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# Identifying Sources of Democratic Legitimacy in Established and Emerging Democracies

Yun-han Chu, Ming-hua Huang and Yutzung Chang

It is conventional wisdom among social scientists that a stable democracy requires citizens who believe in the legitimacy of democracy. For a new democracy to be considered consolidated, it needs at least a majority of its citizens to share such a belief (Linz and Stephan 1996; Diamond 1999). It is both of theoretical and practical importance to acquire a systematic understanding of the sources for democratic legitimacy. This paper is set out to examine the reasons why citizens develop favorable orientations toward democracy and whether the basis on which citizens form positive attitudes to democracy differs systematically across established and emerging democracies. Specifically, we focus on two attitudinal measures that are employed by CSES Module II: satisfaction with the way democracy works and belief in its preferability (over other forms of government).

The two measures are empirically related but conceptually distinctive. It has been well-documented that citizens may be critical of the way democracy works, skeptical of their political institutions, but remain faithful to democracy as a legitimate and preferable system (Norris 1999; Putnam and Pharr 2000; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). The sources for citizens' satisfaction are expected to be substantially different from what account for the intensity of their belief in democratic legitimacy. Satisfaction is believed to be more performance-based while legitimacy is more a function of the perceived quality of democratic governance as well as the socializing effect of the political institutions and citizen participation in democratic process. Earlier research also indicated that in established democracies level of satisfaction was closely tied to economic performance and trust in political institutions as well as political leaders. But for emerging democracies, an adequate supply of a range of political goods, such as freedom, human rights, fair treatment and popular accountability, is more important than the delivery of economic goods in shaping people's view on democracy. Citizens expect and demand significant improvement in these areas when a political system becomes democratized (Klingemann and Hofferbert 1998; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

## **I. Measuring Support for Democracy**

One of the most widely used indicators of support for democracy among scholars drawing on survey data in their research is 'satisfaction with democracy'. This indicator is

included in major surveys such as the Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Latinobarometro, New Europe Barometer, Afrobarometer, East Asia Barometer as well as CSES Module II. It is, however, far from obvious what ‘satisfaction with democracy’ actually signifies. We agree with Linde and Ekman (2003) that the survey item ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’ is not an indicator of support for the ideal of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for the way the democratic regime works in practice. For this reason, this measure is highly sensitive to the timing of a survey and the specific institutional context under which the citizens found themselves.

More recently Pippa Norris developed David Easton’s three-fold distinction between different objects of support – the political community, the regime and the authorities – into a five-fold model of political support (Easton 1975; Norris 1999). Emphasizing the fundamental multidimensional nature of the concept of ‘support’, Norris distinguishes between five levels or objects of support: the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. These different objects are treated as existing on a continuum, ranging from diffuse support (for the national community) to specific support (for particular political actors). The distinction between ‘regime principles’ and regime performance’ is necessary to account for the difference between support for ‘democracy’ as a principle or an ideal (i.e., as the most preferable form of government) and attitudes towards the way democracy works in practice in a particular country at a given point in time.

This paper concerns primarily with support for democracy as an ideal because this predisposition is more enduring and less susceptible to short-term political and economic stress and thus more critical to the resiliency of democracy. However, satisfaction with democracy is also of significance because over time it buttresses democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, protracted discontent with the performance of the democratic system will eventually erode popular support for democracy as an ideal (Putnam, and Pharr 2000).

In the recent past, a variety of measures were designed to measure the support for democratic regime. These measures tap into overtly favorable orientation toward democratic ideals and practices and address their various attitudinal components: such as the desirability of democracy, the suitability of democracy, the preference for democracy, the efficacy of democracy, and the priority of democracy over other social objectives.<sup>1</sup> In an ideal world, one should employ a battery of indicators to allow one to make valid statements about support for democratic regime (Adcock & Collier 2001: 538). In the CSES Module II, the support for democracy is measured with a single item: “Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government. (Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or

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<sup>1</sup> For a survey of the full array of widely-used questions for measuring detachment toward democratic regime, please refer to Larry Diamond (1999) and Doh Chull Shin (2001).

disagree strongly with this statement?)”. Despite of this limitation, this item enjoys face validity because it addresses explicitly the superiority of democracy and this helps us make distinction between the level of regime principles and that of performance. In principle, it is difficult to ascertain the true validity of any singly-item measure, but we can confirm its validity through backdoor in terms of both “discriminant validity” if the two measures are not highly correlated with each other and “construct validity” if the explanatory sources of the two attitudinal measures are sufficiently different and differ in ways that meet our theoretical prediction.

The data collected from 16 countries between 2001 and 2004 under the auspices CSES Module II lends some support to our claim that the two measures are distinctively different. While the two measures, as one would expect, are positively correlated, their bivariate correlation coefficient (across all sixteen countries) suggests that the two are only weakly associated (.316). As Table 1 shows, the strength of correlation also varies wildly from the high of .476 (in Bulgaria) to the low of .106 (in Portugal). This means that the way the two measures correlate with each other varies from one historical context to another, suggesting that their generative mechanisms are not the same.

In Chart 1, we plot the sixteen mean scores of the two measures on a two-dimensional space. On the macro-level, the linear relationship between the two measures looks stronger than their bivariate correlation observed at the individual level. It is perhaps no coincidence that the combination of high level of support for democracy as an ideal with a relatively high level of satisfaction with democracy concentrates in the so-called “established democracies” or “advanced industrial societies”. On the other hand, the combination of lower level of support for democracy as an ideal with a depressingly low level of satisfaction is found exclusively among societies that have experienced the trauma of the collapse of communism and transition from command economy. This suggests that there are some macro-level forces at work in shaping the distribution of the two attitudinal predispositions. The observed pattern also suggests that a cross-level analysis that helps decipher the causal mechanisms at both individual and macro-level is clearly called for.

[Table 1 and Chart 1 about here]

## **II. Some Theoretical Consideration**

There are burgeoning efforts to apply sophisticated statistical model to cross-national survey data for winnowing out competing explanatory sources for the acquisition of belief in the legitimacy of democracy. However, most of the recent studies have focuses on third-wave democracies (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Mishler 2003; Bratton and Mattes 2003). With the exception of a few chapters in Pippa Norris’ edited volume (1999), few

scholars extend their comparative analysis to include both emerging democracies and established democracies. For example, in their initial efforts to tackle the question why people differ in their orientations toward democratic regime, Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer focused only on Central and Eastern European countries (1998). Commonality in their trajectory of regime transition simplified the task of their comparative analysis but also precluded them from exploring the influence of certain system-level traits such as characteristics of “ancient regimes” and modes of transition. Instead, they identified two competing theoretical perspectives: performance theories vs. socialization theories (1998: 116-119). According to Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, socialization theories stress fundamental political values and beliefs formed through a lengthy process of socialization begun in childhood (Almond and Verba, 1963). Performance theories by contrast (Rogowski 1974) hypothesize that individuals will support a form of government if they believe that they deliver more satisfactory outcomes than others. The performance criteria are oftentimes defined in materialist terms, e.g., the ability to distribute economic benefits. Yet, performance can also refer to the delivery of political goods, such as absence of political oppression, equal treatment, protection of political rights, and the responsiveness of the leaders. They cautioned us, however, the distinction between the two theoretical perspectives can be overdrawn. Both approaches conceive support for democracy vs. non-democratic forms of government as a product of experience. They differ principally in the time-frames and in the types of experiences that they regard as most relevant.

