamentary Elections. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Ever since the first popular election of the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, voters are presented with two channels to legitimize decision making within the European Union. In national elections voters authorize and hold accountable their national representatives, who represent their interests in the European Council. Through the elections to the EP voters elect and hold accountable their European representatives; this channel is gaining importance as the role of the EP in European decision-making increases. Conventional wisdom has it that national concerns dominate elections to the EP, which constitute “second order elections” that mirror the popularity and performance of national governments (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Van der Brug & Van der Eijk, forthcoming). This fact (among other things) has often caused scholars to view EU politics as plagued by a democratic deficit (recently see Hix & Follesdal, 2006). In this paper we present a different view. Following Mair (2005), we argue that it is most rational for voters to voice their opinion about the course of European integration in national elections. We utilize data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the European Election Survey (EES) between 1994 and 2004 to show that EU issue voting (i.e. the impact of voters’ EU preferences on vote choice) is more extensive in national elections than in EP elections. Hence, this study has important implications for our understanding of how issues regarding European integration affect electoral politics, as well as for the ongoing debate regarding the democratic deficit in EU politics

Rosema, M. and J. Thomassen (2008). A Theory of Dual Partisanship. 31st Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Paris. In this paper we contrast two approaches of conceptualising and operationalising partisanship. The first defines partisanship as a social identity, following the original conceptualisation by the Michigan scholars. The second defines partisanship as a configuration of attitudes or party evaluations. We discuss the differences between both approaches and present empirical analyses using cross-national survey data to show that both approaches lead to different conclusions regarding the number of partisans, the relationship between partisanship and vote choice. Furthermore, these differences have consequences for the study of short-term factors like candidate evaluations. These findings underline the need for a conceptualisation that comprises both elements of partisanship.

Rosset, J., N. Giger, et al. (2011). Political Representation of the Poor and Economic Inequality: A Comparative Analysis. 3-Länder-Tagung. Basel: 26. This paper analyses the relation between economic inequality at the macro-level and the political representation of poor citizens in a comparative perspective. More specifically it addresses the research question: Does the level of economic inequality at the time of the election affect how well citizens belonging to the two lowest quintiles of the income distribution are represented by the party system and governments as compared to richer citizens? Using survey data for citizens’ policy preferences and expert placement of political parties, we find that in economically more unequal societies the party system represents relatively poor citizens worse than in more equal societies. This moderating effect of economic inequality is also found for policy congruence between citizens and governments, albeit slightly less clear-cut.

Rudi, T. (2006). What kind of party identification does exist in emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe? Nicosia 2006 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, Cyprus. Party identification is one of the most prominent factors in voting behaviour research. Although some critical assessments concerning the application of party identification outside the US have been made (Thomassen 1976), party identification has widely been used in explanations of voting behaviour in established democracies in Western Europe (Butler and Stokes 1974; Holmberg 1994; LeDuc 1981). Moreover, party identification has already been used to explain voting behaviour in emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Colton 2000; Klobucar/Miller/Gwyn 2002). However, despite its application whether the concept of party identification can actually be transferred to these democracies is anything but uncontested. Whereas some argue that the concept of party identification does not suit young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (Rose/Tikhomirov/Mishler 1997: 801; Anderson/Lewis-Beck/Stegmaier 2003: 471), others indicate that they have already found clear indications of emerging party identifications (Miller/Klobucar 2000; Miller et al. 2000; Colton 2000; Tucker 2001; Vlachová 2001; Tworzecki 2003). Which position should one adopt?

Rudi, T. (2010). The role of economic voting in explaining voting behaviour in post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. According to numerous studies, economic variables are decisive factors in explaining vote choices - not only in established democracies, but also in post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. However, in contrast to established democracies, the explanatory power of the standard incumbency-hypothesis has been contested in the post-communist context. Instead, several context-specific hypotheses focusing on new regime and old regime parties have been formulated. In contrast to this conventional wisdom, I will argue that the role economic voting plays in explaining voting behaviour in post-communist democracies has been overestimated – due to omitted variable bias. In addition, it will be maintained that within the economic voting approach the standard incumbency hypothesis is more appropriate than the contextspecific hypotheses. In order to test the propositions, a general model of vote choices in post-communist democracies in Central and Eastern Europe integrating factors known from established democracies with factors being specific for the post-communist context will be formulated and tested. Using cross-sectional individual-level data for seven countries, (strong) empirical evidence is found for the theoretical expectations.

Samuels, D. (2003). Presidents, Assemblies, and Accountability. 99th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Much research explores the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the comparative exploration of accountability under presidentialism remains largely unexplored, despite a lively debate about the relative merits of presidential government. The issue merits particular attention not only because of some scholars’ skepticism whether voters can hold executives and legislators to accounts under presidentialism, but also because the separation of powers may generate different forms of accountability across executive and legislative elections. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggested that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” mediates the accountability relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I explore this notion in 24 presidential systems. The results indicate that economics always influences executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects legislative elections, but institutional clarity of responsibility mediates this relationship: legislative accountability for the economy is lower under “localizing” electoral rules. However, in contrast to the implications of some earlier research, the electoral cycle does not appear to mediate this relationship. These findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics by providing an empirical basis for a broader discussion of accountability under presidentialism.

Samuels, D. (2004). The Initial Emergence of Mass Partisanship: Evidence from Brazil. 4O Encontro Nacional da ABCP - Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política. Rio de Janeiro. Scholars believe that mass partisanship in Brazil is comparatively weak. I compare scholars’ suspicions against survey evidence and find that the aggregate level of party identification falls only slightly below the world average, and exceeds levels found in many newer democracies. However, I also find that the distribution of partisanship is skewed towards only one party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) or Workers’ Party. Brazil is a good case for testing theories of the sources of mass partisanship. I derive hypotheses from research on established and younger democracies to explain this distribution of partisan attachments. I find that strong partisanship for the PT and weak partisanship for Brazil’s other parties support the notion that party identification generally emerges from a combination of party organization and recruitment and individual motivation to acquire knowledge and become involved in politicized social networks. In contrast, group attachments, policy positions, and personalistic attachments to leaders are relatively unimportant to the development of a partisan identification.

Sapiro, V. (1999). Fifty Years of the National Election Studies: A Case Study in the History of "Big Social Science". 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.

Schmitt, H. (2000). Multiple Parteibindungen: Parteibindungen der Schweizerinnen und Schweizer im internationalen Vergleich. Annual Meeting of the Swiss Political Science Association, Balsthal, Switzerland. Das Papier rekapituliert zunächst das Konzept der Parteibindungen und wendet sich darauf dem Spezialfall multipler Parteibindungen im internationalen Vergleich zu. Wie prominent sind solche multiplen Parteibindungen im Gefüge politischer Orientierungen? Drei institu-tionelle Variablen, die multiplen Parteibindungen verursachen könnten, werden auf ihre Wir-kung überprüft: das Format des Parteiensystems, das Wahlrecht und die Dauer demokrati-scher Parteienkonkurrenz. Das Papier wendet sich dann dem Einfluß exklusiver bzw. multip-ler Parteibindungen auf die Wahlentscheidung zu. Es zeigt sich generell, (1) daß multiple Par-teibindungen im internationalen Vergleich mehr als eine zu vernachlässigende Randerschei-nung darstellen; (2) daß die begrenzte Wahlerfahrung von Wählern in neuen Demokratien der beste Prädiktor multipler Parteibindungen ist; und (3) daß die Konsequenzen multipler Partei-bindungen für das Wahlverhalten recht begrenzt sind. Mit Blick auf die Schweiz ergibt sich (4), daß Parteibindungen angesichts der spezifischen Rahmenbedingungen relativ zahlreich und sehr konzentriert sind.

