

Preference voting systems and their impact on the personalisation of politics

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Abstract: In most West European democracies, the voter is allowed to choose among a party's candidates in parliamentary elections. This paper investigates the extent to which preference voting systems encourage competition among a party's candidates and the personalisation of politics. Preference voting systems are defined in terms of three main components: ballot structure, constituency structure and formulatic structure. The analyses show that the degree of intraparty competition differs greatly across preference voting systems: it is lowest in rigid list systems, moderate in personal voting systems and highest in flexible lists. They also point to the conclusion that preference voting is not an important factor determining the personalisation of politics.

Keywords: Preference voting systems, intraparty competition, personal vote.

In most West European democracies, voters are permitted to choose among a party's candidates at the level of parliamentary elections (Marsh, 1985). Preference voting is also used in parliamentary elections of several post-communist, Latin American and Asian democracies. In 14 of the 32 countries included in the CSES national election study dataset (Module 1), voters are allowed to cast preference votes for particular candidates within a party group. Intraparty preference choice is provided in legislative elections to the Lower House or the Unicameral Parliament in Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan. There are, however, major variations in the method of intraparty choice across these countries: In Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland, members of Parliament are elected by party lists from which electors can select particular candidates. In several list systems (Chile, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) voters are allowed to vote for one candidate within a party list. In Switzerland and Luxembourg voters, in contrast, have as many votes as there are seats to be filled in the constituency. Variations are also reflected in the different impact of the party -ordering of candidates on the outcome. In Chile, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland and, in most instances, in Denmark the order of election within a party group is entirely determined by the number of nominative votes candidates receive. In Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, a combination of party ordering and nominative votes determines which candidates will be elected. Finally, in other countries as in Japan (until 1994) and Taiwan members of Parliament are elected directly by voters. In these systems votes are only given to candidates.

With the notable exception of the works of Katz (1980, 1994), preference voting has been neglected in comparative studies of electoral systems. Although there is a considerable body of

literature on some preference voting systems, it typically focuses on a single country, mainly on Italy (D'Amato, 1964; D'Amico, 1987; Scaramozino, 1979; Pasquino, 1993), Japan (Dore, 1957; Thayer, 1969; Curtis, 1970, 1988) and Ireland (Chubb, 1984) etc¹. Additionally, preference voting systems have been very often poorly described.

One political implication of preference voting is that under such systems, candidates of the same party must compete amongst themselves for election. Research on several countries seems to indicate that the degree of intraparty competition differs greatly across preference systems: In Irish and Italian elections (until the 1990's) candidates compete with their party mates to be elected (Katz, 1980). Dutch and Norwegian candidates, in contrast, do not seem to organise personal campaigns to secure their election (Valen and Katz, 1965; Valen, 1989). As a second political consequence, the intraparty choice of candidates is likely to favour the personalisation of politics. In this sense, preference voting and intraparty competition is likely to increase both the visibility of candidates and the importance of voters evaluations of their qualifications for casting a vote. It should also lessen partisanship in such systems.

This paper investigates the degree to which preference voting systems favour intraparty competition and therefore the personalisation of politics. Although the paper covers the 14 preference voting systems of the CSES dataset, it also focuses on the national experience of several established democracies: Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy (until 1994), Japan (until 1994)², Luxembourg, and Malta. Preference voting systems are, in turn, defined in terms of three main components: ballot structure, constituency structure and formulatic structure³.

There are four main sections to this paper. Section one identifies electoral mechanisms for intraparty choice. Although the classification of preference voting systems is built up of a limited number of national experiences, it claims to cover all contemporary types of preference voting in use at the national level. Section two explores how preference voting systems encourage competition among a

party's candidates. It may be expected that different types of preference voting will lead to different motivations for intraparty competition. Section three provides quantitative analysis of the personalisation of politics in preference systems by using the CSES dataset. Section four offers some conclusive remarks.

1. A classification of preferential voting systems.

The common element that all preference voting systems share is that the voter has the possibility to choose among a party's candidates. There are, however, major variations in the application of preference voting across systems. Differences relate to ballot structure, constituency structure and formula structure: a) The ballot structure defines how voters cast their votes; b) the constituency structure refers to the number of seats to be filled in the constituency and the number of voters within it; c) The formulatic structure provides the method for allocating seats among and within parties. In this section, we analyse how preference voting systems differ in terms of the ballot structure and the formulatic structure.

Variations in ballot structure

The ballot structure has three main dimensions: ballot paper⁴, system of voting and nominative votes.

- There are two types of *voting systems*: personal and list procedures. In list *systems* "every vote is, wether or not given in first intance to an individual candidate, automatically and without futher reference to the voter's wishes, added to the total of the list in which the candidate appears" (Lakeman, 1970: 104). In these systems a vote for a particular candidate may contribute to the election of all other candidates of the same party. By contrast, under personal voting systems votes are given only to candidates.
 - o Personal voting systems can be further classified according to the number of nominative

votes allowed. Firstly, there is the single vote: each voter may cast a single ballot and vote for one candidate. This is known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) when expressed in nominal terms and, as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) when allowing an ordinal choice. The SNTV was used in Japanese Diet elections until 1994 and is currently employed in Taiwan. The STV is used for national elections in Ireland, Malta and Australia (Mackerras & McAllister, 1996).

The second alternative is the limited vote under which voters have more than one but fewer votes than there are seats to be filled in the district. Spanish Senate elections provide one of the few contemporary examples of the limited vote (Lijphart et al. 1994; Montabes & Ortega, 2002).

Thirdly, under the block vote voters may cast as many votes as there are candidates to be elected in multi-member districts. Ecuador briefly experimented with block voting in the 1999 parliamentary election (Ortega, 2002).