They used multiple regression analysis to determine the influence of social structure (as a surrogate measure of the influence of socialization) on support for democracy. They found out that notwithstanding a plenitude of social structural explanation of political orientations, the six variables -- education, age, gender, embracing national tradition, churchgoing and urbanization -- explain only a fraction the total variance in the support for democratic regime in the nine post-Communist countries. The one social structural variable with consistently significant influence is education. In contrast, the performance theories demonstrate a much powerful explanatory strength. The two most powerful determinants of support for democracy are political: first, a negative evaluation of the former Communist regime, and next the perception of greater political freedom in the current regime. Political variables remain the most powerful factors. Of the four objective country-level variables, the three political measures (such as Freedom House score) are each more powerful than the economic one (change in GDP).

Their formulation of the dichotomy between performance perspective and socialization perspective was evidently not inclusive enough to cover a broad range of competing theoretical perspectives in comparative politics and at the same time left a huge room for theoretical refinement. More recently, Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi (2004) have developed a more inclusive analytical framework in which they identified five theoretical traditions -- sociological, cultural, institutional, cognitive, and rational -- that

might inspire competing hypotheses about how Africans acquired favorable orientations toward democracy. The rich data set from their Afrobarometer survey enabled them to evaluate the relevance of these competing theoretical perspectives in a unified model. Also the diversity in the initial conditions of authoritarian breakdown among sub-Saharan countries that they examined also allow them to investigate the impact of some macro-level characteristics such as *dominant post colonial regime type*.<sup>2</sup> However, they did not employ hierarchical linear models and missed the opportunity for a more rigorous cross-level multivariate analysis. In addition, the basic similarities in the macro-historical traits of sub-Saharan African countries still deprived them of meaningful cross-national variances.

The data that was made available by CSES Module II is by no means ideal. Despite of its limitations, it possesses many of its own strengths. First, it cuts across both established democracies and emerging democracies. Second, it employs more revealing indicators about citizens' evaluation of the quality of democratic governance than World Values Survey which is also cross-continental in scope. When combining the individual-level survey data collected under CSES Module II with relevant data on macro-level characteristics, we are in a strong position to examine an extensive array of relevant hypothesis, which can be grouped into at least three broad theoretical categories: *modernization/postmodernization, institution, and rationality*.

#### *Modernization and Postmodernization*

Modernization theory has been developing over a century. The central claim of Modernization theory from Karl Marx, Max Weber to Daniel Bell is that economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent patterns that are changing in the world in predictable ways (Inglehart 1997: 7). Modernization theory was understood by some as a variant of structural explanation (Bratton and Mattes 2003) because many Modernization theorists emphasized social mobility and location in modern parts of the social structure as the leading cause of cultural change (Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Pye, 1990). While there has been continuing debate over the causal linkages, many empirical findings do support the claim that socioeconomic development generates more modern attitudes and values -- greater tolerance and valuing of freedom, higher levels of political efficacy, greater capacity to participate in politics and civic life (Diamond 1999). The Postmodernization theory developed by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues agree with the Modernization theorists on their central claim but differ from most Modernization theorists on four essential points: change is not linear; economic determinism is oversimplified; the rise of the West is not the only version of Modernization; democracy is not inherent in the Modernization phase but democracy does become increasingly likely as societies move beyond the Modernization

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<sup>2</sup> They made the distinction among "Settler Regime", "Plebiscitary One-Party Regime, and "Competitive One-Party Regime".

phase into Postmodernization (Inglehart 1997: 10-25). Inglehart and his colleagues have accumulated three decades of time-series data to demonstrate an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values, linked with rising levels of economic development (Inglehart 1977, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1995). As economic development brings rising levels of tolerance, trust, political activism, and greater emphasis on freedom of speech (the components of what they defined as “Self-expression values”), it leads to growing mass demands for liberalization in authoritarian societies, and to rising levels of direct mass participation in societies that are already democratic. In so far as Postmaterialists give high priority to protecting freedom of speech and to participation in making important government decisions, this trend should bring growing mass demands for democracy. Adherent to the Modernization/Postmodernization perspective, one would predict that intergenerational shift toward greater appreciation for democracy comes with fast expansion in education, vast improvement in economic wellbeing and rapid urbanization. Operationally speaking, on macro-level we should expect to see a strong linear relationship between a country’s level of socio-economic development and its aggregate level of support for democracy and on micro-level we would predict that citizens with higher education and of younger generation have higher propensity to acquire favorable orientation toward democracy.

However, Ron Inglehart has cautioned us that this cultural shift might generate rather different influence on citizens’ evaluation with the performance of democracy (1999). The post-modern shift to declining respect for/deference to authority among the publics of advanced industrial societies has contributed to dwindling confidence in political institutions and growing number of citizens who are critical of the performance of the democracy. For an empirical testing of the Modernization/Postmodernization theses in our multivariate analyses, we focus on the impact of three socio-economic background variables, *education, age and gender*, at the individual level and one country-level socio-economic variable, *GDP per capita*, on support for democracy as well as satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesize that education will be one of the strongest predictor of level of support for democracy. But citizens with higher education might be more critical of and less satisfied with the performance of democracy.

### *Institution*

A standard theoretical argument based on Neo-institutionalist perspective would posit that people develop certain orientations toward democracy as well as non-democratic regimes as a *consequence* of the organizing principles of formal and informal institutions: specifically, the incentives, disincentives and habits created by the rules embedded in differing forms of political institutions (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Muller and Seligson, 1994, Norris, 1999; Bratton and Mattes, 2003). Participation in formal procedures like voting, working for parties or candidates, attending election rallies, attending community meetings, joining with others to raise issues or contacting elected leaders can

have an educative effect increasing interest and efficacy (Finkel 1987) as well as building support for democracy (Bratton et al, 1999; Finkel, Sabatine and Bevis, 2000). Also, affiliations with political parties help citizens relate themselves with the political system and strengthen their identification with democracy. Also, membership in civic organizations may shape build up social capital and cooperative practices and organizational and communicative skills that individuals apply in other and larger political arenas (Nie, Powell and Prewitt, 1969; Putnam 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; McDonough, Shin and Moises, 1998; Shin, 1999). The historical institutionalist perspective, in particular, emphasize the socializing effects of institutions in shaping citizens' preference or even identity over time (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992). Practicing democracy over time would help citizens develop a new and longer term perspective on judging democracy, based on an appreciation of the intrinsic nature of democracy rather than its consequences.