Schmitt, H. (2000). Zur vergleichenden Analyse des Einflusses gesellschaftlicher Faktoren auf das Wahlverhalten: Forschungs-fragen, Anlysestrategien und einige Ergebnisse. German Political Science Association Meeting, Mannheim, Germany. Die Sozialstrukturanalyse von Wahlverhalten ist eine Domäne der Soziologen. Diese neigen dazu, politische Phänomene von der Gesellschaft her zu interpretieren. Sie suchen nach Regelmäßigkeiten im politischen Verhalten sozialer Großgruppen, um diese dann als ursächlich sozial zu begreifen. Darin ähneln sie den Ökonomen, die politisches Verhalten aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Interessen zu erklären suchen.

Schmitt, H. (2005). Political Parties, Left-Right-Orientations and the Vote in Germany and France. International Conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan. Many will agree that political parties, current political issues and the candidates that are up for election are the central factors that determine citizens’ vote choices (Campbell et al. 1960).2 However, it never has been easy to assess the relative prominence of these factors. Problems with the measurement of party identification outside of the United States of America have demonstrated this at an early stage (Budge et al. 1976). This is astonishing enough because parties themselves are a relatively easy matter: here at least we know what we are talking about. The case of issues is more complicated. Both their appearance and their effectiveness are debated.3 Additionally, issues are bound to vary between electoral systems and often even between elections. Measurement problems are reduced if one focuses on ideological orientations instead of issue preferences. Technically speaking, ideological orientations are latent variables which to some degree determine preferences about specific political issues.

Schmitt, H. and D. Ohr (2000). Are Party Leaders Becoming More Important in German Elections? Leader Effects on the Vote in Germany, 1961-1998. 96th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. This paper explores the evolution of leader effects on the vote. The laboratory in which this is done is the German Federal Republic (after re-unification: West Germany), and the time horizon is roughly the last four decades. It is argued that leader effects on the vote have their place in a “realistic” model of representative democracy, and that they are expected to increase due to processes of partisan dealignment and personalisation of politics. While earlier German research could not identify a secular increase in leader effects on vote choices, we do find some hints in this direction. Developments are not linear though, and dramatic events and the political actors on stage after 1983 seem to have reversed earlier trends to some degree. Methodological issues are also taken up. A strategy for the simultaneous analysis of vote choices in multi-party systems is proposed, and an ‘ideal’ research design for the identification of leader effects on the vote is identified – if only at the very end of the paper.

Schwirz, L. M. and M. Marsh (2012). Non-alignment of party and leader sympathies: Do voters follow the party or the leader? Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) conference. Oxford: 23. There is a common conception that party leaders have come to play a very significant role in the decision-making process of voters. However, the literature on the impact of leadership effects on vote choice provides no consensus in support of this claim. One problem about much of the research is that the causal direction between leader sympathy and party support is problematic, and the cross-sectional designs of many studies have seemed inadequate to the task of resolving the issue. In this paper we propose a novel solution. Many studies contain data on leader and party sympathies. We explore these, and in particular examine instances in which a voter thinks the party with the best leader is not the best party, or the best party does not have the best leader. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and the European Voter project we ask: in such situations do voters follow the party or the leader? The findings suggest that, contrary to the ‘leaders matter’ argument, voters more often follow the party rather than the leader and there appears to be no consistent change in this tendency over time, but rather some trendless fluctuations.

Seawright, J. (2004). The “Demand Side” of Party System Collapse: Political Preferences and Votes for Insurgent Parties. Workshop on the analysis of political cleavages and party competition. Duke University, Durham, NC. In the 1980s and 1990s, Peru and Venezuela underwent some of the most dramatic changes in political parties that have occurred anywhere in 20th century Latin America, involving the collapse of what had previously been institutionalized party systems. Other countries, such as Argentina, faced similar pressures but experienced less party system change. Finally, countries like Costa Rica and Chile have experienced essentially no change in the identities of the major parties. Why did voters in some countries support insurgent candidates, while voters in other countries remained committed to traditional parties? What kinds of voters first began to support insurgent candidates in countries where the party system did collapse? This paper argues that divergences in policy positions between voters’ preferences and the substantive appeals of traditional parties can best account for the behavioral changes behind these party system collapses. In testing this claim, I adopt a focus on the “demand side” of party system change, exploring the motivations behind voters’ decisions to change their electoral behavior. Alternative explanations, such as economic voting and corruption perceptions, do not adequately fit the evidence. The explanation based on ideological positioning and policy divergence, by contrast, is consistent with the data.

Sellers, J. and D. Kübler (2009). Metropolitan Sources of Political Behavior in Comparative Perspective: Results from a Ten-Country Study. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Toronto: 68. This paper concludes a ten-country collaborative study of metropolitan regions and their consequences for political behavior. The analysis summarizes results from multilevel or ordinary least squares regression models of partisanship, national election turnout and local election turnout over the 1990s and early 2000s. Across most advanced industrial countries and beyond, the findings reveal an emerging new political geography that is rooted in metropolitan places. Divisions within and between metropolitan regions have increasingly replaced both urban-rural cleavages and national class interests as the determinants of electoral participation and partisanship. These new patterns help to account for the expanding bases of support for neoliberalism in most advanced industrial societies, and for emerging political cleavages linked to cultural divergences and globalization. In ways that vary with national systems of institutions, disparities in localn and national voter turnout are also rooted not just in the socioeconomic composition of communities, but in the contextual conditions of metropolitan places.

Selway, J. S. (2009). A Socio-Institutional Theory of Public Goods Provision. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL. Why are some developing democracies better than others at providing health and education to their citizens? Two strands of quantitative literature have attempted to answer this question. First, the ethnicity literature claims that more ethnically fractionalized societies have poorer provision of public goods. Second, the institutional literature claims that Proportional Representation (PR) systems are superior in providing public goods. Thus far, both strands have ignored the implications each has for the other. In this paper, I argue that the effect of electoral proportionality is conditional on the underlying ethnic structure. However, I go beyond a simple interaction between ethnic fractionalization (EF) and electoral rules. In addition to EF, I measure ethnic structure through a measure of economic inequality among ethnic groups (ethno-income cross-cuttingness, or EIC) and the geographic dispersion of ethnic groups (ethno-geographic cross-cuttingness, or EGC). Specifically, I argue that, certain combinations of ethnic structure and electoral rules provide greater incentives for cross-ethnic voting, and in such cases, the effective constituency will be broader. As a result, resource allocation will be more broadly redistributed across the nation, resulting in better health and education outcomes. Testing my theory in a set of 47 developing democracies for the period 1970-2000, I find that PR is not always best system for public goods provision, and that, in general, majoritarian systems have the best potential for improving public goods provision in the more ethnically diverse societies.

Sharma, S. (2000). The Impact of Electoral Systems on Parties and Candidates. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Sheng, E. C. J. (2005). An Exploratory Comparison of Partisan Strength Across Nations. International Conference on "Elections and Democratic Governance", Institute for Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan. The author uses the CSES data set to compare the strength of partisanship across nations, with various indicators reflecting different dimensions of the concept, and further analyze the attitudinal, constitutional, and institutional factors influencing partisan strength. We found that parties under comparison possess different strengths and weaknesses along different dimensions, prompting us to be cautious in making comparison with a single indicator. Also, we found constitutional and institutional factors to be highly influential while attitudinal factors to be of minimal consequences. However, due to the complexities of comparing multiple nations and other research limitations, further development and empirical examination of testable hypothesis derived from this exploratory analysis is essential to verify or nullify the findings.

Shou, H. (2007). Gauging Political Support in Transitional Societies. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Siles, A. J. (2010). Partisanship within first time Elected Parties. . Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL. This article focuses the partisan realignment of German Green voters upon their first entrance into government. By studying voter data from the 1998 and 2002, before they had ever been in government, and after they had been in government for one term, pattern of the voter’s partisanship begin to surface. The original hypothesis of the paper is that there is a unilateral positive effect between the Green party entering into government and partisanship amount and strength. It was shown that partisanship among partisan Green voters increased, but overall strength of partisan among individual voters decreased. This shows that that the party was able to add and convert partisans, but they were unsuccessful at persuading them to become strong partisans.

Silver, B. D. (2007). Political Institutions and Support for Democracy by Ethnic and Political Minorities. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.

