

Chapter 7

Turnout

In many established democracies, concern about eroding participation at the ballot box has been widely expressed, with commentators suggesting that we are seeing the ‘vanishing voter’, especially in America¹. Yet patterns of voting turnout in the United States are far from typical, and indeed always have been during the postwar era, and levels of electoral participation today vary dramatically among democracies. In the countries under comparison, on average more than 80% of the voting age population turned out in legislative elections held during the 1990s in Iceland, Israel, and Sweden, compared with less than half of the equivalent group in the United States and Switzerland (see Figure 7.1). The comparison shows that turnout cannot simply be explained by differences in the historical experiences of older and newer democracies, as the Czech Republic, Chile, and South Korea all rank in the top third of the comparison, while the US, Canada and Japan lag near the bottom. Worldwide there are even greater disparities, with over 90 percent of the voting age population (Vote/VAP) participating in legislative elections during the last decade in Malta, Uruguay and Indonesia compared with less than a third in Mali, Colombia, and Senegal. To explain these patterns, Part I considers accounts based on rational choice institutionalism and the cultural modernization theories. Part II examines the evidence and analyzes how far turnout varies by political institutions, by electoral laws, and by voting procedures, as well as by the social characteristics and cultural attitudes of voters, and by levels of societal modernization. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings for electoral engineering, including how far attempts to boost voting participation through electoral reform and civic education can hope to succeed.

[Figure 7.1 about here]

Rational-choice and cultural modernization theories of voting participation

Comparative research has long sought to understand the reasons for voting participation and the explanations for cross-national differences in turnout². As in previous chapters, debate surrounds about how far this process is affected by the strategic incentives derived from electoral rules and by the cultural habits arising from the socialization process and societal modernization.

The Costs and Benefits of Participation

Attempts at constitutional engineering are based on the premise that the electoral design can shape the behavior of parties, candidates, and citizens. Rational-choice accounts emphasize that taken-for-granted institutions, rules and regulation are not neutral in outcome; instead they set the context through facilitating participation for some actors while discouraging or restricting others. Three types of factors are believed to be important. (i) Political institutions set the broadest context, most distant from the specific act of casting a ballot, including arrangements such as the type of electoral system, whether the executive is presidential or parliamentary, and the type of party system. (ii) The legal system determines more specific features of electoral regulations, exemplified by the use of compulsory voting laws and the age qualifications for suffrage. Lastly (iii) electoral administrative procedures are most proximate to the act of voting, such as registration processes, the distribution of polling stations, and the facilities for voting. These factors could shape the behavior of political actors *indirectly*; in majoritarian electoral systems, for example, minor parties could decide to focus their effort and resources in their strongest target seats, rather than campaigning across the country. In countries with compulsory voting laws, parties may invest less effort in get-out-the-vote drives. These factors could also influence citizens *directly*, through shaping the costs and benefits of voting.

Many comparative studies have emphasized the importance of the institutional and legal arrangements for electoral activism, suggesting that rules do matter. Hence Powell established that turnout in established democracies was boosted by the use of compulsory voting laws, by automatic registration procedures and by the strength of party-group alignments, while it was depressed in one-party predominant systems allowing no rotation of the parties in government³. Jackman and Miller confirmed that political institutions and electoral laws provided the most plausible explanation for variations in voter turnout, including levels of electoral proportionality, multi-partyism, and the use of compulsory voting⁴. Blais and Dobrynska analyzed vote as a proportion of the registered electorate in parliamentary elections in 91 democracies from 1972-1995 and concluded that turnout was influenced by

the use of compulsory voting, the age at which citizens became eligible to vote, the type of electoral system, the closeness of the electoral outcome, and the number of parties, as well as by levels of socioeconomic development and the size of the country⁵. Franklin analyzed postwar elections in 22 established democracies and argued that an important part of the reason for any decline in turnout during the last decade concerned changes in the institutional context, such as the abandonment of compulsory voting laws and the lowering of the age of qualifying for the franchise, yet the impact of any such changes was lagged rather than immediate, as there was a cohort effect upon new generations entering the electorate⁶. In the United States, as well, turnout is believed to be depressed by the hurdle of registration requirements where the onus lies with the applicant, generating attempts at partial reforms like the 'Motor Voter' initiative⁷. Yet even if 'institutions matter' it remains unclear *why* they matter, whether because they reinforce and reflect long-term cultural habits and taken-for-granted traditions within each society, or because they alter the rational calculus when voters decide whether to participate. Moreover the link between the broader cultural context, and how voters perceive and weigh the costs, choices, and decisiveness of elections, is only poorly understood.

Cultural modernization, civic skills and motivational attitudes

Theories of cultural modernization advanced by Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton, discussed in the introduction to the book, suggest that common social trends, including rising affluence, the growth of the service sector, and expanded educational opportunities, have swept through postindustrial societies, contributing towards a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies⁸. This process is believed to have increased demands for more active public participation in the policymaking process through direct action, new social movements, and protest groups, as well as weakening deferential loyalties, support for traditional organizations such as churches, parties and unions, and also eroding conventional participation via the ballot box⁹. Growing levels of human capital are regarded as critical to this process, since education, and the cognitive skills that it provides, is one of the factors that most strongly predicts political activism¹⁰. If this process is indeed critical, as theorists suggest, then we would expect to find different patterns of electoral participation in industrial and in postindustrial societies.

Rather than consciously calculating the potential rewards and benefits of voting, cultural accounts emphasize that the propensity to participate or abstain is a 'habit of the heart' acquired early in life and reinforced through experience of successive elections, along with other closely related civic attitudes and values such as partisan attachments and political trust. In this view some people will turn out to vote through rain or shine, because they are interested in public affairs, they believe it is their civic duty to vote, they want to express support for a particular party, or they want to express disapproval of the incumbent's performance, irrespective of whether they believe that the vote 'matters' by influencing which particular candidate or party gets elected. Indeed since one vote will not determine the outcome, as Downs argued, if voters are calculating the strategic benefits of casting a ballot for maximizing their interests, the well-known 'paradox' of elections is why anyone votes at all¹¹. Cultural theories stress that habits of civic engagement takes many years to become engrained over successive elections, so that attempts to boost turnout by administrative fixes and legal modifications, such as the simplification of registration procedures through the Motor Voter Act in the United States, the introduction of all-postal ballots in Oregon, or the use of Internet voting in Geneva, are misguided and impractical. Cultural theories suggest that while institutional reforms are unlikely to achieve their goals in the short-term, in the longer term they may have a more glacial impact, if younger generations gradually start to participate at higher levels by using the new opportunities, and the process of demographic replacement eventually transforms the composition of the electorate. This process is clearly exemplified by the expansion of the franchise to women, since it took many decades after the franchise was granted before they achieved parity with men at the ballot box, before eventually overtaking them¹². Moreover if the early socialization process stamps the younger generation with participatory habits, then it follows that civic education is one of the most important mechanisms available for encouraging political engagement, by influencing what children learn about democracy and citizenship in schools while habits remain plastic and fluid¹³.