A recent debate sparked by Juan Linz's seminal work on the perils of presidentialism in Latin America (1990) focuses on the effects of presidentialism and parliamentary government on democratic stability (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Mainwaring 1993; Stephan and Skach 1993; Power and Gasiorowski 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). On the basis of a statistical analysis of 135 countries observed annually between 1950 and 1990, Adam Przeworski and his associates concluded that "Parliamentary regimes last longer, much longer, than presidential ones..." (Przeworski et al, 1995: 47). The reason that presidentialism is not conducive to democratic stability is manifold. As Juan Linz explicated, presidentialism exhibits a number of features that contribute to political conflict and instability, notably the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative, both of which are elected by the citizens. In political confrontations, each branch claims to represent the people, and each develops a rigid position. Regime crisis may ensue, because no easy mechanisms exist to replace presidents who have lost the confidence of the legislature. Presidential systems also contribute to the decline of political parties, the key institution for political representation in modern democracies. Presidential systems, especially those with double-round elections, stimulate fragmented party systems, the dangers of which have been amply analyzed by Giovanni Sartori (1976).

However, the effects of institutional designs on the development of popular support for democracy have not been thoroughly investigated so far. In their recent work on South Korean democracy, Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin argued that presidentialism is partially responsible for the superficial and fragmented nature of South Koreans' support for democracy (2000). The sixteen countries examined in this paper cover a full range of constitutional design, from parliamentary system, to parliamentary system with a popularly elected president, semi-presidentialism to presidentialism. It is interesting to see if political institutions with stronger tendency of presidentialism tend to have higher attenuating effects on support for as well as satisfaction with democracy.

For an empirical testing of the Institutionalists theses in multivariate analyses, we focus

on the impact of the following individual-level variables -- index of *electoral participation*, index of *non-electoral participation* (primarily citizen-initiated contact, *partisan orientation toward incumbent*, and *Partisan Attachment* -- plus two country-level variable – *life-span of democracy* and *type of political institution* -- on support for as well as satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesize that both higher political participation and stronger partisan affiliation may bring about stronger support for democracy. Also, we hypothesize that the longer the learning experiences under a democracy the stronger the propensity to believe in democratic legitimacy. However, the causal mechanisms identified above are not expected to be working for satisfaction with the way democracy works. Lastly, we hypothesize that experiences with presidentialism, and to some extent semi-presidentialism, tend to erode support for democracy.

### *Rationality*

Rational choice theory claims that people develop democratic norms because democracy works (Evans and Whitefield, 1995: 489). Rational choice theory argues that individual behavior is purposive and based on logic of utility-maximization. People compare the costs and benefits associated with different regimes and align themselves with arrangements that best serve their interests. There are two variants of performance-based explanation for the growth of democratic legitimacy. The neo-classical rational choice theorists privilege “economic goods” while the soft-core rational theorists identify a much broader range of performance criteria.

### Provision of Economic Goods

Typically, rational choice theory anchored on the neo-classical assumptions defines “interests” in materialist terms, i.e., economic benefits. So, if citizens feel that elected governments fulfill campaign promises of net improvement in economic welfare, support will increase, not only for the government of the day, but also for democracy. If, however, they suffer inflation or unemployment, support will decrease (Bratton and Mattes 2003). In general, rational approaches have focused on people’s short term economic evaluations, including their present, past, and future evaluations of micro and macro economic trends (Kitschelt, 1992; Dalton, 1994; Anderson, 1995; Mattes & Christie, 1997; and Norris, 1999).

Since the CSES Module II did not include items that measures individual’s subjective evaluation of both national and personal economic condition, we use their evaluation of the overall performance of the sitting government (*general performance*) and the ability of the government (*specific performance*) to deal with the most important problem the country is facing as two surrogate measures of their evaluation about the tangible output they are getting from the political system. We supplement the two subjective measures collected at individual level with two objective country-level measures of effectiveness in delivering economic goods -- the *average unemployment rate* and the *average economic growth rate* (over the

last four years). For an empirical testing of the ration-choice perspective emphasizing tangible output we focus on the impact of the performance variables on support for as well as satisfaction with democracy.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, we hypothesize that belief in democratic legitimacy is least influenced by the objective economic performance variables.

### The Provision of Political Goods

While the rational choice approach following the neo-classical tradition focuses on the materialist goods that a political system delivers, the soft-core rational choice approach underscores that citizens in democracies will use a broader range of performance criteria, factoring in their immediate political conditions as well. Moreover, they form their evaluative judgment about democracy by comparing it with the non-democratic regimes or other relevant historical references. Citizens believe in the superiority of democracy exactly because democracy offers a basket of political goods, such as freedom, political equality, transparency, rule of law, popular accountability and representation, that non-democratic regimes could not. Linz and Stepan have shown with regard to Spain and then for other third wave democracies, citizens of a new democracy are able to distinguish between the political and economic dimensions of regime performance. They may come to value democracy for the political goods it produces even when its economic performance is perceived to be poor and costly in the short term (1996: 443). Part of this is owing to the fact that citizens of postcommunist Europe have proven to be more patient and realistic in their time horizons for economic improvement than many observers expected. But much of it owes as well to the real improvements they perceive in what Linz and Stepan call the political basket of goods.

For an empirical testing of the utilitarian theses based on the provision of political goods, we focus on the impact of the following variables -- *satisfied with the way democracy works*, *perceived level of political corruption*, *perceived effectiveness of popular accountability through voting*, and *perceived representativeness of the system*, as well as whether citizens felt that they are being adequately *represented by a particular party or a particular candidate* in the political system – on support for and satisfaction with democracy. We hypothesize that perceived effectiveness in delivering good quality of democratic governance contributes to both stronger support for democracy and more satisfaction with democracy.

In the following, we test these competing hypotheses against a comprehensive data set made available by the 16 country teams that implemented the CSES Module II between 2000 and 2004.

### **III. The Research Design and Model Specification**

The aim of our research design is to tackle three questions: First, what factors account for citizens' satisfaction with democracy? Second, what factors contribute to the growth of

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<sup>3</sup> The CSES Module II did not include items that measures individual's subjective evaluation of national and personal economic condition.

popular belief in the superiority of democracy? Third, is there any significant heterogeneity of the previous findings for support of democracy across different countries? If yes, what system-level traits explain the cross-national divergence? To achieve these analytical purposes, we adopt ordered regression models for the first two questions with Stata 8 and hierarchical linear models for the last one with HLM 6.

