

Consequences of Elections on Changes in Satisfaction with Democracy in Post-Socialist Countries

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Introduction

The transition to democracy is both symbolically and from the point of view of a trial of how it is working, characterised by free elections. Such was also true after the “velvet revolution” of the early nineties in the socialist countries. Many factors influence any assessment of how a democracy is working. Among the most important are factors linking an evaluation of the political system with its economic effectiveness. These factors are present universally, both in well-established and new democracies. In the post-socialist countries perceptions of social rights provision can also be very important. There are high expectations of the role of the state in providing social rights, present due to the inheritance of their high fulfilment before transition and the resulting reduction in protection and increase in inequality on introducing economic reforms. Certain social groups can be identified, which are particularly at the sharp end of these measures. There are then in the assessment of a democracy political factors such as fulfilment and responsiveness of the system to initiatives and interests of citizens, individual political alienation and the inability to influence change as well as the level of trust, which is, in a sense of social capital, a public good that is chronically lacking in post-socialist countries.

This study is focused on one factor alone. The influence of elections on changes in assessments of how democracy is working has been explored. Other factors were accounted for in the context of clarifying specific mechanisms of shaping attitudes to democracy in the winners and losers of elections. Elections create winners and losers and this influences the evaluation of satisfaction with the system of one and the other. Winners usually feel their goals are fulfilled and are therefore more satisfied. In a dynamic context, elections differ from other factors in generating support for democracy. They are particularly interesting because of their periodic 'intervention' effect nature. In new democracies it is important to investigate how various factors are harmonised between each other. In these countries the question is posed as to how gradual consolidation of democracy forms a basis for its continuance (Fink-Hafner 1993; Welsch and Carrasquero 1995; Mishler and Rose 1996). Thus it is interesting as to whether the evaluations of political and economic satisfaction together contribute to an increase in satisfaction with democracy. To what degree is this shown by the elaboration of the background to the differences in satisfaction in winners and in losers? Because of frequent unfavourable trends in these factors it is interesting whether a low level of specific support or

legitimacy of a political system can lead to a lack of trust in such a system morally. And if matters actually change in a certain direction, what is the role of specific factors in this? Consequently, on understanding this movement, the critical points of support for the system can be determined.

Discovering the strength of influence of election on the working of democracy in societies in transition to democracy is particularly interesting for generalising findings on the operation of these factors and for confirming theories that are in the background of their clarification for a wider circle of countries. Especially interesting in these countries is the dynamics of change. Elections as a test on the practice of democracy have the possibility that with each repeat they contribute to increasing satisfaction with democracy and thus can lead to a gradual consolidation of democracy. Naturally, however, in post-socialist countries total uniformity of events and changes cannot be expected. It is therefore interesting to look at what kind of differences exist between them and which development scenarios confirm consolidation of democracy.

Several countries were compared from data available at the time of analysis preparation from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (CSES Planning Committee 2003a, 2003b) in two time points. The sample taken comprised three consolidated western democracies (West Germany, New Zealand and Spain) and four new democracies of Eastern Europe (Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Slovenia). Attention was paid to explaining changes in the new democracies and the analysis repeated for the more established democracies. The emphasis was on examining changes during the period covered by the last two elections. The analysis of changes over the period should have showed how stable the results obtained in one point in time are. If changes were frequent this could denote the prevalence of situational factors but if greater stability was present within the countries, then a greater number of institutional factors were present. Quantifying and qualifying changes is relevant for forecasting the dynamics of support for democracy. Especially interesting is the effects on the lasting status of the losers (Anderson and Tverd, 2001).

The central question of interest was possible changes in the level of satisfaction with democracy due to the effects of the elections. Every election has its winners and losers. The election factor can influence changes in the level of satisfaction in two ways. Both changing differences between them in satisfaction levels and changing proportions of losers against

winners can bring changing levels of satisfaction. The changing in the power of the factor – an increase in the gap between winners and losers – with an unchanged governing composition can lead to a reduction in satisfaction with democracy in successive years (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). The share of the vote for the government coalition after successive elections can drop where the passivity of voters has come so far that they feel that nothing will change and abstain from participating in elections. A reduced share of voters for governing parties with unchanged relationship between variables can lead to a contraction of satisfaction over time.

Because such a question, the study did not deal with explaining the differences between countries in levels of satisfaction in general. Countries are presented as a context in which changes occurred. Comparative study design represents here an attempt to generalise and compare the effectiveness of election factors on satisfaction with democracy, allowing in this the existence of peculiarities in each country as constant. Analyses were formed separately by individual countries due to substantial differences in the historical character of transition to democracy in each country. Uniformity of results was therefore not exposed to by analysis design.

The effect of elections on the evaluation of the working of democracy

As a rule one would expect the winners of an election to profit the most, in that their interests are easier realised, and this they prefer to put down to a political system that works well. One would expect a positive effect on the status of the winners at elections on evaluation of democracy (Anderson 2002a). In this case the winner is one who votes for the party or government coalition coming to power through the elections.

Depending on circumstances, changes can come about in the extent of influence of election winners and losers on their assessment of democracy. Important is the difference in majority and consensual systems. In the latter, differences between winners and losers are less (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Many countries are introducing changes to election legislation and it would be interesting to see what affect these will have on the impression of democracy, especially among losers.

Evaluation of the working of a democracy is a matter of individual and collective experience of citizens. In the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe the experience of freedom and especially free elections is quite recent. The assessment of the working of democracy through elections is conditional on the expectations of actors in transition and with the disappointment linked to this when expectations are not met. Generally expectations, linked to social affiliation and experiences from the past, play a central role in understanding the feeling of defeat (Cebulak 1997, Powers and Cox 1997, Anderson 2002a). Where there is great investment in an election the consequence of losing is greater. The advancement of democracy is a gradual process where there opens up in parallel democratic culture and mutual trust. Due to the shortness of experience with functioning of the new political system in post-socialist countries, the individual events such as specific elections carry some weight in the general assessment of the working of a political system.