Ever since Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* (1963), a long series of studies have stressed that political participation requires the motivational attitudes to become active in public affairs, as well as possession of the resources that facilitate civic engagement¹⁴. This perspective suggests that psychological orientations towards the political system and participatory habits are learnt at an early age

from parents, teachers, colleagues, and neighbors, when people are open to change. Among these civic attitudes, Almond and Verba emphasized three elements. *Cognitive* orientations include knowledge and beliefs about the nation-state, political leaders, and major policy issues, as well as an awareness of citizen's rights. *Affective* orientations towards the political system include the belief that citizens are competent and capable of influencing the democratic process (termed 'internal political efficacy' or 'subjective competence'), the sense that government is responsive to public needs and demands ('external political efficacy'), and interest in politics and public affairs. *Evaluative* orientations concern judgments about the political process, such as the fairness of elections or the performance of government¹⁵. Lack of trust and confidence in government has also been regarded as depressing activism, since the rising tide of political cynicism in the United States occurred during roughly the same period as the fall in turnout, although others have argued that dissatisfaction may have the reverse effect by stimulating involvement¹⁶. For Almond and Verba, the civic culture works most effectively where the predominant psychological orientations are congruent with the political system.

Resources are also regarded as important, since time, money, and civic skills, derived from family, occupation, and associational membership, make it easier for individuals who are predisposed to take part to do so. Since resources are unevenly distributed throughout societies this helps to explain the disparities in participation related to gender, race/ethnicity, age, and social class. Education, in particular, is one of the best predictors of many types of civic engagement, furnishing cognitive skills and civic awareness that allows citizens to make sense of the political world and increasing feelings of subjective competence¹⁷. People of higher socioeconomic status – in terms of education, income and occupation – are commonly far more active in politics. The most thorough study of generational trends in the United States, by Miller and Shanks, emphasized that a long-term secular trend generated turnout decline, with the post-New Deal generation consistently less likely to vote than their fathers or grandfathers. This phenomenon was not a product of lifecycle, or aging, they suggest, but rather represents an enduring shift among the generation who first came to political consciousness during the turbulent politics of the 1960s. The long-term slide in American turnout, they conclude, is due to the process of generational replacement, not to a fall in the propensity of the older generations to turnout. *"It was the gradual replacement of the habitual voters of the pre-New Deal generations with the non-voting post-New Deal cohorts that produced the thirty-year national decline in aggregate voter turnout from the early 1960s to the late 1980s."*¹⁸ More recently, Robert Putnam has presented a formidable battery of evidence illustrating lower levels of civic engagement among the post-war generation, including electoral participation¹⁹. In a comparative study, Franklin also emphasizes the role of generational cohorts in 'dampening' the effects of any institutional reforms²⁰. If *culture* were important, then we would expect to see considerable variations in voting participation evident at individual-level associated with patterns of education, age, and socioeconomic status, as well as a strong relationship between turnout and motivational attitudes such as political efficacy and partisan identification. If cultural *modernization* is important, then we would also expect that patterns of turnout would vary systematically with levels of human development in different societies, as greater human capital (education and cognitive skills) would contribute towards rising levels of citizen activism.

Analyzing Turnout

Multivariate models help us to evaluate the evidence for these accounts. If voters respond to electoral rules, then levels of turnout should vary systematically under different institutional arrangements. If societal modernization affects the civic culture, then national levels of human development, as well as individual civic resources and attitudes, should predict turnout. To test the evidence for these propositions, binary logistic regression analysis is used where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting or not in the legislative elections in the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset. As with other surveys, levels of reported turnout were nearly always slightly higher in each country than the official estimate of either the votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population (Vote/VAP) or as a proportion of the registered electorate (Vote/Reg). Model A in Table 7.1 first entered levels of human development, then adds the main political institutions commonly thought to influence electoral participation, for reasons discussed fully later. These include whether the electoral system is majoritarian, combined or proportional; the average population size of electoral districts; the frequency of national elections; the use of any compulsory voting regulations; whether the political system has a

presidential or parliamentary executive; patterns of party competition (measured by the percentage vote for the party in first place); and the type of party system (measured by ENPP). After including these factors, the model explains 7% of the overall level of variance in turnout (measured by the Nagelkerke R^2). Model B then enters the social and cultural factors at individual level, including the standard factors of age, gender, education, income, union membership and religiosity used in earlier chapters, as well as partisan identification and external political efficacy, explaining in total 20% of the variance in turnout. This suggests that Model B improves the goodness-of-fit, although many other factors not included in this limited analysis also influence political participation, including the role of mobilizing agencies such as parties, social networks, and the news media²¹.

Overall the models suggest that both the institutional context and the cultural factors contribute about equally towards explaining voting turnout. In the countries under comparison, all other things being equal, among the *political institutions* that matter, voting participation is likely to be maximized in elections using proportional representation, with small electoral districts, regular but relatively infrequent national contests, competitive party systems, and in presidential contests. But even controlling for the institutional context, there are significant inequalities in electoral participation related to human development, socioeconomic resources, and cultural attitudes. The formal rules help to determine overall levels of turnout from one country to another, but even so within each society citizens who are more educated, affluent, and motivated remain more likely to participate than others, and activism is higher in postindustrial nations. Let us examine the meaning and interpretation of these results in more detail.

[Table 7.1 about here]

Cultural modernization

Theories of cultural modernization advanced by Ronald Inglehart and Russell Dalton, discussed in the introduction to the book, suggest that common social trends, including rising affluence, the growth of the service sector, and expanded educational opportunities, have swept through postindustrial societies, contributing towards a new style of citizen politics in Western democracies²². This process is believed to have increased demands for more active public participation in the policymaking process through direct action, new social movements, and protest groups, as well as weakening deferential loyalties, support for traditional organizations such as churches, parties and unions, and also eroding conventional participation via the ballot box²³. Growing levels of human capital are regarded as critical to this process, since education, and the cognitive skills that it provides, is one of the factors that most strongly predicts political activism²⁴. The comparison of turnout (Vote/VAP) in legislative elections worldwide during the 1990s confirm these predictions, as shown in Figure 7.2; overall 74% of the voting age population cast a ballot in industrial societies, compared with 80% in postindustrial societies. The multivariate model in Table 7.1, using the CSES dataset, confirms that human development is significantly related to higher voting participation. As argued elsewhere, societal modernization does indeed matter, with the main effects of education occurring in the initial stages of the expansion of schooling and literacy in the shift from agrarian to industrial society, and the effects leveling off and thereby proving curvilinear at later stages of societal development²⁵. That is to say, it is basic schooling and literacy which makes the fundamental difference for patterns of turnout, a relatively undemanding act but one that does require some basic familiarity with the major parties and where these can be placed across the political spectrum, as well as some understanding of the electoral process. Basic education facilitates comprehension of political coverage in the news media, particularly newspapers. Further participation in colleges and university-level education makes a difference for more demanding forms of civic engagement, such as protest politics, but the spread of access to further education in a society does not in itself add incrementally to higher electoral turnout. Given the strong interrelationship between levels of economic and democratic development in the 32 nations in the CSES dataset, not surprisingly similar patterns are evident in Figure 7.2, when turnout is compared in older and newer democracies.