Our individual-level data all come from the CSES Module II. This dataset includes 16 country samples, including Bulgaria (2001), Taiwan (2001), Czech Republic (2002), two samples of Germany (2002), France (2002), Hungary (2002), Ireland (2002), Israel (2003), Mexico (2003), New Zealand (2002), Norway (2001), Poland (2001), Portugal (2002), Sweden (2002), and Switzerland (2003). Except for one Germany sample administrated by a mail-back survey, all the others are conducted by telephone or face-to-face interview.<sup>4</sup> Considering the inconsistency that the different data-generating processes may cause, we decide not to use the mail-back sample of the Germany survey. Besides, we weight each country-sample equally in our analysis by adopting sampling weights.

With regard to the objective country-level data, we include the following five macro variables -- “Type of Government”, “Democratic Lifespan”, “Unemployment”, “Economic Growth”, and “GDP Per Capita”. Except for “Type of Government”, which is coded by our own judgment, all the data come from two sources, Polity IV and World Development Indicators.

The dependent variables for the first and latter two questions are “Satisfaction with Democracy” and “Belief in Superiority of Democracy”, respectively. Both are measured with a four-point Likert scale. While it is obvious that the ordered logit model is more appropriate for a Likert-type dependent variable, we decide applying it only in the first two questions but not the last. The main reason is that the weighting option is not available for the order logit model in HLM 6. Therefore, we apply a hierarchical linear model instead of a nonlinear one, in which the dependent variable is treated as interval rather than ordinal.<sup>5</sup>

The explanatory variables are organized as four groups: quality of governance, government performance, political participation, and partisanship. The first two indicate how respondents evaluate the output of the electoral system, and the latter two indicate the respondents’ input to the electoral system. Specifically, “Quality of Governance” includes “Accountability”, “System Representation”, “Parties of Candidate Representation”, “Freedom”, “Corruption”, and “Satisfaction with Democracy”.<sup>6</sup> “Government Performance”

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<sup>4</sup> The exception is the Switzerland sample, which combined telephone and mail-back surveys.

<sup>5</sup> Based on our former analysis, assuming the linearity assumption doesn’t make much difference when we analyze the individual-level model on “Belief in Superiority of Democracy”, although it is difficult to say which the linearity assumption or the equal-weight assumption will bias our estimation more in the multi-level modeling.

<sup>6</sup> “Satisfaction with Democracy” is treated as the dependent variable in our first question, but it is taken as an explanatory variable in the other two questions. The rationale behind this design is that we believe whether people satisfy with how democracy works is a strong intermediate variable to account for people’s belief in superiority of democracy. While this article will simplify the causal framework and only focus on multilevel modeling instead of combing structural equation modeling and hierarchical linear modeling, we found

includes “General Performance” and “Specific Performance”. “Political Participation” includes “Electoral Participation” and “Non-Electoral Participation”. Finally, “Partisanship” includes “Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent” and “Partisanship Attachment”. In order to control the demographic background and also test the modernization theory in our model, we include three control variables: “Education”, “Gender” and “Age”. Taken together, we include 16 individual-level and 5 country-level variables in total. Detailed information about the variable formation and the re-coding scheme can be found in Appendix I.

Certain variables have a somewhat larger proportion of missing cases. This leads to a serious problem if we want to include all of the 15 independent variables in the regressions by the listwise method. While it is possible to adopt different methods of multiple imputations to cope this problem, we simply run the same regression with and without such a variable, and then compare whether the result will be different. If the difference does exist, it indicates the missing-value problem does matter; otherwise, we can leave this problem for another future research.

As Appendix 2 shows, the sample size of the 15 country samples is 23,590. Among the 16 variables in question, 3 of them have missing cases over 4000, which are “System Representation”, “Specific Performance”, and “Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent”. In view of this, our baseline model will be specified without the above three variables, and later we will put them back one by one, and finally the above four models will be compared to the full model, which includes all of the variables. This analytical strategy applies to the two ordered logit models; however, as to the hierarchical model, we need a more complicated strategy based on the findings from the regression analysis.

It is usually recommended that researchers should have a clear theoretical framework in mind when they conduct multilevel modeling. Most importantly, each model specification should follow a consistent rationale instead of arbitrary manipulation. In our analysis, we are interested in the question whether different countries have heterogeneous relationships in explaining people’s belief in superiority of democracy. If our investigation in the second question reaches a consistent finding, what we need to do is to relax the fixed coefficient assumption and let each regression coefficient variable, by which we call such a model as “a random coefficient model”. Bare in mind that the ordered logit model and hierarchical linear model are two different models, because the former only has one level of analysis and the regression coefficients may contain the synthetic effects from both within- and between-country variations; nonetheless, the latter has two levels of analysis and the regression coefficients for different-level models represent specific effects from within- and between-country variations, respectively. The main difference comes from the grouping methods in the micro level and the model specifications for random coefficients in the macro

level.<sup>7</sup> By comparing the results of the above two modeling scheme, we will exactly know what kinds of variation relate to the effect represented by each coefficient, and moreover we are able to decide which coefficient deserves further investigation in our next step of hierarchical linear modeling. Simply put, we only have interest in the coefficients showing significant variance (chi- squared statistics) in the macro-level model.

Once we are certain about which micro-level coefficients display significant heterogeneity, we can complete our multi-level modeling by adding the contextual (macro) variables one by one and see whether the heterogeneity can be explained significantly. The reason of restricting one contextual variable is that we have too few macro-level units, only 15 cases in total. Besides, we are aware that it is impossible to exhaust all the possibilities of model specification in the macro-level model. Therefore, we choose to find out a coherent explanation by interpreting all the results meaningfully when adding different contextual variables. We do not pursue a “best” finding simply by optimizing the model-fit statistic.

The result of our multilevel modeling will distinguish three different relationships, that is, individual-level effects, country-level contextual effects, and country-level crossover effects. We expect little change of the individual-level effects no matter what contextual variable is brought in. If so, it indicates that our findings are not sensitive to different specifications of the macro-level model. On the other hand, we do expect to see some change of the both country-level effects. The contextual effects indicate the direct influence of the social environment to the individual’s attitudes. The crossover effects signify the existence of the heterogeneous individual-level relationship which can be systematically explained by the macro variable. Combined with the three types of the findings, we can derive a full picture of why people believe in superiority of democracy.

#### **IV. The Empirical Findings**

Corresponding to the three questions previously mentioned, we present the findings in the same order. As can be seen in Table 2, we find two groups of variables that can explain people’s satisfaction with democracy regardless of the missing value problem. The two groups are “quality of governance” and “government performance”, which all refer to the output of the political system. Within the two groups, all the explanatory variables unanimously indicate that the better people view the output of the political system, the more the satisfaction with democracy. Consistent with our prediction, we find little explanatory power of the other two groups of variables related to the input dimension. Specifically, none of four variables in the groups of “political participation” and “partisanship” consistently shows the positive relationship as expected. Somewhat surprisingly, we find a strong negative relationship between “Non-electoral Participation” and “Satisfaction with Democracy”. While it can be interpreted that the more the dissatisfaction with democracy, the stronger the

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<sup>7</sup> The grouping method of our hierarchical models is centering the individual-level variables by the country means and the country-level variables by the grand-means.

motive for political participation, this counters to argument that participation has no direct bearing on satisfaction. In fact, this finding suggests an alternative causal hypothesis: Strong sense of discontent prompts citizens to engage public officials or representative to seek remedy. Therefore dissatisfaction may be the cause and non-electoral participation be the result. As to the socioeconomic factors, younger people are more much satisfied with democracy, but in terms of education, we find the positive relationship is barely significant and inconsistent when the missing-value problem is considered.

