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**Pocketbook or Rosary?
Economic and Identity Voting in the 2000 Presidential
and 2001 Parliamentary Elections in Poland**

Introduction

Ever since the nascent of democracy, Polish electoral politics have been confusing their observers, domestic ones as much as foreign. The Solidarity movement swept the historic vote of 1989, only to disintegrate into a swarm of “couch parties” that contested the 1991 and 1993 general elections. It reunited under the banner of the Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) to win the 1997 contest, only to fall to pieces again before the most recent (September 2001) vote. Its counterpart, the Democratic Left Alliance, after the humiliation suffered by its Communist predecessor (Polish United Workers Party, or PZPR) in 1989, has been gaining momentum throughout the 1990s, winning comfortably in 1993 and 2001, but losing to AWS in 1997, despite having collected more votes than four years before. Of the seven parties represented in the current Sejm, four are there for the first time, and of these four three did not even exist a year before the election. In the presidential races, the legend of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa, finished first in 1990, to lose narrowly in 1995, and to fall into the “also-ran” category in 2000, while a former Communist apparatchik, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who edged Wałęsa in 1995, in 2000 won re-election by a landslide.

Interpretations of these electoral swings, turns, ups, and downs are many, yet the majority of those writing on the subject tend to link the seemingly erratic behaviour of Polish voters with the vicissitudes of the transition away from command economy to a free market/free enterprise environment. I have discussed the validity of such claims in my analyses of the 1995 presidential and the 1997 parliamentary elections (Jasiewicz 1998, 1999a, 1999b), as well as in earlier versions of this paper.¹ The paper presented here begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical arguments, to follow with a presentation of election results (for both the 2000 and the 2001 vote), and to conclude with a series of multivariate analyses of voting behaviour. The empirical data used here come from two post-election surveys, the PGSW 2000 (Polish General Voting Survey 2000) conducted by the CBOS (Center for Public Opinion Polling) in October 2000 on a

¹ Earlier versions of this paper, based on different sets of empirical variables and different analytical methodologies, have been read at the BASEES convention in Cambridge, UK in April 2001, the APSA meetings in San Francisco in August, 2001, the Conference of Europeanists in Chicago in March 2002. It has been submitted for publication in the Strathclyde University’s Studies in Public Policy series. A Polish-language version has been published in *Studia Polityczne* no 13 (2002).

representative sample (1,048 cases) of all eligible voters,² and the PGSW 2001, conducted also by the CBOS (1,794 cases) a year later.³

Voting Behaviour in Poland: Economy or Identity?

No sooner were the first free elections conducted in Poland and elsewhere in East Central Europe than the scholars began to speculate about the prospects for development of pluralist democracy and competitive party systems across the region. Some authors (Kitschelt 1992, 1995) expected that the party competition space in the early stages of transition to market economy would be defined by two cross-cutting cleavages, between market versus distributive and libertarian/cosmopolitan versus authoritarian/particularist political strategies. Others (Evans and Whitefield, 1993) anticipated that the actual patterns of party competition might be country specific, involving at least three dimensions: socio-economic, ethnic (in multi-ethnic states), and valence (like the issue of nation-building in break-away states). For Poland, Evans and Whitefield predicted that socio-economic cleavages should become the main basis for party competition (in absence of sizeable ethnic minorities or the break-away factor), with specific issue dimensions defined by redistributive, authoritarian, anti-West attitudes vying with pro-market, liberal, cosmopolitan ones. Also native analysts (see, among others, Grabowska 1991, Gebethner 1992, Jasiewicz 1993, Wiatr 2000, Wesolowski 2000) have put the emphasis on multi-dimensional character of party competition and have pointed out the virtual impossibility of distributing Polish parties and their constituencies along a single continuum.

Despite the many differences among them, all the cited authors seem to agree that party competition and voter identification in post-1989 Poland have been defined by two crosscutting cleavages. The first, of socio-economic nature, represents the discord between support for the neo-liberal free market/free enterprise policies and the option in favour of state interventionism in the economy and welfare state-type social policy. The other, labelled in various ways by different authors, reflects a conflict of ideological or even axiological nature. On the most general level, it can be understood as strife between universalistic and particularistic visions of social and political order. In the terms of specific attitudes, it manifests itself chiefly as a conflict between confessional and secular approach to politics and policies and is closely related to the contrasting assessments of Poland's Communist past and opposing stands on the issue of decommunization. Unlike

² The funding for this survey came from a grant received by the author from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, under the authority of a Title VIII grant from the U.S. Department of State. Additional support for this project has been provided by grants from the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Earhart Foundation, the Class of 1962 grant from Washington and Lee University, and the hospitality of University College in Oxford, where the author spent part of his 2000-01 sabbatical leave from Washington and Lee. Responsibility for the views expressed here rests solely with the author.

³ Polish General Election Survey is affiliated at the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (ISP PAN) and financed by a grant (No. 5 H02E 021 20) from the Committee for Scientific Research (KBN), with additional funds made available by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Higher School for Social Psychology (SWPS) in Warsaw.

in Western Europe, in the language of Polish politics this ideological cleavage, not the socio-economic one, is defined as the left-right dimension.