The final alternative is the approval voting which enables voters to vote for as many of the candidates as they wish (Brams & Fishburn, 1983) but it has not been applied in national elections.

o As with the personal voting classifications, there are many variations of list voting systems. Bogdanor (1983) differentiates between rigid, flexible, open and free lists. Rigid lists are of no interest here since voters can express no preference among a party's candidates. In flexible lists systems voters may cast either a "list vote" or nominative votes for particular candidates from a party list. In open list systems candidates are presented alphabetically on party lists and the voter is allowed to vote for one candidate. Finally, in free list systems candidates are listed alphabetically, but the voter has the possibility to vote for candidates of more than one party.

Marsh (1985) points out that Bogdanor's classification of preferential list systems obscures some important differences, in particular the differential effect of list ordering on the allocation of seats among a party's candidates. According to Marsh (1985) *"the most interesting difference of type is that between systems where seats are allocated between candidates purely on the basis of preference*

votes and those where the ordering of the list by the party is also a factor". However, both approaches rather than being incompatible they complement each other: whereas Marsh focuses on the effect of party ordering of candidates on the final outcome, Bogdanor considers some other important variables: ballot access and number of nominative votes allowed.

In this work, we distinguish between closed and open list systems. In closed list systems the voter is permitted to select particular candidates within a party list. In open lists the voter has the possibility to choose among a party's candidates and is also allowed to vote for candidates of more than one party. Closed list systems can be further classified into flexible and rigid lists according to the effect of party ordering of candidates on the allocation of seats among the party's candidates: in flexible list systems the order in which candidates are elected is determined by the number of individual votes they receive, whereas in rigid lists a combination of party list ordering and nominatives votes decides which candidates, within the list, are elected. In rigid list systems the ordering of candidates on the ballot is set by the party organization, in flexible list systems both alphabetical and partisan rank ordering of candidates can be used. By contrast, in open lists preference votes entirely determine the order of election.

Closed flexible lists are, or were, used in Chile, Finland, Denmark (in most instances), Greece, Italy, Poland and Slovenia. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Lithuania and Norway fit the category of closed rigid lists. Finally, Switzerland and Luxembourg use open lists to elect Members of Parliament.

Preference list systems also vary according to the number of nominative votes allowed. In several closed list systems (Chile, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden) the voter is permitted to select one particular candidate from a party list. By contrast, in Belgium, Greece, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Italy (prior to 1992) and Peru, voters are allowed to cast more than one preference vote. Italian voters were allowed to select up to three or four candidates within a party

group (Katz & Bardi, 1980). In the Czech Republic (1995 law) and Lithuania (2000) up to four preference votes are permitted. Under the new Czech Law of 2001, the number of preference votes were reduced to two. Peruvian voters are also allowed to cast two preference votes. Greek voters, in some constituencies, have the possibility to express several preference votes within a party list. In Belgium voters may cast preference votes for all candidates of a party list. Finally, in Switzerland and Luxembourg the voter has as many nominative votes as there are seats to be filled in the constituency.

Variations in the formulaic structure

The formulaic structure refers to the method for allocating seats between and within parties. In preference voting systems the formulaic structure may be divided into two components: the electoral formula and the electoral quota. The electoral formula defines the method for allocating seats among parties and, the electoral quota refers to the procedure for allocating seats within parties. In personal systems the electoral formula coincides with the electoral quota, but in list systems the electoral formula differs from the quota.

Electoral formulas are usually classified into two broad categories: majoritarian (both plurality and majority) formulas, and proportional formulas. All personal voting systems, except the STV use the plurality method for the allocation of seats. By contrast, under the STV a candidate must reach the Droop quota to be elected. This is often regarded as one of the most proportional methods.

In all cases but one (Chile) list systems are used with proportional formulas, but the type of electoral quota differs greatly across systems. There are two main types of electoral quotas: majority, and quotient procedures. Flexible and open list systems use the plurality method for the allocation of seats within party lists: those candidates with the largest number of nominative votes are declared elected. By contrast, in rigid systems a variety of quotient systems are used. In Austria and Sweden candidates must obtain 6% and 8% of the total list votes respectively to be elected on the basis of

nominative votes. Under the 1995 Czech law, the electoral quota was 10% of party voters but it was reduced to 7% in 2001. Dutch candidates must reach 25% of the Hare quota. Norwegian candidates, meanwhile, must attract the support of 51% of their party voters to be elected out of party list order.

Table 1

A classification of Preference Voting systems

1. Personal voting systems:

1.1 Multiple voting systems:

- 1.1.1. Block vote: Ecuador (1999)
- 1.1.2. Limited vote: Spanish Senate elections

1.2. Single voting systems:

- 1.2.1. Single Non-Transferable Vote: Japan (until 1994) and Taiwan
- 1.2.2. Single Transferable Vote: Australia (Senate), Malta and Ireland

2. List voting systems.

2.1. Closed lists:

- 2.1.1. Rigid lists: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
- 2.1.2. Flexible: Chile, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy (until 1993), Poland and Slovenia

2.2. Open lists

- 2.2.1. Party lists: Switzerland
 - 2.2.2. Alphabetical lists: Luxembourg
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Table 1 presents the classification of preference voting systems. The major distinction being made is the one between personal and list voting systems. Within personal voting procedures we also distinguish the block vote, the limited vote and the single vote. Although the block vote is not under investigation, it was used in the 1999 Ecuadorian parliamentary election. The limited vote is used for election to the Spanish Senate. The SNTV was used in Japanese Diet Elections and is currently employed in Taiwan. Finally, Australia, Ireland and Malta use the STV¹.

Among list systems the major distinction has to do with the degree of choice among candidates (open versus closed systems) and the type of electoral quota (flexible versus rigid lists). Flexible list

¹ For a comparative analysis of these types of systems see: Grofman et al., (1999).

systems are, or were, used in Finland, Denmark, Greece, Italy (until 1993), Poland and Slovenia. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (by some political parties) use a form of rigid lists. Finally, open lists are used in Switzerland and Luxembourg.