Every election brings with it winners and losers. The capability of the system to generate consent receives a critical test of its legitimacy in how far it succeeds in satisfying and gaining lasting support from the losers. If the losers judge the elections to have been fair and believe they will have a chance of coming to power at the next opportunity, then the elections have succeeded in raising the general level of satisfaction and democracy is strengthened. A review of changes in satisfaction with democracy through successive elections show a prevailing experience – where changes are positive, towards increased satisfaction, the experience will have contributed to the building of a democratic culture.

Contrary to this, if elections are judged unfair and the losers believe manipulation had occurred and there was unequal opportunity for success, non-fulfilment of the rules of the game, etc., such elections cause a fall in satisfaction with democracy. The losers assume the opportunity to win in future elections is also in doubt. Where this occurs in a new democracy, past experience increases doubts as to the fairness of elections. For example, if the reformed Communist party succeeding on winning an election it is open to complaints that it took advantage of its position in the past regime, using its political and human capital to win (Mateju, 1999). Due to the lack of democratic tradition, there are no clear criteria on admissible and inadmissible means of influencing voters. Elections can be played out using underhand methods of violating the rules such as one-sided manipulation of the media and blackening the names of opposition candidates (Schedler, 2002). Even where there is no

actual proof of violating the rules, a subjective perception from the side of the actors that they did not have an equal chance in the elections is a factor generating general dissatisfaction.

This thinking leads to the hypothesis that due to limited experience and great political tension, differences in perceived gains after elections between the losers and winners will increase in transitional countries compared to the Western, stable democracies (Listhaug, 2002, Anderson and Tverd, 2001).

Democracy is never simply a state of an institutional plan, but rather it is important the way democracy works. Often elections are accompanied by protests and attempts to change the rules of the game, i.e. the institutional basis of the political system (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). In circumstances of expected defeat, losers often attempt to improve equal opportunities by proposing changes in electoral legislation. This shows their preparedness to participate once again in elections, which itself denotes establishing a working democracy through elections (Schedler, 2002, Anderson, 2002a). Dissatisfaction with democracy often implies criticism directed at improving the system not its negation. At least in the Central European region the democratic ideal is strong and critics are also solid democrats (Fuchs and Klingemann 2000). What kind of strategic decisions the losing party will adopt and how they will impact on increasing or decreasing the level of democracy is the result of subtle decisions by the actors, assessing their chances at various levels (Schedler, 2002, Bowler and Donovan, 2002).

Losers in an election in new democracies have to “learn to lose” (Anderson, 2002a). To accept winning is easy, but to accept losing in conditions where levels of mutual trust between political opponents and between people are very low is much harder (Toka, 1995, Cebulak, 1997, Evans, 1997). If it is seen the winner takes all, then defeat can be all the more painful. Learning democracy is progressive and it would be interesting to investigate in which circumstances defeat is less painful. It is important that the losers have the feeling that in spite of losing they can still influence events in society. In any case the debate on conditions that affect whether or not the status of the losers is accompanied by an increase in dissatisfaction with the system is interesting. As in these is conditional the preservation of democracy as a system of institutional changing the composition of power and the effect on the wide span of actors on the functioning of power (Anderson, 2002a).

On the other hand the consequences of elections can also be in the withdrawal of support and cooperation in the system, future lack of participation in elections, a reduction in the support of parties and an increase in political disaffection (Hill, 2002, Whirely and Seyd, Southwell and Everest, 1998). Lack of confidence in the institutional foundation increases with repeated defeats in successive elections (Anderson, 2002a), that is, there is a cumulative effect of defeats (Bowlan and Donovan, 2002). In countries with barely 10 years of democratic history a defeat repeated just once or twice can be perceived as a situation showing non-changeability of the status quo. Losers experiencing such events feel all the more powerless and cannot see when they will ever come to power and effect change. Cases of lengthy periods where one party stays in power can also be found in the West, for example in Great Britain from 1979 to 1997 and in Spain from 1982 to 1996. It can also be demonstrated that in these countries there is also a fall in satisfaction with democracy (Anderson, 2002b). Due to the contraction of the time horizon in post-socialist countries, a more visible consequence of erosion in satisfaction can be expected after several positional repeats at election results.

In exceptional cases a contrary effect can come about on winners and losers that can have an interesting consequence on the ponderings of theoretical explanation of the winner's status factor. Do changes in the composition of the ruling coalition only cause a delay in its support when it not immediately clear after the election the advantage of the winners (Bowler and Donovan, 2002)? Does this mean a delayed effect of factors influencing change of the winning coalition through the pre-election period? Or does it mean the effects of the winner's attraction that is dependant on the recruitment of support over a lengthy period and is not clearly expressed immediately after the election? Those betting on the losing horse slowly "forget" their decision on the way they voted and overcome their loss by changing support. Supporting this is the fact that the winners have greater media coverage than the losers. It is known that in the months following an election polls show greater share of respondent reporting that they voted for the winners (Wright, 1993).

Variables

Dependent

The dependent variable in the analysis was *satisfaction with democracy*. There exists much literature on the theoretical content of the variable linked to the question of legitimacy and support of a political system (Fuchs, 1993). A distinctive feature of this indicator for measuring the standing of democracy and extent democracy is working over time for comparisons between countries is its sensitivity to short-term events (Anderson, 2002c). Whether or not such holds true within the context of collecting democratic experiences in transitional countries was put to the test. Certain authors emphasise its face validity (Anderson, 2002c, Fuchs, 1993) in that it measures the content of the question literally. That is to say it measures the judgement or subjective level of satisfaction (that is, positive or negative experiences) with democracy (as appointed generalised content of the political system). Within it, it subsumes both satisfaction with the working of the political system at an individual level (from a material and other aspects of satisfaction with life) and satisfaction at the societal level (the level of trust in society and the level of economics and politics working for the common good achieved).

Independent

The principle independent variable is the status of the losers or winners at elections determined by whether or not the respondent voted for a party making up the government coalition or another party or stayed at home and did not vote. This form of variable has an equivalent significance in all countries.

In addition to the control variables sex, education and family income, two variables were used in the analysis to explain the differences between winners and losers in their attitude to democracy. The same variables would be used also in models explaining vote choice and political participation in general. That in theory would be a condition needed for a factor which we can expect to have some effect in explaining the differences in satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers. These were the level of economic satisfaction with conditions and the political alienation or individual's feeling of powerlessness. These two variables were only used in the first module of the CSES study.

