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**Party Representation and Leader Representation.
Does it matter how it fits?**

First draft, comments welcome

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Prepared for the research workshop

WHAT WERE THE ELECTIONS ABOUT? HOW DO WE KNOW IT?

RESEARCH WORKSHOP OF THE ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
CO-SPONSORED BY CSES (COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTROAL SYSTEMS)
AND TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY

TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 24-26 2010.

Party Representation and Leader Representation. Does it matter how it fits?

1. Introduction

The personalization of politics is a big topic in electoral research. One thrust of the argument for the assumingly increasing personalization in the calculus of voting is the way in which election campaigns have changed due to the role of the mass-media focusing more on persons than ever before (Hayes 2009); a second argument concerns the role of persons in politics as cues or shortcuts (Mondak 1993) in an increasingly complex political world in which it becomes more and more difficult to observe differences between parties and their election platforms without reference to the political personal. A third aspect is the move of parliamentary systems towards an increasing power and executive authority of leaders, a development also called “presidentialization of politics” (Mughan 2000). Ian McAllister argues that the personalization of politics is not restricted to presidential system: “In a trend that has been shared by all of the liberal democracies, politics has become increasingly personalized... The popular focus on leaders now appears commonplace across almost all of the major parliamentary systems, where parties once occupied the center stage” (McAllister 2007: 572).

In parliamentary democracies, however, it is almost universally the case that parties rather than persons get the mandate to represent and to govern. From this seemingly contradiction between mandating and the assumed increase in the role of persons in voting, the question arises, which role parties and leaders do play in citizens’ voting behavior. This paper argues that research has largely neglected the role of the interplay of the evaluations of parties and their leaders by too strongly concentrating on personalization. The general claim here is that the distinction between person/leader and organization implicitly assumed by the personalization hypothesis does not capture how voters observe politics. In contrast, the hypothesis pursued here is that parties and their personal form a unity in the views of the voters, with a dominant role of party-related evaluations for voting behavior. This does not imply that leaders do not count – to the contrary: for vote choice it is decisive that parties and their personal are in congruence in voters’ perception.

This hypothesis will be further developed in section 2 and investigated in two steps. In section 3, the role of the interplay between party and leader evaluations for turnout will be

investigated and the variation of the impact of these two mobilizing evaluations across different macro contexts explored. Section 4 deals with the interplay of party and leader evaluations and their relative impact on vote choice across different macro contexts. Section 5 concludes.

2. Parties, leaders, and vote choice: state of research, hypotheses, data and model

If there would be a personalization or presidentialization of politics in parliamentary systems, this would leave political representation and electoral democracy with a puzzle. The object evaluated in order to arrive at a vote choice would be a different one than the object of choice. Ian McAllister has observed this and stated “many of the changes in political leadership that are taking place, particularly in parliamentary systems, occur in absence of any significant institutional change” (McAllister 2007: 577). This is because in parliamentary democracies, almost universally parties rather than persons get the mandate to represent and to govern. In parliamentary democracies the simplest and best way to describe the electoral link is the responsible party model (Schattschneider 1977). Political representation in parliamentary democracies is collective representation, i.e. of voters by parties, rather than a dyadic relation between voters and a person (Thomassen 1991). Basically, the system of representation implemented is one in which political parties offer an implicit contract between voters and elected. Voters vote for a program offered by one of the parties, parties commit their MPs to this program, and by this commitment “parties are essential for making the democratic accountability of MPs meaningful” (Müller 2000, 311). In terms of the principal-agent approach: delegation runs from voters to parties, from parties to MPs and government officials, accountability consequently from government officials and MPs to political parties, and from political parties to voters (Weßels 2007). Under these conditions the vote goes to a party for a mandate, regardless whether the vote is a personal or a list vote.

If personalization is on its way, i.e. if there is an increase in the role of persons for voting, this seemingly is a contradiction between mandating and the rational of vote choice. Whether this is really a contradiction depends on the view on political representation. Thus, should the calculus of voting not only be instructed by evaluation of parties rather than leaders? This would neglect that parties are collective bodies which organizes accountability but cannot act themselves. As simple as it is, only persons are actors. Not the party sits in parliament but their deputies, who may be strictly bound to party discipline or not. Thru them “party” becomes visible - or not.