The salience of these two cleavages, as well as their crosscutting configuration in the political spectrum, has been well documented in empirical studies (Żukowski 1994, Markowski and Toka 1993, Jasiewicz 1995 and 1998, Kitschelt et al. 1999). Yet conventional wisdom has attributed the swings of electoral mood among the Polish voters almost exclusively to the hardships of economic reforms and the longing for the social safety net of the bygone Communist era. This point of view is based on the presumption that societies undergoing a rapid social and economic change bifurcate into the winners and the losers, the haves and the have-nots, causing massive feelings of relative deprivation, which in turn generates political populism. The hardships of transition feed retroactive sentiments – longings for the times of full employment and a reliable, if merely minimal, social safety net. Such attitudes have supposedly accounted for the remarkable comeback of former Communists to political prominence across Eastern Europe, of which Kwaśniewski's rise to presidency in 1995 and his 2000 reelection, or the SLD's victories in 1993 and 2001, are arguably most spectacular illustrations.

This reasoning hardly defies the common sense and seems at least reasonable. In the literature of the subject it is probably best expressed by Petr Mateju, Blanka Rehakova, and Geoffrey Evans in their contribution to the volume *The End Of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*, edited by Evans (1999). They point out at four processes that reinforce class interests (and, by implication, class, that is economically based, voting) in post-Communist societies undergoing the transition to market economy:

1. The emergence of class of proprietors and entrepreneurs.
2. The increase in class consciousness of the workers, deprived of the special position given to them by Communist ideology and threatened by rationalization of industrial production and employment.
3. Growing economic inequality.
4. The strengthening of materialist (as opposed to post-materialist) values, due to a rapid transition from the economy of shortage to the economy of abundance.

In the authors' view, this analysis applies not only to the Czech Republic, but also to other post-Communist polities in Central Europe, including Poland. The authors recognise the initial role of the ideological or identity factors, but predict that the outlined processes "... create conditions for the strengthening of class-based voting behaviour and the crystallization of the 'traditional' left-right political spectrum" (Mateju, Rehakova, Evans, 1999: 235). For the Czech Republic, they find strong empirical evidence to support these predictions.

For Poland, years before the publication of the cited article, a similar point of view has been often expressed (albeit less eloquently and often rather implicitly than explicitly) by the analysts of elections and voting behaviour, both domestic and foreign. In his often-cited occasional paper, "The Left Turn in Poland" (ISP PAN, 1993), Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński points out at the economy as the major (although not the only) factor

behind the success of the post-communist SLD in the 1993 general election. Also Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan (1995) sees the results of the 1993 election as the proof that the major political cleavage in Poland has shifted from the ideological to socio-political dimension. Interestingly, after the next election four years later the same author was much more cautious in his conclusions (Chan 1998). Other authors seek empirical proofs of the alleged economic influences over electoral fortunes and misfortunes in Poland. Such is the case of John Gibson and Anna Cielecka (1995), who question validity of public opinion surveys, which have consistently indicated lack of relationship between unemployment and voting for the post-Communist SLD, and to counter them present analyses based on aggregate (on province level) data that seem to speak to the contrary. The authors fall here victims of ecological fallacy: even if the support for the SLD is stronger in the provinces with a higher unemployment, it doesn't yet mean that the unemployed are more likely to vote for the SLD than the employed. This can be established only at the individual level, and for that purpose no method better than public opinion surveys has been invented so far. Furthermore, the complex model of multiple regression constructed by Gibson and Cielecka includes only age and education as the sole non-economic variables. Regression models allow for assessment of the impact a particular independent variable has on the dependent variable (here: voting), controlling for all other variables, but they are only as good as the variables included. A model may generate statistically significant relationships, but if potentially important variables are left aside, the meaning of such findings is dubious. Another example of such fallacious conclusions about individual voting patterns drawn from analysis of macro-level economic data, without introduction of any non-economic controlling variables, can be found in Janice Bell's article "Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns during the Economic Transition in Poland, 1990-1995" (1997). The author limits her explanatory model to only two variables, unemployment and income, and, needless to say, finds positive relationships between unemployment and the vote for the post-communist left.

The intention of this criticism is not to deny the occurrence of statistically significant correlations between economic variables and voting patterns on the aggregate level. Such correlations, indeed, exist, but this does not prove, contrary to the cited scholars' claims, that it is the economy that shapes voting behaviour of Poles in the 1990's. Other authors who do include social and cultural variables in their analyses, present in effect more balanced descriptions of the complex network of economic, cultural, and ideological considerations behind individual voting preferences. Such is the case of Hubert Tworzecki, the author of the most comprehensive to the date study of Polish elections available in English (1996), who in his analysis combines statistical sophistication (in the use of aggregate-level data) with an in-depth understanding of historical and cultural factors underlying contemporary Polish politics. Aggregate (provincial level) data are used also by L.L. Wade, P. Lavelle, and A.J. Groth (1995), but these scholars do not shy away from non-economic indicators and find significant relationship between voting patterns (party preferences) and measurements of religiosity. Among those who trust survey data, Denise V. Powers and James H. Cox (1997), on the basis on secondary analysis of a post-election survey conducted in 1993 by the Electoral Studies Division of the ISP PAN, conclude that it is the assessment of Poland's communist past rather than current economic situation of the individual's household that

