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The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
Final Report of the 1995-96 Planning Committee

February 3, 1996

Members of the Planning Committee:
Rita Bajarunieni (Lithuania)
John Curtice (Great Britain)
Juan Diez Nicolas (Spain)
Oscar Hernández (Costa Rica)
Soren Holmberg (Sweden)
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Germany)
Marta Lagos (Chile)
Felipe B. Miranda (Philippines)
Yoshitaka Nishizawa (Japan)
Steven J. Rosenstone (United States)
Jacques Thomassen (Netherlands)
Gabor Toka (Hungary)

Consultants to the Planning Committee:
Gary Cox (University of California, San Diego)
Ekkehard Mochmann (Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung)
Richard Rockwell (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research)
Herman Schmitt (European Election Study)
W. Phillips Shively (University of Minnesota)

CSES Secretariat:
Center for Political Studies
Institute for Social Research
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106-1248, USA
Fax: 313-764-3341
Telephone: 313-764-5494

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) is a collaborative program of cross-national research among election studies conducted in over fifty consolidated and emerging democracies. The goal of this collaboration is to illuminate how the institutions that govern the conduct of elections constrain the beliefs and behaviors of citizens to condition the nature and quality of democratic choice as expressed through popular elections. By coordinating the collection of electoral data across polities, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems strives to advance the understanding of enduring and fundamental debates about electoral behavior in a way not possible through the secondary analysis of existing data. Social scientists from around the world have collaborated to specify the research agenda, the study design, and the micro- and macro-level data that indigenous teams of researchers will collect within each polity.

1. Organizational Structure of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems

Study Design: The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems focuses on the nature of electoral choice in democratic polities (consolidated democracies, those undergoing democratic transitions, and those recovering from democratic breakdown). Beginning in 1996, collaborators will include in their national election studies a module of common questionnaire content. The module contains 16 questions (running about 10 minutes in length) and will be asked in its entirety in a post-election survey. Collaborators will also provide macro-level data as well as data on the background (demographic) characteristics of respondents, coded to agreed upon standards. Collaborators shall aspire to a set of scientific standards concerning sample quality, study administration, and data quality.

Study Planning: Collaborators have participated broadly in setting the study's substantive agenda, in specifying the questionnaire module, and in specifying the demographic and macro-level data to be collected. (See section 2, below.) The Planning Committee has drawn upon the advice offered by colleagues at every stage of the planning process.

Data Collection: In each democracy, between 1996 and 1999 indigenous teams of researchers will conduct a national election survey that includes a common module of questions and demographic variables. Each team will be responsible for securing funding to finance their national data collection, though the Planning Committee will make efforts to identify sources of support that may subvent the costs of individual or multiple data collections. Teams of researchers will collect macro-level data, and additional macro-data will be collected by collaborators in within each country.

Data Archiving and Dissemination: Each collaborator shall deposit his data and accompanying documentation in a central archive in a timely fashion. Micro- and macro-level data from all polities will be merged into a single, cross-national data set. Data will be placed in the public domain as quickly as possible.

The Future: We envision that the CSES will be an ongoing program of research. This report summarizes agreements reached concerning this initial of collaboration. Planning for the next round of collaboration will begin in 1997 (see section 10, below). The second and subsequent rounds may focus on a subset of the themes covered in the first collaboration, or may turn to a new set of themes.

2. The Study Planning Process

Initial Stimulus Paper: In March 1994, the International Committee for Research into Elections and Representative Democracy (ICORE) circulated to directors of election studies around the world a stimulus paper ( The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ) that identified several themes around which collaborative data collection might be organized, sketched a study design, and suggested how the planning process might unfold. (1) A Steering Committee (comprised of Thomassen, Rosenstone, Klingemann, and Curtice) invited colleagues to comment on the paper and to participate in an initial planning conference scheduled for August 20-21, 1994 in Berlin at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung. Eighty-five social scientists responded with comments and suggestions that were summarized in a second document, Comments on The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

1994 Berlin Planning Conference: Social scientists representing thirty-one democracies, participated in the Berlin Planning Conference where discussion focused on the need for comparative electoral data, the intellectual agenda, strategies for coordinating micro- and macro-level data collections, the lessons that should be learned from previous cross-national efforts, and how the project's planning activities should unfold. Collaborators in Berlin charged an international Planning Committee comprised of social scientists from Eastern and Western Europe, Asia, and the Americas with several tasks: formulate recommendations on the content of a questionnaire module; identify background data to be collected; specify macro-level data to be gathered; draft aspired to standards of data quality; and establish norms and standards for archiving and disseminating the data. Following the Berlin Conference, the Planning Committee communicated with collaborators around the world to solicit their advice on these topics.

January 1995 Meeting of the Planning Committee: The American National Election Studies (which was asked to serve a two-year term as Secretariat for the project) organized the January 1995 meeting of the Planning Committee with financial support from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Two weeks before the meeting, the Secretariat distributed to members of the Planning Committee two-hundred pages of written materials relevant to the Committee's deliberations. The documents studied by each committee member included: correspondence to the Planning Committee; a detailed summary of the suggestions that social scientists had made concerning the project; a listing of background and attitude measures currently employed in various cross-national opinion surveys; a collection of the alternative wordings employed in various national election study questionnaires for the items being considered for inclusion in the CSES survey module; and detailed summaries of the advice that prospective collaborators had offered concerning the project.

The Planning Committee met on January 26-28, 1995 in Ann Arbor, Michigan at the Institute for Social Research. Every member of the Planning Committee participated in discussion and debate over the merits of the various organizing themes around which the data collaboration might focus. Everyone strove to understand the different points of view that colleagues from the diverse political cultures brought to the table. Every member of the Planning Committee contributed to each aspect of this report. The Committee worked to formulate a set of recommendations that would significantly advance our substantive and theoretical understanding of electoral politics, that would be feasible to implement, and that would win the endorsement of collaborators around the world.