Research on the personalization or presidentialization of politics has surprisingly little looked into the dimension of representation. Representation is also rather a neglected focus in electoral research. Although in spatial voting models the relationship to representation is close, it is seldom explicated in this way. Research into the role of leaders for voting behavior has looked into general evaluations of parties and leaders, i.e. like-dislike scales, sympathy thermometer, and the like; and into specific leadership traits. Here, we do not deal with any of these measures but concentrate on the relevance of voters' evaluation of representation by parties and leaders for their voting behavior.

Even though this implies introducing a new focus into the debate about personalization, the implications of personalization with regard to the impact of leader vis-à-vis party should be similar. Lauri Karvonen has systematically reviewed existing (comparative) studies. Not so clear is whether there is a trend towards personalization. Whereas Holmberg and Oscarson come to the conclusion, that the independent effect of party leaders is a fairly marginal phenomenon, and that the alleged increase in leader effects over time is a myth (cited from Karvonen 2010: 10), in contrast Poguntke and Webb conclude that the overwhelming weight of evidence lies in favor of the presidentialization thesis (Poguntke, Webb 2005), and McAllister also concludes that the popularity of leaders on the probability of voting for a party show consistently strong effect (McAllister 2007). There is, however, not only the effect on voting for a party but on voting at all: "leaders are now important not just for voter conversion, but for mobilization as well, traditionally the major function of the political parties" (McAllister 2007). Thus, both, the impact on turnout and the impact on vote choice have to be investigated.

With regard to differences between different parliamentary elections, one unanimous finding is that personalization is more widespread and important in majoritarian than in systems with proportional representation (Karvonen 2010: 10ff). McAllister argues that greater executive authority and the ability to shape policy increased personalization. This is the case in presidential system, the there is also "clear evidence that the post-war operation of parliamentary systems has moved close to this presidential model" (McAllister 2007: 576).

Thus, comparative research on the personalization hypothesis provides the following insides: 1) leaders matter both for turnout, and for vote choice; 2) electoral systems matter, i.e. plurality or majority electoral systems are more prone to personalization than proportional systems; 3) executive authority matters, i.e. the higher the more do leaders count for voters.

What does this research tell us about leaders vs. parties as elements of the calculus of voting? Results are obviously mixed in this regard. Our hypothesis is, as mentioned above, that the focus on leaders took the wrong route with the emphasis on personalization.

Rather, parties are still the dominant object of orientation. This does not imply that leaders do not count. To the contrary, for the electoral success it is crucial that parties and leaders match and are congruent in citizens' evaluations. We argue with Holmberg and Oscarson that an effect of leaders independent of parties is rather unlikely in parliamentary elections. In our view, the way in which voters accumulate information to derive at a vote choice starts with parties and information about a leading candidate enables them to make judgments about the suitability of party and candidate. This hypotheses, however, does not claim that there is no variation in the relevance of leaders for voting behavior.

Hypotheses

On the background of previous findings, the respective hypotheses can be formatted straight forward. It seems to be reasonable to assume that there are two different dimensions which shape the role of leaders for vote choice: the institutional setup of a political system, and the formal structure of political competition.

Turning to the institutional factors first, research has argued that electoral system and executive authority should matter for the role of leaders on voting behavior. Klingemann and Weßels have shown that voters are able to apply evaluation standards in accordance with the institutional setup and the related utility of evaluation criteria (Klingemann, Weßels 2009). Results show that the more restrictive the electoral system, i.e. the higher the threshold and the lower the district magnitude, the more impact have candidate evaluation on *party vote*. This implies that in more restrictive electoral systems even if the vote is cast for a party the yardstick are leader evaluations. In the same way as their influence increases the impact of party evaluation decreases the more restrictive the electoral system. This implies that in plurality/majority systems, leader evaluations show a relative stronger impact on the vote than party evaluation which is dominant in PR systems. One consideration is that it matters, how important leaders and in particular executive leaders are in a political system. This relates to the debate about the presidentialization of politics. Germany, for example, is regarded as a "chancellor's democracy" because of the crucial role the chancellor plays with regard to the personal composition of cabinet and with regard to the supremacy over policies of the cabinet. Thus, executive dominance might matter for leader's impact on vote choice. The hypothesis is straight forward: the higher the executive dominance, the stronger the impact of leader evaluation on the vote relative to party evaluation. This general hypothesis should also fit for the specific evaluation of representation by parties and leaders.