Shifting the focus to the result related to “Belief in Superiority of Democracy”, we find a very different pattern of explanations. As can be seen in Table 3, despite the strong explanatory power of “quality of governance”, there is no evidence indicating that government performance has anything to do with people’s belief about the superiority of democracy. Furthermore, it is clear that the two variable groups of the input dimension have strong explanatory power immune from the missing-value problem. With regard to the socioeconomic factors, consistent findings indicate that people with better education and older age are much supportive of democracy. The overall result suggests that the input and output of the political system are both related to the belief of the superiority of democracy, but such a belief won’t be weakened by poor government performance in general or on dealing with pressing issues. In other words, short-term fluctuation of the government output does not attenuate people faith in democracy, but other factor related to the systemic output does matter.

One puzzling finding deserves our attention. Those who didn’t vote for the incumbent party in the last election have a stronger belief of democracy than those who did. Again, this findings run counter to our expectation and it seems to suggest the possibility of the reversed causality that people who have a stronger belief of democracy tend to vote against the incumbent party, something need to be investigated further.

A drawback of using multi-national pooled data is that we may fall into the ecological fallacy if we don’t purge out the contextual effect from the individual-level relationship we conclude. The precondition of this possibility is that the dependent variable has significant variance from the between-country variation. Our ANOVA analysis does corroborate this precondition and indicates that our data should be treated as hierarchical and we may find heterogeneous relationships across different countries.<sup>8</sup> In order to find out which individual-level relationship needs further investigation, the result of the random coefficient models in Table 4 can provide us the foundation to make such a judgment.

The statistics presented in Table 4 is the regression coefficients of all the individual-level variables, based on our grouping method and the random coefficient assumption. The figures in the parentheses are the chi-squared statistics indicating whether the variance of each coefficient is large enough and needs a macro-level explanation. The

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<sup>8</sup> Our ANOVA shows that the random effect of the country means has a chi-squared value of 2510.68 (df=14), by which the p-value is 0.000.

results can be summarized as the following:

1. Only the variable groups of “quality of governance” and “political participation” have a significant relationship with “Belief in Superiority of Democracy”. Nonetheless, some variables in the former group are not significant, such as “System Representation”, “Parties of Candidate Representation”, and “Corruption”. The other two groups, “government performance” and “partisanship” do not have explanatory power. Among the three socioeconomic variables, only Education shows a significant and positive relationship.
2. For those variables significant in Table 3 but not significant in Table 4, the pseudo individual-level relationship is wrongly concluded if we conflate the effects of within- and between-country variations as Table 3 did. Four variables are identified having this problem, such as “Parties of Candidate Representation”, “Corruption”, “Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent”, and “Partisan Attachment”.<sup>9</sup>
3. We find six explanatory variables that show significant variance of their coefficients across different countries. They are “Freedom”, “Corruption”, “Satisfaction with Democracy”, “General Performance”, “Partisan Attachment”, and “Constant”. The constant in the random coefficient model refers to the level of the belief in superiority of democracy if the respondent has the average level of all the independent variables in each country.

With the above findings, we decide to form our baseline model without the three variables having topmost missing cases. In addition, we only specify random coefficients for the six explanatory variables with significant variance and let others be fixed as Table 3 does. Finally, we will add different macro variables and see whether the crossover or contextual effects are significant. The overall results of the hierarchical lineal modeling will tell us which level-2 variable can explain the heterogeneity of the individual-level relationship.

As Table 5 shows, the individual-level relationships have little change no matter what level-2 variable is added into the model. Our conclusion from Table 4 in this aspect still holds. What we concern most are the findings of the contextual effects and crossover effects. The former can be seen from whether the level-2 variables can significantly explain the variation of the individual-level constants. The result indicates that there are three level-2 variables having such an effect, including “Type of Government”, “Democratic Lifespan”, and “GDP Per Capita”. Specifically, it means (1) the closer the regime is to the parliamentary system (2) the longer the country has been democratized (3) the higher the level of economic development, the stronger the belief in superiority of democracy. With regard to the crossover effects, only “Unemployment” and “Economic Growth” have reinforcing effects on its individual-level relationship, which can be understood as (1) if the country has a higher unemployment rate, the positive relationship between “Satisfaction with Democracy” and “Belief in Superiority of Democracy” is stronger. (2) if the country has higher economic growth, the positive relationship between “General Performance” and “Belief in Superiority

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<sup>9</sup> The relationships of Gender and Age are not consistent but it is clear that the effects are attenuating when we separate the effects of within- and between-country variations.

of Democracy” is stronger. Notice that the individual-level relationship of the second finding is only significant when “Economic Growth” is specified as the level-2 variable. In other cases, this relationship just falls short of the significance level.

## **VI. By Way of Conclusion**

Democracy enjoys a significant base of popular support in the sixteen countries the CSES Module II covered. More than two out of three citizens (67 percent) across all sixteen countries say that they prefer democracy to other forms of government. While higher level of support for democracy seem to be a defining feature of the established democracy, the emerging democracies including post-communist regimes also enjoy a solid base of pro-democracy sentiment. Also our analysis led us to believe that the endurance of many emerging democracies is not under any immediate danger because popular belief in the superiority of democracy is not susceptible to up-and-down of government performance or the short-term economic fluctuation.

However, there remains a marked gap between evaluations of the ideal and the practice of democracy. Only in seven countries more the two third of the citizens expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works. In eight countries (exactly one half of the sixteen cases) less than 55% of the citizens are content with the practice of democracy. Our data provides solid evidence to support our initial claim that support for democracy as an ideal is conceptually different from satisfaction with the practice of democracy and that the generative mechanisms of the two variables on the one hand share some commonalities but are also sufficiently different. Furthermore, satisfaction with democratic practice remains relevant to the task of democratic consolidation as our analysis also indicates that satisfaction with democracy tends to buttress popular belief in the superiority of democracy.

Our analysis also demonstrates that all three theoretical perspectives are indispensable for a comprehensive understanding of the sources of democratic legitimacy for both established and emerging democracies. The transformative power identified by the Modernization/Postmodernization perspective manifested itself largely through the impact of education on belief in democratic legitimacy. Our findings also buttress the institutionalist hypothesis that legitimacy is a function of cognitive mobilization through long-term exposure to democratic practices, participation in democratic process and organized political affiliations. Our model has shown that both the length of the experience living under a democracy and level of political participation have an educational effect on citizens, adding to a sense of democratic legitimacy. However, most the theoretical predictions based on a narrow conception of “utility-maximization” turn out to be irrelevant. Instead, Our analysis performance-based legitimacy is a function of a more diffuse basket of political goods including freedom, corruption, accountability and representativeness.