By the end of the first day of discussion, the Committee reached consensus on the priorities and concepts that should be at the heart of the collaboration (these are spelled out in more detail below). On the second day, the Committee divided itself into subcommittees to work on the various planning tasks. Bajarunieni, Curtice, Holmberg, Lagos, and Nishizawa were responsible for crafting the initial draft of the questionnaire module. Responsibility for formulating the initial recommendations on the background (demographic) data were taken up by Cox, Diez Nicolas, Hernandez, Klingemann, Miranda, Mochmann, Schmitt, and Toka. Cox, Hernandez, Klingemann, Miranda, Schmitt, Thomassen, Shively, and Toka worked as a subcommittee to delineate the initial recommendations on the macro-level data that should be collected while Diez Nicolas, Mochmann, Rockwell, and Rosenstone drafted recommendations on the archiving and dissemination of the data. Cox, Klingemann, Rockwell, Rosenstone, Thomassen, Shively, and Toka formulated the initial recommendations on aspired to standards for data quality and comparability. On the third day, the entire Planning Committee reconvened to discuss in detail each subcommittee report. Following that discussion, each report was rewritten to reflect the consensus. The Secretariat assembled an initial draft of the current document which the Planning Committee reviewed. Proposed changes where discussed though an email conference and by fax.

March 1995 Preliminary Recommendations of the Planning Committee: The CSES Secretariat circulated the Planning Committee s Preliminary Recommendations to nearly 200 social scientists in 63 polities. Collaborators provided comments and suggestions which led to revisions to the proposed questionnaire module.

Pilot Work: During the summer and fall of 1995 collaborators in seven polities (Belarus, Costa Rica, Hungary, The Netherlands, Romania, Spain, and the United States) conducted pilot studies to test the questionnaire module. Several items were also piloted in the Philippines, Japan, and South Africa. In November 1995, these collaborators prepared pilot study reports that evaluated the performance of the questionnaire module. The Secretariat circulated these reports to members of the CSES Planning Committee and to collaborators who attended the Budapest Planning Conference in December 1995. The Secretariat also prepared a Compilation of the Pilot Studies Reports Prepared to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems which integrated into a single document the pilot analysis carried out in five of the polities. The Secretariat circulated this Compilation to all collaborators.

December 1995 Budapest Planning Conference: All collaborators were invited to participate in the Second Planning Conference that was held at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary on December 8-9, 1995. Forty colleagues from 29 polities attended the Conference. Colleagues participating in the Conference engaged in a detailed review of every aspect of the study plan: the questionnaire module; the measurement of voter turnout and vote choice; the background data to be collected; the aspired to standards for data quality; the norms regarding the archiving and disseminating of the data; and the macro-level data to be collected.

Preparation of Final Report: In the weeks following the Budapest meeting, the Planning Committee codified the consensus reached in Budapest. The Secretariat prepared the Final Report of the Planning Committee and accompanying study materials which the Planning Committee reviewed before the materials were sent to all collaborators.

3. Theoretical and Substantive Focus

Guiding Principles

  1. The power of the study design rests on its ability to make theoretical and substantive advances in our understanding of how variation in the institutional arrangements that govern the conduct of elections affect the nature and quality of democratic choice. Through comparative analysis, where citizens are observed in different settings, the impact of institutions can be established. We have given priority to concepts that help us understand the impact that macro-level properties of the political system have on political evaluations, turnout, and electoral choice.
  2. The timing of the data collection (in the weeks following national elections) provides a unique opportunity to study the nature and quality of electoral choice in ways not possible through existing data or through other cross-national projects that collect their data outside of the context of national elections. Our recommendations try to exploit this opportunity.
  3. The power of this project lies not only in its ability to tackle new questions, but in its capacity to shed new light on longstanding and important debates about electoral behavior.
  4. We acknowledge that other projects are also collecting cross-national survey data (such as the ISSP and the World Values Survey) and see little reason to spend the scarce 10 minutes of questionnaire time replicating those efforts.
  5. The questionnaire module should cover a small number of themes well rather than many topics thinly. We selected items that will serve multiple research purposes. We recognize the inherent tension here, but have tried to strike a delicate balance between items that will help test specific theoretical propositions and those that will support a variety of inquiries.
  6. We have given priority to substantive and theoretical questions that can be addressed within the constraints of a cross-sectional study design.
  7. We have tried to formulate recommendations that are feasible for collaborators to implement.

With these principles in mind, we recommend that the initial round of collaboration in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems focus on three general themes: the impact of electoral institutions on citizens political cognition and behavior (parliamentary versus presidential systems of government; the electoral rules that govern the casting and counting of ballots; and political parties); the nature of political and social cleavages and alignments; and the evaluation of democratic institutions and processes.

The Impact of Electoral Institutions

If elections are central to democracy, then how should a society organize the institutions that govern the processes by which government leaders are selected? The possibilities are legion. Should there be a parliament or a president and a legislature? Should legislative seats be allocated in proportion to the popular vote, or should the winner in each district take all? Should there be two, or three or a dozen political parties? Should the parties be strong or weak, centralized or decentralized, ideologically unified or diverse?

These are not merely abstract considerations that busy social scientists as they ponder the meaning of democracy. They are the pragmatic issues that policy makers, constitutional experts, and the founders of democratic systems have debated, increasingly so over the last two decades, as new democracies have emerged in southern and eastern Europe, in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa. Such debates are heated because the political stakes could not be higher: institutional arrangements influence the distribution of power; shape the ways that politicians pursue their goals; and constrain the ability of citizens to control their government.

How the institutional arrangements that govern elections affect voters in a particular polity can only be appreciated through comparative research. Without variation in institutional arrangements, it is impossible to learn how any particular configuration of institutions structures votes, public opinion, and political participation. We need to examine how otherwise comparable citizens behave when operating under different institutional constraints -- and this requires that we move beyond a single nation's borders.

Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism

Parliamentary and presidential government are the two principal models by which democracies are organized. And although the debate between parliamentarism and presidentialism is a familiar one (see for example, Linz 1990; Lijphart 1992; Mainwaring 1990; Shugart and Carey 1992; Powell 1989), many of the arguments central to this debate entail assumptions about voters: about the information that they possess, the beliefs they hold, and the considerations they bring to bear on the electoral choices they make. Such assumptions, are rarely tested.