With regard to the formal structure of political competition, there are several aspects which may be relevant for the impact of leader evaluations. One is the closeness of the race. If one regards voting as an act which does not happen in a vacuum but in social

context, the information about the closeness between the two largest parties provides voters with a number of information. One is that voting may count, because the race is close. A second is the information that obviously a rather similar proportion of people evaluate both parties positively. This can imply that voters try to use additional criteria beyond party to arrive at a decision. In such a situation, leadership evaluation can become relatively more decisive than compared to a clear difference between the two biggest competitors.

A second feature of the structure of political competition is fragmentation or hegemony of two parties over the competition. Vote concentration on the two biggest parties indicates their dominance and their competition about executive leadership. In such a situation, it is quite likely that leadership evaluation outperform the relevance of party evaluation for the vote.

These considerations leave us with the following four hypotheses concerning the relative importance of leaders' effect on voting behavior:

H1: Compared across electoral systems, leader evaluations should be relatively more important for voting behavior in plurality/majority electoral systems as compared to proportional systems. Mixed electoral systems are in between.

H2: The stronger the executive dominance, the relatively more important are leader evaluation for voting behavior.

H3: The closer the race between the two biggest parties the more relevance entertains leader evaluation in addition to party evaluation for voting behavior.

H4: The more votes the two biggest parties receive, the more relevant become leader evaluation for voting behavior.

These four hypotheses have to be specified differently relating to turnout and to vote choice. Before we turn to voting, a short introduction into the data and the model follows.

Data and Model

For the comparative analysis, we use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), second module (2001-2006), the final release. The data are publicly available at www.cses.org. From the available election studies in this module only parliamentary elections have been selected. The number of available countries is limited furthermore by the availability of macro-data, in particular on executive dominance. With regard to executive dominance, the Consensus Democracy Indicators database has been used. It covers 26 countries of the second CSES module. Four countries could not be included because they provided a presidential election study or because they did not ask for representation by leaders (Belgium, France, Japan, and the Netherlands). Thus, 22 election

studies from 22 countries are used for the analysis. The distribution of macro-characteristics across countries can be found in table A1 in the appendix.

On cross-country average, 40 percent do not feel represented by a party nor a leader; 12 percent by a party only, 8 percent by a leader only, 7 percent by both but not from the same party, and one third by both in a consonant way. The detailed distribution across countries is displayed in table 1.

Table 1: Distribution of Feeling being represented by a Party, a Leader, or both in 22 Parliamentary Elections

	no repr	party only	cand only	dissonant	consonant
AUS_2004	14,1	8,5	6,1	11,3	60,0
CAN_2004	28,2	7,9	8,2	3,7	52,0
GBR_2005	25,8	10,4	5,5	5,7	52,7
USA_2004	16,3	8,3	12,2	5,2	58,1
DEU12002	36,9	13,3	12,4	15,9	21,7
HUN_2002	22,8	4,0	12,7	29,9	30,7
ITA_2006	74,2	7,1	3,8	1,0	13,9
NZL_2002	20,4	15,2	13,3	11,3	39,9
BGR_2001	71,3	7,6	7,9	0,1	13,2
CHE_2003	34,3	33,0	6,1	2,1	24,5
CZE_2002	74,6	11,1	1,2	0,0	13,2
DNK_2001	22,1	19,7	7,0	6,0	45,2
ESP_2004	33,4	4,0	5,1	0,8	56,6
FIN_2003	39,6	21,4	9,0	7,5	22,5
IRL_2002	28,5	10,5	7,7	7,1	46,3
ISL_2003	34,0	21,4	11,1	5,0	28,6
NOR_2001	19,7	15,1	6,2	14,7	44,3
POL_2001	80,5	6,9	5,7	0,8	6,1
PRT_2002	45,5	7,2	9,0	4,3	34,0
ROU_2004	54,1	6,2	12,3	10,6	16,9
SVN_2004	76,2	6,5	6,9	1,9	8,6
SWE_2002	28,0	23,5	4,3	5,0	39,2
Mean	40,0	12,2	7,9	6,8	33,1
Min	14,1	4,0	1,2	0,0	6,1
Max	80,5	33,0	13,3	29,9	60,0

The data have been used in two different formats. For the analysis of participation in the election the traditional form of the matrix is used. For the analysis of vote choice a stacked data set has been constructed. It allows investigating vote choice in a binary way (simple logistic regression) without being forced to use multinomial logistic regression.