In all preference voting systems but rigid lists, preference votes entirely determine the order of election. By contrast, in rigid list systems a combination of party list order and nominative votes contribute to the allocation of seats within party lists.

In most countries the preference vote is nominal, meaning that voters are not able to express a rank-ordering of preference among a party's candidates. By contrast, the type of vote used in Australia, Ireland, Malta and to a certain extent in Switzerland and Luxembourg is ordinal. In Australia, Ireland and Malta voters are requested to rank candidates in order of their preferences. In Switzerland and Luxembourg voters are allowed to cast two votes per candidate.

Finally, preference voting systems differ in terms of the nature of intra-party choice, which may be either optional or compulsory. In personal voting systems, party nomination strategies determine the nature of intra-party choice. When a party nominates as many candidates as there are votes per voter, the casting of intra-party choice is optional. By contrast, a party attempting to accommodate more candidates than there are votes per voter in a personal voting system would be obliging its candidates to compete with each other since voters would not have enough votes for all the party's candidates. Intra-party choice would be inevitable.

In closed list systems, the nature of intra-party choice is set by electoral law. In several flexible systems the casting of an intra-party choice is optional: in Denmark, Greece and Italy, voters may cast either a list vote or nominative votes for particular candidates from the list. In Chile, Finland, Poland and Slovenia, the casting of a preference vote is compulsory: voters are forced to select a particular candidate within a party group. In rigid list systems the casting of nominative votes is optional but intra-party choice is compulsory since list votes are assumed to endorse the ordering of candidates by the

party.

Finally, in open list systems when a party fields as many candidates as there are votes allowed, the casting of intra-party choice is optional.

3. Incentives to organise personal campaigns in preference voting systems.

In their 1995 article in *Electoral Studies*, Carey and Shugart (1995) provide a model aiming to determine the degree to which electoral systems reward politicians' personal reputation. In particular, they focus on the effects of ballot control, vote pooling, type of votes and district magnitude. Although Shugart and Carey make important contributions to the study of electoral systems, their model does not capture an important element of preferential voting systems: the formulatic structure. In addition, they do not provide empirical data supporting their model.

Without questioning the theoretical justification of Carey and Shugart's model, in this section we examine the degree to which preference voting systems encourage competition among a party's candidates. In these systems candidates must compete with members of other parties and also with running mates to be elected. Two questions are fundamental in sorting through the incentives that preferential voting systems provide to organise personal campaigns: firstly, we should investigate the extent to which preferential voting systems encourage candidates to compete with members of other parties for election. Secondly, we should explore the extent to which these systems favour intra-party competition.

Preference voting systems are defined in terms of three basic dimensions: the ballot structure, the formulatic structure and the constituency structure. Following Carey and Shugart's model, the first two dimensions can be scored according to the incentive they offer to cultivate a personal vote: the first group- the ballot structure- can take 3 possible values: 0, 1, 2. The higher the score, the greater the incentive. The formulatic structure can take two possible values: 2 and 1. The score of " 0" for the latter

variable is excluded in preferential voting systems since it would indicate that the ordering of candidates on the ballot entirely determines the intra-party allocation of seats.

Ballot structure

The ballot structure has three main elements: the voting system, the ballot paper and nominative votes. Whereas the first dimension of the ballot structure – the voting system - creates incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote in inter-party competition, the latter two distinctions affect personal motivations for intra-party competition.

The voting system provides incentives to cultivate a personal vote in inter-party competition. It measures if the voter is allowed to support one candidate or several candidates to the exclusion of all other candidates of the same party in inter-party competition. Voting system is scored as follows:

- | |
|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">0: Systems of total transfer1: Systems of partial transfer.2. Systems without transfer. |
|---|

A score of "0" may indicate two things: firstly, a vote cast for a particular candidate may contribute to the election of all other candidates of the same party. All types of list systems are included in this category. Secondly, voters have enough votes to vote for all a party's candidates. Such systems include personal voting systems in which parties endorse as many candidates as there are votes per voter. Under these conditions, candidates of the same party do not have to compete personally with members of other political groups for election but they can compete as a group.

A score of "1" indicates that voters are allowed to support several of a party's candidates. Such systems include candidate systems with multiple voting in which parties nominate more candidates than there are votes per voter. Under such systems, candidates of the same party can compete in subgroups with members of other parties for election. In addition, the STV is included in this category: under the

STV voters are allowed to rank all a party's candidates in order of their preference, but transfers of votes depend on the election/elimination of one of the party's candidates.

Finally, a score of "2" indicates that voters are allowed to vote for one candidate from a party group. Such a system includes the SNTV. A voting system allowing voters to vote for one candidate from a party group obliges these candidates to compete individually with members of other parties for election.

Concerning ballot papers, two basic structures may be applied to build up party lists: one, the 'alphabetical list' gives all the candidates of a single party in alphabetical order. The 'partisan list', in contrast, ranks all the candidates of a single party according to the party preferences. Research on preference voting systems seems to indicate that where voters are allowed to choose among a party's candidates, the rank-order of candidates on the ballot has an effect on the vote (Darcy and McAllister, 1990). Katz and Bardi (1980) analysed the Italian parliamentary elections of 1976, finding that candidates placed higher on party lists received more nominative votes than those listed in subsequent positions. Similar position effects have been observed in Switzerland (Gruner et al., 1975), Ireland (Robson and Walsh, 1974) and Spain (Lijphart and Lopez Pintor, 1988). In this regard, alphabetical list systems are likely to create more incentives for candidates to organise personal campaigns than partisan list structures. However, Spanish Senate elections illustrate that the alphabetical rank-ordering of candidates on the ballot can be manipulated by political parties to favour particular candidates by placing their names first on the list (Montabes & Ortega, 2002).