Economic satisfaction, which was measured only in the first module, was replaced in the second module by the proxy variable satisfaction with government. It is widely recognised

that economic factors influence election results (Lewis-Beck, 1988). The government in power who provides successful economic conditions has a greater chance of being re-elected. At the same time, the assessment of success of economics is the most important factor contributing to the satisfaction in the political system in general. Numerous and not always well-prepared economic reforms in the post-socialist countries intensified feelings of social inequality and a strong influence on support for the regime was anticipated (Powers and Cox 1997, Listhaug 1999).

The experience of defeat, that in post-socialism can be multi-faceted, can induce a feeling of powerlessness and political alienation (Anderson, 2002a). The independent influence of political powerlessness and alienation variables can thus show how dissatisfaction with the system is generated through the feeling of unequal chances due to “non-compliance with the rules of the game”. That can cumulatively lead to a worsening of the legitimacy of the system. It raises the question as to whether the reactions to elections defeat lead to alienation and the consequent quitting of political action, or to the contrary to establishing a group that attempts to change and improve the system (Anderson and Tvern, 2001). In addition to the variable of political alienation, individual assessments of efficacy were considered that were expressed through views on the importance of the election result. This variable was added to the analysis as it was considered in both CSES study modules. The influence of elections on satisfaction with democracy is linked by definition to the assessment of the fairness of the elections, the last variable assessing political factors (compare with Blais, 2002). The answer to the question on fairness is naturally already conditional on the status of the winners and losers of elections. The variable was included in order to obtain the wider range of variables of politically based satisfaction and a chance to look at the various situation-based factors of phenomenology of formation of satisfaction with democracy through elections. That last variable emphasises the nature of an election as an event.

The position on the left or right of the political spectrum can also be significant as particular ideological groupings can feel “privileged” or “disaffected”. So the left could feel as “big losers” as they have lost the privileges of the previous regime (Listhaug, 1999). The right, on the other hand, can be expected when not in power to feel greater injustice had been done as they expected more from transition as the left did, who in principle are reconciled to the possibility of defeat.

Data and methods

Data for the analysis came from the first and second module of CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems). Data was available through the CSES home page (CSES Planning Committee 2003a, 2003b). The study was undertaken immediately after elections in the individual countries. The questionnaire was a translation from the English original and used in context of wider studies of elections in most of the countries. Questionnaires were carried out as personal interviews in most cases, except in Germany where a telephone interview was used and in New Zealand where it was self-administered on paper. Samples of the voting population were taken randomly. Weightings given by the data-providers were used in the analysis of responses. The dataset used for Slovenia after the second elections, was the questionnaire from the first module after elections in 2000 (Toš 2000), which was not yet included in the international dataset.

Analysis was undertaken using OLS regression. The construction of independent variables together with the assessment of reliability is given in the appendix.

Presentation of results and interpretation

Differences between winners and losers over the years

Initial results are not univocal. At least in the cases analysed, there were not rare exemptions to the rule that winners were more satisfied with how democracy was working. This was not confirmed by the 1998 election results in West Germany, whilst Eastern part of a country showed support to be almost equal. In Hungary the losers of the 1998 and 2002 elections both times appeared more satisfied than the winners. Also in Poland in 2001 the losers were a little more satisfied with democracy than the winners. In Spain in 1996 the losers expressed quite a lot more satisfaction than the winners. As shown by various studies in the past (Anderson, 2002b, S. Bowler and T. Donovan, 2002) specific elections bringing a change in power can also bring reversed proportion between winners and losers in satisfaction with democracy. It is necessary here to emphasise that the survey was carried out immediately after the elections in most countries. For this reason it is natural to assume judgements of the social situation was subject to a large degree by the position parties had before the elections. The opposition is

usually critical to circumstances in society and conditions of its functioning and this is still true during the first weeks after eventual elections success, where they do not change their attitude to the system immediately. This only occurs over time. Then the working of mechanisms providing a “cognitive consistence” comes to the fore as people voting parties in the government coalition offer greater support to the government and positively judge circumstances in society as a whole. This is also the effect of post-election “winner-attraction”. There is also an increase in satisfaction due to perceived profit to supporters of parties in power with the anticipated realisation of their interests through the policies of the government coalition. The above-stated cases appear to be exceptional for elections where there was a change in power.

(Figure 1: Satisfaction with democracy among winners and losers over time)

That elections are really an important factor in forming opinion on the working of democracy is also shown by a lively time dynamic. The differences between winners and losers grew in Western and Eastern Germany when in the second module the positive assessment of the winners increased at the expense of the loser’s dissatisfaction. Differences widened in a quite special way in Hungary, where in each case there was a different loser and its satisfaction was increased at the expense of the winners reduced satisfaction. In New Zealand winners were gradually more satisfied and the losers less and the difference between them widened. Data was for 1996 and 2002 but there were irregular elections in between for which no data. In 2002 the coalition were returned to power after also winning an irregular election. The situation in Poland was similar to that in Hungary, where there was a change in power after the last election, and proportions of satisfaction among the winners and losers were reversed. The peculiarity here was that each time there was a growth in dissatisfaction among the winners who were losers before their victory. If the preposition that when the status of election winners changes, they continue to express the feelings of losers is to be accepted as the result of their defeat at the previous election, then the result could be interpreted as a sign of worsening opinion of conditions in the political system by the defeated. The case in Spain was similar to that in Germany only there was a relatively greater increase in the satisfaction of the winners, as also was the case in Slovenia. Repeated defeat in successive elections led to an increase in the difference between winners and losers in all countries. This complies with the hypothesis that the effect of elections increases where repeated defeat is experienced.