More specifically, we found that legitimacy based on a more diffuse basket of political

goods and cognitive mobilization through participation in democratic process remain robust after controlling for the effect of the length of a democracy's life span and level of economic development. People who participate more in the democratic process tend to develop a stronger belief in democracy's superiority and this is true for both old and young democracies, regardless their difference in constitutional design, and for countries at very different stage of economic development. Also, people whose experiences with the quality governance is more positive also tend to develop a stronger belief in democracy's superiority and this is true for both old and young democracies, regardless their difference in constitutional design, and for countries at very different stage of economic development. Of course, we can not be for sure that the direction of causation necessarily running from participatory experience to more positive orientation toward democracy. It might run the other way around, i.e., people who hold stronger belief in democracy's superiority are more motivated to take part in electoral process. In reality, they probably come together and reinforce each other.

Our findings also carry important policy implications. For emerging democracies, in order to move up the path towards more stable and consolidated democracy, their leaders need to place more emphasis on two relatively simpler tasks. The first objective is to the involvement of citizens in democratic process, not only through voting and electoral participation but also through organized affiliation with political parties. These activities will expand citizens' cognitive skills, accelerate the diffusion of democratic values and help citizens to develop stronger attachment to the political system.

The second objective is that governors must secure the rule of law, protect individual rights and freedoms, control corruption, and ensure that elections are meaningful and consequential. While these are issues commonly lumped today under the rubric of "good governance" and associated with external pressures from the World Bank and IMF, they also appear to be very important to ordinary citizens at home. Put another way, the failure to achieve good democratic governance will imperil much more than access to foreign assistance, it will threaten the very prospects of popular support for democracy.

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
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Table 1: Bivariate Correlation of Satisfaction with and Support for Democracy

Sample		N	Bivariate Correlations of Satdemo and Beliedem
Bulgaria_2001	1.00	1104	0.476
Taiwan_2001	2.00	1611	0.193
Czech_2002	3.00	795	0.233
France_2002	4.00	976	0.289
Germany_2002	5.00	1971	0.345
Hungary_2002	7.00	1102	0.229
Ireland_2002	8.00	2136	0.240
Israel_2003	9.00	1160	0.119
Mexico_2003	10.00	1782	0.222
New Zealand_2002	11.00	1277	0.177
Norway_2001	12.00	1996	0.225
Poland_2001	13.00	1378	0.384
Portugal_2002	14.00	1073	0.106
Sweden_2002	15.00	996	0.169
Switzerland_2003	16.00	1362	0.303
Total		20719	0.316

All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Chart 1: Scatter Plot of Country Mean Scores of Satisfaction with and Support for Democracy



**Table 2 The Factors Related to the Satisfaction with Democracy**

<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
I. Quality of Governance					
<b>Accountability</b>	0.099*** (0.015)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.100*** (0.018)	0.084*** (0.016)	0.064** (0.020)
Representation <b>System</b>		0.391*** (0.027)			0.387*** (0.033)
<b>Parties or Candidates</b>	0.175*** (0.021)	0.131*** (0.023)	0.156*** (0.024)	0.171*** (0.022)	0.111*** (0.028)
<b>Freedom</b>	0.699*** (0.023)	0.651*** (0.025)	0.711*** (0.027)	0.676*** (0.025)	0.643*** (0.230)
<b>Corruption</b>	-0.435*** (0.021)	-0.390*** (0.023)	-0.450*** (0.023)	-0.408*** (0.022)	-0.383*** (0.028)
II. Government Performance					
<b>General Performance</b>	0.924*** (0.027)	0.865*** (0.029)	0.960*** (0.031)	0.748*** (0.034)	0.760*** (0.043)
<b>Specific Performance</b>				0.283*** (0.029)	0.226*** (0.036)
III. Political Participation					
Electoral	0.004 (0.008)	0.000 (0.009)	0.020 (0.015)	0.003 (0.009)	0.017 (0.018)
<b>Non-Electoral</b>	-0.099*** (0.022)	-0.091*** (0.024)	-0.091*** (0.024)	-0.080*** (0.023)	-0.075** (0.027)
IV. Partisanship					
Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent			-0.004 (0.037)		-0.090* (0.042)
Partisan Attachment	0.026 (0.016)	0.017 (0.017)	0.026 (0.017)	0.035* (0.016)	0.031 (0.020)
V. Socio-Economic Background					
Education	0.024* (0.010)	0.020 (0.011)	0.025* (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.018 (0.013)
Gender	-0.000 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.032 (0.041)
Age	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Constant					
Threshold 1	1.156 (0.158)	1.674 (0.178)	1.242 (0.204)	1.311 (0.168)	1.806 (0.243)
Threshold 2	3.336 (0.162)	3.874 (0.182)	3.465 (0.208)	3.458 (0.173)	4.005 (0.248)
Threshold 3	6.623 (0.169)	7.145 (0.191)	6.770 (0.215)	6.707 (0.180)	7.263 (0.257)
Pseudo R-squared	0.1492	0.1464	0.1504	0.1519	0.1495
N	16937	14207	13181	15090	10030

\* p 0.05; \*\*p 0.01; \*\*\*p 0.001. Entry is unstandardized coefficient. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

**Table 3 The Factors Related to Belief in Democracy**

<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>I. Quality of Governance</b>					
<b>Accountability</b>	0.149*** (0.016)	0.156*** (0.017)	0.156*** (0.019)	0.145*** (0.017)	0.156*** (0.021)
Representation System		-0.063 (0.028)			-0.094** (0.035)
<b>Parties or Candidates</b>	0.080*** (0.022)	0.089** (0.024)	0.077** (0.025)	0.081*** (0.024)	0.079** (0.029)
<b>Freedom</b>	0.385*** (0.025)	0.355*** (0.027)	0.402*** (0.029)	0.383*** (0.026)	0.381*** (0.032)
<b>Corruption</b>	-0.183*** (0.021)	-0.124*** (0.023)	-0.178*** (0.023)	-0.158*** (0.022)	-0.108*** (0.027)
<b>Satisfaction with Democracy</b>	0.474*** (0.026)	0.475*** (0.029)	0.488*** (0.031)	0.473*** (0.028)	0.495*** (0.034)
<b>II. Government Performance</b>					
General Performance	0.015 (0.026)	-0.000 (0.028)	0.034 (0.029)	0.038 (0.032)	0.002 (0.041)
Specific Performance				-0.013 (0.028)	0.031 (0.036)
<b>III. Political Participation</b>					
<b>Electoral</b>	0.035*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.100)	0.039* (0.017)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.019)
<b>Non-Electoral</b>	0.219*** (0.024)	0.195*** (0.026)	0.208*** (0.027)	0.222*** (0.025)	0.187*** (0.030)
<b>IV. Partisanship</b>					
<b>Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent</b>			-0.180*** (0.039)		-0.139** (0.044)
<b>Partisan Attachment</b>	0.084*** (0.017)	0.120*** (0.018)	0.089*** (0.018)	0.075*** (0.018)	0.124*** (0.021)
<b>V. Socio-Economic Background</b>					
Education	0.173*** (0.011)	0.170*** (0.011)	0.171*** (0.012)	0.174*** (0.011)	0.168*** (0.013)
Gender	-0.077* (0.033)	-0.086* (0.036)	-0.089* (0.038)	-0.066 (0.035)	-0.083 (0.043)
Age	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Constant					
Threshold 1	0.134 (0.173)	0.049 (0.193)	0.048 (0.224)	0.316 (0.183)	0.218 (0.262)
Threshold 2	1.660 (0.168)	1.645 (0.188)	1.541 (0.218)	1.786 (0.180)	1.740 (0.256)
Threshold 3	4.304 (0.173)	4.306 (0.192)	4.186 (0.222)	4.388 (0.184)	4.352 (0.260)
Pseudo R-squared	0.0891	0.0797	0.0869	0.0878	0.0782
N	16187	13615	12695	14450	9703