helps to predict one's voting behaviour. The authors of a comprehensive empirical study of political parties and party systems in four post-communist democracies (Kitschelt et al., 1999) conclude that the patterns of party competition in Poland involve both economic and socio-cultural dimensions. Also Aleks Szczerbiak (1999) emphasises the interplay of economic interests and non-economic values in strategies applied by parties to attract voters. Éva Fodor, Eric Hanley and Iván Szelenyi, who expect the emergence of class-based voting in Poland and Hungary, point out that in the early elections (before 1995) religiosity, not class was the best predictor of party preferences. Even certain authors, who focus their analyses exclusively on economic voting and completely disregard the role of identity factors (Duch 2001), agree that for Poland of the 1990s there was no evidence of economic voting. Among scholars based in Poland, Mirosława Grabowska (1993, 1997) and Tadeusz Szawiel (1999, see also Grabowska and Szawiel 2001) have pointed out the role of ideological (and specifically religious) factors as determinants of voting behaviour.

All in all, it is fair to say that voters' support for either of the two major political camps, the post-communist SLD and the post-Solidarity AWS (and their candidates in presidential races) was, throughout the 1990s, unrelated to their policy preferences regarding economic and social issues (unemployment, taxes, privatisation, etc.). Instead, it was determined by voters' general political and ideological identity, of which the best available indicator was one's religiosity. Economic considerations seemed to play some role only in the case of support for less popular parties, such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) or the Freedom Union (UW).

Yet, as Poland entered a period of economic disturbances in the late 1990s (high unemployment, slowdown in economic growth, crisis of public finances, etc.), these things could have changed. Considerations stemming from economic and social policy failures could have overridden those general political identities as the actual motivations of voting behaviour. Before we examine the role of economic and identity voting in 2000 and 2001 more closely, we need to look briefly at the actual election results.

The 2000 and 2001 Election Results

Thirteen candidates contested the 2000 presidential election. Among them were: Jarosław Kalinowski, the leader of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL); Marian Krzaklewski, the leader of both the trade union Solidarity and the Electoral Action Solidarity, an umbrella organization of several parties and groupings stemming from the Solidarity movement; Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the incumbent president, the leader of the post-Communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in the early 1990s and a junior minister in the Communist government in the late 1980s; Andrzej Olechowski, a former minister of finance (1991-92) and of foreign affairs (1993-95); and Lech Wałęsa, the former leader of Solidarity and President from 1990 to 1995. In addition, several candidates represented ideological fringes of Polish politics: populist (Andrzej Lepper), libertarian (Janusz Korwin-Mikke), fundamentalist Catholic (Jan Łopuszański), radical Socialist (Piotr Ikonowicz), and nationalistic (Dariusz Grabowski, Tadeusz Wilecki, Bogdan Pawłowski).

The election took place on Sunday, October 8, 2000. Of the 29,122,304 eligible voters, 17,789,231, or 61.1%, cast their ballots. The number of invalid ballots was 190,312, or 1.1%. The voting was conducted in a peaceful, even solemn atmosphere. No major irregularities were reported. The results of the vote are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Results of presidential election, October 8, 2000.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>No of Votes</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>
Aleksander Kwaśniewski	ind (SLD)	9,485,224	53.90
Andrzej Olechowski	ind	3,044,141	17.30
Marian Krzaklewski	AWS	2,739,621	15.57
Jarosław Kalinowski	PSL	1,047,949	5.95
Andrzej Lepper	Self-Defence	537,570	3.05
Janusz Korwin-Mikke	UPR	252,499	1.43
Lech Wałęsa	ChD III RP	178,590	1.01
Jan Łopuszański	ind (PP)	139,682	.79
Dariusz Grabowski	ind (KdP)	89,002	.51
Piotr Ikonowicz	PPS	38,672	.22
Tadeusz Wilecki	ind (SND)	28,805	.16
Bogdan Pawłowski	ind	17,164	.10

(Ind = independent; names of parties that endorsed a given independent candidate are indicated in parentheses. Party names' abbreviations: SLD = Democratic Left Alliance, AWS = Electoral Action Solidarity, PSL = Polish Peasant Party, UPR = Union of Real Politics, ChD III RP = Christian Democracy of the Third Republic, PP = Polish Alliance, KdP = Coalition for Poland, PPS = Polish Socialist Party, SND = National Democratic Party)

Kwaśniewski's outright victory in the first round was hardly surprising. His popularity rankings had been high throughout his entire term (1995-2000), and he consistently led by a large margin in pre-election opinion polls. The relatively strong showing by the runner-up, Andrzej Olechowski, a former minister in a couple of post-1989 governments, who ran as an independent and a self-described centrist, indicated the strength of moderate, middle-of-the-road attitudes among the electorate. Marian

Krzaklewski, the candidate who attempted to rally behind him all the post-Solidarity forces, was dealt a humiliating defeat, failing not only to force the run-off, but even to finish second. Yet for many observers the most devastating was the fate of Lech Wałęsa, the legendary ex-leader of Solidarity, who collected barely 1% of the vote, losing not only to the leaders of major parties, but also to such fringe candidates as Lepper or Korwin-Mikke.