Slovenia was the exception in that the winners had won elections for the third time in succession. This case indicates a prove of a theory that the feeling of defeat can increase in a situation of the lack of experience with democracy, when each election was deemed more a matter of fate than the last. Other circumstances however can also influence the power of the factor such as how severe the defeat was, the width of the coalition and the number of parties involved. It would therefore be necessary to examine events in more countries with similar history of election results for a wider confirmation of this hypothesis. With respect to the peculiarities of the remaining new democracies, both Hungary and Poland are at present experiencing political upheavals accompanying intensive institutional change and in Poland new election legislation. The situation is quite unpredictable and special in both countries. At each successive election winners were even more unsatisfied with democracy. Elections however brought them, as a majority, greater opportunities to express their dissatisfaction in constructive ways through their representation in the government coalition. In this situation it is worrying that every change in power was accompanied by an increase in tension and differences in the assessment of how democracy is working between political poles. For the consolidation of democracy smaller differences would be better and an opening up of opportunities for constructive accession of different political groupings to the constructing of a political system made for all. It shows that because of limited experiences with democracy attitudes about the democracy are not strong, that why opinions and evaluations of situation are unstable and vulnerable to short-term impulses. The dynamic there show a prevalence of situational factor, where the structural ones are still to a large extent absent.

Changes in the structure and circumstances of defeat

The proportion of winners and losers by country were largely unchanged between the two elections. A substantial strengthening of the majority, that is, a wider coalition as after the previous election occurred in both Spain and Slovenia and this could go some way towards explaining the increased dissatisfaction among the losers. Changes in the proportion between winners and losers operate neutrally or positively on the joint judgement on democracy. Similar occurs with the category “not as certain”. This group expressed satisfaction with democracy at a level somewhere between that of the winners and losers and were (with the exception of Spain) less represented the second time. The proportion of defined voters in new

democracies was substantially lower that is demonstrated by the lower level of party distinctiveness.

(Figure 2: Proportions of Winners (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) (%) by Year and Country.)

The change in strength of a factor contributes more to the decline in the level of satisfaction with democracy influenced by elections than changes in proportional structure. It is thus noticeable the worsening opinion in losers in both parts of Germany and among the “ex-losers” in Poland.

Changes in the proportion of satisfaction with democracy in general and also with respect to the differences between winners and losers, happened in the context of the working of other factors. Changes in economic and political circumstances at election time cause a reversal in the proportion between winners and losers of economic satisfaction and the assessment of political efficacy when there is a change in government. This is similar to what was demonstrated in the general assessment of satisfaction with democracy. It appears that economic factors prevail both over time and in the differences between winners and losers. Differences in political factors that accompany are somewhat less intensive.

(Figure 3 to Figure 5)

Explaining the differences between winners and losers

The purpose of separate analyses of factors of satisfaction with democracy by country and by year is to establish whether or not the type of country (Western democracy or new democracy) and type of election (a change or re-election) influence differences in size of the explanatory power of different factors, whether the role of economic factors is more important in the stated situations and how important is the role of political factors. The third question is whether either of the stated two groupings of factors can explain the differences between winners and losers in their assessment of democracy.

Results indicate the most recent government coalitions re-elections, particularly in both parts of Germany and in New Zealand, slightly increased the influence of factors of political alienation on general satisfaction. Normally parties in power repeat their success at elections because of their successes with the economy. As shown by the results, however, this situation gradually generates an increase in politically conditional judgement on the situation in society. The effect of political factors alone is not especially significant in explaining the differences between winners and losers in their attitudes to democracy. The coefficients of winner influence do not change with the inclusion of factors of political alienation. It appears that the politically conditional component of attitude to democracy is the same for both winners and losers. As opposed to this the economic factor explains nearly half the difference between winners and losers in attitude.

(Table 1: Regression Coefficient of Independent Variables on Satisfaction with democracy by country and by year)

The new democracies, especially Hungary and Slovenia, have compared to the other countries higher levels of economics conditional dissatisfaction. This shows that during a period of intensive economic restructuring and adapting economic rules to those of the European Union, this factor has been a priority. It was noticeable that around the assessment of economic efficacy there was also formed a difference with respect to political support of parties at elections. In Poland the political and economic components of attitudes to democracy were slightly more in a balance. The effect of economic factor even increases the gap between winners in losers in Poland. That confirms the results that shows light to the puzzles of ever changing government in Poland, even in the periods the economy is improving. Vote choice in Poland is routed in deeply rooted in cleavages of traditions. Besides that there is extremely low level of traditional political participation that is connected with the general low trust given to political elite. The Eastern part of Germany by structure of working of the factors was completely comparable to the Western part.

These findings go somewhat against those of Evans and Whitefield (1995) on factors of support for democracy. As opposed to their results, where politics conditional factors of experience with the working of democracy have priority, in this case, at least in the short-term, levels of satisfaction appear to be more influenced by economics conditional judgement. This demonstrates that material-judged reality prevails after 10 years of experience with

democracy focusing on the tangible results of economic success. At the same time political factors appear to correspond in size to coefficients in the West. The factors of political alienation and opinion of unfairness of elections were shown somewhat greater in the first election immediately after reform in 1996 in New Zealand.

It shows that as suspected the turn about in the influence of winners in an election is consistently explainable by reversed proportions of economic dissatisfaction. Immediately after the election the winning coalition expresses its criticism to economic conditions and with it a conditional dissatisfaction with the working of the system. Among other variables ideological direction was also mentioned in the introduction. Although in post-socialist countries there is a generally positive effect in that the right more positively assesses how democracy works, this factor is not present in all repeated elections and in specific situations the sign of relationship is reversed. The situation can be understood as dependent on the colour of the winning coalition as remained unexplained by the division of winners and losers rather than the ideological differences in support for the governing party.

Explanation of the influence of elections over time

To explicitly respond to the question as to why in situations of repeated defeat negative opinion of democracy rises in losers, the model of satisfaction with democracy influenced by time was tested. Both Spain and Slovenia were included as measurements of dependent and independent variables in both points in time were available for these two countries.

The analysis showed a similar result in both countries. An improvement in satisfaction with democracy noticeable in the winners was completely explained by the utilitarian factor of assessment of economic success. Approximately half of the coefficient showing improvement in satisfaction with democracy over time was explainable by this factor. The remaining two factors, political alienation and the assessment of unfairness of elections, although having a statistically characteristic effect on the assessment of democracy, were not connected with the time component. The opposite was true for the losers. The assessment of economic conditions reflected the generally favourable situation in the country and was progressively more positive as with the winners. The factor of time conditional changes in the assessment of democracy, however, also increased when assessments of political conditions were included.