For example, if accountability makes retrospective sanctions of the executive more available in presidential than in parliamentary systems, then one should find that voters in presidential systems have greater clarity about the performance of the incumbent government and are more willing to rely on retrospective evaluations in their vote choice.

Or, to take another example, consider the charge that divided control of government obscures accountability in presidential systems. Nowhere has this claim been confronted with evidence. Do citizens living under divided government have more difficulty figuring out who is to blame than citizens living under united presidential government or parliamentary rule? Under divided control are voters less likely to rely on retrospective evaluations of the performance of the executive when casting their ballots? We simply don't know.

Do coalition governments obscure accountability and reduce the ability of the electorate to assign blame (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988, 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Strom 1990)? How does a party's participation in a coalition government affect the public's evaluation of the party? Do all parties in the coalition get held equally accountable or does the size of the party or its role (share of portfolios) affect the extent of blame or credit? And, does a change in the composition of a parliamentary government during the period between elections make it more difficult for voters to know whom to blame on election day? We do not know.

Nor do we know whether accountability is undermined in presidential systems because voters give too much weight to the personal attributes of presidential candidates and too little weight to issues. Does the evidence sustain this familiar critique of presidential elections? Do the personal characteristics of party leaders play a less dominant role in parliamentary systems or do some parliamentary systems like a German type Kanzelardemocracy display effects similar to those found in presidential systems (Lijphart 1992)?

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws

Electoral laws determine how citizens cast votes, how votes are aggregated, and how aggregated votes are converted into positions of governmental authority. Electoral systems differ in the formula used to decide how votes are translated into legislative seats, in district magnitude and threshold, in ballot structure, and in the timing of elections. Such laws constitute a second set of institutional arrangements for cross-national study.

Although we know that electoral laws have profound effects on the number, size, and ideological diversity of parties, on the way in which votes are get converted into legislative seats, and on the strategies that political parties pursue, (2) we do not possess, as Michael Steed (1985) has argued, knowledge of the ways in which electoral laws ultimately affect voters and their representation in government.

For example, which electoral arrangements facilitate the close connection between individuals and their representatives and which do not (Bogdanor 1985)? Just what are the circumstances under which personal ties between citizens and candidates matter to voters? How do variations in district magnitude, for instance, affect the nature of the interaction between constituents and their representatives? When electoral laws permit representatives in a multi-member district to free ride on constituent services performed by their colleagues, does the propensity to engage in constituency service and develop personal relationships with constituents go down (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987)?

Do high district thresholds not only discourage parties from contesting seats, but do they also discourage voters from casting their ballots for small parties that hover perilously close to the threshold? How powerful are Duverger's (1954) "psychological effects" in reducing the tendency for voters to waste their vote on smaller parties that have no chance of winning seats? Is the effect really a psychological one, as Duverger posited, or does it stem from the unwillingness of parties to invest scarce resources in those districts where things seem hopeless? Although it is well understood that different voting rules offer different opportunities and incentives for strategic voting (Cain 1978; Niemi, Whitten and Franklin 1992; Black 1978; Johnston, et al. 1992) it is not at all clear whether the propensity of citizens to engage in strategic behavior varies with the occasions that electoral rules present.

These questions, which are fundamental to our understanding of the political consequences of electoral laws, deal with the impact of these laws on individual citizens: on the ways they make choices and on the relationship they establish with their representatives. They are questions that as yet have no firm answers.

Political Parties

Democracy, E. E. Schattschneider argued, is "unthinkable save in terms of the parties" (1942). Modern democratic theorists of all stripes embrace parties as institutions that organize electoral competition, aggregate disparate social interests, mediate social conflict, increase voter rationality, enlarge the electorate through mobilization, link people to their government, and constrain those in positions of power. (3) In emerging democracies, it is the political parties that play an instrumental role in consolidating the new regimes (Mainwaring 1988; Dix 1992).

But how well do political parties actually perform these functions? Electoral systems differ in conspicuous ways with respect to parties: in their number, ideological distinctiveness, and their organizational strength. Our concern is with understanding how such differences affect electoral choice and party performance.

We know much about how electoral arrangements affect the electoral styles of political parties (e.g. Katz 1980), but very little about the impact of different party systems on beliefs and behavior of ordinary people. For example, whether two-party or multi-party systems best facilitate democracy depends on how citizens think, what they know, and how they choose. Do citizens in fact have more trouble assigning blame under a multi-party than two-party system, making accountability lower?

How does voter choice differ between two-party and multi-party systems? Do two parties really simplify the voter's task, and do many parties make things more confusing? In multi-party systems is a citizen better able to find a party that approximates her ideal point (Huber 1993; Strom 1990)? When parties stake out ideologically distinct positions on salient issues, do citizens have an easier time perceiving where the parties stand than when party positions are muddled? As the ideological distinctiveness of parties grows, is there a parallel increase in the intensity with which mass publics hold their opinions, in the ideological coherence that underlies those opinions, or in the impact of issues on vote choice?

Does strategic voting mitigate the representational benefits claimed for multi-party systems? Under what circumstances will voters decide to throw their support to a larger party that has a chance of winning a seat? What is the impact on ordinary citizens of the parties acting strategically by entering into alliances with other parties through joints lists, list alliances, or through legislative or portfolio coalition? Do voters get confused about the position of the various parties in the coalition? Does party attachment and loyalty go down?

Parties can also be thought of as organizations, and as such, they differ enormously in structure and strength (Katz 1980; Mayhew 1986; Mainwaring 1988; McDonald and Ruhl 1989; Dix 1992; Janda 1993). In some systems, parties are strong: they control resources and nominations; there are local, regional, and national organizations; there is formal party membership; local party organizations play an important role in the social life of citizens (Michels 1962; Duverger 1954; Gosnell 1968; Banfield and Wilson 1963; Wilson 1962, 1973). In other systems political parties are relatively weak (Mayhew 1986).