The 2000 presidential election set up the stage for intense political and legal maneuvering before the 2001 general election. This maneuvering included amendments to the law on political parties (state budget was made the major source of party financing) that were introduced by the AWS to offset the fund-rising advantages of the SLD and the PSL and to hamper the development of new parties. Equally important were the amendments to the electoral law, first on such a scale since 1993. The amendments had become a necessity, to ensure the compatibility between the shape of electoral districts and the new administrative division of the country, which had been in effect since January 1, 1999. Yet the amendments went much further, abolishing the national list in the *Sejm* elections (and hence removing the assurance for top party leaders that they would win seats even if they performed poorly in their districts) and changing the mode of seat allocation from the D'Hondt formula (advantageous to the strongest parties) to the modified Sainte-Laguë formula that gives an edge to parties winning fewer votes. The obvious rationale of the right-of-center parliament in introducing this change was to minimize the gains of the SLD, which enjoyed a huge lead in pre-election polls. The thresholds for parties (5 per cent) and coalitions (8 per cent) were, however, left intact.

The election took place on Sunday, September 23, 2001. The number of eligible voters was 29,364,455, of which 13,591,681, or 46.3%, reported at the polls, and 13,559,412 actually cast their ballots. The number of invalid ballots was 541,483, or 4.0%. The results of the vote are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Results of parliamentary election, September 23, 2001.

<i>Party</i>	<i>No of Votes</i>	<i>% of Votes</i>	<i>No of seats</i>	<i>% of seats</i>
Democratic Left Alliance /Labor Union (SLD/UP)	5,342,519	41,0	216	47.0
Civic Platform (PO)	1,651,099	12,7	65	14.1
Self-Defence	1,327,624	10,2	53	11.5
Law and Justice (PiS)	1,236,787	9,5	44	9.6
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	1,168,659	8,9	42	9.1
League of Polish Families (LPR)	1,025,148	7,8	38	8.3

German Minority	47,230	0.4	2	0.4
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(below the threshold, 8% for coalitions, 5% for parties, national minorities exempt):

Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right (AWSP)	729,207	5.6		
Freedom Union (UW)	404,074	3.1		
Other	85,582	0.7		

The election resulted in a landslide victory of a left-wing coalition formed by the SLD and the UP. The coalition won 41 per cent of the votes, well ahead of the runner-up, the Civic Platform (PO), but still fell short of securing the outright majority of seats in the *Sejm*. To be able to form a majority government, the SLD/UP coalition expanded to include the PSL. The election dealt a humiliating defeat to both the AWS and the UW, as each party fell short of the thresholds set by electoral law. They evidently paid the price for their performance as incumbents, UW in a coalition with AWS (1997-2000), AWS additionally also for the period when it ruled alone (minority government, 2000-2001). Somewhat better fared three new parties, set up by dissenters from these two: the Civic Platform (PO), led by Andrzej Olechowski (the 2000 runner up) and the former leaders of liberal wings in their respective old parties, Donald Tusk (UW) and Maciej Płażyński (AWS); the Law and Justice (PiS) of the Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław; and a radical and populist-leaning League of Polish Families (LPR). Beyond the two major political camps, the most impressive were the gains of the Self-Defence, a radical populist organization led by another 2000 (and 1995) presidential hopeful, Andrzej Lepper. It outscored the Polish Peasant Party PSL, until this election the main spokesman for Polish farmers and arguably the only truly class-based party in Poland. Altogether, the election results seem to confirm the suspicion that the assessment of economic and social policies played significant (and certainly stronger than in the 1990s) role in shaping voters' preferences.

Indicators and Indices

Both surveys (PGSW 2000 and 2001), in addition to the standard background variables, included several indicators of economic and other considerations that might have influenced voters' choices. Specific indicators of economic voting have been selected to correspond to certain controversies in theories of voting behaviour, such as the role of egotropic (or pocketbook) versus sociotropic voting (see Markus 1988) or retrospective versus prospective voting (see Fiorina 1981). In addition to both the national and household economic situation, the respondents were asked to assess the political situation in the country. All indicators have been designed to reflect the assessment of a specific issue by the respondent on a five-point Likert scale (*very good—good—neither good nor bad—bad—very bad*; or *much better—better—neither better not*

worse—worse—much worse). The composition of the indicators and their mutual relationships illustrates Table 3.