Singer, M. (2007). Anti-Poverty Welfare Programs and Economic Voting in Mexico. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Variations in economic voting are commonly linked to the ability of voters to hold politicians accountable. In contrast, we argue that they may also stem from the incentives that voters have to cast an economic vote or not. In this paper, we follow Pacek and Radcliff (1995) and argue that voters who receive welfare benefits from anti-poverty programs should be insulated from swings in the national economy and thus have fewer incentives to cast a sociotropic vote. Evidence from the Mexican public opinion surveys conducted over the 1991-2004 period offers support this proposition. The findings suggest the rewards for investing in anti-poverty welfare programs may increase with program efficiency rather than politicization and that effective social safety nets are political ones as well. It also suggests that variations in economic voting might not reflect the weakness of accountability but its strength: voters are getting what they ask for.

Singer, M. (2008). Who Says “It’s the Economy”?: Cross-National and Cross-Individual Variation in the Salience of Economic Factors. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. While government support is often a function of its economic record, this is not always the case. We look at the forces that lead some citizens to focus on economic issues while other citizens are more interested in foreign policy, corruption, social policy, or some other issue. Data compiled from 32 countries participating in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project demonstrate that while the economy is generally viewed as important, the economy’s place on the issue agenda varies across individuals and also electoral contexts. If the economy is not perceived as important, its effect on government approval is strongly mitigated. Our data suggest that the economy is more likely to dominate other issue concerns when the economy is in a recession, in countries with volatile economies, if the citizen in unemployed, or if the citizen is economically vulnerable. Governance crises related to corruption and human rights reduce attention to the economy, though we do not find clear evidence that terrorist attacks or participation in wars do the same. Thus variations in the economy’s salience need to be further incorporated into studies of economic voting.

Singh, S. (2008). Electoral Systems and Political Dimensionality. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper analyzes the interplay between a nation's electoral system and the dimensionality of its politics using cross-national data covering several nations and a new measure of dimensionality. Restrictive electoral institutions provide incentives for parties to ignore or absorb emerging dimensions and are not well-suited for representing small societal groups. Alternatively, permissive systems make it worthwhile for parties to take positions along nascent political dimensions, often representative of minority interests. Thus, I predict that countries with permissive electoral systems will be characterized by high dimensional political constructs, while restrictive systems will conform well to a single dimension. To test this prediction, I estimate multiple models using CSES data from several nations and a new measure of political dimensionality.

Singh, S. (2009). Electoral Systems, the Dimensionality of Politics, and Party-Voter Correspondence across Nations. 67th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. In democracies, the relationship between the constituent and the representative is of fundamental importance. Yet the nature of representation is not uniform throughout the world; political institutions are known to place constraints on leaders and citizens that shape their behavior, and thereby the character of representation. In this work, I expand upon the cross-national examination of representation, examining how representation varies with the dimensionality of politics in nations. I expect that party-voter correspondence will be high in nations with simple dimensional constructs. Alternatively, in countries with multidimensional political space, the probability of parties and voters converging on the same ideal point decreases. To test these expectations, I examine how well party positions mirror both the median and spread of voter preferences, conditional on the electoral institutions and political dimensionality of nations. Using data from a wide sample of nations and a new measure of dimensionality, I find that the positions of parties correspond more closely to those of voters in countries with low-dimensional political space, whereas electoral systems play a smaller role in the nature of representation.

Singh, S. (2009). The Nature of Electoral Behavior: A Cross-National Examination of Proximity Voting. 80th Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA. It is generally assumed that individuals vote according to a proximity logic, selecting the party they perceive as ideologically closest. Yet previous research identifies numerous factors which lead individuals to stray from this logic, instead choosing parties that do not necessarily match their ideological preferences. To shed light on this phenomenon, I examine the nature of voting from a comparative perspective, accounting for several theoretically relevant factors. I also consider a previously unexamined variable, political dimensionality, under the assumption that proximity voting is less likely in countries with a complex political space. Results from a multilevel model show strong party identity and political efficacy to have a positive relationship with proximity voting, while party system fractionalization, proportional electoral setups, and compulsory voting rules relate negatively to proximity voting. In addition, I find proximity voting to occur less in countries with complex dimensional constructs. These findings shed light on the institutional and individual bases for proximity voting and add to the general understanding of the nature of voting behavior.

Singh, S. (2011). Winning, Satisfaction, and the Nature of the Vote. 82nd Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA. It is well known that individuals who vote for the winning party in an election are more satisfied with democracy than those who backed a losing party. However, many winners deviate from their first choice in the voting booth. I argue that the ideological and psychological mechanisms that boost satisfaction should attenuate among such winners. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this paper shows that these “non-optimal winners” do, in fact, experience a much smaller boost in satisfaction than “optimal winners,” those who voted their expressed first preference. Results also demonstrate that psychological benefits better explain the boost in satisfaction associated with winning than ideological considerations. Lastly, this paper shows that the proportion of winners voting for the optimal party is more prevalent under majoritarian electoral rules, which provides a new explanation for the relatively pronounced effect of winning on satisfaction in such systems.

Singh, S. P., J. Roy, et al. (2010). The impact of Complexity, Political Knowledge, and Party Mobilization on Voter Turnout. Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago. The number of parties competing in an election boosts the complexity of the vote decision environment by increasing informational costs for potential voters. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this research examines how voter turnout is conditioned by such complexity. Our expectation is that while voter participation is negatively correlated with complexity, all individuals are not affected equally. That is, both high levels of individual knowledge and contact with politicians should offset the dampening effect of complexity by making it easier for individuals to differentiate among the political parties. Results indicate that the turnout-decreasing effect of multipartism is attenuated among those with more knowledge and those who experienced political contact. The results of this research allow us to identify institutional deterrents to political participation and how these deterrents may be addressed.

Singh, S. P. and J. Thornton (2012). Strange Bedfellows: A Theory of Coalition Ambivalence with Evidence from Australia and the United Kingdom. Annual Conference of the Southern Political Science Association: 1-42. It is known that both ambivalence and coalition government—two things that are not usually considered together—condition political attitudes and behavior. Noting a relationship between these concepts, we argue that individuals who are ambivalent towards the parties in the governing coalition, which occurs when one is viewed favorable and other negatively, will have less favorable views of democracy. We first advance our theory of coalition ambivalence and then test our expectations with survey data from the United Kingdom in 2010 and Australia in 2004. We focus on these two cases because of the noticeably different character of the coalitions that developed. Evidence demonstrates that while coalition ambivalence is greater when the parties are ideologically different, significant portions of the public are ambivalent in both political systems. And, in both political systems ambivalence erodes attitudes toward democracy.

Sinnott, R. (2009). Political knowledge and voter turnout - an exploration of the significance of institutional context. 67th Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, Il. We know a lot about the effects of political knowledge on political attitudes. We know much less about how, if at all, such knowledge affects voter turnout. Part of the problems is theoretical and conceptual, having to do with how electorally-relevant knowledge is acquired not just in the short term but cumulatively over the active life span. Measurement is also problematic, particularly in the case of comparative research - just how comparable are our measures of knowledge when the objects of knowledge vary over time and across countries? Finally, how should contextual factors such as the electoral system, the governmental system, the party system, the media system and the interactions between these system-level variables that affect the political learning environment, be taken into account. Using CSES and ESS data, this paper applies a two-step estimation approach to this problem. Making plausible assumptions regarding the other problems mentioned, the paper focuses on the contextual aspect of the relationship between knowledge and turnout, seeking to identify the institutional factors that nurture or stymie electorally relevant knowledge and foster (or fail to foster) a link between such knowledge and voter turnout.