[Figure 7.2 about here]

The Impact of Political Institutions

Electoral Systems

Previous studies have commonly found that the type of electoral formula shapes participation, with proportional representation generating higher turnout than majoritarian systems²⁶. This pattern

seems well supported by the evidence: Table 7.1 shows that, even after controlling for levels of human development, the basic type of electoral system remains a significant indicator of turnout. Legislative elections held during the 1990s in the CSES countries under comparison generated 75% turnout (Vote/VAP) under PR systems, 10% higher than in those elections contested in majoritarian systems, and a similar pattern was confirmed in a broader comparison of all 164 nations holding competitive elections worldwide during the 1990s. Since the type of electoral system is a categorical rather than a continuous variable, Table 7.2 provides further details about the impact of different electoral systems on worldwide levels of voter turnout in the 1990s, measured in the standard way by vote as a proportion of the voter age population (Vote/VAP) and, for comparison with some previous studies, by vote as a proportion of the registered electorate (Vote/Reg). The results without any controls confirm that average turnout (using either measure) was highest among nations using proportional representation, namely party list and the Single Transferable Vote electoral systems. In contrast voting participation was fairly similar among the different types of majoritarian and combined systems, with turnout across all these systems about 7.5 to 11 points less than under PR. The results indicate that the basic type of electoral system does indeed shape the incentive to participate, with the key distinction between PR systems and all others. The exact reasons for this relationship remain unclear²⁷, but incentive-based explanations focus on the differential rewards facing citizens under alternative electoral arrangements. Under majoritarian systems, supporters of minor and fringe parties with geographic support dispersed widely but thinly across the country, like the Greens, may feel that casting their votes will make no difference to who wins in their constituency, still less to the overall composition of government and the policy agenda. The 'wasted votes' argument is strongest in safe seats where the incumbent party is unlikely to be defeated. In contrast PR elections with low vote thresholds and large district magnitudes, such as the party list system used in the Netherlands, increase the opportunities for minor parties with dispersed support to enter parliament with only a modest share of the vote, and therefore this could increase the incentives for their supporters to participate.

Electoral Districts

Many other aspects of the electoral system could shape voter participation, such as the ballot structure, the use of open or closed party lists, and levels of proportionality, but district magnitude, and in particular the population size of the average electoral district, can be expected to be especially important, since this may determine the linkages between voters and their representatives. Observers have long noted a relationship between the size of a country and democracy, although the reasons for this association remain unclear²⁸. It is possible that the smaller the number of electors per member of parliament, the greater the potential for constituency service and for elected representatives to maintain communications with local constituents, and therefore the higher the incentive to turnout based on any 'personal' vote²⁹. Voters may not be able to shape the outcome for government, but in smaller single-member or multi-member districts, as we shall examine in later chapters, they may have greater information, familiarity and contact with their elected representative or representatives, and therefore they may be more interested in affecting who gets into parliament³⁰. The simplest way to measure district size is to divide the number of seats in the lower house of the legislature into the total population in each country. There are considerable cross-national variations in the average number of electors per representative depending upon the size of the population and the number of seats in parliament, ranging from India with 1.7 million electors per member of the Lok Sabha down to about 5500 per MP in the Bahamas, Malta and Cape Verde. The results in Table 7.1 confirm that indeed the size of electoral districts proved a significant predictor of turnout, in a negative direction, with smaller districts generally associated with higher voter participation.

Presidential v. Parliamentary Executives

Another factor commonly believed to influence the incentives to turnout concerns the power and level of the office and, in particular, whether there is a parliamentary or presidential (or directly elected) executive. *First-order elections* are the most important national contests, including legislative elections in countries with parliamentary systems of government and presidential contests in countries with strong presidencies. In contrast *second-order* elections are all others, including state, provincial or local contests, referenda and initiatives, and direct elections to the European Parliament among the 15-member EU states³¹. In parliamentary systems, the head of government - such as the prime minister, premier, or chancellor - is selected by the legislature and can be dismissed by a legislative vote of no confidence. In presidential systems (in the case of Israel, direct elections for the Prime Minister) the head of government is popularly elected for a fixed term and is not dependent upon the legislature³². Rational

choice theory suggests that the incentive to vote is likely to be greatest with the most salient elections determining the composition of government. In countries with presidential systems of government where elections for the president and legislature are held on separate occasions, like the mid-term elections in the United States, more people are likely to participate in executive rather than in legislative contests. Where Presidential and parliamentary elections are held on the same date then there is likely to be no substantial difference in levels of turnout in both types of contest. The result of the analysis presented in Table 7.1 confirms that overall turnout was significantly higher in legislative contests with parliamentary executives than in countries with presidential executives, where these become second order contests. In the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset, turnout was 85% in executive-only elections, 83% in election combining legislative and executive office, and 74% in legislative-only contests.

Frequency of Contests

The frequency of elections has also been thought to be important for participation, because this increases the costs facing electors and may produce voting fatigue. Franklin et al. have demonstrated that the closeness of national elections immediately before direct elections to the European parliament is a strong predictor of turnout in European elections³³. The cases of Switzerland and the United States are commonly cited as exemplifying nations with frequent elections for office at multiple levels, as well as widespread use of referenda and initiatives, and both are characterized by exceptionally low voter participation among Western democracies³⁴. California, for example, has primary and general elections for local and state government, including for judicial, Mayoral and Gubernatorial offices, Congressional midterm elections every two years for the House and Senate, Presidential elections every 4 years, as well as multiple referenda issues on the ballot all producing what Anthony King has termed the 'never-ending election campaign'³⁵. If the frequency of elections generates voter fatigue, the increase in contests associated with the growth of primaries in the United States after 1968, the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and contests for regional bodies following devolution and decentralization in countries like Spain, France and the UK, could help to explain any decline in turnout in recent decades. A simple measure of electoral frequency can be calculated by the number of national-level parliamentary and presidential elections held during the decade of the 1990s, ranging from only one contest in a few semi-democracies up to seven or more elections in the United States and Taiwan. It should be noted that this measure provides the most consistent and reliable cross-national indicator that is available although it is likely to represent a conservative estimate, since it does not count many other types of contest held during this decade including national or local referenda and initiatives, pre-nomination primaries, nor European, regional/state and local contests. The results in Table 7.1 confirm that the frequency of national elections was strong and significant, in a negative direction: the more often national elections are held, the greater the voter fatigue. This result is likely to provide important clues to some of the sharpest outliers in turnout in the elections under comparison, such as Switzerland and the United States, both among the richest and most developed countries on earth yet characterized by relatively low (and falling) levels of voter participation.