This means that when economic factors are included, political alienation along with a negative assessment of election fairness grew over time among the losers and with it their general assessment of the status of democracy worsened.

(Table 2: Regression Coefficient of the effect of Time controlling for other Independent Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy, separated by status of winners and country)

Conclusions

The review on the working of democracy on the shaping of satisfaction with democracy shows that elections are a very important situational factor. In every country and type of democracy something happens at elections – either the size of the differences change or the mathematical sign is reversed and the influence of economics or political conditional differences increase or decrease. There is some pattern in a result, however. Irrespective as to whether it is a new democracy or established democracy, it is important as to whether the elections produce a change in government or the government is re-elected. The latter bring with it greater politics conditional worry over how democracy is working. The case of Hungary and Poland with constancy in change of government after every free election, show the case that even constant change may yield toward increase in gap between winners and losers. The gap increases in a direction where winners are more and more dissatisfied in those cases. This may show a low level of consolidation of democracy if there are groups showing extreme low level of satisfaction. Conditions of low levels of trust do not prevent from influence of even relatively innocent events to effect gaps in evaluation of a functioning of a regime. A spiral of increase of a support for democracy thus couldn't be formed.

The peculiarity of new democracies is the prevalence of the economic factor on satisfaction with democracy and also as an explanation of the differences between winners and losers in this respect. This factor is present in all cases in time. With respect to the shortness of experience with democracy, each election can be important in the shaping of durable standpoints with respect to attitudes to democracy. It is therefore somewhat worrying the situation where ex-losers (losers from past elections) after every consecutive election express a lower level of satisfaction with how democracy is working. This could gradually lead to an increase in feelings of powerlessness in the face of changing conditions in society. With

respect to the number of problems facing countries in transition, criticism and prevailing dissatisfaction with circumstances is understandable. It has been demonstrated, however, that factors of political alienation and dissatisfaction have a smaller role in explaining differences between winners and losers, after taking into account differences in economic conditional satisfaction. This at least partially confirms the conclusions on losers that continue to feel there is a point in reform and gradual upgrading the system (Anderson and Tverd, 2001). When anticipating a defeat actors attempt to change circumstances to their advantage. In the new democracies there are signs in the battle for democracy that pressure from the opposition to attain institutional change in electoral legislation and improve influence in the media. In that case a democracy is sustained as long the social actors perceive it as a space that gives them a chance for pursuing their interest.

The unfavourable influence of political alienation due to repeated defeats was possible to explicitly confirm only in Spain and Slovenia as a side issue where relative economic success after repeated re-elections prevailed. This finding is important from a theoretical point of view as it lays bare the background to the workings of strengthening effects of elections results when there is a repeated defeat. Exclusively for the losers in this situation time conditional increases in political alienation and election fairness are shown, net of relatively positive trend in economic optimism. This increase directly explains a worsening of the assessment of how democracy is working over time by the losers. It is especially interesting that this factor operates in both Western democracies with decades of democratic tradition and in the new democracies with barely 10 years experience.

Our data does not allow to discern the causal order of variables in a model. It would be interesting in future analysis to tackle a question of the dynamic of formation of winners and losers gap in satisfaction with democracy. It may well be sought that winners, after became aware of their privileged position, begin to evaluate economic conditions in country more positively, as an explanation following "cognitive consistency" theory would predict. In situation where party alignments are not so prevalent, as is the case of much of the public in a post-socialist states, one may sought also about a model when social groups that are economically well, began to search for a political allies by supporting the ruling coalition parties.

Reviewing the results it is evident that every country's case is unique. In attempting an interpretation stories reflecting only local public were avoided. To generalise the results it would be interesting to repeat the analysis modules in more countries so as to obtain a more representative picture of situations conditional on the effects of elections on satisfaction with democracy. This time-orientated analysis shows that in addition to institutional and other peculiarities of each country the factor of the present situation is very important. Future elections could completely reverse the picture obtained.

Appendix A: Construction of variables

The following subjective variables from CSES Questionnaire were used in analysis.

Satisfaction with Democracy (scores 1-4). "Q1. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]? - VERY SATISFIED - FAIRLY SATISFIED - NOT VERY SATISFIED - NOT AT ALL SATISFIED."

Economic performance (1-5). Index of variables: "Q9. What do you think about the state of the economy these days in country]? Would you say that the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad? - VERY GOOD - GOOD - NEITHER GOOD NOR BAD - BAD - VERY BAD."

"Q10. Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in [country] has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? - GOTTEN BETTER - STAYED THE SAME - GOTTEN WORSE."

"Q10a. Would you say much better or somewhat better? - MUCH BETTER - SOMEWHAT BETTER"

Q10b. Would you say much worse or somewhat worse? - SOMEWHAT WORSE - MUCH WORSE."

Cronbach α in a range from 0.45 to 0.64.

Government performance (1-4). "Q7. Now thinking about the performance of the government in [capital]/president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/president in [capital] has done over the past [number of years between the previous and the present election OR change in govt.] years. Has it/he/she done a very good job? A good job? A bad job? A very bad job? - VERY GOOD JOB - GOOD JOB - BAD JOB - VERY BAD JOB."

Political Alienation (1-5). Index of variables: "Q4. Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself? - POLITICAL PARTIES IN [COUNTRY] CARE WHAT ORDINARY PEOPLE THINK - POLITICAL PARTIES IN [COUNTRY] DON'T CARE WHAT ORDINARY PEOPLE THINK."

"Q11. Some people say that members of [Congress/ Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress/Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress/Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress/ Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself? - MEMBERS OF [CONGRESS/PARLIAMENT] KNOW WHAT ORDINARY PEOPLE THINK - MEMBERS OF [CONGRESS/PARLIAMENT] DON'T KNOW WHAT ORDINARY PEOPLE THINK."

Cronbach α in a range from 0.31 to 0.69.

Vote Inefficacy (1-5). "Q14. Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make a difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference), where would you place yourself? - WHO PEOPLE VOTE FOR WON'T MAKE A DIFFERENCE - WHO PEOPLE VOTE FOR CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE."

Elections Unfair (1-5). "Q2. In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country], where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election

was conducted unfairly? - LAST ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED FAIRLY - LAST ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED UNFAIRLY".