Slomczynski, K. and I. Tomescu-Dubrow (2006). Representation of Countries in Cross-National Opinion Surveys:The Case of Post-Communist Europe. American Sociological Association. Montreal, Canada: 25. This paper examines whether reliable cross-national analysis of public opinion polls is possible, given presently available data. To make this assessment, we focus on post-communist Europe and compare international surveys that make explicit claims about providing cross-national data on the post-communist countries in the region. Specifically, we examine the the the World Values Survey (WVS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), European Social Survey (ESS), and several specific East European surveys with respect to the presence or the absence of particular European states. We demonstrate that some of the European post-communist countries have not been appropriately represented to draw substantive conclusions about the cross-national differences between the old and new Europe. Specifically, we show that the extent of participation in international projects is strongly related to countries’ political and economic development, measured by the index of political rights and gross national income, respectively

Solt, F. (2004). Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement. 62nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Since Aristotle, who observed that great economic inequality leads the wealthy to seek a share of power matching their share of resources and so to subvert democratic government, scholars of politics have theorized that the proper functioning of a democracy depends on a relatively equal distribution of economic resources. Inequality, though, has been rising in the nearly all of the world’s rich and upper-middle-income democracies since the at least the mid-1980s, and in many countries this trend began in the early 1970s. Examining individual behavior in twenty-four countries at multiple points in time, this paper investigates whether increases in economic inequality have had a negative effect on the functioning of democracy, focusing specifically on citizens’ political engagement. It finds that contexts of greater income inequality reduce interest in politics, views of government responsiveness, and participation in elections.

Soroka, S. and C. Wlezien (2014). Responsiveness and Representation. A Preliminary Analysis of Wave 4 CSES Data. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: 15. This paper provides an introduction to and some initial analyses of responses to questions about government spending in the CSES 4 module. Thus far, we have data for just 11 countries – the possibilities where analysis is concerned are rather limited. Even so, we aim here to describe the initial justification for the questions, and then to review the data gathered thus far. Our analyses will then focus on (a) basic country-level descriptives, (b) evidence of (cross-sectional) thermostatic responsiveness to government spending, and (c) differences in spending preferences across income cohorts.

Soroka, S. and C. Wlezien (2015). Responsiveness and representation. A preliminary analysis of Wave 4 CSES data. American Political Science Association.

Soroka, S. N. and C. Wlezien (2014). Political Institutions and Opinion-Policy Links: Preliminary Evidence from the CSES. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Sum, P. (2005). Political Participation in Romania: Resources, Attitudes and the Mobilization Capacity of Civil Society. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. As Romania and other new democracies began the process of regime consolidation, it was unclear whether initial rates of non-voting forms of political participation would continue or if we would witness a decline in participation. In this paper, I evaluate the pattern of Romanian political participation (1995-2004). Using data collected in 1996, 2001, and 2004, I develop a model of political participation that evaluates resources, engagement/ attitudes and membership to civil society organizations. Overall, rates of participation have declined. Application of the model overtime shows that correlated factors with political activity move from resource-based to recruitmentbased (civil society membership). However, the decline in participation is proportional among members and non-members of civil society suggesting that political representation through non-voting forms of participation has not reached the ideals set forth in liberal democratic theory.

Superti, C. (2015). Measuring popular political discontent and predicting trouble. MPSA.

Thomassen, J. (2006). Party identification revisited. Nicosia 2006 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, Cyprus. In this paper we revisite the debate on the usefulness of the concept of party identification in cross-national research. In our earlier work we showed that, at least in the Netherlands, party identification was empirically hardly discernible from the vote, whereas party identification was less stable than vote choice (Thomassen 1976). As several authors argued that these findings might be due to the nature of the times in The Netherlands, we replicate these analyses with data spanning a longer period of time. The analyses mainly confirm our original findings. Next we show that explaining vote choice on the basis of the concept of party identification appears also problematic in several other parliamentary as well as presidential systems. Therefore, we discuss a possible alternative and apply it to the 1996 Israel prime ministerial election. Findings indicate that partisanship strongly influenced vote choice. This could best be demonstrated if partisanship is conceptualized in terms of party evaluations instead of party identification.

Thomassen, J. (2007). Party identification revisited: A comparative study of partisanship and the vote in Europe. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. In this paper we revisit the debate on the usefulness of the concept of party identification in cross-national research. In our earlier work we showed that, at least in the Netherlands, party identification was empirically hardly discernible from the vote, whereas party identification was less stable than vote choice (Thomassen, 1976). As several authors argued that these findings might be due to the nature of the times in the Netherlands, we replicate these analyses with data spanning a longer period of time on the basis of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES). The analyses mainly confirm our original findings. We then proceed to explore the same issue from a comparative perspective, utilizing the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). We show that explaining vote choice on the basis of the concept of party identification appears also problematic in several other parliamentary and presidential systems across Europe. Therefore, we discuss an alternative conceptualisation and operationalisation, which we test in the same context. The analyses confirm the strong correlation between partisanship and vote choice across Europe, but suggest that in particular contexts both may be discerned. We discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical modelling as well as questionnaire design.

Thomassen, J. J. A. and K. Aarts (2005). Electoral Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy. 101st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. According to mainstream normative democratic theory elections in a representative democracy have two important functions. First, elections allow voters to determine the political colour of their government, making government accountable to the judgment of the people. Secondly, elections should produce a legislature that is representative of the division of political opinion amongst the electorate. However, there is a certain tension between these two functions. Electoral systems and more in general democratic systems cannot optimally serve both functions at the same time. Majoritarian models of democracy are supposed to optimise the accountability function, consensus models of democracy the representation function. Because the two models are based on different normative perspectives it is hard to advance a convincing argument why either one of the two models serves democracy better. However, in his Patterns of Democracy (1999) Lijphart claims on empirical grounds that a consensus model of democracy is superior to a majoritarian model. Part of his argument is based on people’s satisfaction with democracy. First, referring to earlier work of Klingemann (1999) he comes to the conclusion that citizens in consensus democracies are significantly more satisfied with democratic performance in their countries than citizens of majoritarian democracies. The difference is approximately 17 percentage points. Secondly, he refers to Anderson and Guillory (1997) who found that in all countries respondents who voted for the winning party or parties where more likely to be satisfied with democracy than respondents who had voted for the losing party or parties. However, they also found that in consensus democracies the differences between winners and losers were significantly smaller than in majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999: 286-7).

Thomassen, J. J. A. and K. Aarts (2006). Electoral Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy. 20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan. According to mainstream normative democratic theory elections in a representative democracy have two important functions. First, elections allow voters to determine the political colour of their government, making government accountable to the judgment of the people. Secondly, elections should produce a legislature that is representative of the division of political opinion amongst the electorate. However, there is a certain tension between these two functions. Electoral systems and more in general democratic systems cannot optimally serve both functions at the same time. Majoritarian models of democracy are supposed to optimise the accountability function, consensus models of democracy the representation function. Because the two models are based on different normative perspectives it is hard to advance a convincing argument why either one of the two models serves democracy better. However, in his Patterns of Democracy (1999) Lijphart claims on empirical grounds that a consensus model of democracy is superior to a majoritarian model. Part of his argument is based on people’s satisfaction with democracy. First, referring to earlier work of Klingemann (1999) he comes to the conclusion that citizens in consensus democracies are significantly more satisfied with democratic performance in their countries than citizens of majoritarian democracies. The difference is approximately 17 percentage points. Secondly, he refers to Anderson and Guillory (1997) who found that in all countries respondents who voted for the winning party or parties where more likely to be satisfied with democracy than respondents who had voted for the losing party or parties. However, they also found that in consensus democracies the differences between winners and losers were significantly smaller than in majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999: 286-7).

Thomassen, J. J. A. and H. van der Kolk (2000). Economic Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Tir, J. and S. Singh (2011). Is it the economy or foreign policy, stupid? The impact of foreign crises on leader support. Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans: 38. According to the public support literature, the state of the economy is the primary driver behind leader popularity. Yet, according to the diversionary theory of war, an unpopular leader may engage in a foreign crisis to both divert domestic discontent and bolster his or her political fortunes through a rally around the flag effect. Though this controversial assertion is quite popular, studies of whether foreign crisis participation actually increase public support for the leader are rare. Moreover, extant works either focus on the unique case of the US or, in a cross-national context, rely on macro-level outcomes such as office retention. Utilizing CSES Module II surveys covering 26 countries, 2001-2006, we conduct the first-ever cross-national investigation linking countries’ participation in foreign crises with individual-level data on subsequent support for their leaders. Multi-level analyses of the data reveal that foreign crisis participation (1) draws attention to foreign policy issues (i.e. agenda setting), (2) increases support for the leader, and (3) comes close to offsetting the negative impact of unemployment. Furthermore, while (4) employed and unemployed individuals respond to foreign crises nearly equally, (5) crisis participation helps the leader less among citizens concerned about foreign policy. This suggests (6) that the part of the population generally unconcerned with foreign policy is the one most susceptible to rallies. These novel insights offer a much more nuanced view of ramifications of foreign crises and thus inform both public support and diversionary literatures.