Political Parties

As we have seen in Chapter 4, the type of party system and patterns of electoral competition are closely related to the basic type of electoral system, although there is not a perfect one-to-one fit. Ever since Duverger, it is well known that the plurality method of elections favors two-party systems, by systematically over-representing the largest party when translating votes into seats³⁶. We have already demonstrated that as disproportionality rises, so the effective number of parliamentary parties falls³⁷. The analysis in chapter 4 showed that the majoritarian elections under comparison were contested by 5.2 parliamentary parties on average, compared with almost twice as many parties (9.5) in proportional systems. In Israel, for example, the May 1999 elections to the 120-member Knesset returned seventeen parties, and no single party won more than 14% of the popular vote. In the Ukraine, thirty parties and party blocks contested the 1998 parliamentary elections and as a result 8 parties were elected via party lists and 17 won seats via the single member districts, along with 116 Independents³⁸. By contrast, in the 1996 US mid-term elections, while some minor party challengers like the Greens contested a few districts, only one independent was returned to the House of Representatives. In the 2000 parliamentary elections in South Korea, the two major parties (the Grand National Party and the Millennium Democratic Party), and the minor United Liberal Democrats, swept up all seats. Yet there are a number of important exceptions to this rule, with plural societies such as Papua New Guinea and India characterized by

multiple parties in majoritarian electoral systems, as well as Malta and Austria with two-party and two-and-a-half party systems despite PR elections. Beyond the electoral formula, the electoral fortunes of smaller parties can all be shaped by the existence of social cleavages in plural societies, the geographic distribution of heterogeneous populations, the use of high voting thresholds, and the geographical drawing of constituency boundaries³⁹.

The party system can therefore be expected to influence voter turnout, but there is little agreement in the literature about the exact nature of this relationship, and there is a complex interaction between electoral choice and electoral competition. Some suggest that the greater the range of alternative parties listed on the ballot, stretching from the nationalist far right through the moderate center to the post-Communist left, the more people are stimulated to vote⁴⁰. This claim assumes that wider electoral choices across the ideological spectrum means that all sectors of public opinion and all social groups are more likely to find a party to represent their views, preferences and interests. Yet the counter argument is also heard from those who suggest that the higher the level of party fragmentation, the greater the probability of coalition government, the less the share of votes cast determines the formation of government, and therefore the lower the inducement for electors to turnout⁴¹. As Jackman has argued, voters in multiparty systems that produce coalitions do not directly choose the government that will govern them, instead they vote for the parties in the legislature that will select the government that will determine the policy agenda. Under multiparty coalitions voters appear to be offered a more decisive choice among policies, whereas in fact they are offered a less decisive one⁴². The range of parties contesting an election is related to levels of electoral competition. Where the outcome is anticipated to be close, this seems likely to increase the incentive to participate, while parties have greater inducements to get out the vote. To measure the party system we will use the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP), a measure discussed in chapter 4, as a summary indicator of the range of electoral choice. Table 7.1 confirms that in the countries under comparison the ENPP was significantly related to voting turnout, with more parties maximizing the range of choices on the ballot paper. Nevertheless the 32 CSES nations only included a limited range of party systems, as shown in Figure 4.1, ranging from the two-party system of the US congress (with an ENPP of 1.99) through to the fragmented multipartyism of Belgium (with an ENPP of 9.05). Elsewhere in the world there are wider variations in party competition, including one-party systems where opposition movements are suppressed (such as Uganda, Zimbabwe or Singapore) and even more extreme fragmentation. Examination of the full range of 876 parliamentary elections held worldwide from 1945-2000, explored elsewhere, reveals that the relationship between turnout and party competition is actually curvilinear: voting participation is depressed both by extreme fragmentation (where the leading party wins less than 30% of the vote) and (even more) by one-party predominance (where the leading party gains more than 60% of the vote)⁴³. In both cases, the party systems hinder the ability of citizens to generate a decisive result if their vote is an attempt to 'throw the rascals out' and achieve turnover of the governing party or parties.

Although it might be thought that voters would be more easily mobilized by the more extreme parties across the ideological spectrum, Figure 7.3 shows that although there were some variations by the type of party family, the differences were fairly modest. Overall turnout was slightly lower for the moderate liberal parties, but elsewhere across the political spectrum turnout was fairly evenly spread among parties of the left and right. Clearly many other factors beyond the ideological position of parties may be at work here, including the party's organizational strength and ability to mobilize and turnout their supporters, as well as their chances of electoral success. Even if partisanship is stronger among supporters of the far-left and far-right parties, as already shown in Figure 6.5, this does not necessarily mean that their supporters will necessarily be more active as the 'wasted vote' calculation becomes relevant, where minor parties on the extreme left and right stand less chance of being returned to office. If we compare the age at which parties were founded, there is a modest (4-point) gap between older parties (founded more than twenty years ago) and younger parties, but this is far less than might be expected.

[Figure 7.3 about here]

Electoral Laws

Compulsory Voting

The use of compulsory or mandatory voting laws can be expected to have an obvious impact on turnout, although the strength of the effect depends upon how strictly such regulations and any associated sanctions are implemented and enforced⁴⁴. In practice legal rules for voting may be de jure or de facto. The most common legal basis is statutory law although the obligation to vote may also be rooted in constitutional provisions⁴⁵. Implementation ranges from minimal de facto enforcement to the imposition of various sanctions. Fines are most common, as in Brazil, Egypt and Luxembourg, although other punishments include the denial of official documents like passports, identity cards, drivers license or government benefits, used in Italy and Greece, but even occasionally the threat of imprisonment (up to six months in Cyprus) as a criminal offence. The effectiveness of any legal penalties is dependent upon the efficiency of the prior registration process and, where the initiative falls upon the elector, whether there are fines or other penalties associated with failure to register. Where implementation is loosely enforced, then the impact of any mandatory regulations has to operate largely through the impact of the law on social norms, similar to the effect of no-parking restrictions on city streets. Mandatory voting regulations may be genuine attempts to increase widespread public involvement in the political process, or they may be employed by less democratic regimes to compel the public to vote, in the attempt to legitimize one-party contests. Even in democratic states the use of legal regulations may have unintended consequences for participation, since it may reduce the incentive for parties to organize and mobilize their heartland supporters to get them to the polls⁴⁶. Worldwide, twenty-three countries currently use compulsory voting in national parliamentary elections, including seven older democracies such as Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy. In addition this practice is also used for national elections in a few provinces in Austria and in Switzerland, and until 1970 the Netherlands also used such regulations. Voting is also mandatory in many Latin American countries at different levels of democratization, as well as being used by non-democratic regimes in Singapore and Egypt⁴⁷.

[Table 7.3 about here]

Most previous studies have found that compulsory voting is associated with higher turnout, but these have been limited mainly to established democracies, most of which are in Western Europe. Table 7.1 demonstrates that in national elections held worldwide, the use of compulsory voting was related to turnout. To explore this further, Table 7.3 shows the levels of turnout in the 1990s found in all 23 countries worldwide with compulsory voting regulations, broken down by type of democracy. The results show that in older democracies there is indeed a positive relationship; levels of vote as a proportion of the voting age population are 7.7% higher in nations using mandatory voting laws, and are a remarkable 14.2% higher in terms of vote as a proportion of the registered electorate. Where these laws exist in established democracies in Western Europe, Asia-Pacific and South America, then the registered electorate, the group that is most obviously subject to any sanctions, is far more likely to cast a ballot. Yet in all other types of political system the result is very different, with vote/VAP actually slightly lower among newer democracies and semi-democracies with mandatory laws, and far lower in Egypt and Singapore, the only two non-democratic states with mandatory regulations and at least semi-competitive elections.