Ballot paper is scored as follows:

- | |
|--|
| 0: Partisan ballot. |
| 1: Alphabetical ballot with party control over access to ballot. |
| 2: Alphabetical ballot without party control over access to ballot |

The nominative vote variable has two dimensions: the first dimension is the number of

nominative votes allowed, which may be either one (single voting systems) or more than one but less than the number of seats (limited voting) or equal to the number of seats (block voting). The second dimension is the type of voting voters are asked to express, which may be either nominal or ordinal. All these types of nominative votes can be used in either personal or list systems. While in personal and open list systems voters have one type of vote (nominative votes), in closed list systems voters may cast two distinct votes: a list vote and a diverse number of nominative votes². In order to analyse the effect of nominative votes on intraparty competition, we have to study separately personal and open lists systems, and closed systems. Since nominative votes in closed systems are built up of personal voting systems, we shall begin with personal and open list systems.

In both personal and open list systems, the effect of nominal votes depends on party nomination strategies. When a party nominates as many candidates as there are votes per voter in multiple voting systems (block and limited), a personal preference for one or several candidates results in a weakened party vote, that is, when a party presents three candidates and voters have three votes, intra-party choice requires voters to opt for one or two of the party's three candidates. Under these conditions, parties should prevent their candidates from competing amongst themselves.

By contrast, when a party nominates more candidates than there are votes per voter, its candidates have to compete with each other to increase the party strength. Intraparty competition takes place among subgroups of candidates rather than among candidates. Finally, under nominal single voting systems, candidates of the same party have to compete personally with each other without grouping.

Now, consider the possibility that voters are asked to rank order candidates in personal and open lists. Under ordinal voting systems, as opposed to nominal systems, a personal preference for either one or several of a party's candidates does not result in a weakened party vote, regardless of the

²Although in open list systems voters have two types of votes: nominative and list votes the number of list votes coincides with the number of nominative votes.

number of candidates nominated by the party . Under these conditions, candidates of the same party can subgroup but they have to distinguish themselves from co partisans.

Finally, in several voting systems, voters are allowed to cast up to two votes for particular candidates (cumulative voting). When voters are allowed to cast two votes for one candidate, personal motivations for intra-party competition are similar to those provided by ordinal systems. If in multiple voting systems the number of candidates for whom voters can cast two ballots is more than one, that is, if voters can vote twice or more times for several candidates of the same party, these candidates can subgroup: under these conditions intraparty competition is reduced to competition among subgroups and candidates have no incentive to differentiate from each other within their group.

Assuming that parties nominate as many candidates as there are seats to be filled in the constituency, nominative votes in personal and open list systems are scored as follows,

Block vote: 0 if nominal; 2 if ordinal, 1 cumulative
Limited vote: 1 if nominal or cumulative, 2 if ordinal
Single vote: 2 if nominal or ordinal

Next we consider the effect of nominative votes in closed systems on intra-party competition. It has been shown that when a party nominates as many candidates as there are votes per vote in both personal and open list systems, its candidates are forced to campaign as a group. When voters are permitted to vote for as many candidates as they wish from a closed party list, a personal preference for particular candidates within the party group, in contrast, does not result in a weakened party vote, since list votes entirely determine the partisan allocation of seats. Therefore, the use of both the limited and the block vote in closed list systems always favour intraparty competition but it encourages candidates to group. Intraparty competition takes place among subgroups of candidates. Under these conditions, a candidate's electoral chance depends not only on his/her personal merits but also on the ability of his/her group to get votes. When the single vote is used in closed list systems, candidates of

the same party are forced to campaign against each other without grouping.

Nominative votes in closed list systems are scored as follows:

Multiple voting systems: 1 if nominal; 2 if ordinal

Single voting systems: 2 if ordinal or nominal

Formulatic structure

Concerning the formulatic structure the major distinction of type is that between systems where preference votes alone determine which candidates, within a party group, will be elected and those where the party ordering of candidates is also a factor. The former group offers more incentives to organise personal campaigns than the latter. Electoral Quotas can be scored in the following way:

2: systems where the intraparty allocation of seats is based entirely on nominative votes

1: systems where intraparty allocation of seats is based on both nominative votes and party ordering of candidates.

In rigid list systems, the importance of personal reputation is determined by the size of the electoral quota and also by the number of a party's candidates standing and the number of nominative votes allowed. The larger the number of candidates a party nominates, the smaller the incentive its candidates have to organise personal campaigns: when a party presents a large number of candidates competing for a small number of seats, a high degree of intraparty competition could bring about that no candidate reaches the electoral quota required to be elected on the basis of nominative votes. Secondly, in rigid systems incentives to organise personal campaigns are also conditioned by the number of votes voters are allowed to express: an increase in the number of votes allowed increases the probability that some candidates reach the electoral quota with their nominative votes. As a result, the score of nominative votes (block=0, limited vote=1; single vote=2) is reversed in rigid systems. Under rigid lists, the block vote=2; the limited vote=1; the single vote=0.

Table 2 shows the ranking of preference voting systems used for national elections in 16 stable

democracies, according to the incentives each creates for candidates to cultivate a personal vote.