Toka, G. (2007). Policy outcomes, voting, and citizen knowledge. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Empirical studies relating variance in voting behaviour to variation in policy outcomes are few and far between. Data availability and a host of methodological problems pose considerable obstacles to testing these relationships in any detail. Yet an even more serious obstacle to advances in understanding this aspect of democratic representation may be the relative underdevelopment of the theories that would predict and explain variation in these linkages across democratic societies. This paper considers the linkage through a new empirical test of the seeminly trivial proposition that better informed voting behaviour produces greater collective welfare – i.e. more of those things that every voter, and especially the median voter may find desirable. The novel aspect of the present test is in an arguably more adequate measurement of both the independent and the dependent variable than those found in previous studies. The data come from the cross-national post-election surveys of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project plus World Bank data on the quality of governance across the globe. The findings show some significant effects of citizens’ ability to emulate fully informed choices on the quality of governance after the elections in question. However, the effect only materializes over multiple elections, and may not extend to all aspects of good governance.

Tóka, G. (2000). Do Some Party Systems Make Equal Votes Unequal? A Comparison of Old and New Democracies. Conference on Re-Thinking Democracy in the New Millenium, University of Houston, Houston, TX. In this present and some future papers I intend to explore some usually neglected, but nevertheless possible links between party system characteristics, citizens' political behaviour and democratic governance. While they are certainly not the only, and most probably not even the most powerful connections between institutional design and the quality of democracy, they do surface, from time to time, in learned reflections on democratic government, and their existence seems, at first sight, plausible. Yet, in the scholarly literature they tend to be neglected, partly, I believe, because of the apparent difficulty of their empirical assessment, and partly because of an overwhelming preoccupation of theoretically oriented research on voting with how relatively uninformed citizens can perform the role assigned to them in democratic theory (as interpreted by survey researchers) at all. Instead, I would like to ask whether they do this as well as their better informed peers.

Tóka, G. (2000). Expressive vs. Instrumental Voting and the Number of Political Parties. 18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Québec City, Canada.

Tóka, G. (2000). Turnout and Information Effects on Election Outcomes in a Comparative Perspective. Center for the Study of Democratic Politics Conference on "Political Participation: Building a Research Agenda", Princton, NJ. The paper offers a cross-national empirical analysis that connects two lines of arguments about the determinants of election outcomes. The first posits that because of correlations between socio-economic status and some socio-demographic variables on the one hand, and both vote choice and electoral participation on the other, election results may be significantly different from those observed if turnout approached 100 percent. A parallel argument suggests that despite voters' occasionally skilful use of ingenious information shortcuts, observed election outcomes still differ from those that would obtain in an electorate fully informed about the given choice set. The apparent implication of both arguments is that it is the less resourceful groups whose underlying preferences remain underrepresented at the polls. The paper develops at some length on the concepts involved in these propositions and the methodological problems that their empirical testing poses. Finally, data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is utilized to empirically evaluate the above propositions.

Tóka, G. (2004). The Impact of Turnout on Election Outcomes in a Cross-National Perspecive. 14th Biennial Conference of Europeanists "Europe and the World: Integration, Interdependence, Exceptionalism?", Chicago, IL.

Turgeon, M. (2008). Measuring and Explaining Political Sophistication in a Comparative Context. 31st Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Sciences Po, Paris, France. A lot has been said about how to measure political knowledge and what factors explain it. But most of the work in the area has focused almost exclusively on the American case, and very few of it is comparative. This paper shows that measuring political knowledge in a comparative context presents its own challenges, and that individual-level factors explaining political knowledge in some countries have considerably less importance in others. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and a methodology adapted for multilevel modeling with large clusters, I show that part of the country differences can be explained at the institutional level. The results carry important lessons for institutional design and those interested in improving democratic citizenship.

Tverdova, Y. (2007). How Widespread is Corruption? A Cross-National Study. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper looks at how people form perceptions about corruption. By combining survey data with system-level indicators in 31 countries, the author first explores the relationship between elite and mass evaluations of corruption. Furthermore, the author tests a series of hypotheses pertaining to how individual-level factors, such as political allegiances, personal economic conditions, and education may influence people’s perceptions. The findings reveal that mass assessments of corruptions track closely those of the elites. In addition, more economically fortunate individuals and those who supported the government in the previous election tend to be less critical of corruption. The effect of education is contingent on a country’s level of corruption. Specifically, more educated citizens in “cleaner” countries do not see as much corruption as their less educated counterparts.

Tverdova, Y. V. (2011). What Drives Party Loyalty? Candidate Evaluations, Party Evaluations, and Macrocontext. 82nd Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. New Orleans, LA: 31. In the recent years, the debate over the personalization of politics has been brought to the forefront of electoral studies. On the surface, it seems that politics in,general and elections in particular have become more candidate-focused. However, them empirical evidence to date has been mixed, indicating that party identification is still the most powerful predictor of vote choice. This project has two major objectives. First, it looks at the effects of candidate sentiments and party evaluations on voter loyalty. Second, this study explores the contextual factors on partisan voting, namely the effects of electoral institutions and the type of elections (party-centered versus candidatecentered). Overall, this analysis confirms the primary role of party allegiances for determining vote choice, but also finds strong evidence in support of the candidatecentered argument. Both party and leader effects are conditional on the type of elections.

Ullrich, H. (2004). The Impact of Policy Networks in Agricultural Trade Liberalization During the Uruguay and Doha Rounds: The Role of Ideas, Interests and Institutions. 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper investigates the membership, activities, interaction and variance in policy impact of three distinct groups of policy networks, namely epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions and elite transnational networks, operating within and between the agricultural policy environments of the US and EC, as well as at the multilateral level, during the GATT Uruguay Round and WTO Doha Development Agenda. This paper reaches three conclusions: 1) Using the case of agricultural liberalisation, a successful shift in policy requires new ideas, accepted changes in beliefs, and political leadership/management. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, three specific types of policy networks either emerged or increased their activity and contributed significantly to the successful negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture. These policy networks have been active in the current Doha Round negotiations, although with somewhat altered membership. 2) The contribution and impact of these three types of policy networks varies according to the specific stage of the negotiations due to the changing policy needs and objectives of policy-makers and negotiators. 3) The policy networks interacted in specific ways. Epistemic communities required legitimisation of their ideas by advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions used the new ideas developed by pro-reform epistemic communities in developing and supporting their policy proposals. Elite transnational networks were used by advocacy coalitions, and policy entrepreneurs acting within them, as a means of finding compromise, showing political will, and breaking impasses in the negotiations.

Van Coppenolle, B. (2011). Electoral Systems and Information Processing by Voters: the Effecto of District Magnitude and List Type on Candidate Recognition and Political Contact. Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology: 27. Dierent electoral systems present dierent choices to voters. Therefore, electoral systems can be expected to inuence how voters process information about candidates. District magnitude and its differential effect according to list type in particular have been suggested to encourage personal vote building, hence to aect what voters know about candidates. To test this link more directly this paper studies information processing employing individual level survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Individual information processing can be measured by candidate recognition. Politicians can supply information in two ways: by cultivating a personal vote over a longer period of time, or by emphasising candidate-specic messages in the electoral campaign. Results from logistic models conrm the expected dierential eect of district magnitude according to list type on candidate name recognition. However, the eects are stronger for non-voters than for voters. There is also no evidence that district magnitude aects the probability of being contacted by a politician. These results suggest that the eect of district magnitude on information processing seems due more to the passive eects of varying short-term campaign messages than to active information processing by voters or long-term relationship building by politicians.