Disregarding macro variables and their interactions with micro variables, the model used is very simple. It consists of party identification, the feeling of being represented by a party, and feeling of being represented by a leader. The rational of this simple model is the

following. Party and leader evaluations figure quite at the end of the funnel of causality of vote choice (Miller, Shanks 1996). These are short-term factors which are shaped by the election campaign. The long-term factors like position in the social structure, values and beliefs, and the like, are factors which are quite well covered by party identification. There is no doubt, that they are not identical with party identification, but party identification is the most important long-term factor for voting behavior which entails quite a proportion of those factors standing to the left of party identification in the funnel of causality (Miller, Shanks 1996).

3. Turnout

The four hypotheses laid out above must be specified for turnout. The specification is not very demanding. In accordance with the argument of McAllister we assume that parties and leaders mobilize voters. If voters feel represented by a party or a candidate one can assume that the campaign has reached this voter. If a voter has developed a positive opinion about both, parties and candidates, this should insure her that going voting is the right thing because it relates to representation. Thus, a voter having evaluated both objects positively should more likely vote than a voter who has done so only for one, either party or candidate. Table 2 shows the results.

Table 2: Probability of voting, depending on party and candidate representation

Party Representation	Candidate Representation		Diff P-C	Diff Both-P
	No	Yes		
All				
- No	0,42	0,60		
- Yes	0,77	0,87	0,17	0,09
No PID				
- No	0,38	0,52		
- Yes	0,70	0,79	0,18	0,09
PID				
- No	0,66	0,74		
- Yes	0,83	0,90	0,10	0,07

Results from logistic regression of having voted on party identification, party representation, and candidate representation controlled by country dummies, 31913 cases, 22 countries, reference USA. All variables are statistically significant at 0.05, except dummy for Romania. Pseudo R-square 0.23

Controlled for country, the probability to vote is highest when voters feel represented by both, party and leaders. The probability to participate in elections is on average 9 percentage points higher as compared to voters who have only evaluated parties positively.

Comparing feeling represented by a candidate to feeling represented by a party shows that the probability of voting is 17 percent higher for party representation than for candidate representation. Comparing voters, who do identify with a party to those who do not, the levels of the probability of voting are higher for those, who identify. Despite the difference in levels, however, the pattern of differences in probabilities regarding party- and leader-representation is very similar. Thus, a first conclusion regarding the mobilization hypothesis of McAlister clearly is: a positive evaluation of party representation is more important for turning out than a positive evaluation of leader representation. However, turnout is highest, if voters feel represented by both, parties and leaders.


Does the relevance of leader evaluation vary across contexts? The hypotheses suggest that leader evaluation should matter more for turnout in plurality/majority systems than in PR systems, more in countries with strong executive dominance, more in countries with a close race between the two biggest parties, and more in countries where the two biggest parties have a larger vote share. In order to evaluate these hypotheses, the marginal effects of party- and leader evaluations under variation of the macro variables have been calculated. These calculations base on logistic regressions with interactions for the respective variable of interest, i.e. party representation, and leader representation. Probabilities for turnout by country estimated by the basic model including country dummies are displayed in table A2 in the appendix.

$$\text{Turnout} = a + \beta_1 \text{PartyRep} + \beta_2 \text{LeaderRep} + \beta_3 \text{Party ID} + \beta_3 \text{MacroVar} + \beta_4 \text{PartyRep*MacroVar} + \beta_5 \text{LeaderRep*MacroVar} + e$$


Figure 1 shows the results. Three of the four hypotheses are clearly supported by the results. In proportional electoral systems, the marginal effect of party representation is far higher than of leader representation, for the four plurality/majority systems in our analysis, the marginal effect of leader evaluation is a little higher than party evaluation (panel 1 of figure 1). With regard to executive dominance results show that where it is low, party representation plays a role for voting, leader representation not. In systems with strong executive dominance, party and leader marginal effects are equally strong (panel 2). Vote share difference between the two biggest parties does not fully produce the expected effects. The relevance of party representation increases the more apart parties' vote shares are. However, the relevance of candidate representation does not increase the closer the race is (panel 3). Finally, the degree of dominance of the two biggest parties in the party system shows that the less they are, the larger the marginal effect of party representation.

Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Party and Candidate Representation on Voting under varying Macro Conditions


a) Electoral System




b) Executive Dominance



c) Vote Share Difference between biggest Parties



d) Sum of Vote Share for biggest Parties



In systems where they together hold 75 percent of the votes, the influence changes, and where they hold even more, the marginal effect of leader representation becomes even bigger than that of party representation for voting (panel 4).