Table 2

Incentives to cultivate a personal vote in preference voting systems

Ballot paper	Voting system	Nominative votes	Electoral Quota	Countries
0	0	0	1	Norway, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden (1)
0	1	0	1	Australia (Senate) (2)
0	0	1	2	Switzerland (3)
0	0	2	1	Belgium, Czech Republic, Lithuania (3)
1	0	0	2	Spain (Senate) (3)
0	0	1	2	Italy, Slovenia (3)
1	0	1.5	2	Greece (4.5)
1	0	1	2	Luxembourg (4)
0	0	2	2	Chile, Poland (4)
1	0	2	2	Denmark (5)
1	1	2	2	Ireland, Malta (6)
2	0	2	2	Finland (6)
1	2	2	2	Japan, Taiwan (7)

As it is showed, rigid lists used in Austria, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden are the most restrictive systems to provide incentives for campaigning personally. The Australian STV system has a score of "2". In Australian Senate elections candidates are hardly encouraged to organise personal campaigns. The Senate ballot paper has two sections: voters can vote either above or below the line: if they vote above the line, they have to write "1" next to one party name; if voters vote below the line, they are required to rank order all candidates on the ballot. The former choice allows the voter to treat STV as a rigid list system (Farrell et al., 1996). If voters choose to vote above the line, their preference votes are distributed according to the party's ordering.

The third group with a score of 3 includes several systems: the Belgian rigid list, the Swiss open list system, the Spanish limited vote and the Italian flexible list. Under the Belgian rigid list system, voters have as many votes as there are candidates of a same political group competing. As a result of the application of this approval voting, Belgian candidates are more likely to reach the electoral quota with their nominative votes than their counterparts are in other rigid list systems. In all these list systems, candidates of the same party usually compete amongst themselves for election. Spanish candidates, in contrast, hardly organise personal campaigns. It should be taken into account that although the limited vote is used in Spanish Senate elections it works as a block system: both larger and minor Spanish parties usually endorse as many candidates as each voter has votes³. Under these conditions, candidates of the same party are discouraged to compete amongst themselves for election.

On the next position with a score between 4 and 5 several flexible list systems with optional intraparty choice (Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg) and with compulsory preference voting (Chile and Poland) are found. However, the score of Luxembourgish and Danish systems can be overvalued since in both countries parties usually place a candidate first on the list and present all other candidates in alphabetical order. Under the electoral law of Poland and Chile, intraparty choice is obligatory but the ballot paper lists candidates according to party preferences. Voters are allowed to cast one preference votes and candidates are elected on the basis of nominative votes.

The Irish and Maltese STV and the Finnish flexible list have a score of 6. Under these systems, voters have no option but to vote for a particular candidate from a party group to cast a valid vote. Finally, the Japanese SNTV offers the greatest incentives to organise personal campaigns.

Constituency structure

So far, we have analysed the influence of ballot and formulatic structure upon party

³A. Lijphart, R. López Pintor and Y. Sone (1994), "The limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples", in B. Grofman and A. Lijphart (eds), *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, Agathon Press, New York, pp. 163.

competition, we consider now the effect of the constituency structure. The constituency structure has two dimensions: the first one is the number of seats to be filled in each district (constituency magnitude), the second one is the number of voters per district (constituency size). The effect of constituency magnitude on intraparty competition depends on ballot papers: while in partisan systems a large constituency magnitude may contribute to reinforce the party rank-ordering of candidate, in alphabetical list systems a large district magnitude may contribute to encourage intraparty competition, since it is more difficult for parties to manipulate the order in which candidates are listed on the ballot. Concerning the effect of the constituency size on intraparty competition, it could be stated that the smaller the district size, the weaker efforts candidates have to make to contact personally voters and therefore, the greater the incentive for candidates to organise personal campaigns.

Intraparty competition is a slippery concept and there is no easy way to measure it. Three measurements will be used to evaluate patterns of intraparty competition: the use of nominative votes, the Gini index of inequality and intrapartisan defeats.

Firstly, the use of nominative votes measures whether voters express a personal preference for particular candidates from a party group or they cast no intra-party choice. In single voting systems this index can be easily calculated: the number of nominative votes is divided by the total of list votes. However, in multiple voting systems calculating the use of intraparty choice is more complicated. This can be estimated by calculating first the total number of nominatives votes allowed and by dividing the number of nominative votes effectively cast for particular candidates by the first result.

The second parameter, the Gini index of inequality, measures whether voters concentrate their nominative votes on particular candidates, or spread their votes equally among a party's candidates (Wildgen, 1985). It ranges from 0 to 1. A score of '1' indicates that voters concentrate their nominative votes on a single candidate within a party group, whereas a value of '0' means that voters spread their nominative votes equally among all a party's candidates. The higher the score, the lower the degree of

intra-party competition.

The Index of intrapartisan defeats —to use the term coined by Katz (1994)— measures the percentage of incumbent candidates who are defeated by newcomer mates. An incumbent candidate is a member of the immediately preceding legislature. *"In simple terms, each Member of Parliament must be re-elected, defeated or not considered a candidate at the next election. Those who are defeated can lose in either of two ways. On one hand, their party can lose strength so that it no longer wins sufficient mandates to allow all the incumbents standing to be re-elected (partisan defeat). On the other hand, if a new member is elected, then the defeat of an incumbent can not be regarded as purely a partisan matter, instead, intraparty processes must have played a significant role"* (intrapartisan defeat) (Katz, 1994).

The index of intrapartisan defeats may range from 0 to 100. A value of '0' indicates that no incumbent member suffers intraparty defeat. A score of '100' means that newcomer mates defeat all incumbents standing.

A high use of preference voting in combination with a Gini value equal to or near '0' and large proportions of defeated incumbents is indicative of a high degree of intraparty competition. A low degree of competition within a party group, in contrast, will be illustrated by a low use of preference voting, a Gini value equal to or near 1, and a small proportion of defeated incumbents.