Van der Meer, T. and P. Scheepers (2007). The politicised participant? Explaining the impact of left-right position on political participation. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Preceding to the choice what to vote, is the question whether to vote. Why do citizens decide to become politically active, either traditionally (e.g. voting, campaigning) or non-traditionally (e.g. protesting)? Repeatedly, citizens’ ideological position on the left-right scale is found to be an important determinant of political participation. Generally, leftwing citizens are more involved in non-traditional political participation and less involved in voting and campaigning than rightwing citizens. Ideological extremists participate more than moderates. Yet, the explanatory power of ideological position on political participation differs vastly across countries. This study aims to explain the country level differences - both in the level of participation, and in its association with ideological position. We test and integrate two lines of reasoning. The first starts from the literature on contested politics. We propose that citizens are more likely to become politically active when they are faced with a government from the opposing ‘ideological colour’. In other words, people from the left are more likely to become politically active when they are faced with a right-wing government and vice-versa. The second line is laid down by Lijphart (1999). He claims that citizens in consensual democracies (1) participate more and (2) are more equal than citizens in majoritarian systems. In other words, compared to majoritarian democracies, the level of participation should be high in consensual democracies, whereas its association with ideological position (i.e. the differences between leftwing and rightwing citizens) should be low. Our study takes up a multilevel approach (citizens, nested in governmental periods, nested in countries). We simultaneously test the direct and (two-way) cross-level interaction effects of contextual and individual level data. The latter are derived from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 2001-2006 dataset.

Van Ham, C. (2008). Downs and the Third Wave: the Voting Paradox in New Democracies. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. This paper develops and tests a theoretical framework for assessing the meaningfulness of elections to citizens in new democracies by studying voter turnout. Building on a Downsian perspective, it is argued that elections are meaningful to citizens if (a) citizens have a clear choice between policies and leaders; if (b) this choice has consequences for government action; and if (c) sufficient other citizens turn out to vote. The theoretical propositions are tested using cross-national aggregate time series data of voter turnout in 22 old democracies and 23 young democracies from 1970 until present.

Vander Weyden, P. (2006). Electoral Systems, Ethnic Minorities and Time in New Democracies. The Use of Multilevel Models. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. In this paper, we will try to break through the discussion as to whether electoral systems or ethnic heterogeneity are the most important independent variable, by demonstrating that both are major factors in explaining the number of parties in the party system. In the paper, we follow and further develop the line of thought recently presented in the literature, by considering electoral systems and social heterogeneity characteristics as interacting terms; Together with time as variable we will illustrate that the interaction effect between electoral system and ethnic heterogeneity differs in the course of time. To test our theory we will use election and census data from the country of Suriname at district level.

Vowles, J. (2002). Is Responsible Party Government Dead? Government Strength or Weakness, Globalisation, and Public Perceptions in 27 Countries, 1996-2001. 50th Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Responsible party government is one of the key concepts in contemporary democratic theory. A series of empirical studies question whether responsible party government is feasible given low voter information, and where governments are weakened by divided constitutional powers or multi-party coalitions. More recently, there have been claims that responsible party government cannot survive under conditions of economic globalisation that are said to promote policy convergence between countries, and policy convergence of parties within countries. This paper identifies some key cross-national differences in political institutions and in exposure to the international economy. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), it tests whether and how these influence the voter perceptions and expectations that are needed to underpin the effective practice of responsible party government.

Vowles, J. (2002). Is Responsible Party Government Dead? Government Strength or Weakness, Globalisation, and Public Perceptions in 27 Countries, 1996-2001. 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA. Empirical studies question whether responsible party government is feasible given low voter information, and where governments are weakened by divided constitutional powers or multi-party coalitions. There are claims that responsible party government cannot survive under conditions of globalisation that promote policy convergence between countries, and policy convergence of parties. This paper identifies some key cross-national differences in political institutions and in exposure to the international economy. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), it tests whether and how these influence the voter perceptions and expectations that are needed to underpin the effective practice of responsible party government.

Vowles, J. (2006). Comparing Electoral Systems Over Time: An Appraisal After New Zealand's Fourth Election Under MMP. 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA. Because of the limited number of cases of major electoral system change, we still know little about many of the medium to long-term effects of the process. In particular, we do not know the extent to which some important differences between electoral systems identified on a cross-sectional basis using datasets such as that from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) might apply when systems change. New Zealand’s four elections under a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system compared to nearly a century of single-member plurality (SMP) elections provide an obvious case study with which one can address electoral system differences over time. This paper addresses possible effects on turnout and campaign mobilisation, and briefly discusses whether problems identified after New Zealand’s fourth MMP election could lead to abandonment or modification of the system.

Vowles, J. (2007). Does Globalisation affect Public Perceptions of ‘Who in Power can make a Difference’? Evidence from 37 Countries, 1996-2005. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. Economic globalization is often said to promote policy convergence between political parties in government in democratic states, and thus substantially constrain voters’ choice options. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) modules one and two, this paper tests whether and how cross-national differences in exposure to the international economy may influence the voter perceptions that are needed to underpin expectations of differences between alternative governments, one of the main preconditions for the effective practice of responsible party government. It identifies two dimensions of economic globalization, trade dependence and international financial integration, and uncovers evidence that international financial integration does indeed encourage pessimism about ‘making a difference’. The paper tests whether these effects are moderated by the electoral system.

Vowles, J. and T. Hellwig (2014). Risk, Policy Preferences, and Party Choice in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC.

Wagner, A. (2011). Duverger meets Downs in Germany. The Impact of Duverger's Law on Spatial Voting in a Mixed Electoral System. ECPR General Conference. Reykjavik, August 25-27, 2011. Since the 1950s, Duverger’s law is well known in comparative politics. Basically, it states that single-member plurality (SMP) electoral systems tend to favour two-party systems, whereas proportional representation (PR) makes multi-party systems more likely. At the heart of this statement lies the assumption that rational voters try to avoid wasting their votes. Therefore, they do not vote for smaller parties in SMP, even if they prefer these parties to one of the larger parties. However, studies analysing Duverger’s law on the micro level are scarce. Up to now, there has been no attempt to combine classical theories of electoral behaviour with the Duvergerian macro approach. This paper compares individual vote functions based on a simple Downsian spatial approach for personal and list vote in the recent German parliamentary election in 2009. Due to its mixed electoral system combining SMP and PR, Germany constitutes an ideal laboratory for this analysis. A theoretical micro model of the electoral systems’ impact on individual-voting decision making is developed proposing that proximity considerations should play a minor role in voting for a large party in SMP compared to voting for a smaller party. No such differences should exist in PR. First empirical findings indicate that this hypothesis holds true.

Wagner, M. (2011). Explaining perceptions of party polarization: the effects of politicization and information. Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA). Chicago. Party polarization is a key characteristic of party systems (Sartori 1976). Although usually treated as an aggregate measure, perceptions of polarization may differ between individual citizens. Yet, this variation in perceptions has so far remained largely unexplained. I argue that voters who are politicized perceive higher levels of party polarization, with voter politicization defined as someone who is ideological and/or attached to a party. However, the influence of politicization depends on the information context of the election. The effect of politicization should therefore decrease when (1) the amount of available information increases, whether at the individual level (education) or at the country-election level (party system size, social heterogeneity) or (2) the nature of available information changes, for example if parties are objectively more polarized. These hypotheses are tested for 56 countryelection contexts. The findings of this paper have implications for our understanding of voter perceptions of politics and therefore for political participation and democratic legitimacy.