4. Vote Choice

For vote choice the model is that voters vote according to their positive evaluations of parties and/or leaders, and their party identification. In a first step, we analyze the overall relative relevance of party and leader representation for vote choice. Stacked data are used, the logistic regression includes feeling represented by a party, feeling represented by a leader, party identification, and country dummies.

The probability to vote for a party is very low when there is no positive evaluation or no party identification (below 10 percent; table 3). When a voter identifies with a party, the probability to vote for that party is 44 percent even without any positive evaluation. When there is the feeling of representation by a party alone, vote probability increases strongly, when there is the feeling of representation by a leader alone, vote probability increases moderately, except for when there is also party identification. However, there is always a considerable higher probability to vote for a party in case of party representation as compared to candidate representation. If voters feel represented by a party and a leader, probability to vote for that party is 85 percent in the absence of party identification, and 98 percent if identification exists. Altogether the results show that party representation is more important for vote choice than candidate representation, but really crucial is that parties recruit the fitting leaders. Thus, it is to the benefit of the vote share very much when there is a fit and clearly to the disadvantage if this is not the case. If we take the figures of the mean distribution of varying types of representation from table 1 and calculate vote how many more votes parties could have gained if they could have convinced their voters that the leader fits to the party or vice versa, they could have gained 7 to 10 percentage points more. This is not a negligible proportion. It easily could decide about a role in government or in opposition.

Turning to the variation in the relative impact of parties and leaders on vote choice, according to the four hypotheses we expect that leader evaluation matter relatively more in plurality/majority systems, when there is executive dominance, when the race between the two biggest parties is close, and when the two biggest parties together have a very large vote share. Again, we evaluate this by estimating the marginal effects of party representation and leader representation across the variation of the macro context. The regressions performed are similar to those used in case of turnout:

$$\text{Vote Choice} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{PartyRep} + \beta_2 \text{LeaderRep} + \beta_3 \text{Party ID} + \beta_3 \text{MacroVar} + \beta_4 \text{PartyRep*MacroVar} + \beta_5 \text{LeaderRep*MacroVar} + e$$

Figure 2 displays the results in four panels. They support the hypotheses quite strongly. The marginal effect of leader representation is higher than the one for party representation in plurality systems and lower in PR systems. When executive dominance is low, the marginal effect of party representation is significantly higher than for leader representation, when executive dominance is high both show a similar marginal effect. If the race between the two biggest parties is close, marginal effects are similar, the larger the difference gets, the larger the effect of party representation and the lower the effect of leader representation. The marginal effect of party representation is much higher when the vote share of the two biggest parties is relatively low, when they share about 70 percent the marginal effects are similar, above that point leader representation becomes increasingly relevant for vote choice.

Table 3: Probability of Vote Choice according to party and candidate representation


Party Representation	Candidate Representation		Diff P-C	Diff Both-P
	No	Yes		
All				
- No	0,06	0,43		
- Yes	0,69	0,94	0,26	0,26
No PID				
- No	0,06	0,28		
- Yes	0,45	0,85	0,16	0,40
PID				
- No	0,44	0,82		
- Yes	0,90	0,98	0,08	0,09

Results from logistic regression of vote choice on party identification, party representation, and candidate representation controlled by country dummies; stacked data set, 125444 cases, 22 countries, reference USA. All variables are statistically significant at 0.05, except dummies for Australia, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, and Sweden; Pseudo R-square 0.45.


Resuming the findings on turnout and vote choice in comparative perspective, two arguments seem to be true under any circumstance: a) positive evaluations have positive consequences; b) the more parties are able to recruit leaders which fit to the party, the more votes they will get. Do they fail in this regard, it hurts them. However, to which degree parties or leaders matter more depends. On average there is no doubt that party representation matters more than leader representation for turnout and vote choice. But there are variations across different political systems.

Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Party and Candidate Representation on Vote Choice under varying Macro Conditions


a) Electoral System




b) Executive Dominance



c) Vote Share Difference between biggest Parties



d) Sum of Vote Share for biggest Parties



In terms of marginal effects, there are even instances in which leader evaluations matter more than party evaluations. This is the case in majority/plurality systems, and where the two parties have more than about 80 percent of the votes. These two aspects quite often go together but must not. In the 22 elections under investigation here, from the plurality systems only the USA fulfills both conditions, 80 percent or more of the votes have the two biggest parties in Spain, a proportional system, and Hungary, a mixed system. This implies that not all macro conditions of one country must push in the same direction.