Table 3

Measurement of intraparty competition in 15 countries

Country Date of election	Use of preference voting (%)	Gini index	Intrapartisan defeats
Spain (Senate), 1993-1996	5*	0.15	1.4
Japan, 1986-1990	100	0.09	2.7
Australia (Senate), 1993-1998	5	0.93	2.5
Malta, 1996-1998	100	0.55	15.4

Country Date of election	Use of preference voting (%)	Gini index	Intrapartisan defeats
Ireland, 1992-1997	100	0.26	4.2
Austria, 1995-1999	19.3	0.63	-
Belgium, 1995-1999	66.2	0.48	-
Netherlands, 1994-1998	17.5	0.78	-
Sweden, 1994-1998	30	0.66	-
Denmark, 1994-1998	30	0.43	9.7
Finland, 1995-1999	100	0.49	15
Greece, 1993-1996	89	0.36	15.9
Italy, 1987-1992	30	0.47	9
Luxembourg, 1995-1999	40	0.30	8.3
Switzerland, 1995-1999	50*	ND	3.7

Notes: *=Estimation; NA= No available.

Table 3 presents the three measurements of intraparty competition in 15 countries for recent elections. As it can be observed, rigid list systems have the lowest degree of intraparty competition. Under these systems, with the important exception of the Belgian one, most voters do not cast nominate votes for particular candidates within a party list. When they choose among a party's candidates, they tend to concentrate their nominative votes on a few candidates, mainly on those placed high on party lists. As a result, no incumbent candidate is defeated by a newcomer mate under such systems.

Flexible list systems have the highest degree of intraparty competition: Finland, Greece, Italy and Denmark. The major difference between these systems is ballot structure. In Finnish and Greek elections, most parties use the alphabetical ballot structure to build up party lists. In Italian lists, most candidates, in contrast, were listed according to their party preferences. Finally, Danish parties usually place one candidate first on the list and present all other candidates in alphabetical order.

The degree of intraparty competition in personal voting systems is lowest in Australian and Spanish Senate elections, moderate in Irish and Japanese elections, and highest in Maltese ones.

Data shows that most Spanish voters do not choose among a party's candidates in Senate elections. When they cast a personal preference for particular candidates, they tend to choose candidates placed first on party columns. Most incumbents are listed high on party lists. As a result, a small proportion of incumbent candidates are defeated by newcomer mates.

Under the STV in Australian Senate elections, most voters vote above the line. When Australian voters choose to vote below the line, they concentrate their first preference votes on candidates whose names appear high on party columns. In addition, most incumbent candidates are listed first on party columns. The result is that a small proportion of incumbents are defeated by newcomer mates.

In Irish and Japanese elections (until the nineties) minor parties usually nominate just one candidate in each constituency. Larger parties, meanwhile, are forced to nominate more candidates than the single vote per elector in most constituencies in an attempt to secure a majority of parliamentary seats. As a result, intra-party competition only affects candidates of major parties in Irish and Japanese elections. When voters choose among a major party's candidates, they tend to disperse their nominative votes widely among the party's candidates. The result is that, under such systems, a small proportion of incumbent candidates was defeated by newcomer mates. The main reason accounting for this is that major parties tend to nominate as many candidates as it is possible to elect (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1994; Cox, 1997; Cox and Ninou, 1999).

The degree of intra-party competition is highest in Maltese elections. The Maltese ballot list all candidates of a single party in alphabetical order. Both minor and major parties usually nominate more candidates than there are seats to be filled in each constituency (Hirczy and Lane, 1997). This overnomination strategy clearly increases intraparty competition by pitting many candidates from the same party against each other for the same limited seats. The result is that a large proportion of incumbent candidates were defeated by newcomer mates.

3. Preference voting and the personalisation of politics.

Intraparty competition under preference voting systems is likely to foster the personalisation of politics for three main reasons. Firstly, to cast a preference vote, voters need to inform themselves not only about party platforms but also about the profile of individual candidates running for election. Secondly, candidates must run personal campaigns to compete against their co-partisans for election. This increases the visibility of individual candidates. In addition, candidates must differentiate themselves from their co-partisans and are forced to compete on a personal basis. In this regard, intraparty choice rewards personal qualifications of candidates. Thirdly, once they have been elected, Members of Parliament must keep close contact with their constituencies and be concerned about their constituents' preferences in order to secure their reelection. All these factors are likely to lessen partisanship in preference voting systems. Preference voting systems are less convenient for political parties than non-preference systems since they increase the political visibility of candidates, reward personal qualifications of candidates and homework of Members of Parliament (MPs). These factors may lead to weaken the role of parties in parliamentary elections.

In part 3 we analyse how preference voting affects the personalisation of politics. We provide quantitative analysis of it in both preference and non-preference voting systems by using the CSES dataset. In all preference systems under investigation but two (Taiwan and Chile) the intraparty choice is provided in party lists of Proportional Representation. In Chile Party lists are used with plurality rule, whereas in Taiwan the SNTV is employed. The major difference among preference list systems are that between flexible and rigid lists. Within non-preference voting systems we have a great variety of voting procedures: Closed and blocked party lists are used with Proportional Representation in the parliamentary elections of Israel, Portugal, Spain and Romania. Personal voting systems in single-member districts are used in Australia, Belarus, Canada, Great Britain, Mexico, Korea and the United

States. In Belarus, Canada, Great Britain and USA the "First Past the Post" system is employed to elect Members of Parliament. In elections to the Australian House of Representative, the Alternative Vote with Majority Rule is used. In Korea and Mexico, although voters have a single personal vote, seats are allocated at two levels. In the remaining cases with no intraparty choice (Germany, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Russia, Thailand and Ukraine), a double ballot mixed system is used to elect Members of Parliament.

According to our expectations concerning the personalisation of politics, voters knowledge of candidates running for parliamentary election is expected to be higher in preference voting systems than in systems with no intraparty choice. In CSES national election studies (module 1), voters were asked whether they could remember the name of at least one candidate running for election in their district. The proportion of voters recalling at least one candidate is portrayed in table 4.