Table 3. Indicators of voters' motivations

Assessment of the situation:	Changes within last year	Current	Expectations for the coming year
Political in the country	<i>Retrospective 'political' voting</i>	<i>'Present day' political' voting</i>	<i>Prospective 'political' voting</i>
National economy	<i>Retrospective sociotropic voting</i>	<i>'Present day' sociotropic voting</i>	<i>Prospective sociotropic voting</i>
Respondent's household	<i>Retrospective egotropic voting</i>	<i>'Present day' egotropic voting</i>	<i>Prospective egotropic voting</i>

The lack of space prevents us from presenting here the distribution of answers given by respondents in the two surveys to these questions, or the breakdown of these responses by voting preferences. In short, the outcome of such analyses can be summed up as follows:

1. The relationships between the assessments of the political or economic situation (in the country or in the household) and the voting preferences were somewhat stronger in 2001 than in 2000, yet in both cases these relationships were rather weak. In general, the worse the assessment, the higher the chance of voting for Kwaśniewski or SLD (and, in the case of egotropic voting, also for the Self-Defence and LPR).

2. There is a relatively strong relationship between the vote for Kwaśniewski and SLD and the positive expectations for the future. It should be noted, however, that, since the data come from post-election surveys, it is likely that the very fact of being a supporter of the winner in the election might have enhanced the expectations for the coming year (which reverses the relationship presumed in the hypothesis on the role of prospective voting).

3. The indicators of sociotropic voting seem to give somewhat better predictions than the indicators of egotropic voting.

4. The relationship between religiosity (measured by the frequency of participation in religious services) and voting preferences remains, for both 2000 and 2001, stronger than the relationship between any indicators of economic voting and the actual voting behaviour.

The character and strength of bi-variate relationships have been influenced by the high number of choices (about a dozen in the case of each election), and their asymmetry (landslide victories by Kwaśniewski and SLD). To overcome this methodological problem, the single indicators, presented in Table 3, have been subsequently converted into the following indices:

1. **Economic sociotropic voting:** the sum of the assessments regarding the current situation of the national economy, its changes over the past year, and expectations for the coming year.

2. **Economic egotropic voting:** the sum of the assessments regarding the current economic situation in the respondent's household, its changes over the past year, and expectations for the coming year.

3. **“Political” voting:** the sum of the assessments regarding the current political situation in the country, its changes over the past year, and expectations for the coming year.

The same indicators have been grouped differently, to create the following indices:

4. **Retrospective voting:** the sum of the assessments of the changes in the political situation in the country, the national economy, and the economic situation in the respondent's household that have occurred over the course of past year.

5. **“Present-day” voting:** the sum of the assessments of the current political situation in the country, the state of national economy, and the economic situation in the respondent's household.

6. **Prospective voting:** the sum of the assessments of the expected changes in the political situation in the country, the national economy, and the economic situation in the respondent's household in the coming year.

For all these indices the minimal value is 3, the maximal 15. In addition, the survey questionnaires included variables measuring:

1. The generalized assessment of the changes that have occurred in Poland since the fall of communism in 1989 (the respondent's views on how the current situation compares with that in pre-1989 days in three dimensions: political regime, national economy, and quality of life of respondent's family). On the basis of these variables, the index of the **regime change assessment** has been created (min. = 3, max. = 15).

2. The general assessment of the “four reforms.” The AWS/UW coalition government has launched a cluster of four major reforms of public administration and welfare state institutions (local government, education, health services, and pensions) in 1998-99. These reforms, while unquestionably necessary (and long delayed by the inaction of successive SLD/PSL governments in the 1993-1997 period), were, by and large, poorly prepared and implemented. The growing dissatisfaction of the public was reflected in the dwindling government's popularity ratings and in the view of many analysts has contributed to the outcome of both elections. These variables have become the basis of the **welfare state reforms assessment** index (min. = 0, max. = 16).

3. Finally, several measurements of **religiosity** have been introduced in the 2000 survey. They turned out to be very highly correlated to one another, and therefore highly interchangeable as indicators. In the following analyses a five-point scale measuring the frequency of participation in religious services (*seldom or never—a few times a year—monthly—weekly—more often than weekly*), included in both surveys, will be used as the indicator of religiosity.

The Analyses

We will begin the presentation of the research results with the tables giving the mean values (and standard deviations) of all eight indices introduced above.

Table 4. Mean values of eight indices by voting preferences in the 2000 presidential election

Candidate:		Krzaklewski	Kwaśniewski	Olechowski	other	<i>Eta</i>
Index:						
Economic sociotropic voting	mean	7.95	7.70	7.94	7.57	<i>0.077</i>
	SD	1.49	1.68	1.76	1.72	
Economic egotropic voting	mean	8.41	8.00	8.65	8.43	<i>0.127*</i>
	SD	2.02	2.13	2.23	1.73	
“Political” voting	mean	7.97	8.15	8.06	8.14	<i>0.038</i>
	SD	1.49	1.53	1.66	1.43	
Retrospective voting	mean	7.90	7.37	7.71	7.65	<i>0.113*</i>
	SD	1.67	1.79	1.66	1.75	
“Present-day” voting	mean	7.99	7.63	8.25	7.77	<i>0.124*</i>
	SD	1.70	2.02	1.75	1.94	
Prospective voting	mean	8.47	8.84	8.69	8.73	<i>0.080</i>
	SD	1.55	1.55	1.66	1.29	
Regime change assessment	mean	10.71	8.42	10.56	8.12	<i>0.319*</i>
	SD	2.99	3.17	2.78	3.38	
Welfare state reforms assessment	mean	6.57	5.60	6.50	6.27	<i>0.152*</i>
	SD	2.83	2.77	2.78	3.01	
<i>N</i> =		<i>96</i>	<i>450</i>	<i>137</i>	<i>77</i>	