There may be a number of explanations for this intriguing finding. First, the law may be enforced more strictly, and the registration processes may be more efficient, in the older democracies, so that voters face stronger negative incentives to participate. In addition, it may be that the impact of mandatory laws depends primarily upon broader social norms about the desirability of obeying the law and those in authority, which may prove stronger in established democratic states in Western Europe than in many Latin American cultures. Lastly, newer democracies characterized by low electoral turnout may be more likely to introduce laws in the attempt to mobilize the public, but that without strict implementation these laws prove ineffective correctives. Some evidence to evaluate these propositions is available in the CSES dataset where it is apparent that in countries where compulsory voting is strictly enforced then 95% of the public voted (see Figure 7.2). In countries where the laws on compulsory voting were without any sanction, however, turnout was no greater than in nations without any such laws. This pattern helps to account for some of the striking differences in the impact of compulsory voting laws in different types of political system, and suggest the need for caution in generalizing from how these laws work across nations.

Eligibility for the Franchise

The restrictions to the minimum age at which people qualify to vote is important since in most West European countries for which we have survey data, the young are consistently less likely to vote than older groups, and similar patterns are well-established in the United States⁴⁸. *Ceteris paribus*, we would find that the lower the ages at which citizens are eligible to vote, the lower the turnout. Blais and Dobrzynska confirmed that, all other things being equal, turnout is reduced by almost two points when the voting age is lowered by one year⁴⁹. Latin American states were the first to lower the age of the franchise from twenty-one to eighteen, beginning in the nineteenth century, and it was only in the 1970s that the United States and west European countries followed suit⁵⁰. Today the age of the franchise is usually in the region of eighteen to twenty years old. Studies demonstrate that the age of voting eligibility is now unrelated to cross-national variations in turnout, probably because most democracies have now standardized to within a relatively similar age range⁵¹.

Restrictions on the franchise vary from one country to another, such as the disenfranchisement of felons, bankrupts, resident aliens, and groups like the mentally incapacitated⁵². Waves of immigration or increases in the prison population can have an important dampening effect on vote/VAP. In the United States the claim of steadily declining turnout since 1972 has been challenged as an artificial product of the rise in the number of ineligible voters (due to increased numbers of resident aliens and felons in prison or on probation), swelling the size of the voting age population⁵³. The enfranchisement of women has had a dramatic impact on electoral participation. Only four countries enfranchised women before the start of World War I: New Zealand in 1893, Australia in 1902, Finland in 1907 and Norway in 1913. Women had attained the suffrage by the end of World War II in 83 nations, and in 171 nations in total by 1970. In another twenty nations this occurred even later, for example in 1971 in Switzerland, 1976 in Portugal, 1980 in Iraq, 1984 in Liechtenstein, 1994 in Kazakhstan, and today women continue to be barred from voting in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates⁵⁴. The first election when women were initially enfranchised has usually seen a sudden drop in overall levels of Vote/VAP, as older generations of women who had never participated before suddenly become eligible to vote, followed by a slow recovery in rates of turnout. In the United States and Britain, for example, women were first enfranchised in the early 1920s, and the first election afterwards saw an immediate sharp drop in overall turnout. Subsequent decades saw a slow and steady increase in levels of female turnout until the early 1980s, when women come to participate at similar, or even slightly higher, levels than men. Similar patterns have been found elsewhere⁵⁵. The residual effect of this pattern is found more widely; countries that enfranchised women prior to 1945 had average turnout (vote/VAP) of 69% in the 1990s, compared with 61% for countries that granted women the vote in the post-war era. Nor is this simply due to a close association between women's rights and overall levels of democracy. Studies have found this difference to be strong and significant; even after controlling for general levels of political rights and civil liberties, countries that enfranchised women earlier tend to have higher turnout today than those that reformed in more recent decades⁵⁶.

Electoral Administration

Turnout may also be affected by the administration of registration procedures and facilities for voting that alter the costs for certain groups, such as the use of absentee, advance, overseas, and postal ballots, proxy votes, the distribution of mobile polling facilities for special populations like the elderly, infirm or disabled in nursing homes and hospitals, and polling scheduled for weekend or holidays rather than workdays⁵⁷. The Bush-Gore debacle in Florida vividly illustrated the importance of seemingly minor and routine practices such as the design and layout of the ballot paper, the security checks used for verifying registration lists, and the type of counting mechanism⁵⁸. Reformers often focus on administrative procedures, on the grounds that lowering the barriers and simplifying the procedures for registration and voting, while maintaining the integrity of the electoral process, will boost participation. This process is exemplified through special electoral arrangements for mobile populations, such as facilitating the casting of postal, proxy, absentee, or overseas votes, as well as providing polling facilities for the elderly and disabled in nursing homes and hospitals, locating polling stations in areas like shopping centers and supermarkets, and holding elections with lengthy hours on a non-workday. Registration procedures are often thought to be another important hurdle if citizens have to apply to register, often well ahead of the election, and complicated, time-consuming, or restrictive practices depress participation⁵⁹. Registration is

by application in the United States, France and Brazil, whereas in many other countries eligible citizens are automatically enrolled to vote and registration is the responsibility of the government, conducted via a door-to-door canvas, an annual household census, or a rolling register. Under other regimes, voters can be deterred by far more serious barriers, such as in Belarus, where citizens faced the threat of intimidation at polling places. Incentive-based theories commonly assume that reducing the hurdles to registration and casting a ballot will boost participation. Yet if broader features of the political system remain unchanged, such as the range of parties contesting elected office, then tinkering with administrative procedures may produce minimal change.

Registration Processes

The facilities for registration and casting a ballot are commonly expected to affect turnout. The evidence that the registration process matters is most persuasive in comparisons of regulations that vary from state to state within the United States. Rosenstone and Wolfinger examined the difference in turnout between those states with the easiest registration requirements, for example those like North Dakota that allow registration at polling places on election day, and those with the strictest requirements. Their estimates suggest that if all American states had same-day registration, this would provide a one-time boost of turnout by about 5 to 9 percent⁶⁰. Since their study in the 1970s, many states have experimented with easing the requirements, through initiatives like the 'motor voter' registration (where citizens can register to vote at the same time as they complete the form used for motor vehicle registration), with limited effects on voter participation⁶¹. Some states like Oregon have also experimented with postal voting. The 1993 National Voter Registration Act requires all states to make voter registration available in motor vehicle bureaus, as well as by mail, and at various social service agencies, and it also forbids removing citizens from the rolls simply for not voting. Nevertheless as the Florida case vividly illustrated in the 2000 presidential contest, the efficiency of the registration and voting procedure at state level can leave much to be desired. Studies suggest that easing voter registration processes has slightly improved American voter turnout, with a one-time bump when new processes are introduced, but that the impact is not uniform across the whole electorate, as it has had the most impact increasing participation among middle-class citizens⁶².