Table 4

Proportion of respondents recalling at least one candidate in both preference and non-preference voting systems (%)

Preference voting systems		Non preference voting systems	
Belgium 1999	NA	Australia 1996	NA
Czech Republic 1996	59,3	Belarus 2001	16,2
Denmark 1998	77,5	Canada 1997	68,5
Iceland 1999	83,4	Germany 1998	58,7
The Netherlands	Na	Great Britain 1997	NA
Peru 2000, 2001	55.0	Hungary 1998	65,2
Poland, 2002	74.4	Israel 1996	Na
Slovenia, 1996	NA	Japan 1996	93,8
Sweden , 1998	37,9	Korea 2000	91,7
Switzerland, 1999	51,0	Mexico 1997, 2001	24,2
Taiwan, 1996	36,3	New Zealand 1996	79.6

Norway, 1997	68,7	Portugal 2002	21.2
		Romania 1996	31.7
		Russia 1999	71.2
		Spain 1996, 2000	29.0
		Ukraine 1998	59.8
		United States 1996	55.8
		Lithuania 1997*	NA
		Thailand 2001	NA
Mean	60.3	Mean	54.7

Notes: NA= Not available. *= Under the 1992 Lituianian law, closed and blocked lists were used in the proportional tier. The 2000 electoral reform introduced preference voting in multi-member constituencies.

Table shows that the proportion of respondents recalling at least one candidate is high in most systems. It also shows that this proportion is in overall terms higher in preference voting systems than in systems with no intraparty choice. All preference vote systems but two (Sweden and Taiwan) show high levels of recalling, regardless of the voting procedure. Within non-preference voting systems, the proportion of voters recalling candidates varies greatly: it ranges from a minimum of 16.2% in the 2001 parliamentary election of Belarus to a maximum of 93.8% in the Japanese election. Data also shows that with the important exception of Belarus, both 'The First Past the Post' and 'Double ballot mixed' systems favour voters knowledge of candidates. By contrast, Portugal, Spain and Romania use closed and blocked lists in parliamentary elections and show low proportions of recalling. These data points to the conclusion that although preference voting systems favour voters knowledge of candidates, other electoral systems (personal voting in single-member districts and mixed systems) may contribute to it.

We have also investigated whether preference voting favours voters contact with MPs. In the CSES national election studies, voters were asked whether they had had some contact with MPs in the last twelve months. Table 5 shows the proportion of voters who reported having had a contact with MPs for each national election. Most voters did have no contact with their parliamentarians. In overall terms the proportion of voters reporting having had some contact with MPs is slightly higher in preference

systems than in systems with no intraparty choice. Within preference voting procedures, the highest proportion of voters contact with MPs is found in three flexible lists: Iceland, Switzerland and Denmark. Concerning non-preference voting systems, the diverse voting procedures do not seem to influence voters contact with MPs. As an example, the proportion of voters having contacted MPs in the last year is higher in Israel with closed and blocked party lists than in First Past the Post systems as Great Britain and the United States.

Table 5

Voters contact with MPs in both preference and non-preference voting systems (%)

Preference voting systems		Non preference voting systems	
Belgium 1999	NA	Australia 1996	15.7
Czech Republic 1996	7.4	Belarus 2001	8.9
Chile, 1999	11.6	Canada 1997	21.5
Denmark, 1998	19.9	Germany 1998	11.3
Iceland, 1998	30.3	Great Britain 1997	12.4
Norway, 1997	14.5	Hungary 1998	7.0
Peru 2000, 2001	8.9	Israel 1996	16.2
Poland, 2002	5.7	Japan 1996	7.4
Slovenia, 1996	NA	Korea 2000	16.1
Sweden, 1998	9.9	Mexico 1997	10.2
Switzerland, 1999	20.4	New Zealand 1996	23.7
Taiwan, 1996	7.9	Portugal 2002	6.1
The Netherlands, 1998	4.6	Romania 1996	6.9
		Russia 1999	2.5
		Spain 1996, 2000	3.3
		Ukraine 1998	7.5
		United States 1996	12.3
		Lithuania 1997*	15.3
		Thailand 2001	16.0
Mean	12.8	Mean	11.5

Notes: NA= Not available. *= Under the 1992 Lituianian law, closed and blocked lists were used in the proportional tier. The 2000 electoral reform introduced preference voting in multi-member constituencies.

In our study, we have also examined whether preference vote increases the representative role of MPs. In the CSES national election studies, electors were asked whether Members of Parliament/Congress know what ordinary people think. Table 6 portrayed for each country the proportion of voters who agreed on this statement (answers "1" and "2" to the question). Data show that the proportion of respondents who regard MPs as sensitive to people's thinking is in overall terms slightly higher in preference systems than in systems with no intraparty choice.

Table 6

Proportion of voters who agree on the statement "Members of Parliaments know what ordinary people think" in both preference and non-preference voting systems (%)

Preference voting systems		Non preference voting systems	
Belgium 1999	26.9	Australia 1996	14.6
Czech Republic 1996	25.8	Belarus 2001	27.6
Chile, 1999	32.4	Canada 1997	18.1
Denmark, 1998	41.1	Germany, 1998	20.9
Iceland, 1998	36.5	Great Britain, 1997	28.8
Norway, 1997	32.2	Hungary, 1998	30.4
Peru 2000, 2001	31.3	Israel, 1996	37.8
Poland, 2002	26.1	Japan, 1996	7.4
Slovenia, 1996	36.0	Korea, 2000	13.7
Sweden, 1998	20.5	Mexico, 1997	27
Switzerland, 1999	32.8	New Zealand, 1996	18.8
Taiwan, 1996	15.7	Portugal, 2002	30.2
The Netherlands, 1998	23.7	Romania, 1996	40.8
		Russia, 1999	33.8

		Spain 1996, 2000	28.6
		Ukraine, 1998	50
		United States, 1996	22.8
		Lithuania, 1997*	23.2
		Thailand, 2001	34.4
Mean	29.3	Mean	26.7

Notes: NA= Not available. Source: CSES National elections studies.