In recent decades, parties have declined as other institutions have taken over many of their traditional functions (Ware 1985; Flanagan and Dalton 1984). Interest groups press citizen concerns outside of party channels; the mass media inform and mobilize (Ranney 1983; Semetko, et al. 1991); party leaders have lost their grip over the slating of candidates (Katz 1986); centralized, capital intensive, professional campaign organizations have replaced decentralized, labor intensive, grassroots political organizations.

Does it matter whether parties are weak or strong? Do strong parties do a better job of educating the electorate and structuring their political outlooks than do weak parties (Kleppner 1982; McGerr 1986)? Are citizens more attached or more loyal to strong parties than to weak ones? What types of party organizations are most effective at mobilizing citizens to action and what impact does party mobilization have on citizens' political beliefs, information about politics, stands on issues, party loyalty and likelihood of participating in politics? Does mobilization have an equalizing effect because it incorporates into electoral coalitions citizens (often the havenots) who otherwise would not take part in politics (Schattschneider 1942; Key 1949; Dahl 1966)?

The Nature of Political and Social Cleavages and Alignments

Lipset and Rokkan's claim that "the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s" set in motion a torrent of research. The class, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and regional foundations of party alignments have all been documented, and in the beginning it appeared that in Western democracies, at least, electoral stability prevailed as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) had predicted (Alford 1967; Rose and Urwin 1969, 1970; Lijphart 1979, 1980; and Dix 1989).

Over the last three decades, however, electoral alignments have weakened, party strength has grown increasingly volatile, and party systems have become increasingly fragmented. (4) In Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and Britain, for example, voters have thrown new electoral support to parties based upon linguistic and ethnic cleavages long thought to have been depoliticized. Elsewhere new parties have championed causes that cut across existing party lines: constitutional reform for Dutch Democrats, traditional morality for new Christian Democratic parties in some Scandinavian countries, tax reductions for Glistrup's party in Denmark, and civil liberties for the Italian Radicals. Electoral support for parties of the left has declined across Europe. Ecological or "green" parties have placed environmental issues on the political agenda, slowly increasing year to year their share of the popular vote (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). These developments have not only transformed the nature of their party systems, they have called into question the relevance of the social cleavages that had once prevailed. What is needed, is a genuinely comparative cross-national study that assesses the current state of alignments and cleavages in the face of all this social change (see Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992).

What is also needed is an assessment of the impact that institutional differences across political systems have on cleavages and alignments. How do institutional structures affect the nature and intensity of social and political cleavages? Do federal systems suppress social cleavages as Chhibber and Petrocik (1989) have suggested? How well do different party systems "encapsulate conflict" by constraining social divisions (Bartolini and Mair 1990)? Do plurality systems produce more broadly based parties that discourage the kind of sectional and ideological parties (and hence intense political cleavages) that can more easily survive under proportional representation? While much is known about the relationship between short- term economic changes and electoral choice within individual countries, we know little if anything about how different electoral systems condition the likelihood that political parties will exploit or ameliorate the political conflict that emerges from moments of profound economic change. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is uniquely poised to shed light on all of these issues.

The Evaluation of Democratic Institutions and Processes

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is also well positioned to advance our understanding of the ways in which citizens assess their polity's democratic institutions and processes. Given the project's general concern with electoral choice and participation, it makes sense to focus on evaluations of the electoral process and on perceptions of the performance of political parties and representatives as institutions that link citizens to government. There are several opportunities here:

First, is the opportunity to monitor and understand the nature and evolution of citizen evaluation of democratic institutions. The CSES study design provides several, powerful analytical strategies. Evaluations found in consolidated democracies can be compared to those that exist in regimes undergoing democratic transition. Regimes at various stages along the road to democratization consolidation can also be compared. And to the extent that our initial collaboration represents the first round of an ongoing collaborative effort, changes in the evaluations of democratic institutions and processes can be monitored over time. In doing so, we will also be able to assess whether support for democratic institutions is maintained through periods of intense political or economic conflict, economic reform, economic disruption, political scandal, and crisis.

We are also in a position to assess how differences in the institutional arrangements that govern the electoral process affect the way that citizens' evaluate democracy. What impact, if any, do institutional differences -- in electoral laws, in the nature of political parties, or in the structure and longevity of the political regime -- have on the way that citizens assess the performance of the electoral process, political parties, and democracy as a whole? Do some kinds of institutional arrangements produce more positive evaluations than others? For example, does citizen satisfaction with the performance of political parties increase with the number and ideological diversity of the political choices that citizens are offered?

Another line of inquiry focuses on the widely held belief that democracies are sustained by political cultures in which there is widespread approval of the fundamental institutions and process of democratic government. By aggregating citizens' evaluations of democracy and monitoring those evaluations over time, we will be in a position to assess whether democratic institutions do indeed crumble following the withdrawal of public support (Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1965; Inglehart 1988, 1990; Muller and Seligson 1994). Just how vital is support of democratic institutions to the survival of democracy?

We are also concerned about how the opinions that citizens hold about the performance of democratic institutions and processes may influence behavior under a given set of electoral arrangements. For example, compared with the single member district plurality system, a national party list system offers citizens the opportunity to vote for the party rather than on the basis of local issues or the characteristics of individual candidates. Whether citizens do so or not, however, may depend on their perceptions of the effectiveness of political parties, or of the extent to which parties are willing and able to service the needs of their constituents.

Finally, evaluations of the functioning of the political system are also thought to affect both the willingness of citizens to participate in the electoral process and the kinds of parties and candidates they are willing to endorse. The core hypothesis is that disaffected citizens either abstain (or invalidate their vote where voting is compulsory) or vote for "anti-system" parties or candidates. The cross-national data that will be collected in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems will enhance our ability to address these claims.

4. Questionnaire Module


The constraint of a 10-minute module presented a formidable challenge. The Planning Committee spent a great deal of time discussing the concepts that should be given highest priority in the questionnaire. Each concept regarded as central to the study, is represented by at least one question. When it made sense to do so, we adopted question formats employed in existing election studies. But, we did not feel bound to old questions, particularly questions that were developed in one context but do not travel well to other political cultures or settings. We regarded the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems as an opportunity to make a fresh start -- to write questions de novo and to modify old questions as needed.