Yet the comparative evidence is less well established. Studies have long assumed that voluntary registration procedures, where citizens need to apply to be eligible to vote, are an important reason why American turnout lags well behind many comparable democracies⁶³. In countries with application processes, including the United States, France, and Australia, prospective voters must usually identify themselves before an election, sometimes many weeks in advance, by registering with a government agency. In other countries the state takes the initiative in registering eligible citizens, through an annual census or similar mechanism. But what is the impact of this process? Katz compared the electoral regulations in thirty-one nations and found that nineteen states used an automatic registration process, while in contrast twelve registered citizens by application⁶⁴. The analysis of electoral participation based on this classification of registration procedures found that these hurdles might be less important than is often assumed, since average vote/VAP proved to be identical in the democracies using either automatic or voluntary registration procedures⁶⁵.

Polling facilities

In terms of other voting facilities, most countries hold their elections on a single day, usually at the weekend that makes it easier for employed people to visit a polling station. In a few countries, however, elections are spread over more than one day; in India, for example, where there are more than 600 million voters and some 800 thousand polling stations, balloting takes place on a staggered basis during a month across the whole country. In addition there are important variations in the use of absentee, overseas, postal, advance ballots, proxy voting, and how far polling stations are distributed widely throughout the community for groups who might otherwise have difficulty in getting to the polls, such as the population in residential homes for the elderly, in hospitals, and military personnel posted overseas⁶⁶. Franklin compared average turnout 1960-95 in parliamentary elections in 29 countries and found that compulsory voting, Sunday voting, and postal voting facilities all proved important predictors, along with the proportionality of the electoral system, although not the number of days that polls were open⁶⁷. Studies found that after controlling for levels of development, only polling on a rest day proved to provide a significant boost to turnout in established democracies; in contrast the use of proxy voting and the number of days that the polling stations were open proved to be negatively associated, perhaps because

countries concerned about low turnout try to increase the opportunities to get to the polls⁶⁸. Other special voting facilities also all proved unrelated to turnout.

Cultural attitudes and individual resources

Yet it is well established that even within particular political systems, some groups and individuals remain far more likely to participate than others. Cultural accounts stress that some people choose to vote for largely affective reasons, such as a general sense of civic duty, or to express support for a party or cause without any hope of electoral gain, even if other instrumental citizens are motivated by the rational tradeoff between electoral costs and benefits. We therefore need to turn to analyze the motivation and resources that help predict why some individuals have higher civic engagement than others. Moreover theories of societal modernization suggest that the process of human development may produce fundamental changes to patterns of political participation. Rising levels of human capital (literacy, education, and the cognitive skills that schooling produces), along with access to the mass media, the rising middle classes, and urbanization can be expected to facilitate political activism, although previous studies have established that modernization operates in a curvilinear pattern, as human development increases turnout most in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, rather than in the stages from industrial to postindustrial⁶⁹.

The results of the multivariate analysis presented in Table 7.1, and the proportion of people who voted illustrated in Figure 7.4, confirms the familiar pattern: turnout was higher among the middle classes, with a 10-point gap between the unskilled manual working class and managers and professionals. Not surprisingly a similar pattern was reflected in household income, generating an 8-point voting gap between the top and bottom quintiles. The education gap was even larger; 68% of those with only primary school education voted compared with 82% of those with either technical or university qualifications. The age profile was familiar; three-quarters of the younger thirties voted, compared with 81% of the over-sixties. The gender gap was modest and, as noted with the patterns of partisanship, varied by type of society, with the gap proving insignificant in the pooled sample of all legislative elections. Moreover both union membership and church attendance contributed towards higher turnout, suggesting that the social networks and mobilizing resources of these organizations contributed towards civic engagement. In terms of cultural attitudes, as expected, partisan identification produced a dramatic voting gap: 91% of those who expressed a strong party identification cast a ballot compared with 76% of those who had only a weak party attachment. External political efficacy also mattered: as cultural theories have long emphasized, people who felt that the system was responsive were more likely to participate. In the multivariate models political ideology also counted, with those on the right slightly more likely to participate, even controlling for their socioeconomic status. Lastly, as expected, turnout was slightly higher in more developed societies, as gauged by the UNDP Human Development Index. The societal changes associated with the modernization process do strengthen electoral participation, as anticipated. A wider range of nations, covering many poorer agrarian economies, could be expected to strengthen this association further.

[Figure 7.4 about here]

Conclusions: Culture, Incentives and Voting Participation

Rational choice theories suggest that the primary incentives facing citizens in national elections may be understood as a product of the electoral *costs* of registering and voting, the party *choices* available to electors, and the degree to which casting a ballot determines the composition of parliament and government. There are multiple costs including the time and effort required to register and to vote, any legal sanctions imposed for failure to turnout, the frequency with which electors are called to the polls. All other things being equal, among postindustrial societies we would expect turnout to be higher in political systems that reduce the costs of voting, such as those with automatic processes for maintaining the electoral register, and electoral arrangements that maximize party competition but which also maintain a strong link between voter's preferences and the outcome for parliament, for government and for the policy agenda. In this view, as well, effective electoral engineering designed to change the institutional context, such as easier registration processes or the use of all postal voting facilities, should generate improvements in turnout. In contrast, cultural accounts suggest that electors are influenced more by their socioeconomic status and their political attitudes, beliefs, and values, generating habitual

and deeply-rooted patterns of participation, so that mass political behavior will respond only sluggishly, if at all, to changes in political institutions, electoral law, or electoral administration.

In the countries under comparison in the CSES dataset, all other things being equal, the results of the analysis confirm further that political institutions matter, in particular that voting participation is maximized in elections using proportional representation, with small electoral districts, regular but relatively infrequent national contests, competitive party systems, and in presidential contests. These factors lend further confirmation to the pattern established in an earlier study comparing a wider range of nations around the globe⁷⁰. Nevertheless the policy implications of these results are far from straightforward since these institutions represent fundamental parts of political systems which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to alter in practice. More *specific voting facilities*, like the role of registration processes, the use of transfer voting or advance voting, are more practical to reform, but comparison of established democracies presented elsewhere shows that these arrangements produce little significant effect on voting turnout. In established democracies, the use of compulsory voting regulations was an important indicator of higher turnout, whereas this was not found among the broader comparison of elections worldwide. The pooled model showed that levels of human development, the institutional context, the social characteristics of electors, and cultural attitudes were all important predictors of turnout. Therefore rather than a false dichotomy, between rational choice strategic incentives and cultural modernization, we should conclude that both these factors contribute towards understanding patterns of political participation, in a 'nested' model. Chapters have therefore established that the type of electoral rules do affect mass voting behavior in terms of patterns of cleavage politics, the strength of partisan identities, as well as contributing towards electoral turnout. But do these rules have a more direct impact upon patterns of political representation, such as the diversity of legislative bodies and the role of elected members? The second part of this book turns to these important issues.