Our last expectation is that preference voting is likely to lessen partisanship. The degree of partisanship can be measured by using two variables of the CSES dataset. Firstly, voters were asked whether they felt close to a political party. This variable can be used as an indicator of party identification. According to our expectations the proportion of voters with no party identification should be higher in preference voting systems than in no-preference systems. Secondly, voters were asked to give their opinion on the necessity of parties for the political system. According to our expectations, the proportions of voters who consider political parties as necessary to make the political system work should be lower in preference voting systems than in systems with no intraparty choice.

Table 7

Proportion of voters who feel close to a party in both preference and non-preference voting systems (%)

Preference voting systems		Non preference voting systems	
Belgium 1999	85.3	Australia 1996	80.8
Czech Republic 1996	44.7	Belarus 2001	8.2
Chile, 1999	19.8	Canada 1997	49.1
Denmark, 1998	48.7	Germany, 1998	36.0
Iceland, 1998	50.5	Great Britain, 1997	45.7
Norway, 1997	52.4	Hungary, 1998	34.9
Peru 2000, 2001	22.3	Israel, 1996	63.3

Poland, 2002	48.4	Japan, 1996	37.3
Slovenia, 1996	20.1	Korea, 2000	23.3
Sweden, 1998	46.7	Mexico, 1997, 2001	47.6
Switzerland, 1999	36.5	New Zealand, 1996	51.1
Taiwan, 1996	32.3	Portugal, 2002	46.9
The Netherlands, 1998	27.8	Romania, 1996	44.4
		Russia, 1999	58.7
		Spain 1996, 2000	42.2
		Ukraine, 1998	59.3
		United States, 1996	53.6
		Lithuania, 1997*	30.6
		Thailand, 2001	13.9
Mean	41.2	Mean	43.5

Notes: NA= Not available. Source: CSES National elections studies.

Table 7 shows that the proportion of voters feeling close to a political party varies greatly across countries. It ranges from a minimum of 8.2% in Belarus to a maximum of 85% in Belgium. Data do not seem to support our hypothesis concerning party identification in preference: the mean proportion of party identifiers is slightly higher in non- preference systems than in systems with intraparty choice. The major difference in levels of party closeness is that between established and new electoral democracies: in overall terms the levels of party identification tend to be higher in stable democracies than in new ones.

Table 8

Proportion of voters who consider " political parties as necessary for the political system" in both preference and non-preference voting systems (%)

Preference voting systems	Non preference voting systems
---------------------------	-------------------------------

Belgium 1999	59.4	Australia 1996	69.9
Czech Republic 1996	72.4	Belarus 2001	49.5
Chile, 1999	62.6	Canada 1997	64.9
Denmark, 1998	86.5	Germany, 1998	80.7
Iceland, 1998	74.9	Great Britain, 1997	76.1
Norway, 1997	88.3	Hungary, 1998	69.4
Peru 2000, 2001	68.4	Israel, 1996	69.8
Poland, 2002	61.3	Japan, 1996	56.8
Slovenia, 1996	57.5	Korea, 2000	55.0
Sweden, 1998	69.6	Mexico, 1997	69.6
Switzerland, 1999	76.7	New Zealand, 1996	67.5
Taiwan, 1996	66.9	Portugal, 2002	62.8
The Netherlands, 1998	75.9	Romania, 1996	73.9
		Russia, 1999	52.4
		Spain 1996, 2000	80.5
		Ukraine, 1998	50.3
		United States, 1996	53.3
		Lithuania, 1997*	50.0
		Thailand, 2001	75.0
Mean	70.8	Mean	61.3

Notes: NA= Not available. Source: CSES National elections studies.

Finally, table 8 shows the proportion of voters who agree on the need of political parties for the political system. In all countries, most voters regard parties as necessary for the political system. Data do not support our last hypothesis concerning partisanship: the proportion of voters who agree on the necessity of parties is higher in preference voting systems than in systems with no intraparty choice. Again, the main factor accounting for variations in levels of party support seems to be the longevity of electoral democracy.

4. Conclusion.

This paper identifies the diverse mechanisms for intraparty choice in use for parliamentary elections. It has been shown that preference voting systems can be distinguished on the basis of three dimensions: (1) The ballot structure (voting system, ballot paper and nominative votes); (2) the constituency structure (magnitude and size); (3) the formulatic structure (the electoral formula and the electoral quota).

Preference voting systems have been first evaluated according to the incentive each creates for candidates of the same party to compete amongst themselves for election. The analyses show that the degree of intraparty competition differs greatly across preference voting systems: it is lowest in rigid list systems, moderate in personal voting systems and highest in flexible lists.

Finally, the paper has also investigated how preference vote favour the personalisation of politics by using the "CSES national election study" dataset. Data show that in overall terms the proportion of voters recalling candidates and having had some contact with MPs is slightly higher in preference voting systems than in voting procedures with no intraparty choice. They also show that preference voting does not weaken partisanship. In summary, results point to the conclusion that preference voting and voting procedures are minor factors determining the personalisation of politics. Within preference systems, different voting procedures do not lead to different patterns of personal politics.

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¹ See also Pesonen (1968) on Finland, Pedersen (1966) on Denmark.

² Italy and Japan adopted a non-preference voting system in the nineties.

³ I borrow the terms "constituency structure" and "formulatic structure" from Cox (1997).

⁴ Most comparative studies on electoral systems do not consider the ballot paper as a basic component of

electoral systems. As an example see: Blais (1988).