However, even if marginal effects of candidate representation are larger than that of party representation, this does not imply that overall, leader evaluation produce a higher vote probability than party evaluation. In fact, results show that there is no country

In fact, exploring vote probabilities produced by party and leader representation in each of the countries under investigation shows in which leader evaluations produce higher probability than party evaluation, even not the USA for which all macro factors point to stronger influence of leader evaluations (see table A3 in the appendix). This finding points to the confounding effects of both types of evaluation.

5. Conclusion

Leaders matter, there is no doubt. This does not imply that the personalization of politics hypothesis is valid. This paper argues that research has largely neglected the role of the interplay of the evaluations of parties and their leaders by too strongly concentrating on personalization. The general claim was that the distinction between person/leader and organization implicitly assumed by the personalization hypothesis does not capture how voters observe politics. In contrast, the hypothesis pursued here was that parties and their personal form a unity in the views of the voters, with a dominant role of party-related evaluations for voting behavior. To explore this claim, the relative impact of leader and party evaluation on voting behavior and the impact of congruence had to be investigated.

The mixed results on personalization show that either result differs by country, or by election, or both. In order to elaborate what could contribute to differences in the relative impact of leader evaluation across countries four hypotheses have been tested in comparative perspective assuming varying impact according to electoral system, executive dominance, closeness of the race, and hegemony of the two biggest parties in a country. Results clearly support the hypotheses which in general assume that the relative impact of leader evaluation varies across contexts. This applies both, to the impact on mobilization for voting, and vote choice. In comparative perspective, it could also be shown that a

match in leader and party evaluation matter much more than any single evaluation, and that, in general, party evaluations are more relevant.

Results clearly provide evidence that the leadership factor in vote choice cannot be reasonably separated from party evaluations (and vice versa). It is the fit of parties and their personal, which matters most for vote choice. Thus, the answer to the question of the title of the paper is: the fit matters for vote choice and thus for electoral success. Parties are well advised not relying on leaders alone. In order to increase their electoral fortune they should choose leaders that fit to the party in view of the voters and the party members. A leader as good as she may be cannot compensate for a perceived mismatch between party and their personal.

Appendix

Table A1: Macro-characteristics of polities under investigation and summary statistics

	Electoral System	Executive Dominance	Vote difference two biggest parties	Concentration of votes on two biggest parties
AUS_2004	maj./plur.	18	2,8	78,1
CAN_2004	maj./plur.	17	7,1	66,4
GBR_2005	maj./plur.	18	2,9	69,4
USA_2004	maj./plur.	10	2,5	97,3
DEU12002	mixed	7	9,0	68,0
HUN_2002	mixed	9	1,0	83,1
ITA_2006	mixed	4	7,6	55,0
NZL_2002	mixed	18	20,3	62,2
BGR_2001	PR	5	24,6	60,9
CHE_2003	PR	2	3,4	50,1
CZE_2002	PR	5	5,7	54,7
DNK_2001	PR	6	2,1	60,3
ESP_2004	PR	10	4,9	80,3
FIN_2003	PR	3	0,2	49,2
IRL_2002	PR	16	19,0	64,0
ISL_2003	PR	16	2,7	64,6
NOR_2001	PR	3	3,1	45,5
POL_2001	PR	5	28,4	53,7
PRT_2002	PR	7	2,4	78,0
ROU_2004	PR	7	5,3	68,3
SVN_2004	PR	4	6,3	51,9
SWE_2002	PR	3	24,6	55,1
Summary Statistics				
n	22	23	22	22
mean		8,5	8,6	63,5
min		2,0	0,2	44,9
max		18,0	28,4	97,3
Characteristics by Electoral System				
N/Mean	N	Mean	Mean	Mean
- Majority/Plurality	4	15,8	3,8	77,8
- Mixed	4	9,5	9,5	67,1
- PR	14	6,3	9,6	58,8