\* p 0.05; \*\*p 0.01; \*\*\*p 0.001. Entry is unstandardized coefficient. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

**Table 4 The Random Coefficient Model for Belief in Democracy**

<b>Model</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>I. Quality of Governance</b>					
<b>Accountability</b>	8.842*** (33.90)	7.338*** (30.93)	8.359*** (30.64)	7.334*** (33.36)	5.789*** (25.15)
Representation System		0.166 (25.02)			-0.079 (22.43)
Parties or Candidates	1.780 (22.61)	1.678 (18.97)	1.117 (23.01)	1.298 (16.58)	0.646 (16.86)
<b>Freedom</b>	8.545*** (43.39) <sup>†</sup>	6.662*** (42.02) <sup>†</sup>	8.095*** (41.55) <sup>†</sup>	7.489*** (36.13) <sup>†</sup>	5.890*** (34.47) <sup>†</sup>
Corruption	0.094 (58.42) <sup>†</sup>	0.465 (46.32) <sup>†</sup>	0.200 (41.91) <sup>†</sup>	0.051 (43.04) <sup>†</sup>	0.374 (33.05) <sup>†</sup>
<b>Satisfaction with Democracy</b>	8.257*** (82.44) <sup>†</sup>	7.141*** (75.30) <sup>†</sup>	9.385*** (55.89) <sup>†</sup>	7.324*** (83.26) <sup>†</sup>	7.653*** (49.78) <sup>†</sup>
<b>II. Government Performance</b>					
General Performance	1.811 (82.36) <sup>†</sup>	1.619 (55.97) <sup>†</sup>	1.335 (84.95) <sup>†</sup>	1.412 (62.66) <sup>†</sup>	0.693 (47.17) <sup>†</sup>
Specific Performance				0.111 (29.38)	0.364 (22.10)
<b>III. Political Participation</b>					
<b>Electoral</b>	6.337*** (7.77)	4.028*** (5.91)	2.938* (18.57)	3.484** (7.95)	2.876* (11.98)
<b>Non-Electoral</b>	6.792*** (10.89)	3.429** (8.43)	6.296*** (9.35)	4.163*** (9.61)	2.544* (5.92)
<b>IV. Partisanship</b>					
Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent			-0.400 (9.90)		-0.044 (9.94)
Partisan Attachment	2.085 (47.20) <sup>†</sup>	2.307* (32.79)	2.062 (35.71) <sup>†</sup>	1.546 (38.61) <sup>†</sup>	1.914 (21.85)
<b>V. Socio-Economic Background</b>					
Education	10.938*** (24.89)	7.939*** (29.11)	11.439*** (19.47)	8.792*** (25.49)	7.317*** (22.20)
Gender	-2.131 (16.46)	-1.586 (17.17)	-2.471* (16.68)	-1.263 (15.74)	-1.453 (18.44)
Age	2.461* (53.52) <sup>†</sup>	1.924 (40.63) <sup>†</sup>	2.498* (31.64)	2.752* (44.84) <sup>†</sup>	2.047 (28.11)
Constant	53.880*** (2338) <sup>†</sup>	53.544*** (1534) <sup>†</sup>	55.509*** (1795) <sup>†</sup>	49.209*** (2057) <sup>†</sup>	51.254*** (1072) <sup>†</sup>
Deviance	31672.18	26881.29	24501.57	28445.71	19037.69
Number of Estimated Parameters	92	106	106	106	137
N	16187	13615	12695	14450	9703

\* p 0.05; \*\*p 0.01; \*\*\*p 0.001. Entry is t-value. Figures in parentheses are chi-squared statistics.

<sup>†</sup> indicates that the p-value of the chi-squared statistic is smaller than 0.001.

**Table 5 The Hierarchical Linear Model for Belief in Democracy**

<b>Level-2 Variable</b>	<b>None (Baseline)</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>DemoSpan</b>
<b>I. Quality of Governance</b>			
Accountability	0.058*** (0.008)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.057*** (0.005)
Representation Parties or Candidates	0.019* (0.009)	0.019** (0.007)	0.020** (0.007)
Freedom	0.103*** (0.012)	0.103*** (0.014)	0.103*** (0.014)
L2 Freedom		-0.003 (0.015)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Corruption	0.002 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	0.002 (0.016)
L2 Corruption		0.026 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.0003)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.154*** (0.019)	0.154*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.020)
L2 Satisfaction with Democracy		0.014 (0.022)	-0.0005 (0.0004)
<b>II. Government Performance</b>			
General Performance	0.038 (0.021)	0.038 (0.022)	0.040 (0.022)
L2 General Performance		0.020 (0.023)	-0.0004 (0.0005)
<b>III. Political Participation</b>			
Electoral	0.014*** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
Non-Electoral	0.035*** (0.005)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)
<b>IV. Partisanship</b>			
Partisan Attachment	0.020* (0.009)	0.019 (0.009)	0.020 (0.009)
L2 Partisan Attachment		0.009 (0.009)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
<b>V. Socio-Economic Background</b>			
Education	0.052*** (0.004)	0.052*** (0.003)	0.052*** (0.003)
Gender	-0.026* (0.012)	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.026* (0.010)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Constant	3.279*** (0.061)	3.280*** (0.054)	3.280*** (0.042)
L2 Partisan Attachment		<b>-0.144*</b> <b>(0.058)</b>	<b>0.004***</b> <b>(0.001)</b>
Deviance	31775.84	31807.43	31845.27
Number of Estimated Parameters	22	22	22
N	16187	16187	16187