Table 7.1: Models explaining turnout, pooled legislative elections

	Model A			Model B			Coding
	b	(s.e.)	Sig.	b	(s.e.)	Sig.	
SOCIETAL MODERNIZATION							
Human development	3.02	.585	***	4.59	.621	***	Human Development Index (reversed) UNDP 2000
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT							
Electoral system	.329	.035	***	.493	.038	***	Majoritarian (1), combined (2), proportional (3)
District size	-.001	.035	***	-.001	.035	***	Mean population per elected representative
Parliamentary or Presidential executive	1.505	.095	***	1.96	.105	***	Parliamentary executive (1), Presidential election (0)
Frequency of national elections	-.008	.003	**	-.002	.003		Mean number of national elections (parliamentary and presidential) held during the 1990s.
Use of any compulsory voting	1.82	.106	***	1.50	.109	***	Compulsory Voting: Yes (1), No (0)
Party competition	.089	.004	***	.094	.004		Mean % vote for the party in 1st place in legislative elections during the 1990s.
Party system	.178	.013	***	.124	.014	***	Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP)
SOCIAL STRUCTURE							
Age				2.12	.113	***	A2001 Logged Years
Gender				.003	.037		A2002 Male=1, female=0
Education				.294	.021	***	A2003 Highest level of education of respondent. Primary 1, secondary 2, post-secondary technical 3, university 4.
Income				.102	.014	***	A2012 5-point scale of household income from lowest to highest quintile.
Union membership				.188	.047	***	Union member=1, not=0.
Religiosity				.095	.012	***	A2015 6-point strength of religiosity scale from never attend religious service (1) to attend at least weekly (6).
CULTURAL ATTITUDES							
Left-right ideology				.019	.008	**	10-point self-position scale.
Party identification				.929	.040	***	"Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?" 'Yes'=1, no=0.
External political efficacy				.154	.009	***	10-point scale from two agree-disagree items: 'Who is in power can make a difference' and 'Who people vote for makes a difference'.
Constant	-.467			-5.9			
% Correctly predicted	83.1			84.0			
Nagelkerke R²	.072			.198			

Notes: The table lists unstandardized logistic regression coefficients, standard errors and significance, with reported voting turnout in legislative elections as the dependent variable in 32 nations. *= $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Human Development: Human Development Report 2000, NY: United Nations Development Program.

Electoral system: See Table 2.1.

Party System: See Table 4.1.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002 N. 24413

Table 7.2: Electoral systems and turnout, worldwide 1990s

Type of Electoral System	Mean Vote/VAP 1990s	Mean Vote/Reg 1990s	N.
MAJORITARIAN			
Alternative Vote	65.5	92.9	2
2 nd Ballot	58.5	65.0	21
First-Past-The-Post	61.2	67.7	43
Single Non-Transferable Vote	52.6	59.8	2
Block Vote	56.5	70.9	9
All majoritarian	60.4	68.3	77
COMBINED			
Combined-Dependent	66.6	71.9	7
Combined-Independent	63.5	69.0	19
All combined	64.0	70.4	26
PROPORTIONAL			
List PR	70.0	74.7	59
Single Transferable Vote	83.4	81.7	2
All PR Systems	70.0	74.6	68
All	65.0	70.8	164

Notes:

Mean Vote/VAP is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

Mean Vote/Reg is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the registered electorate in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

N. Number of nations

Source: Calculated from International IDEA database *Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000*. www.idea.int.

Table 7.3: Compulsory Voting and electoral turnout, worldwide 1990s

		Mean Vote/VAP	Mean Vote/Reg	N. Of Nations
Older democracies	Compulsory	79.4	86.9	7
	Non-Compulsory	71.7	72.7	32
	Difference	+7.7	+14.2	39
Newer democracies	Compulsory	67.7	75.8	9
	Non-Compulsory	69.3	73.9	31
	Difference	-1.6	+1.9	40
Semi-democracies	Compulsory	53.9	60.6	5
	Non-Compulsory	56.6	67.0	40
	Difference	-2.7	-6.4	45
Non-democracies	Compulsory	40.9	70.6	2
	Non-Compulsory	61.8	67.8	38
	Difference	-20.9	+2.8	40
All	Compulsory	65.9	75.4	23
	Non-Compulsory	64.2	70.0	140
	Difference	+1.9	+5.4	163

Notes: *Mean Vote/VAP* is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

Mean Vote/Reg is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the registered electorate in all nations worldwide that held parliamentary elections during the 1990s.

Compulsory Voting: The following 23 nations were classified as currently using compulsory voting with the types of democracy shown in Appendix A:

Older democracies: Australia, Belgium, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg.


Newer Democracies: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Liechtenstein, Panama Canal Zone, Thailand, and Uruguay.

Semi-democracies: Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela.

Non-democracies: Singapore and Egypt.

Source: Calculated from International IDEA database *Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000*. www.idea.int.


Figure 7.1 Votes cast as a proportion of the voting age population, 1990s



Note: Mean Vote/VAP is measured as the number of valid votes as a proportion of the Voting Age Population in parliamentary elections during the 1990s held in the 32 nations in the CSES dataset under comparison.


Source: International IDEA database *Voter Turnout from 1945 to 2000*. www.idea.int

Figure 7.2: Systemic characteristics of turnout



Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002

Figure 7.3: Partisan characteristics of turnout




Note: The proportion of party supporters that vote is classified by partisan identification.

Younger parties: Under 20 years old. Older parties: Over 20 years old.

Party System: Classified based on the ENPP.

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002

Figure 7.4: Social and attitudinal characteristics of turnout



Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 1996-2002

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- ⁴ Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller. 1995. 'Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies During the 1980s.' *Comparative Political Studies*, 27: 467-92. See also Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ⁵ Andre Blais and A. Dobrzynska. 1998. 'Turnout in electoral democracies.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 33(2): 239-261.
- ⁶ Mark Franklin. 2004. *The dynamics of voter turnout in established democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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- ⁸ Daniel Bell. 1999. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*. New York: Basic Books; Russell Dalton. 2002. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrialized Democracies*. 3rd edition. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House; Ronald Inglehart. 1997. *Modernizations and Postmodernization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- ⁹ Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- ¹⁰ See, for example, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp.XX
- ¹¹ Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Row.
- ¹² Carol Christy. 1987. *Sex Differences in Political Participation: Processes of Change in Fourteen Nations*. New York: Praeger.
- ¹³ Henry Milner. 2002. *Civic Literacy: How informed citizens make democracy work*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
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¹⁵ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹⁶ See the debate in Arthur H. Miller, 1974a. 'Political Issues and Trust in Government, 1964-1970.' *American Political Science Review* 68: 951-72; Jack Citrin. 1974. 'Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.' *American Political Science Review* 68:973-88; Arthur H. Miller, 1974b. 'Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?' *American Political Science Review* 68:989-1001; Pippa Norris. Ed. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁷ Ray Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

¹⁸ Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The New American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P. 41.

¹⁹ Robert Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. NY: Simon & Schuster.

²⁰ Mark Franklin. 2004. *The dynamics of voter turnout in established democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²¹ For a discussion of the role of mobilizing agencies such as union membership and church attendance see Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5. For a detailed discussion of the role of the news media and civic engagement see Pippa Norris. 2001. *A Virtuous Circle*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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²³ Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ See, for example, Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp.XX

²⁵ For more details see Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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²⁷ See the discussion in Andre Blais and A. Dobrzynska. 1998. 'Turnout in electoral democracies.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 33(2):239-261.