Table A2: Probability of voting, depending on party and candidate representation

	No Rep	Cand only	Party only	Party & Cand	Diff P-C	Diff Both-P
AUS_2004	0,77	0,87	0,92	0,96	0,05	0,04
BGR_2001	0,22	0,38	0,62	0,78	0,24	0,16
CAN_2004	0,61	0,76	0,83	0,92	0,08	0,08
CHE_2003	0,39	0,58	0,70	0,83	0,12	0,13
CZE_2002	0,16	0,31	0,51	0,69	0,20	0,18
DEU12002	0,70	0,82	0,89	0,94	0,06	0,06
DNK_2001	0,65	0,78	0,87	0,93	0,08	0,07
ESP_2004	0,47	0,71	0,81	0,91	0,11	0,09
FIN_2003	0,46	0,66	0,78	0,88	0,12	0,10
GBR_2005	0,39	0,57	0,68	0,82	0,11	0,15
HUN_2002	0,54	0,71	0,80	0,92	0,09	0,12
IRL_2002	0,54	0,70	0,79	0,88	0,09	0,10
ISL_2003	0,73	0,85	0,91	0,96	0,06	0,05
ITA_2006	0,16	0,35	0,51	0,69	0,17	0,17
NOR_2001	0,50	0,65	0,76	0,87	0,11	0,11
NZL_2002	0,50	0,67	0,75	0,87	0,08	0,12
POL_2001	0,39	0,61	0,74	0,85	0,14	0,11
PRT_2002	0,41	0,64	0,73	0,85	0,09	0,12
ROU_2004	0,57	0,71	0,79	0,87	0,07	0,09
SVN_2004	0,43	0,61	0,73	0,86	0,12	0,13
SWE_2002	0,59	0,73	0,84	0,92	0,12	0,08
USA_2004	0,34	0,53	0,64	0,80	0,11	0,15
Mean	0,48	0,64	0,75	0,86	0,11	0,11
Min	0,16	0,31	0,51	0,69	0,05	0,04
Max	0,77	0,87	0,92	0,96	0,24	0,18

Results from logistic regression of having voted on party identification, party representation, and candidate representation controlled by country dummies, 31913 cases, 22 countries, reference USA. All variables statistically significant at 0.05 level, except dummy for Romania. Pseudo R-square 0.23, 31913

Table A3: Probability of vote choice, depending on party and candidate representation

	No Rep	Cand only	Party only	Party & Cand	Diff P-C	Diff Both-P
AUS_2004	0,10	0,62	0,83	0,98	0,10	0,62
BGR_2001	0,03	0,29	0,73	0,96	0,03	0,29
CAN_2004	0,06	0,40	0,59	0,93	0,06	0,40
CHE_2003	0,07	0,48	0,69	0,94	0,07	0,48
CZE_2002	0,03	0,32	0,67	0,94	0,03	0,32
DEU12002	0,07	0,40	0,67	0,93	0,07	0,40
DNK_2001	0,05	0,38	0,65	0,94	0,05	0,38
ESP_2004	0,07	0,57	0,77	0,97	0,07	0,57
FIN_2003	0,07	0,47	0,74	0,96	0,07	0,47
GBR_2005	0,05	0,34	0,56	0,92	0,05	0,34
HUN_2002	0,03	0,22	0,64	0,90	0,03	0,22
IRL_2002	0,06	0,33	0,55	0,90	0,06	0,33
ISL_2003	0,09	0,53	0,78	0,97	0,09	0,53
ITA_2006	0,02	0,37	0,66	0,93	0,02	0,37
NOR_2001	0,06	0,33	0,61	0,91	0,06	0,33
NZL_2002	0,06	0,46	0,61	0,94	0,06	0,46
POL_2001	0,10	0,61	0,81	0,97	0,10	0,61
PRT_2002	0,08	0,58	0,75	0,96	0,08	0,58
ROU_2004	0,08	0,40	0,56	0,90	0,08	0,40
SVN_2004	0,10	0,49	0,72	0,96	0,10	0,49
SWE_2002	0,06	0,35	0,68	0,94	0,06	0,35
USA_2004	0,05	0,46	0,64	0,94	0,05	0,46
Mean	0,06	0,43	0,68	0,94	0,06	0,43
Min	0,02	0,22	0,55	0,90	0,02	0,22
Max	0,10	0,62	0,83	0,98	0,10	0,62

Results from logistic regression of vote choice on party identification, party representation, and candidate representation controlled by country dummies, 125444 cases (stacked), 22 countries, reference USA. All variables statistically significant at 0.05 level, except dummies for Australia, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, and Sweden. Pseudo R-square 0.45.

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