Wahman, M. (2010). Oppositional Pre-electoral Coalition Formation in Authoritarian Elections. 2010 International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, LA. Empirical and theoretical literature on elections in authoritarian regimes has illustrated the importance of oppositional cohesion. It has been argued that these elections are more likely to result in positive democratic effects as well as oppositional victory if the opposition has formed a unified pre-electoral coalition. Still, our knowledge is limited when it comes to explaining why and when these coalitions are formed. This study takes stock of the vast theoretical literature on government coalition formation, in the predominantly western democratic context. It is argued that it is not reasonable to perceive coalition building as a completely random process, but that certain structures affects the incentives for creating coalitions. In a logistic regression analysis of 104 authoritarian elections in the period 1989-2004, it is shown that policy positions among oppositional parties together with incumbent economic performance is especially associated with the prospects of pre-electoral coalition building. Electoral institutions do, however, have a surprisingly low effect on the probability of preelectoral coalition formation, especially among electoral authoritarian countries with a low degree of electoral experience.

Warwick, P. V. (2007). Relative Extremism and Relative Moderation: Strategic Party Positioning in Democratic Systems. 103rd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper investigates the ways in which parties stake out left-right positions that deviate from the mean positions of their supporters. Previous research has demonstrated a tendency for parties to adopt positions that are relatively more extreme than their supporter mean positions, but there are at least two lines of argumentation (one based on coalition bargaining considerations, the other on vote maximization) that also imply the presence of relative moderation – a tendency for moderate parties to be more moderate than their supporters. Using surveys covering 31 countries compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this investigation shows that, despite the extraordinarily close correspondence between the two sets of positions, parties in coalitional systems do display both types of effect. Further investigation indicates that coalition maneuvering, rather than vote maximization, motivates this behavior.

Weber, T. (2007). Schizophrenic Spaces: Selective Mobilization, Directional Voting, and the Politics of Redistribution. Jahrestagung der DVPW-Sektion "Politik und Ökonomie". Kassel: 24. Although the spatial theory of elections has demonstrated considerable predictive power, there is no agreement on the basic logic of political competition within this setting. Proximity theory holds that voters support the party whose programmatic position is closest to their own preferences, whereas directional theory claims that voters prefer more extreme strategies. Scholars have conducted innumerable competitive tests, but neither theory came out clearly ahead. At the same time, the debate failed to clarify the indistinct theoretical foundations of the directional approach. One argument attributes the effect to strategic discounting of party positions (a bottom-up logic), another argument focuses on symbolic politics (a top-down logic). This conflict cannot be easily resolved by empirical testing because both theories predict the same observable effects, i.e. their predictions are equifinal. This paper aims to disentangle the equifinality problem of directional theory and thereby to clarify the relation of proximity and directional elements in the vote function. Equifinality is considered an artefact of the unrealistic assumption restricting parties to one single position. I propose a model of selective voting where each party is represented by two positions in the political space, one on each side of the neutral point. This model predicts different outcomes resulting from discounting and symbolic politics. Discounting requires voters to weight both positions equally, whereas symbolic politics theory allows for selective mobilization by the political elite. Testing the model with mass survey and manifesto data for a large number of parliamentary elections shows that directional voting reacts mostly to stimuli voters agree with. The directional effect is limited by proximity voting reacting to negative stimuli. This kind of selective mobilization is not fully compatible with strategic discounting, but can be properly explained by symbolic politics theory. Furthermore, directional and proximity voting serve distinct functions. The two theories do not compete to explain the same phenomenon. The theory is then applied to the issue of redistributive politics. Results show that proximity voting is more common for “bread and butter” issues. However, the logic of selective mobilization prevails even in this case.

Weith, P. T. (2011). Let Them Guess: The Sensitivity of Political Information Effects to Variations of Question Format. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Seattle, WA: 17. Political information is generally measured by counting the correct answers given by respondents to factual survey questions related to politics. Some of the weaknesses of the additive approach to measuring skills have already been discussed in the psychometric literature, but only recently have they started to arouse the interest of political scientists. To mention only a few of these shortcomings (discussed in this article), the questions that are used for constructing ability scales are not of equal difficulty; questions of different format yield different rates of correct responses by allowing the respondents to guess at unequal rates; some items perform better than others at reliably estimating the knowledge of respondents. The question that we address here is whether the format related inflations of the averages of knowledge scales affect the reliability and validity of inferential statistical findings obtained with models in which knowledge is used as an independent or dependent variable in a multivariate fashion. In other words, assuming that we construct a political information variable by adding up or averaging the number of correct answers to quiz-like questions; do different question formats yield different slopes or error terms for knowledge or for its predictors in regression-based models? We start by constructing an individual-level format-inflation variable that accounts for the possibility and plausibility that correct answers were obtained by random guessing using data from a survey experiment carried out in Hungary in 2009. Then, we compare the results of regression models in which format-inflation is not accounted for with the results of nested models in which it is controlled for. Political knowledge is alternatively used as independent and as dependent. Using the count of multiple choice and binary response items as controls does not seem to alter the results obtained with these models. Finally, in order to provide additional empirical support to our findings and to rule out the possibility of having results that only reflect the idiosyncrasies of the Hungarian public opinion, we use similar regression models as the ones described previously for the countries in the second module of the CSES database.

Werner, A. (2013). Are Political Parties Failing? An Investigation into the Quality of Representation in Western Europe. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Chicago. There is hardly any political actor that has come under more severe scrutiny and critique in contemporary democracies than political parties. Underlying of much of this critique is the notion that political parties no longer fulfil their central role in representative democracies: to represent the interests of their supporters. While the process of representation has various stages that pose different demands for parties, the first step of making sure that there is a high degree of congruence between parties and party supporters pre-electoral positions is arguably the foundation of the whole process. If parties and their specific supporters do not match ideologically in the run-up to an election, parties are logically not able to represent their supporters positions in parliament or government. I investigate the charge of an increasing disparity between parties and their supporters by employing an innovative measure of the quality of congruence. For the first time, this measure makes a single left-right party position comparable to the whole distribution of party supporters left-right positions. In order to achieve this goal, I create a theoretical distribution of a partys left-right positions over a point estimate and compare this distribution with that of the partys supporters. I employ this measure to a unique data set that matches party positions from the Manifesto Project’s data set (former CMP) to voter positions taken from survey data (Eurobarometer and CSES) for Western European countries, resulting in data for 709 parties in elections between 1973 and 2009. The analysis explores whether certain parties show better congruence than others and why that might be the case. On the level of parties, I find that the parties belonging to the traditional Western European party families create the highest congruence with their supporters and larger as well as more right parties perform better than small and left parties. On systemic level, I find that the electoral system does not have an effect on congruence, which goes against much of the received wisdom in the representation literature (Powell 2000) but confirms newer findings by authors like Golder and Stramski (2010).

Weßels, B. (2003). Voting against Preferences? Accountability as a Determinant of Vote Choice. 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa.

Weßels, B. (2005). Discount by Account? Striking a Balance for Vote Choice. International Conference on “Elections and Democratic Governance”, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taipei, Taiwan.

Weßels, B. and H.-D. Klingemann (2001). Group Conflict, Voting, and Legitimacy: A Cross-National Perspective on Political Integration. 1st General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Canterbury, UK.

Weßels, B. and H. Schmitt (2007). Meaningful Choices, Political Supply, and Institutional Effectiveness. 103rd Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This article explores the degree to which the meaningfulness of electoral choices is a result of the political supply structure and the institutional setup of an electoral system. We argue that meaningful choices require both a differentiated choice set and effective elections. In testing this claim, we follow two strategies. First, we take the level of turnout as an indicator of the meaningfulness of electoral choices and determine the impact of political supply and institutional structures on it. Second, we explore whether and how political supply and institutional effectiveness affect the calculus of voting. We test a set of specific hypotheses by determining the relevance of different criteria for choosing a party with conditional models of macro-micro interactions. Empirical data come from the second wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).