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Tables and Figures:




Figure 1: Evaluations of Democracy among Winners (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertains (N) (% satisfied). Source: CSES 1996-2000 and 2001-2003.




Figure 2: Proportions of Winners (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) (%) by Year and Country.




Figure 3: Average Evaluations of Performance of Economy (Government) by Winners (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) status and Country.




Figure 4: Political Alineation by Winers (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) status and Country.




Figure 5: Elections Unfair by Winers (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) status and Country.




Figure 6: Vote Inefficiency by Winers (W), Losers (L) and Not Ascertain (N) status and Country.

Table 1: Regression Coefficient (t-test in parentheses) of Independent Variables on Satisfaction with democracy by country and by year. Source CSES 1996-2000 and 2001-2003

Independent Variables	West Germany 1998				2002			East Germany 1998				2002		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M4
(Constant)	2.58 (20.3)***	1.95 (13.4)***	2.86 (15.5)***	1.99 (13.2)***	2.20 (15.4)***	1.52 (8.8)***	1.69 (9.4)***	2.08 (14.4)***	1.41 (8.6)***	2.44 (11.5)***	1.42 (8.1)***	2.02 (15.9)***	1.27 (7.9)***	1.46 (8.4)***
Winner (1; Loser is omitted)	-0.20 (-4.0)***	-0.11 (-2.3)*	-0.10 (-2.2)*	-0.10 (-2.2)*	0.30 (5.2)***	0.03 (0.4)	0.07 (1.0)	-0.03 (-0.5)	-0.01 (-0.1)	-0.02 (-0.4)	0.00 (0.0)	0.27 (4.8)***	0.07 (1.2)	0.08 (1.4)
Not Ascertain (1; "-")	-0.37 (-5.7)***	-0.26 (-4.0)***	-0.24 (-3.8)***	-0.25 (-4.0)***	-0.13 (-1.2)	-0.21 (-2.0)*	-0.13 (-1.2)	-0.15 (-2.2)*	-0.07 (-1.0)	-0.03 (-0.5)	-0.04 (-0.6)	-0.18 (-2.1)*	-0.19 (-2.2)*	-0.15 (-1.8)
Gender (1 = Male)	0.18 (4.3)***	0.10 (2.3)*	0.08 (2.0)*	0.11 (2.7)**	-0.05 (-1.0)	-0.03 (-0.5)	-0.01 (-0.2)	0.13 (2.5)*	0.10 (2.0)*	0.10 (2.1)*	0.10 (2.1)*	0.19 (3.8)***	0.18 (3.6)***	0.17 (3.5)***
Years Education	0.03 (3.2)**	0.02 (2.8)**	0.02 (2.2)*	0.03 (3.1)**	0.03 (2.9)**	0.03 (3.2)**	0.03 (3.3)**	0.02 (1.7)	0.02 (1.8)	0.01 (1.3)	0.02 (2.2)*	0.01 (1.2)	0.01 (1.1)	0.01 (1.1)
Household Income (Quintiles)	0.02 (1.1)	0.01 (0.5)	0.00 (-0.1)	0.01 (0.8)	0.03 (1.6)	0.03 (1.8)	0.03 (1.6)	0.03 (1.4)	-0.01 (-0.4)	-0.02 (-0.7)	-0.01 (-0.3)	0.02 (1.2)	0.02 (1.0)	0.02 (0.9)
Left (1) – Right (10)	-0.03 (-2.4)*	-0.03 (-2.6)**	-0.03 (-2.5)*	-0.04 (-3.2)**	-0.02 (-1.7)	-0.01 (-1.1)	-0.02 (-1.1)	0.05 (3.6)***	0.05 (3.7)***	0.05 (3.8)***	0.05 (3.4)***	-0.02 (-1.7)	0.00 (-0.3)	-0.01 (-0.5)
Economic performance (1-5) [Government]		0.22 (8.1)***	0.17 (6.1)***	0.22 (8.1)***		[0.34] (6.7)***	[0.33] (6.5)***		0.26 (7.6)***	0.18 (5.1)***	0.26 (7.7)***		[0.36] (7.1)***	[0.35] (7.0)***
Political Alienation (1-5)			-0.15 (-6.0)***							-0.14 (-4.7)***				
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.14 (-4.4)***							-0.18 (-5.5)***				
Vote Inefficacy (1-5)				-0.04 (-2.0)*			-0.07 (-3.4)***				-0.03 (-1.5)			-0.06 (-2.9)**
R2	0.09	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.08	0.13	0.14	0.04	0.11	0.17	0.11	0.08	0.14	0.14
	Hungary 1998				2002			New Zealand 1996				2002		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M4
(Constant)	2.41 (27.0)***	1.23 (11.8)***	1.74 (13.5)***	1.31 (12.0)***	2.29 (19.8)***	0.96 (7.6)***	1.00 (7.2)***	2.10 (27.8)***	1.67 (20.7)***	3.33 (30.7)***	1.84 (21.8)***	2.42 (16.5)***	1.35 (7.9)***	1.65 (9.2)***
Winner (1; Loser is omitted)	-0.35 (-7.1)***	-0.18 (-4.0)***	-0.15 (-3.4)***	-0.17 (-3.8)***	-0.63 (-10.5)***	-0.28 (-5.0)***	-0.28 (-5.0)***	0.06 (1.8)	0.00 (0.2)	-0.01 (-0.3)	0.01 (0.3)	0.31 (5.9)***	0.09 (1.7)	0.06 (1.2)
Not Ascertain (1; "-")	-0.35 (-7.3)***	-0.17 (-3.9)***	-0.13 (-2.9)**	-0.16 (-3.8)***	-0.55 (-7.9)***	-0.26 (-4.1)***	-0.25 (-4.0)***	-0.10 (-2.4)*	-0.12 (-3.0)**	-0.03 (-0.7)	-0.12 (-3.0)**	-0.04 (-0.6)	-0.09 (-1.4)	-0.06 (-0.9)
Gender (1 = Male)	0.01 (0.3)	-0.01 (-0.3)	0.01 (0.2)	-0.02 (-0.6)	-0.06 (-1.3)	-0.03 (-0.9)	-0.03 (-0.8)	-0.02 (-0.9)	-0.05 (-1.8)	-0.07 (-2.9)**	-0.05 (-1.8)	-0.02 (-0.5)	-0.05 (-1.2)	-0.05 (-1.3)
Years Education	0.02 (3.2)**	0.01 (1.2)	0.00 (0.9)	0.01 (1.0)	-0.01 (-1.5)	-0.02 (-2.3)*	-0.02 (-2.4)*	0.02 (4.3)***	0.01 (2.6)*	0.00 (0.0)	0.01 (2.0)*	0.03 (3.0)**	0.03 (3.3)***	0.02 (2.9)**
Household Income (Quintiles)	0.05 (3.4)***	0.03 (2.5)*	0.04 (2.6)**	0.04 (3.0)**	0.03 (1.7)	0.02 (1.2)	0.02 (1.2)	0.06 (5.7)***	0.04 (4.2)***	0.04 (4.2)***	0.05 (4.8)***	0.00 (0.1)	0.01 (0.4)	0.01 (0.5)
Left (1) – Right (10)	-0.05 (-4.2)***	-0.01 (-0.8)	-0.01 (-0.9)	-0.01 (-1.1)	0.10 (8.9)***	0.04 (3.9)***	0.04 (3.9)***	0.04 (6.0)***	0.03 (3.6)***	0.01 (2.1)*	0.02 (2.8)**	-0.03 (-2.6)**	-0.01 (-0.9)	-0.01 (-1.1)
Economic performance (1-5) [Government]		0.36 (17.7)***	0.32 (14.8)***	0.35 (17.4)***		[0.62] (17.0)***	[0.62] (16.8)***		0.21 (13.3)***	0.12 (7.6)***	0.21 (13.3)***		[0.41] (10.8)***	[0.40] (10.6)***
Political Alienation (1-5)			-0.10 (-5.2)***							-0.22 (-14.4)***				
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.06 (-3.2)**							-0.20 (-14.7)***				
Vote Inefficacy (1-5)				-0.03 (-2.0)*			-0.01 (-0.7)				-0.06 (-5.3)***			-0.10 (-5.1)***
R2	0.11	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.38	0.54	0.54	0.05	0.10	0.22	0.11	0.07	0.17	0.19