The performance and efficacy of each item across a variety of political settings was established through a series of pilot studies conducted in seven polities (described in section 2, above). The results of this pilot work led to the modification of some items and the deletion of others.

The variety of institutional arrangements for voting in different countries makes it impracticable to ascertain turnout and vote choice by means of common questions in each polity. Instead, collaborators shall gather data on turnout and vote choice with questions that are most relevant to their countries' institutional setting and that these data be coded to a common set of standards (described in section 5, below).

The questions below are organized by concept. The question number refers to the order in which the question should be asked. A Mockup of the CSES Questionnaire Module is also provided to facilitate implementation of the questionnaire. The document, Instructions for the Administration of each Question in the CSES Module describes the detailed instruction concerning the implementation of each question.

Party Identification and Leader Evaluation

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems provides a powerful opportunity for advancing our understanding of the ways in which differences in the number, ideological distinctiveness, and organizational strength of parties affects the nature of the relationship that develops between citizens and political parties.

A central theme in the literature on electoral politics has been the contrast between voting for the person versus voting on the basis of issues or party. It is often charged that in presidential systems voters give excessive weight to the personal attributes of candidates. To asses this claim requires measures of voters' perceptions of party leaders and candidates. How do citizens evaluate the personal character of leaders and candidates and under what circumstances do these assessments affect vote choice?

Q3. Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?

  a.  [if yes]  Which party is that?
  b.  [if more than one party mentioned or party block mentioned]
      Which party [in the name of block do you feel closest to?
  c.  [if no to DK or No to Q3]   Do you feel yourself a little closer
      to one of the political parties than the others?  Which party is that?
  d.  Do you feel very close to this [party/ party block], somewhat
      close, or not very close?

Q7. I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is PARTY A.

Where would you place party A on this scale? PARTY B? PARTY C? PARTY D? PARTY E? PARTY F?

NOTE: Where possible, collaborators should ask about all parties represented or likely to be represented in the Parliament (or running in the presidential contest). In circumstances where there are more than six such parties, collaborators should ask at least about the six most relevant parties. In assessing relevance, collaborators should consider likely size, likely importance in coalition formation. If parties only contest elections in part of the country, those parties need only be asked about in those parts of the country where they contest seats.

Q8. And now, using the same scale, I'd like to ask you how much you like or dislike some political leaders. Again, if I come to a leader you haven't heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first political leader is LEADER A.

Where would you place LEADER A on this scale? LEADER B? LEADER C? LEADER D? LEADER E? LEADER F?

NOTE: Collaborators need only ask about a minimum of one leader per party. That person should be the person who would have been expected to be the prime minister (or equivalent) should that party have gained control of the government. In circumstances where there are important candidates who are not members of a party, they should be added. In addition, collaborators shall provide information on the gender and party of the leaders.

Spatial Issue Voting: Left-Right Scale

To understand how electoral arrangements, the number of political parties, and their ideological distinctiveness affect the ease with which voters can identify the positions of parties and locate a choice close to their ideal point, requires that we measure both the voters' issue positions and their perceptions of the parties' positions as well. Such information will also make it possible to identify the political circumstances that prompt voters to act sincerely, to act strategically, to act out of ignorance, or to ignore policy and idealogy altogether.

Q16. In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Using the same scale, where would you place PARTY A? PARTY B? PARTY C? PARTY D? PARTY E? PARTY F?

NOTE: Q16 should be asked of all political parties asked about in Q7. In polities where investigators think that the left-right scale is not interpretable by respondents or does not adequately capture the principle political cleavage in the polity, collaborators should ask a supplemental question that taps the central political division (e.g. liberal/conservative). The Left-Right placement of self and parties appears as the last question in the CSES Module. This supplemental question should be asked in addition to Q16. The supplemental question should appear elsewhere in the questionnaire and should be asked using a 0-10 scale.

Candidate Recognition and Interaction with Representatives

Q6. Do you happen to remember the name of any candidates who [ran / stood] in your [Lower house primary electoral district, e.g. constituency, district, riding] in the last [parliamentary / congressional] election? [IF YES: If name not volunteered) What were their names?]

NOTE: Collaborators will need to code whether the respondent correctly identified none, one, or more than one candidate. In addition, collaborations shall code the gender and party of the candidates recalled.

Election studies are motivated, in part, by an interest in the degree of communication and control that citizens exert over the leaders they elect. One line of research has examined the nature of the personal relationship that gets established between citizens and their representatives in the national legislature / parliament. The following question (along with Q6 on candidate recognition) should help us sort out how the electoral arrangements that govern the conduct of legislative / parliamentary elections affect the nature of the interaction between citizens and their representatives.

Q12. During the past twelve months, have you had any contact with [a Member of Parliament/ a Member of Congress] in any way?

Retrospective Evaluation of Performance of National Economy

Elections are opportunities for citizens to endorse or repudiate the performance of the incumbent government. Measures of citizens' retrospective evaluations of the government performance will enable us to assess how electoral institutions, divided control of government, and minority governments affect the capacity of citizens to sort out who is to blame and to translate that blame into sanctions at election time. Retrospective evaluations of economic conditions also clearly affect electoral outcomes. The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems will provide an opportunity for social scientists to assess the political circumstances under which these retrospective evaluations matter most.

Q9. What do you think about the state of the economy these days in [country]? Would you say that the state of the economy is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?

Q10. Would you say that over the past twelve months the state of the economy in [country] has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse? [IF BETTER: Would you say much better or somewhat better?] [IF WORSE: Would you say much worse or somewhat worse?]