*significant at $p \leq 0.05$

Table 5. Mean values of eight indices by voting preferences in the 2001 parliamentary election

Index:		party:	SLD /UP	Self-Defence	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR	other	<i>Eta</i>
Economic sociotropic voting	mean	6.92	6.80	7.06	7.34	7.27	7.15	7.29		<i>0.115*</i>
	SD	1.44	1.75	1.74	1.65	1.57	1.65	1.70		
Economic egotropic voting	mean	7.80	7.38	8.10	7.91	8.22	7.51	7.68		<i>0.132*</i>
	SD	1.71	1.87	1.91	1.91	1.84	1.76	1.94		
“Political” voting	mean	8.24	7.84	7.97	8.44	8.24	8.00	8.03		<i>0.104</i>
	SD	1.57	1.71	1.71	1.65	1.68	1.41	1.64		
Retrospective voting	mean	6.11	6.09	6.75	6.94	7.07	6.78	6.81		<i>0.205*</i>
	SD	1.80	2.09	2.03	2.07	2.04	1.94	1.87		
“Present-day” voting	mean	7.01	6.77	7.46	7.22	7.58	7.15	7.36		<i>0.143*</i>
	SD	1.68	1.85	1.76	1.68	1.73	1.59	1.78		
Prospective voting	mean	9.84	9.17	8.91	9.52	9.08	8.73	8.83		<i>0.241*</i>
	SD	1.73	1.88	1.42	1.80	1.71	1.85	1.64		
Regime change assessment	mean	7.67	7.02	9.03	7.77	10.49	9.06	8.87		<i>0.321*</i>
	SD	3.06	2.84	3.21	2.98	3.17	2.66	3.71		
Welfare state reforms assessment	mean	5.36	5.43	6.07	6.29	6.52	6.03	7.18		<i>0.200*</i>
	SD	2.82	3.01	3.20	3.07	3.22	2.49	3.24		
<i>N</i> =		428	112	93	86	126	67	94		

*significant at $p \leq 0.05$

The constituencies of particular candidates and parties do not differ much from one another in their assessment of the political situation or the state of the economy. The most profound differences can be found in the case of the generalized assessment of the regime change. In 2000, the supporters of Krzaklewski and Olechowski were here much more enthusiastic than the supporters of Kwaśniewski or other candidates. In 2001, the constituency of the SLD/UP coalition was significantly more critical than the constituencies of all post-Solidarity parties, although not as critical as the supporters of the Self-Defence. All in all, the last group appears the most critical, in particular on the economic issues (both national and pocketbook), which may confirm the popular interpretations of Self-Defence as the spokesman for the losers in the process transition away from Communism. Inversely, the relatively high level of satisfaction among the supporters of the Civic Platform seems to confirm its stereotype of the party representing the beneficiaries of the transition.

The bi-variate analyses summarized above demonstrated that one's social status and subjective perception of a household's economic situation (as well as changes in it attributed to the system transformation) are, as single variables, related to voting preferences. However, a much stronger relationship can be found between voting preferences and variables describing the voter's cultural and ideological identity, such as

self-placement on the left-right continuum and religiosity. To assess correctly the relative strength of economic and ideological variables, one must perform a multivariate analysis. Here we will use multivariate regression analysis. It allows, in short, to assess the net impact of a given independent variable on a given dependent variable, controlling for the influence of all other variables. Coefficients Beta cited in the subsequent tables measure the strength (and direction) of this impact: the higher the value of Beta, the stronger the impact (positive or negative) of a given independent variable on the dependent variable in question. Since nominal variables (such as voting preferences) cannot be used in linear regression analysis,⁴ a different set of dependent variables has been selected: ones measuring attitude of each respondent toward each candidate on an eleven-point scale, where 0 meant that the respondent dislikes and 10 that he likes a given candidate (a format used in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project). These variables correlate very well with the actual choice in the election.

Three multiple regression models of several tested will be presented here. In the first, the following independent variables have been used: respondent's sex (dummy variable, 1=male), age, education (years in school), place of residence (the size of the community, six categories from a village to a big city), income per capita in family, and religiosity (frequency of participation in religious practices). The * sign indicates that the relationship is not significant at the $p \leq 0,05$ level.

Table 6. Support for candidates in the 2000 presidential election – multiple regression analysis, model 1 (values of β coefficients)

Candidate: Variable:	Krzaklewski	Kwaśniewski	Olechowski
Sex	*	*	-0.076
Age	0.121	*	*
Income	*	*	0.085
Education	*	-0.095	0.106
Place of residence	*	-0.074	*
Religiosity	0.250	-0.279	*
$R^2 =$	<i>0.080</i>	<i>0.087</i>	<i>0.027</i>

⁴ Binary logistic analyses for the 2000 presidential election (included in a version of this paper presented at the 2001 APSA meetings in San Francisco) performed with the use of the actual voting choices led to conclusions identical with those outlined below.