Wittrock, J. (2010). Cross-Validating Survey Measures: The EES and CSES Datasets. PIREDEU Final User Community Conference. Brussels, Belgium. Although the spatial theory of elections has demonstrated considerable predictive power, there is no agreement on the basic logic of political competition within this setting. Proximity theory holds that voters support the party whose programmatic position is closest to their own preferences, whereas directional theory claims that voters prefer more extreme strategies. Scholars have conducted innumerable competitive tests, but neither theory came out clearly ahead. At the same time, the debate failed to clarify the indistinct theoretical foundations of the directional approach. One argument attributes the effect to strategic discounting of party positions (a bottom-up logic), another argument focuses on symbolic politics (a top-down logic). This conflict cannot be easily resolved by empirical testing because both theories predict the same observable effects, i.e. their predictions are equifinal. This paper aims to disentangle the equifinality problem of directional theory and thereby to clarify the relation of proximity and directional elements in the vote function. Equifinality is considered an artefact of the unrealistic assumption restricting parties to one single position. I propose a model of selective voting where each party is represented by two positions in the political space, one on each side of the neutral point. This model predicts different outcomes resulting from discounting and symbolic politics. Discounting requires voters to weight both positions equally, whereas symbolic politics theory allows for selective mobilization by the political elite. Testing the model with mass survey and manifesto data for a large number of parliamentary elections shows that directional voting reacts mostly to stimuli voters agree with. The directional effect is limited by proximity voting reacting to negative stimuli. This kind of selective mobilization is not fully compatible with strategic discounting, but can be properly explained by symbolic politics theory. Furthermore, directional and proximity voting serve distinct functions. The two theories do not compete to explain the same phenomenon. The theory is then applied to the issue of redistributive politics. Results show that proximity voting is more common for “bread and butter” issues. However, the logic of selective mobilization prevails even in this case.

Wlezien, C. and S. N. Soroka (2015). Electoral Systems and Opinion Representation. Southwestern Political Science Association.

Xezonakis, G. (2007). The Conditional Effect of Political Leadership on Party Support. Ideological Positioning and Institutional Context. 4th General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy. The paper explores the interaction between voters’ perceptions of ‘party convergence’ and leadership effects. Are leadership effects conditional upon perceptions of ideological distance? And if they are, does this interaction have the character ascribed to it by conventional wisdom -- that the closer the parties, the stronger the leader effect? The paper tests two rival hypotheses. The first, rooted in ‘conventional wisdom’, is that for voters who do not perceive any substantial ideological difference between the main competitors for office, evaluations of party leaders (or presidential candidates) will loom larger in their voting decisions. The theory underlying this hypothesis is that valence considerations (such as evaluations of leadership) will play an increasingly important role when an individual’s party differential, in Downsian terms, is close to zero. The second hypothesis, which derives from the literature on party competition (Iversen, 1994), and the distinction between transformational and transactional leadership (Burns, 1978; Blondel, 1987), is equally plausible. This suggests that the effect of leader-images on voting will be weaker if leaders fail to present the electorate with distinct ideological alternatives. In order to explore the above two hypotheses I use election survey data from Britain, United States and Germany, over the last 30 years or so. I also conduct a multi-country cross-national analysis using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set (CSES). Logistic regression analysis and multiplicative interaction terms are the main methodological tools.

Xezonakis, G. (2007). The Impact of Leaders on Party Support: The Importance of Contextual Effects. 65th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. This paper examines the conditional nature of leadership effects. The popular wisdom surrounding electioneering holds that as parties converge ideologically valence considerations such as party leaders will become more prominent influences on the individual vote. Building on research regarding the importance of party leaders and presidential candidates on the individual voting behaviour, I specify a multiplicative voting model that seeks to test for this conditionality. Results suggest that leadership effects tend to be affected by perceptions of ideological distance between the main competitors for office, but the nature of this interaction is somewhat counterintuitive.

Xezonakis, G., S. Kosmidis, et al. (2013). Electoral Accountability and Political Corruption: A Macro-Micro Approach. ECPR General Conference. Bordeaux. The electoral consequences of individual perceptions of corruption are an important component of political accountability. In this paper we are concerned with what drives variation in corruption voting across countries. While the accountability through elections mechanism is assumed as a force that can combat corruption, this is rarely tested with a combination of individual and system level data as we do here. We argue, and findings suggest that it is so, that features of the party system related to clarity of responsibility in terms of policy outputs and stable system features such as plurality electoral rules might prime corruption as an issue in voting calculations and therefore increase accountability. Individual level attributes do not seem to affect corruption voting in the ‘desired’ direction. If anything, attachment to parties tends to dampen the effects of corruption evaluations on incumbent voting. We test our expectations with a combination of individual level survey data from Module 2 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and macro level data from various sources.

Xezonakis, G. and J. Vowles (2010). From Positional to Valence Issues? Ideology, Leadership, Globalization, and Electoral Choice. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Contemporary democracy is largely based on a framework of party government that connects the voters to the outputs of government using political parties as a linkage mechanism. This paper examines one aspect of this linkage process: how the public’s political orientations, based on the Left-Right scale, influence their voting choices. As we should expect, there is a strong relationship in most democracies, although also substantial cross-national variation. We then consider how this representation process functions for voter-party dyads, and the fit between the Left-Right orientations of party voters and their chosen party. These party dyads display very strong congruence; like-minded voters and parties are able to link together at election time. The results suggest party voters as a group are very well represented in the political system by a party that broadly shares their basic Left-Right orientations. We base our empirical analyses on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) module II.

Yamada, M. (2006). Were the Low Information Voters Mobilized by Koizumi’s Populist Strategy in the 2005 Lower House Election in Japan? 102nd Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. The purpose of this article is to investigate the relationship between political information and populist strategies in Japanese politics. The findings of this paper imply that low information voters in Japan were not unilaterally convinced and mobilized by Koizumi’s populist strategy during the Lower House Election in 2005. Japanese voters had reasons for their vote choice, whether they were well-informed or not. In order to make indices of political information, this article uses the “Don’t Know” response for some items as proxy variables.

Yates, H. E. (2008). Comparing Political Participation in Compulsory and Non-Compulsory Voting Systems. 79th Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA. Scholars contend that low voter turnout in modern democracies present a danger to sustainable democracy. To address this concern, recent literature recommends instituting compulsory voting as a solution to ensure higher levels of democratic participation. The literature also contends that the act of voting itself is a transformative process that compels citizens into deeper levels of political participation. While compulsory electoral laws ultimately achieve higher voter turnout, it is yet to be established that they facilitate a more politically engaged citizenry. This is a cross-national study that comparatively analyzes the impact of compulsory electoral laws on levels of political participation. Several participation models indicate that countries with non-compulsory voting laws actually experience slightly higher rates of political participation.

Zakharova, M. and P. V. Warwick (2012). Teasing Apart the Relationship between Valence and Ideological Distance . Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago.

Zielinski, J., K. M. Slomczynski, et al. (2005). Electoral Control In New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of Fluid Party Systems. World Politics. 57: 365-395. The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of fluid party systems on democratic accountability. To this end, we proceed in three steps. First, we represent party systems as incentive structures that influence the motivation of individual legislators to act in the interest of the electorate. This allows us to investigate how the incentives generated by fluid party systems, i.e. by the prospect of switching political parties when economic outcomes are bad, interact with the incentives generated by the system of repeated elections, i.e. by the prospect of an electoral sanction when economic outcomes are bad. Second, we analyze a new database that contains information about all legislative incumbents and all competitive elections that took place in Poland after the country's transition to democracy. We establish the following: (a) the reelection probability of incumbents from governing parties is a decreasing function of economic performance, while the reelection probability of incumbents from governing parties is an increasing function of economic performance; (b) the probability that incumbents from a governing party switch to a non-governing party is a decreasing function of economic performance; (c) the reelection probability of incumbents who switch parties and contest elections as members of an opposition party is the same as the reelection probability of incumbents who were members of an opposition party from the beginning. In the third step, we use these results to construct a counterfactual comparison of electoral incentives that exist in Poland's fluid party systems to the electoral incentives that would have existed in Poland had its party system been stable. In particular we compare the expected value of an election when party switching is possible to the expected value of an election when party switching is not an option. We find that holding economic performance constant, the expected value of an election with switching is greater than the expected value of an election without switching. This implies that individual incentives generated by fluid party systems erode the incentives generated by the system of repeated elections and thus reduce the extent of democratic accountability.