Evaluation of Democratic Institutions and Process

The CSES questionnaire module will also focus on how citizens evaluate democratic institutions and processes. The concern here is two-fold: First, provide data that will illuminate the impact of institutional arrangements, regime type, and the nature of political and economic conflict on the ways in which citizens evaluate democracy. Second, identify what impact, if any, those evaluations have on electoral participation, vote choice, and regime stability. These concerns, alone, could sustain an ambitious program of research. Given the constraints, the questionnaire module will focus on two sets of evaluations.

Evaluations of the electoral process: whether it is open, fair, and whether voting and election outcomes matter.

Q15. When people are asked to express an opinion, do you believe most people in [country] usually say what they think about politics or do you believe most people usually hide what they really think about politics? Using the scale on the card, (where ONE means that most people in [country] usually say what they think about politics, and FIVE means that most people usually hide what they really think), where would you place yourself?

Q2. In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the last election in [country] where would you place it on this scale of one to five where ONE means that the last election was conducted fairly and FIVE means that the last election was conducted unfairly?

Q14. Some say that no matter who people vote for, it won t make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens. Using the scale on this card, (where ONE means that voting won't make any difference to what happens and FIVE means that voting can make a difference, where would you place yourself?

Evaluations of the responsiveness of representatives, the performance of political parties, and of democracy in general.

Q13. Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn t make a difference who is in power. Using the scale on the card, (where ONE means that makes a difference who is in power and FIVE means that it doesn't make a difference who is in power, where would you place yourself?

Q11. Some people say that members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think. Others say that members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think. Using the scale on the card, (where ONE means that the members of [Congress / Parliament] know what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that the members of [Congress / Parliament] don't know much about what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

Q4. Some people say that political parties in [country] care what ordinary people think. Others say that political parties in [country] don't care what ordinary people think. Using the scale on the card, (where ONE means that political parties care about what ordinary people think, and FIVE means that they don't care what ordinary people think), where would you place yourself?

Q5. Some people say that political parties are necessary to make our political system work in [country]. Others think that political parties are not needed in [country]. Using the scale on the card, (where ONE means that political parties are necessary to make our political system work, and FIVE means that political parties are not needed in [country]), where would you place yourself?

Q1. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?

5. Voter Turnout and Vote Choice

The variety of institutional arrangements for voting in different polities makes it impracticable that vote choice and turnout can be ascertained by means of a common question in each country. For example, in Great Britain or Canada one can ask which party a respondent voted for. But this makes no sense in countries such as the United States, Russia, Germany or Luxembourg where respondents can vote for more than one party at the same election. In countries that make use of run-off elections, collaborators should provide data on turnout and vote choice for the first ballot. In addition to the first ballot data, individual collaborators may chose to collect survey data for turnout and vote choice for the run-off election. Collaborators are thus requested to derive the following standardized information using questions which are most relevant to their country s institutional circumstances.

1. Whether or not respondent cast a ballot (regardless of whether or not the ballot was valid)

    1. Respondent cast a ballot
    2. Respondent did not cast a ballot
    3. Don't know
    9. No answer

In formulating the question used to ascertain this information, collaborators should try to ask the question in a way that minimizes the over-reporting of voter turnout where this is known to be a problem.

2. Which party the respondent voted for (or the party affiliation of the candidate for whom he/she voted in all relevant national elections [e.g. President, Senate and House in the U.S., or first and second vote in Germany]).

Coding conventions to be established. This will include a provision to record separately those voters who disclose that they cast an invalid ballot (null / blank / discarded vote).

The following should be noted:

a) In those countries where voters are required to express an ordinal preference (e.g. Ireland and Malta), collaborators should record the first preference. b) In those countries where voters can distribute their votes across parties in an individual election (e.g. Finland and Luxembourg) collaborators should record the party for whom the voter casts the majority of his/her votes.

3. In those countries where voters have the option of voting for individual candidates, but are not obliged to do so, collaborators should code whether the voter exercised that option. [Examples: (1) In the old Italian system, voters cast votes for party lists first; they then had the option to cast "preference votes" for individual candidates on that list. Here we would want to know whether the respondent cast preference votes or not. (2) In Brazil, voters can either cast a vote for a party list of candidates, or a vote for an individual candidate. Here we would want to know whether the respondent cast a candidate vote or a list vote.]

  1. Voter exercised candidate preference
  2. Voter did not exercise candidate preference
  3. Voter did not vote
  4. Voter did not have opportunity to exercise candidate preference
  5. Don t know
  6. No answer

4. Recall of vote choice and vote turnout in the national election prior to the one just conducted.

Coding conventions should follow (1) (2), and (3) above.

6. Background (Demographic) Variables

Collaborators shall also provide data on background (demographic) characteristics of respondents, coded to be agreed upon set of standards.


1. There is great international variation in the ways that collaborators will go about soliciting information on the background characteristics of their respondents. The objective here is not standardization of the way collaborators ask these background questions, but instead, standardization to a common, cross-national scheme for coding each variable. This standardization should avoid unnecessarily fine distinctions that will be difficult for collaborators to implement.

2. Where feasible, we have followed the standardized coding that other cross-national surveys (such as the Eurobarometers, the ISSP and the World Values Survey) have employed.

3. Each collaborator shall ask respondents the questions needed to elicit the data required to construct the background variable. The questions needed to elicit the background information may be asked either before or after the questionnaire module and may be asked in any order. The only circumstance under which a question does not need to be asked is when there is no variation among respondents in the population (e.g., a collaborator would not need to ask about language spoken if everyone in the polity speaks the same one). If a collaborator does not ask a question because there is no variation in the response, the variable should, nevertheless be appropriately coded in the dataset delivered.

The document, Coding Conventions for Background (Demographic) Variables provides the detailed standards to which the background variables should be coded. Examples of questions that might be used to elicit the background information are provided in the document, Sample Questions for Eliciting Background Data.