(cont.)

Independent Variables	Poland 1997				2001			Spain 1996				2000			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
(Constant)	2.22 (21.6)***	1.39 (11.2)***	2.09 (13.3)***	1.59 (12.8)***	1.55 (12.6)***	1.11 (8.7)***	1.37 (10.1)***	3.04 (29.6)***	2.41 (16.9)***	2.84 (17.0)***	2.47 (17.6)***	2.66 (27.6)***	2.15 (17.5)***	2.74 (18.6)***	2.27 (17.9)***
Winner (1; Loser is omitted)	0.03 (0.6)	0.08 (1.5)	0.07 (1.5)	0.05 (1.1)	-0.02 (-0.3)	0.00 (0.0)	-0.02 (-0.3)	-0.24 (-3.5)***	-0.19 (-2.9)**	-0.18 (-2.8)**	-0.20 (-3.2)**	0.22 (3.8)***	0.15 (2.6)**	0.11 (2.0)*	0.11 (2.0)*
Not Ascertain (1; "-")	-0.06 (-1.4)	-0.02 (-0.5)	0.00 (0.1)	-0.02 (-0.4)	-0.13 (-2.5)*	-0.12 (-2.3)*	-0.07 (-1.3)	-0.18 (-2.7)**	-0.13 (-2.1)*	-0.12 (-1.9)	-0.10 (-1.6)	-0.02 (-0.4)	-0.01 (-0.1)	0.01 (0.3)	0.00 (0.0)
Gender (1 = Male)	0.06 (1.7)	0.01 (0.3)	0.00 (0.0)	0.00 (0.0)	0.00 (0.0)	0.04 (0.9)	0.04 (0.9)	0.06 (1.1)	0.00 (0.1)	-0.01 (-0.3)	-0.04 (-0.9)	0.08 (2.0)*	0.07 (1.7)	0.07 (1.7)	0.07 (1.7)
Years Education	0.01 (1.8)	0.01 (1.1)	0.00 (0.4)	0.01 (0.9)	0.03 (3.4)***	0.02 (2.9)**	0.02 (2.7)**	-0.01 (-1.0)	-0.01 (-1.0)	-0.01 (-1.0)	-0.01 (-1.1)	0.00 (0.2)	0.00 (0.2)	0.00 (-0.1)	0.00 (0.5)
Household Income (Quintiles)	0.06 (4.3)***	0.05 (3.5)***	0.04 (3.1)**	0.05 (3.5)***	0.09 (5.3)***	0.08 (4.6)***	0.08 (4.6)***	-0.04 (-1.7)	-0.04 (-1.6)	-0.04 (-1.8)	-0.03 (-1.4)	0.01 (0.3)	0.00 (-0.1)	0.00 (0.0)	-0.01 (-0.3)
Left (1) – Right (10)	0.01 (1.2)	0.02 (2.4)*	0.02 (2.0)*	0.02 (2.3)*	0.04 (3.6)***	0.02 (2.0)*	0.02 (2.0)	-0.02 (-1.2)	0.00 (-0.2)	0.00 (0.0)	0.00 (-0.1)	0.07 (4.4)***	0.05 (3.2)**	0.04 (2.8)**	0.06 (4.2)***
Economic performance (1-5)		0.29	0.25	0.28		[0.36]	[0.35]		0.20	0.17	0.22		0.18	0.15	0.17
[Government] Political Alienation (1-5)		(11.1)***	(9.5)***	(11.4)***	0	(9.1)***	(8.9)***		(6.4)***	(5.2)***	(7.2)***	0	(6.5)***	(5.3)***	(6.4)***
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.12 (-6.2)***							-0.06 (-2.8)**				-0.08 (-4.6)***	
Vote Inefficacy (1-5)				-0.06 (-4.8)***			-0.08 (-5.3)***				-0.06 (-2.9)**				-0.06 (-3.4)***
R2	0.04	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.07	0.13	0.15	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.17	0.14

(cont.)