Table 7. Support for candidates in the 2001 parliamentary election – multiple regression analysis, model 1 (values of β coefficients)

Party: Variable:	SLD /UP	AWSP	UW	Self- Defence	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
Sex	*	*	*	0.057	*	*	*	-0.068
Age	*	*	*	0.068	*	0.096	0.079	*
Income	*	*	*	-0.085	*	*	0.104	-0.079
Education	*	*	0.113	-0.217	-0.076	-0.064	0.057	-0.100
Place of residence	-0.078	*	*	-0.226	*	-0.282	*	*
Religiosity	-0.202	0.174	*	*	0.071	*	0.118	0.239
$R^2 =$	<i>0.043</i>	<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.012</i>	<i>0.178</i>	<i>0.010</i>	<i>0.104</i>	<i>0.030</i>	<i>0.093</i>

Multiple regression analysis does not indicate any significant changes in patterns of support for candidates between the 2000 presidential and 2001 parliamentary elections. Religiosity proved to be the best predictor for the candidates of two major parties that existed at the time of presidential election, the SLD (Kwaśniewski) and the AWS Krzaklewski); the same was true for the SLD and the AWS-successor parties (AWSP, LPR, PO, to a lesser extent also PiS) a year later. Structural variables influence the level of support for the PSL (place of residence), PO (relatively strong positive relationship with income, although still weaker than the one with religiosity), UW (education, positively), LPR (negative relationships with income and education) and in particular Self-Defence (negative relationships with education, urbanization, and income, positive one with age). This model explains 18% of variance ($R^2 = .178$) in support for Self-Defence (more than any other model tested here). There is no statistically significant relationship between support for Self-Defence and religiosity. This finding may indicate that, if the class voting appeared in 2001 in Poland at all, it did happen at the fringes of both political and economic continua: a radical peasant organization was able to attract the vote of those dissatisfied with the reforms, mostly poorly educated, older dwellers of rural areas and small towns.

Yet the objective features of one's economic and social status seldom, if ever, influence one's voting choices directly. Usually, one's subjective assessment of his situation, or the situation in the country, serves here as an intermediary variable. In relation to Poland, some analysts (Powers and Cox, 1997) observed that it was rather the assessment of political change than the actual economic situation of the household that determines the patterns of voting (in the 1993 general election). The following two multiple regression models include indices (introduced above) that reflect such assessments. In model two, these are indices defined by the time sequence (retrospective, "present-day," and prospective voting), supplemented by the indices assessing regime

change assessment and welfare state reforms, and the indicator of religiosity. In model three, there are indices of ego-tropic, socio-tropic, and “political” voting, supplemented by the same three additional variables. It should be noted that the time-sequence indices and the “-tropic” indices cannot be tested within the same model, because they have been created through different combination of the same nine elementary variables.

Table 8. Support for candidates in the 2000 presidential election – multiple regression analysis, model 2 (values of β coefficients)

Candidate: Variable:	Krzaklewski	Kwaśniewski	Olechowski
Retrospective voting	0.112	-0.094	*
“Present-day” voting	*	0.142	*
Prospective voting	-0.163	0.206	*
Regime change assessment	0.102	-0.282	0.188
Welfare state reforms assessment	0.135	-0.066	*
Religiosity	0.222	-0.222	*
R^2	<i>0.115</i>	<i>0.152</i>	<i>0.034</i>

Table 9. Support for candidates in the 2001 parliamentary election – multiple regression analysis, model 2 (values of β coefficients)

Party: Variable:	SLD /UP	AWSP	UW	Sekf- Defence	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
Retrospective voting	-0.079	0.133	0.096	*	*	*	0.113	0.100
“Present-day” voting	0.134	*	0.067	*	0.102	*	0.093	*
Prospective voting	0.223	-0.086	*	0.092	-0.059	0.134	-0.083	*
Regime change assessment	-0.208	0.101	0.079	-0.303	*	-0.164	0.192	*
Welfare state reforms assessment	-0.084	0.164	0.059	*	*	*	*	*
religiosity	-0.155	0.152	*	*	0.075	0.097	0.071	0.257
R^2	<i>0.134</i>	<i>0.119</i>	<i>0.047</i>	<i>0.094</i>	<i>0.016</i>	<i>0.047</i>	<i>0.103</i>	<i>0.079</i>

Table 10. Support for candidates in the 2000 presidential election – multiple regression analysis, model 3 (values of β coefficients)

Candidate: Variable:	Krzaklewski	Kwaśniewski	Olechowski
Economic sociotropic voting	*	*	*
Economic egotropic voting	-0.084	0.073	*
“Political” voting	*	0.161	*
Regime change assessment	0.133	-0.257	0.188
Welfare state reforms assessment	0.145	-0.077	*
Religiosity	0.237	-0.230	*
R^2	0.098	0.131	0.034

Table 11. Support for candidates in the 2001 parliamentary election – multiple regression analysis, model 3 (values of β coefficients)