²⁸ For a discussion see Robert Dahl. 1998. *On Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

²⁹ For a discussion about this in the context of Britain and the United States, see Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

³⁰ See, for example, the discussion of role orientations of MEPs and MPs in different electoral systems in Richard S. Katz. 1999. 'Role orientations in Parliament.' In *The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration*. Eds. Richard S. Katz and Bernhard Wessels. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³¹ Karl Reif and Hermann Schmitt. 1980. 'Nine National Second Order Elections.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 8: 3-44.

³² For a fuller discussion of the nature of presidential systems see Arend Lijphart. Ed. 1992. *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³³ Mark Franklin, Cees van der Eijk and Erik Oppenhuis. 1996. 'The Institutional Context: Turnout'. In *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*, edited by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

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³⁵ Anthony King. 1997. *Running Scared*. New York: The Free Press. P.157.

³⁶ Maurice Duverger. 1954. *Political Parties*. London: Methuen.

³⁷ See also Arend Lijphart. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pp168-170.

³⁸ Sarah Birch. 1997. "Ukraine: the Perils of Majoritarianism in a New Democracy." In *The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design*, Eds. Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Sarah Birch and Andrew Wilson. 1999. 'The Ukrainian parliamentary elections of 1998.' *Electoral Studies* 18(2): 276-282; Sarah Birch. 1998. "Electoral Reform in Ukraine: The 1988 Parliamentary Elections." *Representation*. 35(2/3): 146-154.

³⁹ Andrew Blais and Kenneth Carty. 1990. 'Does proportional representation foster voter turnout?' *European Journal of Political Research*. 18: 167-181.

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- ⁴² Robert W. Jackman. 1987. 'Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in Industrialized Democracies.' *American Political Science Review*. 81(2): 405-424.
- ⁴³ Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Figure 4.2.
- ⁴⁴ Wolfgang Hirczy. 1994. 'The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi Experimental Approach.' *Electoral Studies* 13(1): 64-76; Arend Lijphart. 1997. 'Unequal participation: democracies unresolved dilemma.' *American Political Science Review*. 91:1-14; Mark Franklin. 1999. 'Electoral engineering and cross-national turnout differences: What role for compulsory voting?' *British Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 205-216; Wolfgang Hirczy. 2000. 'Compulsory Voting.' In *The International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- ⁴⁵ I am most grateful help received in identifying the countries that use compulsory voting from Gillian Evans, Lisa Hill, Marian Sawer, Ian McAllister, and Wolfgang Hirczy.
- ⁴⁶ Ian McAllister. 1986. 'Compulsory voting, turnout and party advantage in Australia.' *Politics* 21(1): 89-93.
- ⁴⁷ One difficulty in analyzing the systematic effects of mandatory voting regulations concerns significant differences among alternative reference sources in the particular countries classified as using these laws. In such cases, the rule was adopted that the use of compulsory voting requirements had to be confirmed in at least three independent sources for classification in this study. These sources included the detailed report provided in a private communication by Gillian Evans and Lisa Hill at the Australian National University; the *International Encyclopedia of Elections* edited by Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press; the Inter-Parliamentary Union *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections* annual volumes 1995-1999. Geneva: IPU; the list published by the Australian Electoral Commission as provided by IFES1996 at www.aec.gov.au/voting/compulsory%5Fcountries.htm; the *CIA World Factbook 2000* www.cia.gov/cia/publications/fields/suffrage.html; and the tables provided by Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 13.1 and 13.2. Reference was also made to the electoral laws and constitutions compiled by IFES at www.IFES.org.
- ⁴⁸ Richard Topf. 1995. 'Electoral Participation.' *Citizens and the State*. Ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp.43-45; Warren Miller and Merrill Shanks. 1996. *The Changing American Voter*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- ⁴⁹ Andre Blais and A. Dobrzynska. 1998. 'Turnout in electoral democracies.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 33(2): 246.

⁵⁰ Florian Grotz. 2000. 'Age of Voting'. In the *International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press.

⁵¹ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁵² Andrew Blais, Louis Massicotte and A. Yoshinaka. 2001. 'Deciding who has the right to vote: A comparative analysis of election laws.' *Electoral Studies* 20(1): 41-62. See also Richard S. Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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⁵⁴ For details see Wilma Rule. 2000. 'Women's Enfranchisement' and also Stefano Bartolini. 'Franchise Expansion'. Both in the *International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press.

⁵⁵ Pippa Norris. 2001. 'Women's Turnout.' In *Voter Participation from 1945 to 2000*. International IDEA. Stockholm: International IDEA.

⁵⁶ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁷ Ivor Crewe. 'Electoral Participation.' In *Democracy at the Polls*, edited by Austin Ranney and David Butler. Washington, DC: AEI Press; G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1986. 'American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective.' *American Political Science Review*. 80(1): 17-43; Robert W. Jackman. 1987. 'Political institutions and voter turnout in industrialized democracies.' *American Political Science Review*. 81: 405-423; Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller. 1995. 'Voter turnout in industrial democracies during the 1980s.' *Comparative Political Studies*. 27: 467-492. Andre Blais and A. Dobrzynska. 1998. 'Turnout in electoral democracies.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 33(2): 239-261; Mark Franklin, Cees van der Eijk and Erik Oppenhuis. 1996. 'The Institutional Context: Turnout'. In *Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union*, edited by Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; Arend Lijphart. 1997. 'Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma.' *American Political Science Review*. 91: 1-14.

⁵⁸ Pippa Norris. 2001. 'US Campaign 2000: Of Pregnant Chads, Butterfly Ballots and Partisan Vitriol.' *Government and Opposition*. January 35(2): 1-24

⁵⁹ Richard Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. New York: Oxford. Table 13.2.

⁶⁰ Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press. For a more recent study see Mark J. Fenster. 1994. 'The impact of allowing day of registration voting on turnout in U.S. elections from 1960 to 1992.' *American Politics Quarterly*. 22: 74-87.

⁶¹ Stephen Knack. 1995. 'Does 'motor voter' work? Evidence from state-level data.' *Journal of Politics*. 57: 796-811; M.D. Martinez and D. Hill. 1999. 'Did motor voter work?' *American Politics Quarterly*. 27(3): 296-315.

⁶² Craig Leonard Brians and Bernard Grofman. 1999. 'When registration barriers fall, who votes? An empirical test of a rational choice model.' *Public Choice*. 21:161-176.

⁶³ Raymond E. Wolfinger, David P. Glass and Peverill Squire. 1990. 'Predictors of Electoral Turnout: An International Comparison.' *Policy Studies Review*. 9: 551-574.

⁶⁴ Richard S. Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Table 13.1 and 13.2.

⁶⁵ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. The mean Vote/VAP in the 1990s was the same (72%) in the countries classified by Katz as using automatic and those using application registration procedures, and the mean Vote/Reg in the 1990s was slightly higher (78.1%) in countries with application procedures than in those with automatic processes (75.1%).

⁶⁶ The best discussion of the administrative arrangements for registration and balloting found around the world can be found at www.ACE.org developed by International IDEA and IFES. For further details see Michael Maley. 2000. 'Absentee Voting.' In *The International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press. See also entries by Andre Blais and Louis Massicotte. 'Day of Election';

⁶⁷ Mark Franklin. 2001. 'Electoral Participation.' In *Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage.

⁶⁸ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁹ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press. P.57.

⁷⁰ See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.