Independent Variables	Slovenia 1996				2000			
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M1	M2	M3	M4
(Constant)	1.78 (13.8)***	0.80 (6.1)***	1.41 (9.1)***	1.02 (7.7)***	2.36 (14.5)***	1.68 (9.9)***	2.18 (11.3)***	1.76 (10.6)***
Winner (1; Loser is omitted)	0.07 (1.3)	0.03 (0.6)	0.02 (0.5)	0.03 (0.7)	0.28 (4.1)***	0.21 (3.3)**	0.16 (2.5)*	0.21 (3.4)***
Not Ascertain (1; "-")	0.01 (0.2)	-0.03 (-0.6)	-0.01 (-0.1)	-0.02 (-0.4)	0.06 (0.8)	0.03 (0.4)	0.02 (0.3)	0.02 (0.2)
Gender (1 = Male)	0.06 (1.3)	0.00 (0.1)	-0.01 (-0.2)	0.00 (0.1)	0.02 (0.4)	-0.02 (-0.4)	-0.01 (-0.1)	-0.01 (-0.3)
Years Education	0.01 (1.8)	0.01 (1.3)	0.01 (0.7)	0.00 (0.1)	0.01 (0.7)	0.00 (-0.4)	-0.01 (-0.9)	-0.01 (-1.1)
Household Income (Quintiles)	0.05 (2.7)**	0.03 (1.8)	0.02 (1.2)	0.04 (2.0)	0.02 (1.0)	0.00 (0.2)	0.00 (0.2)	0.01 (0.5)
Left (1) – Right (10)	0.01 (0.9)	0.01 (0.4)	0.01 (0.5)	0.00 (0.3)	-0.03 (-2.2)*	-0.03 (-2.5)*	-0.03 (-2.1)*	-0.03 (-2.4)*
Economic performance (1-5)		0.46 (16.8)***	0.42 (15.5)***	0.44 (16.9)***		0.33 (9.5)***	0.30 (8.6)***	0.33 (10.0)***
Political Alienation (1-5)			-0.09 (-4.7)***				-0.04 (-1.5)	
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.09 (-5.4)***				-0.11 (-5.8)***	
Vote Inefficacy (1-5)				-0.04 (-2.9)**				-0.03 (-1.4)
R2	0.01	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.05	0.14	0.18	0.15

* p<0.05**; p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Table 2: Regression Coefficient (t-test in parentheses) of the effect of Time controlling for other Independent Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy, separated by status of winners and country.
 Source: CSES 1996-2000 and 2001-2003 Cumulative file

Independent Variables (Constant)	Spain								
	Winner			Loser			Not Ascertain		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
	2.24	1.76	2.17	2.90	2.37	2.92	2.73	2.12	2.58
	(16.3)***	(10.4)***	(10.4)***	(29.1)***	(18.4)***	(19.3)***	(15.3)***	(10.3)***	(10.8)***
	0.80	0.54	0.54	0.19	0.10	0.17	0.42	0.25	0.30
T (1)	(14.1)***	(6.9)***	(6.9)***	(3.7)***	(2.0)*	(3.3)**	(6.2)***	(3.5)***	(4.1)***
Gender (1 = Male)	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	0.07	0.02	-0.01	0.17	0.15	0.14
	(-0.3)	(-0.7)	(-0.6)	(1.5)	(0.5)	(-0.2)	(2.6)*	(2.3)*	(2.2)*
Years Education	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.6)	(-1.3)	(-1.6)	(-1.3)	(-1.1)	(-0.7)	(-0.7)
Household Income (Quintiles)	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03
	(-0.8)	(-1.0)	(-1.1)	(-0.6)	(-0.5)	(-0.5)	(-0.3)	(-0.9)	(-0.8)
Left (1) – Right (10)	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(2.9)**	(3.2)**	(3.1)**	(0.1)	(-0.1)	(0.0)	(-0.6)	(-0.5)	(-0.6)
Economic performance (1-5)		0.19	0.16		0.20	0.16		0.24	0.20
		(4.8)***	(4.0)***		(6.4)***	(5.1)***		(5.6)***	(4.6)***
Political Alienation (1-5)			-0.05			-0.08			-0.07
			(-1.9)			(-4.0)***			(-2.5)*
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.08			-0.12			-0.07
			(-3.0)**			(-5.1)***			(-2.7)**
R2	0.26	0.28	0.30	0.02	0.06	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.16
Slovenia									
	Winner			Loser			Not Ascertain		
	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3	M1	M2	M3
(Constant)	1.90	1.04	1.63	2.25	1.42	2.05	1.75	0.81	1.32
	(13.5)***	(7.0)***	(9.5)***	(11.5)***	(6.9)***	(8.2)***	(10.3)***	(4.6)***	(6.3)***
	0.40	0.28	0.28	0.15	0.08	0.13	0.25	0.17	0.19
T (1)	(8.1)***	(6.0)***	(6.2)***	(1.9)	(1.1)	(1.8)	(4.1)***	(3.0)**	(3.4)***
Gender (1 = Male)	0.09	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.09	-0.10	0.03	0.00	0.00
	(1.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)	(-0.2)	(-1.3)	(-1.5)	(0.5)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Years Education	0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00
	(2.4)*	(1.3)	(0.9)	(-0.6)	(-0.8)	(-1.3)	(1.2)	(0.6)	(0.3)
Household Income (Quintiles)	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(2.3)*	(1.5)	(1.1)	(0.7)	(0.2)	(-0.4)	(1.4)	(0.6)	(0.5)
Left (1) – Right (10)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(-1.5)	(-1.8)	(-1.3)	(-0.3)	(-0.9)	(-0.6)	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.5)
Economic performance (1-5)		0.42	0.38		0.40	0.37		0.43	0.39
		(12.2)***	(11.3)***		(8.7)***	(8.1)***		(12.0)***	(10.9)***
Political Alienation (1-5)			-0.08			-0.07			-0.06
			(-3.8)***			(-2.1)*			(-2.5)*
Elections Unfair (1-5)			-0.11			-0.11			-0.07
			(-5.8)***			(-4.1)***			(-3.4)***
R2	0.09	0.21	0.25	0.01	0.13	0.16	0.03	0.18	0.20

* p<0.05**; p<0.01; *** p<0.001