Party: Variable:	SLD /UP	AWSP	UW	Self-Defence	PiS	PSL	PO	LPR
Economic sociotropic voting	*	0.127	0.097	0.069	0.065	0.063	0.119	0.133
Economic egotropic voting	0.120	-0.078	*	*	*	*	*	-0.089
“Political” voting	0.147	*	*	*	*	0.088	*	*
Regime change assessment	-0.233	0.140	0.112	-0.311	0.055	-0.186	0.234	*
Welfare state reforms assessment	-0.112	0.176	0.075	*	*	*	*	0.059
Religiosity	-0.170	0.163	*	*	0.081	0.086	0.084	0.256
R^2	0.106	0.113	0.040	0.090	0.014	0.045	0.088	0.088

The brief conclusions from these tables are as follows:

1. Voters' assessments of economic conditions play only a limited role as predictors of their support for political parties and candidates; this role is secondary to that of religiosity in almost all cases (exceptions: UW, Self-Defence, PO). Of the two indices of economic voting, socio-tropic voting is more relevant than ego-tropic voting (exceptions: Kwaśniewski and Krzaklewski in 2000 and SLD/UP in 2001).

2. Prospective voting shows stronger, by and large, relationships with patterns of support for parties and candidates than retrospective (as well as "present-day") voting. However, as indicated above, the fact that the data were collected immediately after the elections might have inflated positive expectations among the supporters of the winners, and negative ones among the supporters of the losers.

3. The indices discussed above have been created on the basis of the assessments of the situation in national politics and economy as well as in the respondent's household within a two-year span (changes over the course of last year, current situation, expectations for the coming year), which is a standard practice in research on voting behaviour. The two additional indices reached beyond this relatively narrow perspective: the welfare state reforms assessment index was aimed at the evaluation of specific institutional reforms (still fairly recent, introduced by the incumbent – on election day – government two to three years before the survey), while the regime change assessment index measured the evaluation of the total outcome of changes taking place since 1989 for the political system, national economy, and respondent's household. These two indices, in particular the latter one, turned out to be by and large better predictors of support for parties and candidates than all indices based on short-term assessments, and in some instances better even than religiosity. For the regime change, the relationship is particularly strong with the support for all three top candidates in the 2000 race (negative for Kwaśniewski, positive for the other two), and for SLD/UP, Self-Defence, PSL (all three negative), AWSP, UW, and PO (all three positive) in the 2001 election. The welfare state reform assessment shows a strong relationship with support for Kwaśniewski and SLD (negative), and Krzaklewski, AWSP, and UW (positive). The two former parties were, obviously, responsible for reforms as the members of the ruling coalition (as was Krzaklewski, as the leader of one of them). In general, it is fair to say that the general evaluation of the process of transition in its totality seems to be closely connected with the choices voters make at the polls.

4. This general evaluation is particularly strongly associated with the support for Self-Defence (to the point that it makes all other factors irrelevant). It confirms the previous observation of a strong link emerging between Self-Defence and the individuals and groups that see themselves as the losers in the process of economic and political transition.

Conclusions

The data presented here are congruent with conclusions drawn from the analyses of the 1997 parliamentary elections (Jasiewicz 1999a, 1999b): the primary axis of voter identification in Poland is not diagonal to, but virtually identical to one of the lines defining the political space. It reflects the cleavage between Catholic traditionalism, with a strong anti-Communist component, on the one hand, and cosmopolitan secularism, indifferent to Poland's Communist past on the other. In more general terms (see Kitschelt, 1992 and 1995), it can be described as the cleavage between authoritarian-particularist and libertarian-cosmopolitan politics. The other cleavage defining the political space (between political and market modes of resource allocation) plays only a secondary role (that is it is helpful in identifying support for less important actors).

Yet the economic and social changes that have been launched more than a decade ago and in all likelihood will continue in the future seem to create conditions conducive to class-based or economy-driven voting. This tendency, almost completely absent in all elections of the 1990 and hardly visible during the 2000 presidential race (which could have been due to the very nature of presidential elections in a system where president is in fact not accountable for the state of the economy), has surfaced as a significant factor during the September 2001 general election. Its major manifestation is evident in the support given to the Self-Defence by members of Poland's emergent underclass. There are also other parties that may be associated with specific classes or quasi-classes: the Polish Peasant Party represents farmers (although it should be noted that it lost election in rural areas to both SLD/UP and Self-Defence), the Civic Platform speaks for the emergent middle class (or urban professionals, to be more precise), while the Freedom Union, despite its elimination from the Sejm, has not ceased to be the voice of Polish traditional intelligentsia. Still, support for the most powerful actor on Polish political scene, the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance, is better defined in identity (religiosity) than in socio-economic terms. The same is true about several post-Solidarity parties: the Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right, Law and Justice, League of Polish Families, and, to a lesser extent, the Civic Platform.

Certain indications of economic voting have emerged during the European Union accession referendum in June 2003. They may come to the forefront in the forthcoming 2004 European Parliament elections, as well as in the parliamentary and presidential races due in the autumn of 2005. Thus far, however, when one wants to predict how a Pole will vote, one should ask him not "How thick is your pocketbook?" but "How often do you say your rosary?"

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