Background (Demographic) Variables to be Collected and Coded

  1. Age
  2. Sex
  3. Education
  4. Marital Status
  5. Respondent Member of a Union
  6. Someone Else in Household Other than Respondent is a Member of a Union
  7. Current Employment Status
  8. Main Occupation of Respondent
  9. Private or Public Employment of Respondent
  10. Industrial Sector of Respondent
  11. Occupation of Chief Wage Earner or Spouse
  12. Household Income (coded into quintiles)
  13. Number of People in Household
  14. Number of People in Household under the Age of 18
  15. Attendance of Religious Services
  16. Religiosity
  17. Religious Denomination
  18. Language Usually Spoken at Home
  19. Region of Residence
  20. Race of Respondent
  21. Ethnicity of Respondent
  22. Rural/Urban Residence
  23. Political Information
  24. Month of Interview
  25. Day of Interview
  26. Year of Interview
  27. Number of Days Interview Conducted After the Election
  28. Respondent s Primary Electoral District

7. Macro-Level Data

Principles Concerning the Gathering of Macro-Level Data

The analytical power of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems depends heavily upon the availability of macro-level data on electoral laws, political parties, and other institutional arrangements.

  1. We recognize that collaborators in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems have limited resources that must be utilized judiciously, and that the quality of the macro-level data collected may vary across polities. Where possible, these macro-data should be collected and coded through a centralized process.
  2. When the centralized collection of macro-level data is infeasible, each collaborator in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems should provide macro-level data. The limited number of variables for which collaborators are being asked to provide data are identified below.
  3. We do not think it is feasible to collect, at this time, data at the level of the electoral (parliamentary or congressional) district. Each collaborator, however, should identify the primary electoral district for each survey respondent. This will permit social scientists in the future to merge survey data for each polity with district-level variables not currently being collected. Where possible, a national map of all districts should be provided to the Archives, to facilitate district identification.
  4. To the extent possible, macro-level data should be those which apply at the time of the survey. However, additional data may be necessary in certain cases, particularly for nations undergoing institutional change.
  5. A centralized coordinating function must also be provided, as discussed below.

Macro-Data that Collaborators Shall Provide

Macro-data shall be provided on the form entitled CSES Macro-Level Data. These data include:

  1. The names and party affiliations of all cabinet-level ministers serving at the time of the dissolution of the most recent government.
  2. The collaborator s own, expert judgement on which of nine ideological families each party is closest to.
  3. Whether each party has formal membership in an international organization (e.g. Socialist International).
  4. The collaborator s own, expert judement of where each party should be placed on a left-right scale.
  5. Age of each political party.
  6. The collaborator s assessment of the five most salient factors that would help scholars unfamiliar with the polity to understand the outcome of the election (e.g. major scandals or economic events, the presence of an "independent" political actor).
  7. Whether electoral alliances are permitted and if so, which ones formed in the election.
  8. Where applicable, the full name and party affiliation of all presidential candidates.
  9. Information on the type of political regime.
  10. Information on the nature of electoral districts and the method by which votes are cast and counted.
  11. Collaborators shall provide a copy of the current electoral statute governing elections to the lower house of the national legislature. (An annotated version of the statute is preferable.) Also, if the constitution contains sections relevant to the conduct of elections, collaborators shall include these as well. Complete bibliographic information on the source of the material sent is essential. If the material is available in a number of different languages, materials should be sent in the most internationally accessible language available.
  12. Collaborators shall provide a copy of the party manifesto for each party.

Macro-Data that will be Gathered Centrally

Every effort is being made to gather, centrally, the remaining macro-data:

  1. Institutional Arrangements: A number of questions regarding the operationalization of certain measures, particularly regarding the nature of presidential versus parliamentary systems, remain unresolved at this point. We have identified several resources for assistance, including East European Constitutional Review, and Professors Matthew Shugart (University of California, San Diego) and John Carey (University of Rochester). Specific variables to be collected include:
    • degree of centralization vs. decentralization of the political system (i.e. federalism)
    • fiscal structures of local and central budgets (as an indicator of de facto federalism)
    • degree of bicameralism
    • partisan control and composition of legislature (including composition of upper house)
    • relative power of the two houses of the legislature (if bicameral)
    • selection of the chief executive (parliamentary or presidential; type of presidential system)
    • extent of presidential powers (i.e., appointment of ministers)
    • term limits and qualifications for president
  2. Electoral Laws: Collaborators in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems should participate in an effort led by Professor Gary Cox (University of California, San Diego), to collect annotated electoral codes for each nation. Although the collection of the codes will be undertaken by collaborators within each polity, Cox will coordinate the coding of the laws which would include the following variables:
    • district magnitude
    • electoral formula
    • single vs. dual constituencies
    • number of candidates per district
    • thresholds
    • number of constituencies
    • closed or open list; ease with which the voter can revise or create a voter list
    • possibility of electoral alliances (apparentements)
    • inclusiveness of the franchise
    • other provisions (such as the bonus for winners in Greece)
  3. Electoral Results shall be gathered at the national level for the first and subsequent rounds of voting. Data should include:
    • vote for president (where applicable)
    • vote for lower house of parliament (first and second rounds, and primary electoral district, where applicable)
    • national turnout
  4. Political Parties: Professor Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung) whose Manifestos Research Group has devised a protocol for coding party platforms, will coordinate and lead manifesto analyses for collaborators who choose to join the manifesto studies.
  5. Economic Data
    • unemployment data (average for the six months before election)
    • inflation data (average for the six months before election)
    • trade/exposure to international capital
    • measures of GNP/GDP and GNP/GDP per capita (particularly change over time)
    • life expectancy
    • literacy
    • education levels
  6. Other Data, such as Cingranelli's data on civil rights and repression of opposition, that can be easily obtained should be coded. Other possible sources include data that Przeworski and Vanhanen have gathered.

The CSES Secretariat will try to facilitate collaborations among social scientists interested in gathering and coding the macro-economic data and macro-political data on institutional arrangements and electoral results. Because the macro-level data do not need to be in hand for several years, there is a reasonable period of time in which to carry out this data collection.