\* p 0.05; \*\*p 0.01; \*\*\*p 0.001. Entry is unstandardized coefficient. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

**Table 5 The Hierarchical Linear Model for Belief in Democracy (Continued)**

<b>Level-2 Variable</b>	<b>Unemployment</b>	<b>Growth</b>	<b>GDP</b>
<b>I. Quality of Governance</b>			
Accountability	0.058*** (0.005)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.058*** (0.005)
Representation Parties or Candidates	0.019** (0.007)	0.019** (0.007)	0.019** (0.007)
Freedom	0.103*** (0.013)	0.102*** (0.014)	0.102*** (0.013)
L2 Freedom	0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	0.000002 (0.000001)
Corruption	0.003 (0.016)	0.002 (0.017)	0.002 (0.016)
L2 Corruption	0.008 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.000002 (0.000001)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.154*** (0.015)	0.154*** (0.020)	0.154*** (0.020)
L2 Satisfaction with Democracy	<b>0.013**</b> <b>(0.004)</b>	0.012 (0.010)	-0.000001 (0.000001)
<b>II. Government Performance</b>			
General Performance	0.039 (0.020)	0.040* (0.017)	0.038 (0.021)
L2 General Performance	0.009 (0.005)	<b>0.025*</b> <b>(0.008)</b>	-0.000002 (0.000002)
<b>III. Political Participation</b>			
Electoral	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)	0.014*** (0.003)
Non-Electoral	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.035*** (0.007)
<b>IV. Partisanship</b>			
Partisan Attachment	0.019 (0.009)	0.019 (0.009)	0.019 (0.009)
L2 Partisan Attachment	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.000000 (0.000001)
<b>V. Socio-Economic Background</b>			
Education	0.052*** (0.003)	0.052*** (0.003)	0.052*** (0.003)
Gender	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.026* (0.010)	-0.026* (0.010)
Age	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Constant	3.280*** (0.060)	3.280*** (0.061)	3.279*** (0.032)
L2 Partisan Attachment	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.043 (0.031)	<b>0.000015***</b> <b>(0.000002)</b>
Deviance	31820.22	31810.17	31901.92
Number of Estimated Parameters	22	22	22
N	16187	16187	16187

\* p 0.05; \*\*p 0.01; \*\*\*p 0.001. Entry is unstandardized coefficient. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

### Appendix 1: The Construction of the Variables

Variable Name	Operationalization	Range
Accountability	Respondents' average of the answers on the questions "Who is in power can make difference" (B3013) and "Who people vote for makes a difference" (B3014), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 5(Highest)
Representation—System	Respondents' answers on the questions "How well voter's views are represented in elections" (B3022), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Representation—Parties or Candidates	The number of positive answers to the questions "Is there a party or a leader that represents respondents' views?" (B3023, B3025)	3 (both) 2 (one) 1 (none)
Freedom	Respondents' answers on the questions "How much respect is there for individual freedom and human rights nowadays in your country" (B3043), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Corruption	Respondents' answers on the questions "How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe taking is amongst politicians in your country" (B3044), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Satisfaction with Democracy	Respondents' answers on the questions "On the whole, are you very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country" (B3012), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
General Performance	Respondents' answers on the questions "Now thinking about the performance in [capital ]/ president in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government/ president in [capital] has done over the past several years?" (B3011), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Specific Performance	Respondents' answers on the questions "Thinking about the most important issue, how good or bad a job do you think the government/ president in [capital] has done over the past several years?" (B3010), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Electoral Participation	The number of positive answers to the questions "Whether the respondents voted in the latest and previous elections" (both, only one, none, B3004_1 and B3016), paired with the number of positive answers to the questions "Whether the respondents persuade others to vote for a candidate or whether the respondents participate campaign activities" (both, only one, none, B3001_1, B3001_2). Taken together, the result will be (number of voting, number of activities).	(2,2) 9 (2,1) 8 (2,0) 7 (1,2) 6 (1,1) 5 (1,0) 4 (0,2) 3 (0,1) 2 (0,0) 1
Non-Electoral Participation	The number of positive answers to the questions "Whether the respondents had done the following things over the past five years: (1) contact politicians or officials, (2) protest or demonstration, (3) work with other to share concern". (B3047_1, B3047_2, B3047_3)	0~3
Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent	Whether the respondents voted for the incumbent party in the last election? (Except France using B3005_1, others apply B3006_1)	1(No) 2(Yes)

Partisan Attachment	Respondents' answers on the questions "Do you feel very close to this [party/party block], somewhat close, or not very close?" Missing value means the respondents did not identify any party of party block they feel close and therefore is coded as zero. (B3043)	0~3
Education	Level of Education. In some cases, we found no "1" (none) and "2" (incomplete primary) answers, but in others we found there are "9" answers (more than basic university degree). To unify the scale, we combine "1", "2", "3" answers as "3" (primary completed or below), and "8" and "9" answers as "8" (university degree completed or above). (B2003)	3~8
Gender	Respondents' gender. (B2002)	1(men) 2(women)
Age	Respondents' age. (B2001)	17~101
Belief in Superiority of Democracy	Respondents' answers on the questions "How strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government'." (B3015), recoding in a reversed order.	1(Lowest)~ 4(Highest)
Type of Government	Whether the country's political system is closer to the parliamentary system (coded as 0) or the presidential system (coded as 3).	0~3
Democratic Lifespan	How long the country has been democratized? The definition of democracy is the polity score of 6 or above. Nonetheless, France during the Fourth Republic is defined as a democracy despite its polity score of 5. The data come from POLITY IV.	7~156
Unemployment	The average unemployment rate of the last four years from World Development Indicators.	2.23~15.50
Growth	The average GDP per capita growth rate of the last four years from World Development Indicators.	-0.5~6.96
GDP Per Capita	The average GDP per capita of the last four years from World Development Indicators.	1514.30~ 46561.02

Note: There are some changes in the wording of questions above for the presentation purposes. Exact wording is available in the CSES questionnaire with reference to the ID numbers in the parentheses.

**Appendix 2**  
**The Percentages of the Missing Cases of All the Variables**

Variable	Number of Missing Cases*	Variable	Number of Missing Cases*
Accountability	588 (2.49%)	Electoral Participation	0 (0%)
Representation —System	4462 (18.91%)	Non-Electoral Participation	0 (0%)
Representation —Parties or Candidates	3618 (15.34%)	Partisan Orientation toward Incumbent	6298 (26.70%)
Freedom	1100 (4.66%)	Partisan Attachment	0 (0%)
Corruption	2337 (9.91%)	Education	154 (0.65%)
Satisfaction with Democracy	1225 (5.19%)	Gender	2 (0.01%)
General Performance	1642 (6.96%)	Age	100 (0.42%)
Specific Performance	4093 (17.35%)	Belief in Superiority of Democracy	2321 (9.84%)

\* The total number of observations is 23590, and the figures in the parenthesis represents the percentage of the missing cases