8. Aspired to Standards for Data Quality and Comparability

Collaborators in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems shall adhere to the following standards of data quality:

  1. Mode of interviewing: Interviews should be conducted face-to-face, unless local circumstances dictate that telephone or mail surveys will produce higher quality data.
  2. Timing of interviewing: We strongly recommend that collaborators in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems conduct their interviews in the weeks following their national election. Out of concern for data quality, data collection should be completed in as timely a fashion as possible. In the event of a runoff election, interviewing shall be conducted after the first round election. The date of interview shall be provided for each respondent.
  3. Placement of module in post-election questionnaire: The questionnaire module should be asked as a single, uninterrupted block of questions. We leave it to each collaborator to select an appropriate location for the module in his national survey instrument. Collaborators should take steps to ensure that questions asked immediately prior to the questionnaire module do not contaminate the initial questions in the module. Collaborators are also free to select an appropriate place in their survey instrument to ask the turnout, vote choice, and demographic questions.
  4. Population to be sampled: National samples should be drawn from all age-eligible citizens. When non-citizens (or other non-eligible respondents) are included in the sampled, a variable should be provided to permit the identification of those non-eligible respondents. When a collaborator samples from those persons who appear on voter registration lists, he should quantify the estimated degree of discrepancy between this population and the population of all ageeligible citizens.
  5. Sampling procedures: We strongly encourage the use of random samples, with random sampling procedures used at all stages of the sampling process. Collaborators should provide detailed documentation of their sampling practices, as described in section 9 below.
  6. Sample Size: We strongly recommend that no fewer than 1,000 ageeligible respondents be interviewed.
  7. Interviewer training: Collaborators should pre-test their survey instrument and should train interviewers in the administration of the questionnaire. The Planning Committee will provide each collaborator with documentation that clarifies the purposes and objectives of each item and with rules with respect to probing don't-know responses.
  8. Field practices: Collaborators should make every effort to ensure a high response rate. Investigators should be diligent in their effort to reach respondents not interviewed on the initial contact with the household and should be diligent in their effort to convert respondents who initially refuse to participate in the study. Data on the number of contact attempts, the number of contacts with sample persons, and special persuasion or conversion efforts undertaken should be coded for each respondent.
  9. Strategies for translation (and back-translation): Each collaborator should translate the questionnaire module into his or her native language(s). To ensure the equivalence of the translation, collaborators shall perform an independent re-translation of the questionnaire back into English. Collaborators engaged in translation of the questionnaire module into the same language (e.g. Spanish, French, English, German, and Portuguese) should collaborate on the translation.

9. Archiving and Disseminating the Data

Institutional Structure

The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is a data collection project that includes an international team of principal investigators and international data archives. The CSES is joining forces with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) to make the data produced from this project widely available to the social science community.

Institutions Responsible for the Archiving and Disseminating the Data

Funding strategies

Collaborators in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Archives should act in concert to pursue, simultaneously, several funding strategies:

Depositing Data

Each collaborator shall deposit in the Archives their micro-level data (responses to the questionnaire module, data on voter turnout and vote choice, and the background variables) as well as macro-level data that were collected.

Conventions for coding the data: The CSES, in consultation with the Archives, will develop standard conventions by which each collaborator will code the data. The CSES Secretariat shall make available to each collaborator a codebook as well as SPSS and SAS control cards.

How data and documentation should be deposited: Standards will be established to guide the media, format, and method by which the data will be transmitted to the Archives.

Data Quality: Collaborators are responsible for ensuring that the data provided to the Archives are in accordance with the codebook. (For example, collaborators need to clean the data to remove any wild codes.)

Deadline for Deposit and Dissemination of Data: Data must be deposited in a timely fashion, not to exceed one year after the election date, and in accordance with a set of standards specified by the CSES. The Archives cannot guarantee that data deposited after that date will be included in the integrated data file. The Archives will make the data for a particular country available in a timely fashion, not to exceed two years after the date of the election.

Depositing Documentation

Each investigator will provide documentation for the data following archival standards as well as documentation about the sampling process, response rate, and study implementation. This documentation should be written using the Oxford English language. The CSES, in collaboration with the Archives, will develop a checklist of materials to be included with documentation, including the following information:

Archival Functions

Data Dissemination

10. Future Rounds of Collaboration

Although the Planning Committee s efforts have been directed to working out all the details needed to launch the CSES and this first round of collaboration that will be in place for national elections held between 1996 and 1999, the next step is to begin to think about the long-term intellectual agenda and structure of the project. Our sense is that soon after the field work for this initial cooperative effort is underway, discussion should begin on the second and subsequent rounds of collaboration. As discussed in 1994 Berlin Planning Conference, the next round might focus on a subset of the themes covered in the first collaboration, or might well focus on an entirely different set of themes. We anticipate that a Planning Conference will be held in Seoul, Korea in August 1997 in conjunction with the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Meetings. Members of the Planning Committee will circulate a stimulus paper prior to that meeting to initiate conversation on a variety of themes that might be the focus of future rounds of collaboration. Colleagues with suggestions for themes for discussion or who would like to participate in the drafting this stimulus paper should contact the CSES Secretariat.


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End Notes

  1. All CSES documents are available on the CSES World Wide Web Site ( and by FTP from the American National Election Studies (NES) fileserver, or by contacting the Secretariat for the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106-1248, USA. The NES server is ''.
  2. * For example, see Duverger 1954; Rae 1971; Lijphart 1984, 1990, 1994; Riker 1986; Katz 1980; Powell 1982, 1989; and Taagepera and Shugart 1989.
  3. See Schattschneider 1942; Key 1949; Downs 1957; Dahl 1966; Epstein 1967; Huntington 1968; Sartori 1976; Sorauf 1976; Lawson 1980; and Eldersveld 1982.
  4. Pedersen 1979; Wolinetz 1979, 1988; Maguire 1983; Mair 1983; Sarlvik and Crewe 1983; Dix 1984, 1989; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Crewe and Denver 1985; Inglehart 1977; Clarke, et al. 1980; Rose 1982; Borre 1984; Dalton 1988; Franklin, et al. 1992; Czudnowski 1976; Holmberg 1992; Percheron and Jennings 1981; and Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992.
  5. Fiorina 1981; Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Hibbs 1987; Lewis-Beck 1988; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay 1991; Clarke and Whitely 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993.